THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

# THE TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE AUSTRIAN CROWN LANDS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA, ITALY, AND YUGOSLAVIA, 1918-1919

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by

GEORGE PORGES

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## PREFACE

Although a great amount of effort has been expended by historians on the Peace Conference of Paris 1919, the bulk of the literature, both of genuinely historical and also of tendentious political nature, deals with the Peace Treaty of Versailles with Germany. This is understandable because Germany was, with justification, regarded by the Allied and Associated Powers as the principal enemy; furthermore, Germany's subsequent development was so singularly disastrous to herself and the rest of the world that, in retrospect, the Treaty of Versailles assumed an even greater significance.

Both historians and politicians would do well to investigate thoroughly every aspect of the territorial settlement of the former Habsburg Empire. While it is true that Austria-Hungary had collapsed before the Peace Conference assembled, the statesmen and experts at Paris were nevertheless confronted by immense problems. An ancient political and economic fabric had been torn asunder, the relationship between favoured and unfavoured nations in the Danubian region had radically changed, and several small nations, some without independent political experience for several hundreds of years, were now their own masters. Would they be able to fulfill the tasks they had set themselves, would they use their good fortune with moderation, or would they fail in their hour of decision?

Although the old frontiers had disappeared, the new frontiers were still uncertain when the Peace Conference assembled. Claims and

counter-claims, armed attack and defence, all against a background of famine, despair, revenge, political and social revolution, were part of the legacy of the collapsed Habsburg Empire. At least 13,000,000 people lived in the disputed territory: Germans in Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Carinthia, Styria, South Tyrol, the Burgenland, and the Banat, Croats in the Austrian Littoral and Dalmatia, Slovenes in Styria, Carinthia, the Austrian Littoral and Carniola, Serbs in the Banat and Dalmatia, Italians in the Austrian Littoral, Fiume and Dalmatia, Poles in Teschen, Ukrainians in Galicia, the Bukovina and the Carpathians, Magyars along the northern, eastern and southern fringes of their national territory, Rumanians in the Banat; while the fate of the Slovaks, claimed both by Czechs and Magyars, was still in the balance. Sometimes national and economic interests were so deeply and inextricably interwoven, that a fair settlement to all parties concerned seemed impossible.

It remained to be seen what use the victors would make of their hard-earned opportunity to shape the world: would they act in accordance with the elevated principles which their strongest member had proclaimed, or would they succumb to the temptation of using the situation to their advantage? Was it at all possible to create a durable settlement out of the Central European chaos?

More than forty years have passed since the victorious Powers assembled at Paris, and the world, absorbed with present pressing needs, has probably forgotten most of the complicated and protracted negotiations which led to the emergence of inter-war Central Europe. To recall these memorable events, their consequences, and the lessons to be derived from them, is the purpose of this thesis.

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# CHAPTER I

## I. INTRODUCTION

The Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, ruled by the House of Habsburg, could trace back its development to the thirteenth century when Rudolph of Habsburg, Holy Roman Emperor, had taken possession of the Duchy of Austria, and made it the centre of the possessions of his family. Rudolph's successors, less by conquest than by successful marriage alliances, gradually acquired a considerable part of Europe. Perhaps the most important date in the history of the Habsburgs was the year 1526 when most of Central Europe came under their sceptre. Outlying possessions like Spain, the Netherlands, Burgundy, or Naples might be acquired and lost again, but Central Europe, although consisting of a multitude of races with vastly differing backgrounds, was retained and slowly welded into a state. It is unlikely that this multinational Central European empire, born out of successful dynastic match-making, could have endured for several centuries, had it not filled a historic need: the protection of Christian Europe from the Ottoman Turks. These Moslem intruders from Asia had overpowered the disunited peoples of the Balkan peninsula during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and were now pressing into Central Europe. The Habsburgs[1] were able to stem the onslaught, and after the second successful defence of Vienna, their capital, in 1683, they began the process of expelling the Turks from Europe which lasted till 1913.

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[1]The titular headship of the Holy Roman Empire gave the Habsburgs a brilliant title and prestige but hardly any increase in power and wealth.

By the middle of the eighteenth century the Ottoman peril had passed, and with its disappearance the Habsburg state lost the original reason for its existence. Perhaps it ought to have attempted the liberation of South-eastern Europe over which the Turks still ruled, and helped it to recover quickly from several hundred years of misrule and neglect. There was, however, no sustained effort in that direction, except for two Turkish wars in 1736-1739 and 1787-1790 which were miserable failures; nor was Emperor Joseph II (1780-1790) successful in his attempts to modernize his state. Thus the Habsburgs became one of the great conservative forces in Europe, and as such they met the shock of the French Revolution and of Napoleon I. Their state, since 1804 called the Empire of Austria,[2] was still sufficiently vigorous to survive. The Congress of Vienna 1814-1815 rounded off the boundaries of the Habsburg Empire, left it with some influence over still disunited Germany, and gave it control over Italy.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, aided by the first attempts at industrialization in semi-feudal Europe, the ideas of the French Revolution--liberty, nationality, land reform, and anti-clericalism--grew rapidly in strength. They found staunch antagonists in the Habsburgs. This was understandable, for the cohesion of the Habsburg state with its agglomeration of races, its landowning nobility occupying the leading positions in the army and the German-speaking civil service, and with the Roman Catholic Church as spiritual mainstay of the empire, was endangered by the advance of modern ideas. For nearly forty years Chancellor Metternich maintained the status quo with a system of police repression and forcible estrangement of the various nationalities from one another, while, at the same time, he conducted a foreign policy which

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[2]The Holy Roman Empire was dissolved in 1806.

aimed at suppressing the twin spectres of reform and revolution everywhere. The revolutions of 1848 shook the Habsburg state to the core, but it managed to survive for several reasons: the various nationalities were unable to agree among themselves, the army and also the peasantry in most areas remained loyal to the dynasty, and reactionary Russia came to the aid of the old order. Thus, under the long rule of Emperor Francis Joseph (1848-1916) the multinational empire obtained another lease of life, ruled by Emperor, nobility, army, Church and a German-speaking bureaucracy.

It would be beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the question whether, confronted with the advancing forces of industrialism, nationalism, and democracy, the Habsburg state could have been preserved indefinitely. It might conceivably have survived as the guardian of the small nationalities of Central Europe against the pressure of Czarist Russia and the German Empire established in 1871, at the same time enabling these nationalities to develop freely and on the basis of equality with one another. This would have meant a break with the Habsburg past and a weakening of the traditional pillars of the state. A ruler with courage and vision might have attempted such a gigantic task, but Francis Joseph, although honourable and conscientious, did not possess these supreme qualities. His attempts to maintain absolutism met with failure: discontent did not subside, and unfortunate wars in 1859 and 1866 led to the loss of the possessions in Italy and exclusion from German affairs. Francis Joseph then realized that some fundamental change was necessary, and in 1867 he took the Magyars, the second-strongest nationality of the realm and the bitterest rebels of 1848, into partnership with the privileged German Austrians, and thus a new phase of Habsburg history began.

The "Compromise" or <u>Ausgleich</u> restored the historic borders of the Kingdom of Hungary, and within it the privileges of the Magyar ruling

classes. Henceforth the Habsburg Monarchy consisted of two equal partners, the Empire of Austria[3] and the Kingdom of Hungary. Each had its own parliament and administration and its own capital city: Vienna, the ruler's residence, for Austria, and Budapest for Hungary. Joint ministers managed foreign relations, defence, and finances to provide for both. Either parliament selected sixty members, the "delegations", who adopted the budget for common affairs. Economic matters were periodically adjusted by both partners. Either parliament consisted of a noble upper house and an elected lower house; however, both lower houses severely restricted the right to vote by various qualifications. In 1907 the Austrian half of the "Dual Monarchy" introduced universal manhood suffrage. The monarch became a constitutional ruler in both halves of his empire. Nevertheless, his power remained considerable, especially in Austria where he could publish decrees when parliament was not in session. "No state on the face of the globe had a more complicated framework of government . . . ."[4] The official name of the state was henceforth "Austria-Hungary". This constitution could be changed only by the simultaneous action of both parliaments and with the approval of the Emperor-King. There were now two ruling peoples within the empire: the Germans in Austria, and the Magyars in Hungary. Besides them, there were at least nine more major nationalities: Czechs, Poles, Ukrainians, Rumanians, Italians, Slovenes, Croats in Austria; Croats, Serbs, Rumanians, Slovaks, Ukrainians (Ruthenians) in Hungary.[5] The acquisition of Bosnia-Hercegovina, occupied in 1878 and put under a special regime, not only

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[4]Arthur J. May, The Habsburg Monarchy 1867-1914 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951), p.38.

[5]Hungary also contained a German element. A case for national status could also be made for the Ladins in Tirol, Szekels in Transylvania, and the Jews in Galicia, Bukovina, and northeastern Hungary.

increased the number of Croats and Serbs in the Dual Monarchy, but also added a considerable Moslem element.[6] The attempts of the underprivileged nationalities to improve their positions made up most of the subsequent history of Austria-Hungary.

As this thesis is concerned with the eventual fate of a considerable section of Austria, less emphasis must be placed on the struggle of nationalities in Hungary. There the Magyars, numbering less than half of the total population, pursued a relentless policy of Magyarization against the other nationalities by means of a biased school system, police repression, stringent press laws, discrimination in public employment, and an electoral system which reduced the non-Magyar representation in parliament to five per cent. The inevitable result of this policy was a growing measure of discontent among the non-Magyars, especially their educated classes. Even the Croats, who had retained a considerable measure of home rule and who had a long tradition of service and loyalty to the House of Habsburg, as had been shown in 1848, began to hate the Magyars. Many Croats had originally hoped for a Greater Croatia, consisting of the Croatian, Slovene, and Serbian lands of the Habsburg Monarchy, under Croatian leadership and equal in status to Austria and Hungary, a scheme whose execution would have transformed the "Dualism" of the state into a "Trialism"; however, after the turn of the century an increasing number of younger members of the intelligentsia began to seek an understanding with the Serbs, at first within the Dual Monarchy, then in the Kingdom of Serbia as well. This was the beginning of the "Yugoslav" or "South Slav" movement which aspired to the eventual unity of all Serbs, Croats, and

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[6]See Appendix A for statistics of nationalities, Appendix B for statistics of religions, and Map I for distribution of nationalities of the Habsburg Empire.

Slovenes. With the realization of the impossibility of altering the Dualist system of the Habsburg state, because neither the Austro-Germans nor the Magyars would ever have consented to give up their share of the Adriatic coast, and the growth of independent Serbia, the Yugoslav movement began to look towards Serbia only for the ultimate realization of its hopes. "This meant that southern Slav unionism henceforth was inevitably committed to an anti-Austrian course."[7] The Rumanians of Transylvania began to be attracted by the independent Kingdom of Rumania across the frontier. Among the educated Slovaks a movement for unity with the Czechs began to appear, and pro-Russian sentiments developed among the Ruthenians. Even the German minority of Hungary was not exempt from Magyar pressure. However, at the outbreak of the World War, the actual feeling of disloyalty towards the state was still restricted mainly to the educated classes while the great majority of the population, peasants and agricultural labourers, were as yet largely unaffected by political discontent.

In the Austrian half, where the Germans predominated,[8] there was no systematic attempt to Germanize the other nationalities. The Polish gentry was in practical control of Galicia and exercised an oppressive rule over the less developed Ukrainians in the eastern part of that province. Being in a much better position than their co-nationals in Russia and Germany, the Austrian Poles were loyal to the Dual Monarchy, though most of them were, of course, ready to transfer their loyalty to an independent

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[7]Robert A. Kann, The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Monarchy 1848-1918 (2 Vols.; New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), I, p.289.

[8]See Appendix C for the share of the Austrian Germans in the central bureaucracy.

Poland, should it arise again. Among the Ukrainians, who were led by a very small intelligentsia, there developed two tendencies: one group hoped for the establishment of an independent Greater Ukraine which would contain all Ukrainians of both Russia and Austria-Hungary, while the other group openly looked towards Russia for liberation from the Habsburgs and their Polish landowners and officials. The Austrian Italians lived in the Trentino and the Littoral (Gorizia, Istria, Trieste), with a small minority settled in Dalmatia. With the exception of the peasants of the Trentino, most of them wanted to belong to the Kingdom of Italy, but unable to express these sentiments openly, they played a waiting game. The Slovenes formed the population of the province of Carniola, and also lived in considerable numbers in the northern Littoral, southern Carinthia, and southern Styria. They were mainly interested in gaining concessions in the administrative and educational fields, and were engaged in bitter racial strife with the Germans in southern Styria and the Italians in Trieste. The Austrian Croats lived mainly in Istria and Dalmatia, and, if politically interested, looked towards their brethren in Hungary. They were, for economic and historic reasons, bitterly anti-Italian, and the Italians of Istria and Dalmatia heartily reciprocated this feeling.

The most serious national problem in Austria was the position of the Czechs. The Czechs lived mainly in the interior of Bohemia and Moravia while the fringes of both provinces were inhabited by Germans. The Czechs, who had been crushed by the Habsburgs after the battle of White Mountain in 1620, began a spectacular national revival towards the end of the eighteenth century, and aimed at wresting control of Bohemia and Moravia from the German element. After 1867 the Czechs demanded an <u>Ausgleich</u> after the Hungarian pattern which would have meant the establishment of a unit consisting of Bohemia, Moravia, and Austrian Silesia,

with the Czechs as the dominant nationality. This demand was bitterly resisted by the Germans of these three provinces, who were supported by the Magyars, whose ruling class had become after 1867 the most determined defenders of the status quo within the Habsburg Monarchy. The policy of Francis Joseph towards the Czechs was vacillating: twice, in 1871 and 1897, he was ready to make far-reaching concessions which would have satisfied them, but, confronted with the determined opposition of the Germans and Magyars, he changed his mind. As a result, the attitude of the Czechs towards the Habsburg Monarchy became increasingly negative. Nevertheless, even without obtaining political concessions, material and cultural progress of the Czechs continued, aided by the rapid industrialization of Bohemia. Czech-German animosity became increasingly bitter. "Imperial concerns were swamped beneath the high waves of national passions; every school house, every railway station, every public office excited intrigue and scheming."[9] In the years immediately preceding the World War the political situation in Bohemia deteriorated swiftly. While only a small number of the Czech politicians desired separation from the Habsburg Empire, nearly all wanted self-government, at least for Bohemia. The outstanding Czech politician was Thomas Masaryk (1850-1937), a professor at Prague university and a fearless champion of truth and tolerance. He "sought to weave the Western cultural heritage into the Czech pattern"[10] and was the champion of a close Czech-Slovak understanding. Unlike many of his countrymen, he did not believe in the Pan-Slavist ideology which proclaimed that the liberation of all Slavs would come from Russia.

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[9]May, The Habsburg Monarchy, p.330.

[10]Ibid., p.206.

As in the case of Hungary, it is difficult to estimate how widely disloyalty towards the state had spread throughout Austria by 1914; probably only most of the Italians and a section of the Ukrainians were thoroughly disloyal, while many of the Czechs and most of the South Slav intelligentsia were dissatisfied with the prevailing political conditions and opposed to Austria-Hungary's pro-German foreign policy. There was national discontent even among the two ruling races of Austria-Hungary: among the Austrian Germans the Pan-German movement, strong only in Bohemia and Styria, wanted incorporation into Germany and subordination of the rest of Austria to it, while some members of the Magyar ruling classes wanted to reduce all links between Austria and Hungary to a personal union, i.e., the person of the common ruler. It must be realized that in most cases the national movements were led by intellectuals and supported by the middle classes, that, in addition, Austria-Hungary was 91% Roman Catholic,[11] and that the peasantry were strongly influenced by the clergy who were usually pro-Habsburg in sentiment. Among the industrial working classes socialist doctrines, too, provided an antidote to extreme nationalism. Furthermore, the existence of the Habsburg state provided economic advantages for its members.

> In greater or lesser degree all Habsburg citizens benefited from living in the largest free-trade area of Europe outside of Russia, and tariff protection shielded manufacturers from the superior industrial establishments of Germany and Britain and guarded agricultural producers from transatlantic, Russian and Balkan competition. Representative Czech, Magyar, Slovak and Slovene spokesmen acknowledged that their nationalities were too small to form viable independent states in an age of mass production demanding broad markets.[12]

Another factor which helped to hold the empire together was the armed forces which, by means of universal compulsory service, trained every male

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[11]See Appendix B.

[12]May, The Habsburg Monarchy, pp.484-85.

subject in the spirit of allegiance to the ruler instead of the state. Thus the army

> constituted a real state within the state, a dynastic island in the sea of growing national and social struggles . . . a very scrupulous and tactful care was maintained that the members of the imperial army should feel themselves as equals not disturbed by national rivalries . . . .[13]

The influence of this training on the largely nonpolitically minded peasants should not be underestimated. Last, but not least, there was the universal popularity of Francis Joseph which increased with his advancing age.

It can be easily argued that the only sensible course open for a state consisting of such heterogeneous national elements was a policy of neutrality in foreign affairs. At the same time, by giving all citizens social and national equality, a strong feeling of common patriotism could have been created which would have reduced attraction from co-nationals across the frontiers and might even have drawn small countries like Serbia and Rumania towards unity with the Habsburg state. This line of action was never attempted owing to the feudal privileges of the immensely wealthy high nobility, especially in Hungary and Galicia, which caused the abject poverty of a large section of the rural population, and the national oppression which has already been mentioned.

> Every Austrian, looking at his own country with European eyes, knew . . . that the Habsburg Monarchy had become a European problem; that there was no longer any valid distinction, for the nationalities which it embraced, between internal and external policy; that the one continually reacted upon the other; and that . . . the forces pressing from east, southeast, west and south, upon the corresponding national units in Austria and Hungary were dissolving a connection which centuries of statesmanship had wrought into the fabric of the dynastic, authoritarian State. But the very people who ought to have

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[13]Oscar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago, Illinois; University of Chicago Press, 1929), p.437.

> seen this . . . the ruling classes of the two States . . . saw nothing.[14]

Furthermore, the Habsburg Monarchy had inherited the warlike traditions and power politics of the previous centuries. Consequently, Austria-Hungary took a very active part in international affairs with ultimately fatal consequences to herself.

In 1879 Germany and Austria-Hungary formed the Dual Alliance which the addition of Italy three years later converted into the Triple Alliance. In order to forestall exclusive Russian control of the Balkan peninsula, Austria-Hungary, with European consent, had occupied Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1878, although that region remained technically part of the Ottoman Empire. The population of Bosnia-Hercegovina (usually referred to as "Bosnia" only) consisted of over 40% Serbs, who were the largest group in this territory,[15] and Serbia hoped to incorporate it at some future date. Its official annexation by the Dual Monarchy in 1908 caused a European crisis because Serbia had become Russia's protege, and Russia was allied to France, while Germany very actively backed Austria-Hungary. Russia and Serbia suffered a diplomatic defeat, but anti-Habsburg feeling among the Serbs both within and without the Dual Monarchy was intensified. At the same moment there was a bitter conflict in progress between Magyars and Croats and common grievances brought Croats and Serbs closer together. After 1908 anti-Habsburg propaganda increased among the younger generation of the Bosnian Serbs, and acts of terrorism

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[14] Joseph Redlich, Austrian War Government, trans. James T. Shotwell (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), pp.72-73.

[15] The Moslems formed the second largest group in Bosnia. Although ethnically mainly of Serbian stock, they refused to be classified in the same ethnical category as the Orthodox Serbs whom they bitterly disliked.

against Habsburg officials occurred.

> In almost every way . . . the Serbs in Bosnia had been much closer to Serbia and the Greater Serbian idea than to their conationals in Croatia, Hungary and Dalmatia . . . . The Bosnian Serbs were firmly resolved to undo their permanent incorporation into the empire and to join politically the independent part of the nation. Thus, they increasingly became the vanguard of the Greater Serbian idea in the empire . . . .[16]

Under Russia's guidance, Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro, and Greece formed the Balkan League which Russia intended to be a bulwark against further Habsburg attempts of expansion in the Balkans. However, the Balkan League attacked the Ottoman Empire in 1912, and, with the exception of Constantinople, expelled it from Europe. Another international crisis developed when Austria-Hungary prevented Serbia from annexing northern Albania and thereby reaching the Adriatic. Once more, under the threat of war, Serbia yielded. A quarrel between Serbia and Bulgaria over the division of spoils followed, and in the Second Balkan War of 1913 Bulgaria was defeated. Serbia emerged from the Balkan Wars with her territory nearly doubled and her self-confidence vastly increased. Inevitably Greater Serbian agitation within the Dual Monarchy assumed even greater proportions.

By now the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Berchtold, had come to the conclusion that the Serbian problem could be settled only by force.[17] Military leaders also felt that, with dissatisfaction among the other nationalities increasing, time was working against Austria-Hungary. When young Bosnian Serbs assassinated the Austrian Heir-Apparent, Francis Ferdinand, in the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, the Dual Monarchy used the opportunity to declare war on Serbia.[18] Owing to the

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[16]Kann, The Multinational Empire, I, p.292.

[17]May, The Habsburg Monarchy, p.468.

[18]The assassins had received their weapons from Serbian military stores, but whether the Serbian government actually knew about the plot, is still not conclusively proven.

close relationship of Serbia and Russia, Russia's own Balkan interests, the web of military alliances, and other Great Power antagonisms, by the first week of August the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia had become a world war between Germany and Austria-Hungary, usually referred to as the "Central Powers", on one side, and Britain, France, Russia, Serbia and Belgium, usually referred to as the "Allied Powers", or "Allies", on the other.[19] Within two years, several more countries had entered the war; the most important of these were the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria on the side of the Central Powers; Japan, Italy and Rumania on the side of the Allies.

Austria-Hungary entered the war with the same appearance of unity as the other belligerents; even deprivations and early military reverses affected the morale of the population but little. There were several reasons for this show of strength and endurance: "Deeply buried, but never forgotten, the sense of the Empire and of the State as a whole persisted,"[20] the brilliant achievements of the German army increased confidence in victory, and the establishment of ruthless military control over every phase of public life paralyzed all means of expression. This state of affairs began to change in the third year of the war: a shortage of food began to make itself felt, the army suffered a terrible defeat at the hands of the Russians at Lutsk in the summer of 1916, and in November Francis Joseph died. Gradually the latent discontent among various nationalities began to express itself in declining industrial and agricultural output, and desertions on the front. Francis Joseph's young successor Charles made

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[19]The pact between Britain and France of 1904 was known as the "Entente"; the addition of Russia in 1907 made it the "Triple Entente".

[20]Redlich, Austrian War Government, p.75.

half-hearted attempts at a separate peace, and also permitted a semblance of political activity in the Austrian part of his empire. However, no serious attempt at constitutional reform was made, and the Magyars were adamant towards any change. "The Habsburg Monarchy was not to be remodelled, enlarged or even saved if a sacrifice were required of Hungary's integrity or sovereignty."[21] Events abroad made a deep impression on the population: the Russian revolution of March and November 1917 at first overthrew the Czar's absolutism, and then led to the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship by the Bolsheviks. Here was an example of the dissolution of a powerful empire and army. Furthermore, the Bolshevik slogan of "peace without annexation" was attractive to many people, especially to the socialist workers of Austria-Hungary who after the fall of the Czar were less enthusiastic about fighting against Russia. Another great event was the United States entry into the war on the side of the Allies in April, 1917, and the subsequent proclamation of President Wilson's Fourteen Points as war aims.[22] The Fourteen Points emphasized the moral issues of the war, stressed the principle of nationality, and called for a new world order of justice and equality. For the peoples of Austria-Hungary "freest opportunity of autonomous development" was demanded. The Four Principles, pronounced by Wilson a month later,[23] put stress on nationality and self-determination. Nevertheless, neither Wilson nor the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, desired, as yet, the destruction

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[21]Harold W. V. Temperley (ed.), The Peace Conference of Paris (6 Vols.; London: Henry Frowde and Hodder & Stoughton, 1920-1924), IV, p.73.

[22]See Appendix D.

[23]Ibid.

of the Habsburg state.

Owing to the war-time repression in Austria-Hungary, active opposition against the war or the state had either to go underground or go into exile. Consequently, most of the anti-Habsburg activities were carried on from abroad. The two émigré movements which eventually exercised a great influence were the Czecho-Slovak and the Yugoslav. The leader of the Czecho-Slovak movement was Masaryk[24] who had left Austria in December 1914. He established a Czecho-Slovak National Committee in Paris which aimed at the establishment of a Czecho-Slovak federation after the war.[25] In November, 1915, Masaryk, for the first time, demanded complete independence. His aim was to win over the Allied governments to the Czecho-Slovak idea. He scored his first great success when the Allies in their declaration of January 10, 1917, included the liberation of the Czecho-Slovaks from "foreign domination" into their war aims.[26] When the Austrian parliament, after three years' prorogation, met on May 30, 1917, the Czech deputies demanded the transformation of Austria-Hungary into a federation of free and equal national states, and the union of the Czechs and Slovaks. This would have meant the destruction of the Dualist system, but not necessarily of the Habsburg state. Meanwhile the democratic Russian government, which had succeeded the Czar, permitted the establishment

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[24]Above p.9.

[25]"Czecho-Slovakia" was the originally suggested name of the new state, implying full autonomy for the Slovaks. However, after its establishment it was called "Czechoslovakia", and the question of Slovak autonomy became a very serious problem for the new state.

[26]See Appendix E.

of a Czecho-Slovak Legion on Russian soil, consisting of prisoners of war. These units fought with distinction, but after the Bolshevik revolution and the subsequent conclusion of a separate peace between Russia and the Central Powers, the Czecho-Slovak Legionaries had to make their way out of Russia through Siberia. The Czecho-Slovak National Committee in Paris (renamed Czecho-Slovak National Council), was recognized by the Italian government in November, 1917, and one month later France agreed to the establishment on the Western front of a Czecho-Slovak army which consisted of Czechs and Slovaks living abroad, especially in the United States. At home, Czech resistance to the war was increasing; on January 6, 1918, nearly all leading Czech politicians demanded "a sovereign state of their own", embracing Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and the Slovaks. This was, for the first time within the Habsburg state, a practically undisguised demand for separation.

The Yugoslav movement faced an even harder task. Before the war the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs belonged to three different states: Austria-Hungary, Serbia and Montenegro,[27] and within Austria-Hungary they lived in four separate administrative units: Austria, Hungary, Croatia (a semi-autonomous unit within Hungary), and Bosnia. Also, the Slovenes and Croats were Roman Catholic while the Serbs were Greek Orthodox, and, in spite of close racial affinities, they were separated by 1000 years of different historical development. Only "literary men and visionaries"[28] belonged to the Yugoslav movement before the war; most of the politically active South Slavs were either "Greater Croats" or "Greater Serbs".[29] The "Greater Serbian" idea envisaged the unity

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[27]The people of Montenegro were Serbs.

[28]Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, IV, p.171.

[29]Above pp.6 and 13.

of all Serbs under the banner of the Serbian royal family, and was supported by the governments of Serbia and Russia; its supporters were reluctant to associate with the Roman Catholic Slovenes and Croats.

When the war broke out, some Austrian South Slav politicians fled to the West; their leading spirit was Trumbic, an influential Croatian member of the Austrian parliament. A Yugoslav Committee was set up in Paris in April 1915, moving to London later on, but the Allied governments showed little interest in it in the beginning. The repressive actions of the suspicious military authorities in Dalmatia, Istria, and Carniola, and the brutalities which were committed against the Serbian population in the zone of military operations, aroused common indignation among Austro-Hungarian South Slavs. When Italy entered the war in May, 1915, the Yugoslav Committee was in a delicate position because it suspected that Yugoslav lands had been promised to Italy.[30] Moreover, Italy was thoroughly hated by the South Slavs, and the Croatian and Slovene soldiers of the Austro-Hungarian army fought with great tenacity against the Italians. The situation was different on the Russian front where many South Slav prisoners of war agreed to form Volunteer Divisions. Owing to the suspicious attitude of the Czarist and Serbian governments, these Volunteer Divisions were eventually transferred to the Salonika front.[31] The year of 1916 was not auspicious for the Yugoslav movement, but 1917 witnessed many changes. The Allied declaration of January 10, 1917,[32] mentioned the liberation of the "Slavs" as distinct from the Czecho-Slovaks and Poles. The Russian revolution

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[30]See Appendix F.

[31]Serbia had been overrun by the armies of the Central Powers in the fall of 1915, and Allied troops had landed at Salonika.

[32]See Appendix E.

of March, 1917, removed the Czarist champions of the Greater Serbian idea. The entry of the United States in the war in April, 1917, had great repercussions because there were numerous South Slav colonies living in the New World. On May 30, 1917, the South Slav deputies in the Austrian parliament, under the leadership of Korosec, a Slovene priest, demanded the unification of all territories inhabited by Slovenes, Croats and Serbs into a democratic and independent unit under the Habsburgs. As was the case with the simultaneous declaration of the Czech deputies,[33] the reference to the Habsburgs may have been only added by prudence. "It was the fault of the dynasty that one could omit it without depriving the declaration of more than a casual flourish" said a contemporary German socialist writer.[34] After this, the Slovenes, suffering less severely from the repressive measures of the authorities, became more and more active in favour of South Slav unity. "It is interesting to note how the Catholic Slovenes, led largely by their clergy, moved steadily towards the idea of union with Orthodox Serbia."[35] In Croatia, too, the Yugoslav idea began to make rapid progress.

Under the influence of all these events, the exiled Serbian government on Corfu became more willing to reach an agreement with the Yugoslav movement. On July 20, 1917, Pasic, Prime Minister of Serbia, and Trumbic, President of the Yugoslav Committee, issued the Manifesto of Corfu which laid the foundations of the future "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes." The new state was to be a democratic parliamentary monarchy under the Serbian royal family. It would embrace all Serbs.

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[33]Above, p.16.

[34]Hermann Wendel, Aus dem südslawischen Risorgimento (Gotha: Verlag Friedrich Andreas Perthes A.-G., 1921), p.191.

[35]Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, IV, p.188.

Croats and Slovenes, and provide full equality for all religions. The Cyrillic alphabet used by the Serbs and the Latin one used by the Croats and Slovenes would have equal status. "The publication of the Manifesto marks a decisive point in the Yugo-slav movement. At last all nationalist sections of the people had a definite war aim before them . . . ."[36] The Manifesto had a favourable reception in all Allied countries except Italy. Italy's aim, as indicated in the Treaty of London,[37] was the control of either side of the Adriatic, and a united Yugoslavia did not fit into this plan. However, two unexpected events modified Italy's attitude towards the Yugoslavs. In October, 1917, the Italian army suffered a shattering defeat at the hands of the Austro-Hungarian and German armies at Caporetto, and three weeks later the Bolsheviks, having seized power in Russia, published the texts of all Secret Treaties. The revelation of the Treaty of London confirmed the hatred of the South Slavs for Italy and strengthened again the wavering loyalty of the Croatian and Slovene soldiers in the Habsburg forces. Italy, apprehensive after her military setback, began to seek the help of the Yugoslavs and became more willing to reach an understanding with them. In December, 1917, "exploratory" talks began. On his visit to London in January, 1918, the Italian Prime Minister Orlando had a conversation with Trumbic. With his approval, Senator Torre had final talks with Trumbic in March.

> After lengthy coversations . . . an agreement couched in general terms was reached, the main point . . . being that the liberation and union of the Southern Slavs was in the interest of Italy, whereas the completion of the liberation and unity of the Italian

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[36] Ibid., p.190.

[37] See Appendix F.

people was in the interests of the Yugoslavs. On the face of it, it sounded like a burial of the Treaty of London.[38]

By that time, the Poles, too, had begun to move. After the conquest of Russian Poland, the Central Powers had declared in favour of an independent Polish Kingdom. They established the Council of Regency in October 1917, but by this time the democratic regime of Russia had already promised the Poles self-determination, and the Poles decided to "wait and see". In November 1917 the Allies set up a Polish National Council at Lausanne which was, of course, friendly towards them, and they recognized it soon afterwards. Both Polish bodies eventually coalesced. Meanwhile, arrangements had been made by some Italian politicians, mainly socialists, for a meeting of all anti-Habsburg elements. This "Congress of Oppressed Nationalities" met in Rome in April. "The chief point of the resolution . . . was the right of each oppressed Austro-Hungarian nationality to an independent existence."[39] A delegation was received by Orlando on behalf of the Italian government.

After April, 1918, the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy approached swiftly. In June a great offensive on the Italian front ended with a heavy repulse for the Austro-Hungarian army. The food shortage in the western parts of the state, in spite of the peace treaties with Russia and Rumania, which were supposed to open up the agricultural resources of these countries, became worse. Strikes occurred more frequently, and acts of insubordination in the army increased rapidly. In July the Czech members of parliament formed a National Committee which

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[38] P. D. Ostrovic, The Truth About Yugoslavia (New York: Roy Publishers, 1952), p.71. It must be remembered, nevertheless, that Torre, although he had come with Orlando's approval, was not an official delegate. This casts doubt on the sincerity of the intention of the Italian government.

[39] Ibid.

declared itself in agreement with the émigré Czecho-Slovak movement.

> At the secret session [of Parliament] held to discuss the defeat on the Piave . . . the speeches of the Czech, South Slavs, Italian, and even some of the Polish members showed clearly that the peoples they represented were not counting on the continued existence of the Habsburg Monarchy. They were looking . . . to the allied enemies of Germany and the Danubian Monarchy . . . .[40]

Only the still unbroken German army, fighting on the Western front deep in enemy territory, prevented now the collapse of Austria-Hungary.

After the Congress of Rome the émigré movements scored rapid successes. On April 21 a Czech Legion, recruited from prisoners of war, was established on the Italian front. On May 29, Lansing, the United States Secretary of State, endorsed the resolutions of the Congress of Rome, and Britain, France, and Italy followed his example. On June 28 Lansing went further and stated "that all branches of the Slav race should be completely freed from German and Austrian rule."[41] This meant that the United States now agreed to the dissolution of the Habsburg empire. During the summer, France, Britain, and the United States recognized the Czech National Council as "the first step towards a future government."[42] In September the Italian government identified itself with the aims of the Yugoslav movement, but in October, now certain of victory, the Italians reversed their stand and prevented both the establishment of a Yugoslav Legion and the recognition of the Yugoslav Committee by the Allies. Thus the later difficulties between both countries began with the approach of victory. In the middle of October the Czecho-Slovak National Council formed an interim government in Paris

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[40]Redlich, Austrian War Government, p.162.

[41]Henry Wickham Steed, Through Thirty Years 1892-1922 (2 Vols.; Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1925), p.215.

[42]Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, IV, pp. 261-62. The United States statement went even further.

and the Allied Powers recognized it quickly. This enabled the Czecho-Slovaks to participate in the armistice negotiations.

After the second half of July the position of the German army on the Western front deteriorated rapidly, and the end of the war drew near. On September 14, Austria-Hungary sent a note to Wilson, suggesting a conference of all belligerents to discuss peace terms. Wilson rejected this, pointing out his repeated statements of peace terms.[43] This development forced the Habsburg government to try to reach an agreement with the discontented nationalities. However, even now, an attempt to placate the South Slavs was foiled by the intransigence of the Magyar ruling class. Meanwhile, the Allies had broken through on the Macedonian front, and on September 29 Bulgaria dropped out of the war. French and Serbian troops reoccupied Serbia and threatened southern Hungary. Soon afterwards the Turkish army collapsed, and on the Western front the Germans were unable to stop their retreat. On October 4 Germany and Austria-Hungary asked Wilson for an armistice on the basis of his Fourteen Points and subsequent pronouncements. Germany received a reply on October 9 while Austria-Hungary had to wait till October 19.[44] Emperor-King Charles meanwhile had decided to transform the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy into a federation. This was announced in an Imperial Manifesto, dated October 16 and published two days later. This

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[43]Point 2 of Wilson's "Four Ends" speech on July 4 emphasized the "free acceptance of all peoples immediately concerned;" see Appendix D. Furthermore, the Allies had already recognized the Czecho-Slovak National Council.

[44]It is beyond the scope of this thesis to describe the triangular armistice negotiations of October-November 1918 between Wilson in Washington, the Supreme War Council of the Allies in Paris, and the German government. The Supreme War Council, created in November 1917, was the highest Allied authority. It consisted of the leading members of the British, French and Italian governments, and Colonel House, the United States representative. House was the intimate friend and adviser of President Wilson and became a very important person at the Peace Conference.

proclamation hoped to meet the demands of President Wilson and to retain the loyalty of the Czechs and South Slavs. The Manifesto specifically exempted Hungary. It was flatly rejected by the non-German nationalities and forced the German Austrians to realize that they, too, "had to set up their own House."[45]

The dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy progressed swiftly. On October 6 the South Slav political parties had already formed a National Council at Zagreb which assumed the conduct of South Slav policies. At the same time, the Polish Council of Regency in Warsaw declared the union of all Polish territories, and a week later the Austrian Poles declared their adherence. On October 19 a newly formed Ukrainian National Council at Lvov proclaimed a Ukrainian state, embracing all Habsburg territories inhabited by Ukrainians. By the end of the month, fighting between Poles and Ukrainians over the possession of Lvov began. On October 19, also, the Yugoslav National Council in Zagreb declared in favour of a "National State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs", and on the following day the Czech National Committee in Prague proclaimed the independence of Czecho-Slovakia. On October 21 the German Austrian members of parliament took the first steps to found a German-Austrian state. On October 24 Hungary dissolved all remaining bonds with Austria except for the person of the common ruler, and recalled all troops from the Italian front, hoping that thereby the kingdom with its Magyar rule over other nations would be preserved by the Allies. Wilson's reply to Austria-Hungary's request for an armistice of October 4 was received on October 19 and published two days later: he declared that he could no longer recognize autonomy of the nationalities as a basis of peace, and would have to leave it to their judgement

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[45]Kann, The Multinational Empire, II, p.282.

what actions of the Austro-Hungarian government would satisfy them.

> This verdict broke the last links of Austria-Hungary's logical structure. The Czecho-Slovaks and Yugo-slavs were acknowledged as independent nations . . . . Austria was reduced to its German, Hungary to its Magyar, territory.[46]

On October 27 Andrassy, the last Foreign Minister of the Habsburg Monarchy, sent another note to Wilson, asking for an immediate armistice and expressing recognition of the independent Czecho-Slovak and South Slav States. He never received a reply.

The most amazing spectacle during this period of the empire's dissolution was the endurance of its army. Although it was half starved and weakened by desertions, and the state it was defending already in ruins, it still remained a cohesive fighting force. On October 24, more for political than for military reasons, the Italians launched an all-out offensive. Only after several days of hard fighting did they manage to achieve a break-through, and then all further resistance collapsed. On October 30 the Habsburg high command asked for cease-fire terms which were drafted by the Supreme War Council on the following day. Meanwhile, on October 28, the Czech National Committee took over control in Prague, and on October 29 the newly formed Slovak National Committee at Turcianky Svaty Martin declared the unity of Czechs and Slovaks. On that day the Croatian Diet at Zagreb took over military control of Croatia. Thus by October 30 the independent Czecho-Slovak and Yugoslav States had come into existence. This transformation was accomplished without bloodshed. On October 30, also, the German-Austrian National Assembly, consisting of the German members of the old Austrian parliament, introduced a constitution for the new German-Austrian State. The last government of Emperor Charles, the "Ministry of Liquidation", quietly

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[46]Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, IV, 105-06.

receded into the background.

On November 3 the armistice with the Allies was concluded. "The Armistice . . . was really a document drawn with almost exclusive reference to the needs, demands and claims of Italy."[47] Inter-Allied troops were to occupy all territory given to Italy by the Treaty of London,[48] and in some localities they were permitted to go further: the Sexten Valley, the town of Tarvis and Mount Nevoso. These troops were nearly exclusively Italians who began to act as if they had come to stay. The Austro-Hungarian forces were to be demobilized, and Allied troops permitted to occupy any part of Austria-Hungary deemed necessary. On November 13, the Military Convention of Belgrade regulated the application of the armistice to Hungary. Allied troops occupied southern Hungary and southern Transylvania.[49] Germany, in the throes of a revolution which deposed the Hohenzollern, concluded her armistice with the Allies on November 11, and the World War came to an end. On the same day, Emperor Charles renounced all share in the government of German-Austria, and on November 13 for Hungary as well, without, however, a formal abdication. On November 12 German-Austria decreed herself a democratic Republic and also an integral part of the German Republic, although this Anschluss was not meant to be carried out immediately. On November 16 a Republic was proclaimed in Hungary. Thus the proudest dynasty in Europe and its empire ended their role in history.

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[47] Ibid., p.122.

[48] See Appendix F.

[49] The later revisions of the Military Convention of Belgrade, and the subsequent events in Hungary, are beyond the scope of this thesis.

# CHAPTER II

## II. THE MECHANISM OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

### A. EARLY PROBLEMS

#### 1. Central Europe at the End of the War

By early November 1918, the map of Central Europe bore little resemblance to the map of August, 1914. The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had led to the creation of several independent states: the republics of German-Austria and Hungary which represented the German and Magyar cores respectively of the two partners of the vanished Dual Monarchy; Czechoslovakia, a republic, whose backbone consisted of the Czechs of Bohemia and Moravia, with the Slovenes as partners; and the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, or Yugoslavia, just in the process of forming itself out of the two sovereign states of Serbia and Montenegro, and the South Slav sections of former Austria-Hungary. To the northeast of these states the Republic of Poland, consisting of the Polish parts of the collapsed Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, had come into existence, while still farther to the east there seemed a distinct possibility that the Ukrainians might form an independent State, comprising former Russian and Austro-Hungarian territories. The Kingdom of Rumania, profiting from the disappearance of Czarist Russia and Austria-Hungary, was in the process of doubling its size by occupying Bessarabia, which had belonged to the former, and Transylvania, the Bukovina, and part of the Banat, which had belonged to the latter, claiming with more or less justification that these regions were inhabited

by Rumanian majorities.[1]

The frontiers of these states were, as yet, completely fluid, and several minor wars among the new neighbours were either already in progress or threatened to break out at any moment. Some of the nationalities, having gained their independence only a few days before, began to annex unwilling minorities of different racial backgrounds to their new states. "Each nationality viewed affairs through the coloured prism of its own ambitions."[2] Czechoslovakia, especially, soon resembled old Austria-Hungary as a mixture of many nationalities, not all of them willing members of the new state. Feelings of hatred and revenge against the two ruling races of the fallen Dual Monarchy were widespread among their former subject peoples.

Unstable frontiers and national quarrels were nevertheless not the most urgent problems of Central Europe in November, 1918. With the dissolution of Austria-Hungary, Central Europe's system of economy and transportation, already badly strained by more than four years of war, had been broken up; the new states, especially if there were frontier disputes between them, tightly shut themselves off against one another regardless of economic consequences. Industrial, agricultural, and mining districts, which hitherto had formed economic units became thus separated, and many cities and towns were threatened with famine while industries were forced to shut down for lack of coal. Furthermore, the call-up of most able-bodied men to the armed forces, and the growing

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[1]Rumania and the Ukraine lie completely, and Poland largely, outside the scope of this thesis. All three posed complicated problems to the peacemakers.

[2]Edward Mandell House and Charles Seymour (ed.), What Really Happened at Paris. The Story of the Peace Conference, 1918-1919. By American Delegates (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921), p.92.

war-weariness of the agricultural population had led to an alarming food shortage in the industrialized parts of the western half of the Dual Monarchy during the final stages of the war. Defeat and dissolution naturally led to a further deterioration which was aggravated by the approach of winter. Hand in hand with famine, unemployment, and the disorderly return of millions of soldiers from the front went the possibility of social revolution, encouraged by the Bolshevik victory in Russia and the fall of the old authorities in Germany and Central Europe. Thus the victorious Allied and Associated Powers, on the morrow of victory, were faced with a Central Europe which was torn by national strife, facing starvation, and threatened by social revolution. This dangerous situation made a speedy peace settlement imperative.

Unfortunately, several serious obstacles stood in the path of an early return to peaceful conditions. The complete military collapse of the Central Powers had taken their enemies by surprise; the Allies, as late as the summer of 1918, had not expected the war to be over before the spring of 1919 at the earliest. Furthermore, the disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy had left Central Europe in momentary confusion, and some time was required to see what type of government would emerge in the new states, and who would represent them at the Peace Conference. The immediate need of Central and Eastern Europe was food, and the victorious Powers, especially the United States, soon started a huge relief program in those regions.

There was no modern precedent available as to the assembling and conducting of such a comprehensive gathering: the last great international Peace Conference, the Congress of Vienna, had met more than one hundred years before under greatly different circumstances. In the early nineteenth century wars and their conclusions had still been the

affair of the dynastic rulers and their aristocratic statesmen, but now, in the democratic twentieth century, the sentiments of the peoples concerned had to be considered all the time. Proceedings would have to be conducted under the keen scrutiny of a free press. The peoples themselves were in a bitter mood: "For four years the nations had been committed to the use of every agency in building up a war psychology; to giving men the martial spirit, instilling hatred as an antidote for fear, driving nations into an artificial unity by the force of sheer necessity."[3] In such an atmosphere it was not easy to forgive and forget: revenge on the enemy who had started the war and, especially in the case of Germany, had frequently behaved in a brutal manner, was the passion of many people among the victorious nations. These sentiments showed their strength when some of the Allied leaders, in order to represent their nations with greater authority at the coming Peace Conference, asked the voters of their respective countries for another term of office. These elections, of which the British "khaki" election of December 14, 1918, was the most important, were bound to cause delay. Some of the slogans of the British "khaki" election, such as "Make Germany pay" and "Hang the Kaiser," became a source of embarrassment later on.

Above all, a commonly agreed plan of organizing the Peace Conference was necessary. In November, 1918, it was generally assumed that the victors would arrange for a speedy Preliminary Treaty which would lay down the essentials of the peace settlement and restore normal conditions in Europe, leaving the final details to be worked out between the victors and the vanquished at a later Peace Congress. However, the

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[3]Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and the World Settlement. Written from His Unpublished and Personal Material (3 Vols.; Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Company), I, pp.165-66.

Allies, bending every nerve on winning the war, had not arranged any joint plans beforehand, and began to consider the matter only when the end of hostilities was in sight. This left them with very little to go on after the armistice was signed.

When surveying the situation of the ex-belligerents in the middle of November, 1918, we discern much confusion, uncertainty and passion. Yet, this was by no means the whole picture. The appalling spectacle of the World War had led many people to search for an international arrangement which would enable the nations of the world to live side by side in the spirit of peace and brotherhood. Two main tendencies had emerged, and both had their prophets: Bolshevism with Lenin, and "Wilsonism" with Wilson. The former achieved victory in Russia, but this thesis is not concerned with its international repercussions except where the Paris Peace Conference was affected. Wilsonism and its prophet, President Wilson of the United States, however, became the most powerful single force in the rest of the world for the next few months.

> There was an irreconcilable and unconscious contradiction in the mind of the man-in-the-street on whose consent and support the success of the settlement would ultimately depend. On one plane of his mind the ordinary man wanted a peace based on a moral ideal, a peace that would not only make a safer world but a better world, a peace founded on what came to be called Wilsonism. On another plane, he refused to make any sacrifices which the acceptance of Wilsonism would involve, and insisted on the victor's pound of flesh.[4]

## 2. The Great Powers and Their Leaders

It was natural that within the victorious coalition of Allied and Associated Powers, the five Great Powers (the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan) should yield the greatest influence.

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[4] J. Hampden Jackson, Clemenceau and the Third Republic (London: The English Universities Press Limited, 1946), p.188.

Japan, whose participation in the war had been extremely limited, decided to restrict her attention at the coming Peace Conference to the Far East. This left the other four Great Powers in actual charge of the situation.

The most important of the Great Powers was the United States. They had entered the war comparatively late, and their resources seemed inexhaustible, especially when compared with those of their war-weary allies. Morally, their position was even stronger, because they would come to the Peace Conference without territorial and economic demands and President Wilson was the symbol of a new and better era. Considering Wilson's immense international importance at the end of hostilities, a few words about his background are necessary. Elected President of the United States in 1912, Wilson immediately started a program of reform named "New Freedom" which benefited the people whom the United States governments hitherto frequently had neglected: the workers, farmers and small businessmen. When the World War broke out, Wilson pronounced the neutrality of the United States, but, like the great majority of the American people, he and most of his advisers were sympathetic towards the Allies. In November, 1916, he was re-elected. On January 22, 1917, Wilson proclaimed the conditions under which the United States would help to procure and maintain peace: a universal League to enforce peace, government by the consent of the governed, limitation of armaments, and above all, "peace without victory".[5] Nine days later Germany proclaimed unrestricted submarine warfare, sinking American merchant vessels, and on April 6, 1917, the United States declared war on her. The United

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[5]Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Commager, The Growth of the American Republic (2 Vols.; 4th ed. rev.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1950), II, p.462.

States entered the war not as an "Allied" but as an "Associated" Power because their war aims might, in some respects, be different. Wilson's principles played a decisive role in their formulation.[6]

Wilson's beliefs formed "a definite and coherent body of political doctrines" which he had derived from studying the speeches of the founders of the United States. He believed that there should be no difference between private and public morality which meant that moral principles, not expediency, should be the sole guide in politics. Force as a means of policy was evil, although aggression and tyranny, both within and from without, had to be resisted. The "moral compulsion of the human conscience" should be man's guiding principle. States should settle their disputes by arbitration on the basis of absolute equality. It was the duty of the United States to protect liberty throughout the New World. "Woodrow Wilson, then, had a theory of international relations which he had already partially applied in the New World and which he believed would ultimately win its way by sheer moral force in the old."[7] Wilson's principles aroused international attention even before the war.

During the war Wilson had become deeply interested in the establishment of an international League. The idea of a "League to Enforce Peace" had developed simultaneously in several countries, and had strong international support, especially in Great Britain. To Wilson the League became the keystone of the "New Order." He defined his war aims and general beliefs in the Fourteen Points.[8] Announced on

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[6]For the sake of brevity, this thesis will refer to the "Allied and Associated Powers" as "Allied Powers" or "Allies", unless within the framework of a direct quotation.

[7]Temperley (ed.), The History of the Peace Conference at Paris, passim, I, pp.173-76.

[8]See Appendix D.

January 8, 1918, they were supplemented during the following months by the Four Principles, Four Ends and Five Particulars.[9] The impact of Wilson's pronouncements on the world, as has been described before, was profound. Not only among the Allied peoples but also among the subject races of Austria-Hungary and even in Germany Wilson came to be regarded as a symbol of a better world. Finally, the conclusion of the armistice appeared to make the Fourteen Points the basis of the coming Peace treaties.[10]

It is of interest to note that practically all descriptions of Wilson's character, regardless whether written by friend or enemy, are in substantial agreement. From the wealth of material that has been written about him, there emerges a picture of great virtues and great faults. Perhaps the best description of Wilson has come from Lloyd George who met him on equal terms.

> He was an extraordinary compound . . . of the noble visionary, the implacable and unscrupulous partisan, the exalted idealist and the man of petty personal rancours.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> On the one hand there was his idealism and his undoubted integrity. On the other there were his personal hatreds, his suspiciousness, his intolerance of criticism and his complete lack of generosity towards men who dared to differ from him.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> He was rather an ecclesiastical than a political type of mind. He had high ideals and honestly held them as a faith with a religious fervour. He believed all he preached about human brotherhood and charity towards all men. Nevertheless, he was a bigoted sectarian who placed in the category of the damned all those who belonged to a different political creed and excluded them for ever from charitable thought or destiny.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> He was genuinely humane, but he completely lacked the human touch of Lincoln. He gave you the impression that Wilson's philanthropy was purely intellectual . . . .
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> . . . . . .

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[9] Ibid.

[10] Above p.26.

> He believed in mankind but he distrusted all men. For that reason Wilson never rallied first-rate minds around him . . . . That is why he decided that his personal presence in Europe and at the table of the Congress was inevitable.[11]

Wilson's position was not quite as strong as it would appear at first glance. According to the constitution of the United States the President shared power with the Congress, and the Congressional elections of November, 1918, had gone strongly against the Democratic Party.[12] This meant that Wilson's political and personal enemies were now in a strong position. Moreover, every foreign treaty negotiated by the United States President had to be ratified by a two-thirds majority of the upper house of Congress, the Senate, before becoming valid. These circumstances weakened the position of Wilson immensely, because it was now open to doubt whether the President's ideals really reflected the true sentiments of his people. He never seems to have realized that, with the establishment of his League of Nations, he was asking his people to change their time-hallowed foreign policy of isolationism from Europe; nor does he seem to have been aware of the fact that the American people were none too friendly towards the intellectuals and academicians with whom he surrounded himself.[13] This was a very serious misjudgement.

Great Britain, under Prime Minister Lloyd George, had come through the war very close to financial exhaustion. Great losses in man power, and skillful, if bitter, war propaganda had created a feeling of deep embitterment towards the defeated enemy. Lloyd George was an astute

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[11] David Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties (2 Vols.; London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1938), passim, I, pp.228-34.

[12] As Wilson, rather contrary to the normal usage, had personally asked the voters to choose Democratic candidates, the election was a personal defeat for him.

[13] Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944), pp.107-08.

and sensible politician: he had to manoeuvre between the popular feeling of revenge and his own desire of a lasting, and therefore, moderate, settlement. This is why he was often called an opportunist with expediency as his guiding principle,[14] or "a strange mixture of liberalism and reaction."[15] He did not wish to see Germany, before the war Britain's best customer, permanently crippled, but rather wanted her to be rendered innocuous as a naval threat and colonial rival. He knew very little about Central Europe and never denied it.

France's outstanding statesman was Premier Clemenceau, justly nicknamed "the Tiger." This indomitable man of seventy-seven years, who had seen France invaded twice by the same enemy in his life time, shared one overwhelming desire with his people: to achieve security from their German neighbours. Large stretches of northeastern France lay completely devastated, and the terrible losses on the battlefield could not be replaced owing to the steady decline of the French birth rate. Thus Clemenceau's determination to separate the Rhineland from Germany and to secure huge indemnities becomes understandable; however, this was in complete opposition to Wilsonism. "He believed that mankind should be taken as it is, and not as it was unlikely to be."[16] Therefore he had little belief in Wilson's blueprint for a new world, and on December 29, 1918, before the Peace Conference had begun, he declared

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[14]Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace, p.157.

[15]William E. Dodd, Woodrow Wilson and His Work (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1920), p.304.

[16]Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace, pp.154-55.

so openly in the French Chamber.[17]

While the United States, Great Britain, and France regarded Germany as their main enemy, Italy showed limited interest in German affairs, and concentrated her efforts on the settlement with former Austria-Hungary. The satisfaction of her territorial claims had been guaranteed to her by the Treaty of London but the United States had never been a party to that Treaty or recognized it. Furthermore, Italy's attitude towards the "Congress of Oppressed Nationalities" in Rome,[18] the complete collapse of Austria-Hungary, and the existence of the Fourteen Points led most statesmen to presume that Italy would modify the terms of the Treaty of London at the Peace Conference. Internally, Italy's situation was very precarious: the losses in the war had been heavy, the working classes were discontented, and the rather inglorious record of the Italian armies had produced an extreme nationalistic reaction. Thus Italy's internal stability was threatened both by radical socialism and nationalism, and this reacted on the behaviour of her leading statesmen who, by striking a strongly nationalistic pose, tried to divert their population from socialist ideas, hoping, at the same time, that they would steal the thunder from the extreme nationalists. Orlando, the Premier, was a pleasant and liberal-minded man but his Foreign Minister Sonnino, the architect of the Treaty of London, was by far the stronger personality. Sonnino, who was destined to influence the course of the

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[17] "There was an old system which seems condemned today, and to which I do not hesitate to say that I remain to some extent faithful: nations organized their defence. They tried to have strong frontiers. They went armed . . . . I was saying that there was this old system of . . . balance of power . . . . This system seems condemned today by very bright authorities. Yet I believe that if this balance which has been spontaneously produced during the war, had existed earlier between Britain, the United States, France, Italy . . . this war would never have taken place. At the Conference each will defend its own interests." Jackson, Clemenceau and the Third Republic, pp.789-90.

[18] Above, p.21.

Peace Conference greatly, had, before the fall of 1918, never believed that Austria-Hungary would disappear. He had rejected the Yugoslav movement for two reasons: either it was just "a clever piece of propaganda,"[19] or, in the improbable event of its success, it would endanger the full execution of the terms of the Treaty of London, and thereby upset his calculations. Consequently, Sonnino had done as little as possible to help the Yugoslavs during the war. It was natural that a man of Sonnino's views had no belief in Wilson's idealism: "He had an absolute contempt for all the catch-words of the time and for propaganda."[20] His fixed aim was a strategic frontier for Italy in the north and northeast, and the control of the Adriatic.

Thus it is apparent that unity of purpose was lacking among the Allies. Their differences were bound to come out in the open as soon as hostilities had ceased.

## B. THE PREPARATION OF THE CONFERENCE

Although the end of hostilities had come rather unexpectedly, the Great Powers were not completely unprepared for the tasks that lay ahead. The governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France had during the last year of war used the services of their experts to supply themselves with an abundance of detailed information on the history, geography, ethnology, economies, and other relevant factors of the territories likely to come under discussion at the Peace Conference. The United States had set up a Commission, called the "Inquiry," which became so important that its personnel eventually overshadowed the diplomats

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[19]Carlo Sforza, "Sonnino and His Foreign Policy," Contemporary Review, 768, (December, 1929), p.727.

[20]Ibid.

of the State Department. Furthermore, after the conclusion of the various armistices the governments of each of the Great Powers began to send agents and Field Missions into Central and Eastern Europe to inform themselves on political developments.

Wilson's announcement that, after delivering his annual message to Congress on December 2, he would go to Europe to participate personally at the Peace Conference met with opposition from many of his own supporters and caused dismay among some of the European diplomats, especially Clemenceau. Wilson's friends feared that his influence would suffer if he was exposed to the merciless diplomatic rough and tumble of Europe instead of remaining the distant omniscient oracle, while Clemenceau was afraid that Wilson, who as the United States President was not only the chief executive but also the Head of State, might want to become the Chairman of the Conference,[21] or, worse, enable France's President Poincare, Clemenceau's political enemy, also to claim a seat at the Conference table. But Wilson persisted,[22] and in appointing the United States delegates or Commissioners, alienated the Republicans, his political opponents, further by practically ignoring them in the selection, thereby weakening his position at home still more.

Before Wilson had announced his intention to go to Europe, the United States, British and Italian diplomats had assumed that a Swiss city, most likely Geneva, would become the meeting place of the Conference. However, on November 8, 1918, Wilson, in a cable to House, rejected Switzerland as "saturated with every poisonous element and open to every

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[21] This, incidently, was not Wilson's intention.

[22] On November 16 he cabled to House in Paris: "I infer that the French and English leaders desire to exclude me from the Conference for fear I might there lead the weaker nations against them." Herbert Hoover, The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1958), p.66.

hostile influence in Europe"[23] and fell in with the French desire of holding the Conference at Paris. By this decision Wilson transferred the seat of prospective peace-making from a neutral environment into the very atmosphere of victory, hatred and revenge, for Paris had been threatened by the German army and shelled by heavy German artillery less than half a year before; he also made it inevitable that Clemenceau, the host, would become the President of the Conference.

Wilson arrived in France on December 14, and spent the next few weeks in paying diplomatic visits to Britain and Italy. The immense enthusiasm with which the French, British, and Italian people welcomed him seems to have strengthened Wilson's conviction that they would follow him, if necessary, even against their own governments. At the same time Lloyd George conducted his victorious "khaki" election. All this delayed the convocation of the Conference still further. The delay proved later to have most unfortunate consequences because the fraternal spirit between the victorious nations, which had been created by the common dangers and sacrifices of the war, began to be replaced by selfish nationalist aims as soon as the memory of the common effort receded into the background.[24]

During the month of December, 1918, the situation in Europe had become partially clarified. Eastern Europe was still a seething cauldron, but this thesis is not concerned either with the highly complicated affairs of Russia or with most of the troubles in which newly established

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[23] The Intimate Papers of Colonel House: Arranged as a Narrative, ed. Charles Seymour (4 Vols.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1926), IV, p.218. In early November, 1918, there was serious labour unrest in Switzerland; also during the war the extreme Marxists, including Lenin, had made their headquarters there; and, presumably, the German Secret Service was still active in the country.

[24] Ibid., p.251.

Poland soon found herself. Nor must we forget that before June 28, 1919, the main concern of most of the victorious states centred around Germany. In Central Europe the new states consolidated themselves but violence was never far off. An explosive situation existed along the northern and eastern frontiers of Hungary. A local war was in progress between Austrians and Yugoslavs in southern Carinthia, and a major war between Czechs and Poles over Teschen seemed imminent. The forcible occupation of the German parts of Bohemia and Moravia by Czech troops led to vain protests of the new Austrian government to the Supreme Council in Paris. During these events, the policy of France which aimed at enlarging the new states of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia at the expense of Germany, Austria, and Hungary was already apparent. The greatest concern was caused by the events in the Adriatic area. Under the armistice agreement, Italian troops had occupied areas which roughly corresponded to the line drawn by the Treaty of London.[25] Several high-handed actions by Italian commanders, such as the cutting-off of supplies for Dalmatia in order to coerce the pro-Yugoslav population and the occupation of Fiume, created a tense situation between Italy and Yugoslavia.[26] At the same time, the Italian government and press began to adopt an increasingly intransigent tone towards Yugoslavia and also France who was suspected of trying to thwart Italy's aspirations.

It was under these pressing circumstances that the victorious Allies had to make arrangements for the coming Peace Conference. For that purpose the armistice proceedings might present a likely starting-off point.

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[25]See Map IIIa. Also above p.26.

[26]Frederick Palmer, Bliss, Peacemaker: The Life and Letters of Tasker Howard Bliss (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1934), p.365.

> The example of the Armistice negotiations suggested that the approach to permanent peace should be accomplished in four steps. The Armistice conventions had ended the fighting and established general principles; a series of preliminary treaties could then settle concrete essentials, a general peace treaty could make the definite settlement of details, and then an even more general agreement, including neutrals with the ex-belligerents could specify the plan of a League of Nations to "organize peace." This was the agenda which seemed natural in November . . . .[27]

What, then, were these "general principles"? According to the pre-Armistice correspondence, they were Wilson's pronouncements with the Fourteen Points as the core. But there were also the commitments of the Allies towards one another, and the promises of the Allied statesmen to their own peoples.[28] Other possibilities were the right of conquest, or the principle that "the enemy was responsible for the war and must therefore suffer the consequences."[29]

After the conclusion of the Armistice, Paris remained the centre of Allied political activity because it was the seat of the Supreme Council which was the former Supreme War Council under a new name. It now became the nucleus of the coming Conference. Thus, possibly, close proximity helped the French government to assume the organizational initiative. On November 15 the French Foreign Office made certain suggestions to Colonel House as to procedure and organization of the preliminary Peace Conference.[30] The French plan ignored the Fourteen Points and proposed the Allied Declaration of January 10, 1917,[31] as the

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[27]Robert C. Binkley, "New Light on the Paris Conference," Political Science Quarterly, XLVI (1931), p.337.

[28]For instance the slogans of the British "khaki" election, above p.31.

[29]Binkley, Political Science Quarterly, XLVI, p.338.

[30]Clemenceau told House that this Preliminary Conference, where the Great Powers who had dictated the Armistice, would dictate the preliminary peace to the enemy, would take about three weeks. The following Peace Congress would last approximately four months. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, p.213.

[31]See Appendix E.

basis of negotiations. It confirmed the peoples' right of self-determination but modified it in favour of "a certain homogeneousness of States, principally applicable to Bohemia, Tyrol, Istria, Dalmatia, Luxemburg . . . ."[32] It also suggested that all agreements reached during the war should be suspended. This idea seems to have been developed by the French government in order to justify a "strong" Rhineland policy against Germany.[33] An amendment to this draft on November 21 added the statement of Germany's war guilt as one of the guiding principles and once more rejected the Fourteen Points as "point of departure" because they "do not possess the concrete character indispensable for approaching the precise regulations of concrete stipulations."[34] A similar scheme, handed to the Secretary of State by the French Ambassador in Washington on November 29 repeated the suggestion that all treaties arrived at by some of the Allies only during the war should be suspended. It touched another unsolved problem by stating that "the representatives of the Great Powers will have to come to an agreement on the principles of representation of the several belligerent, neutral, and enemy states at the Peace Congress. . . ." It proposed that only the representatives of the victorious Great Powers should attend all of its sessions. It introduced the idea that "the enemy has no right to discuss the terms that will be imposed upon him by the victors . . . ."[35] without actually suggesting complete exclusion of enemy countries from the Peace Conference. The

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[32]U.S., Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1919: The Paris Peace Conference (12 Vols.; Washington: U.S.Government Printing Office, 1942-1947), I, p.349.

[33]Binkley, Political Science Quarterly, XLVI, p.343.

[34]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, I, p.353.

[35]Ibid., p.367.

French schemes ran counter to the United States position not only on the Fourteen Points but also concerning the attitude towards the enemy. They were in consequence completely ignored by Wilson.

On December 2-3 a conference was held in London between Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Sonnino. They agreed, subject to the approval of the United States, upon holding an Inter-Allied Conference before the start of the Preliminary Conference. It was decided that smaller Powers were not to be represented except when questions concerning them were on the agenda. The British Dominions and India, for instance, would be able to be present, as additional members of the British delegation, when matters concerning them were discussed. This represented a success for the French, although in deference to the United States the smaller states were not completely excluded. Immediately afterwards the French government began to invite some of the "Lesser Allies" to send representatives to the coming Inter-Allied Conference. This action caused the British government, on December 11, to ask France to formulate the principles of representation. Two days later the French Foreign Minister Pichon suggested a scheme which gave five delegates for each of the Great Powers, three each for the "Lesser Allies", two each for the new states and one each for states in formation and neutrals. Enemy countries were not to be invited. During the next few weeks further negotiations between the Great Powers and other states took place in order to determine who was to be invited, and which of the new states should be recognized as friendly, neutral, or hostile. This was not easy.

> The Austrians and Hungarians claimed that their revolutions had rendered them neutrals and taken them out of the war without a treaty of peace; the Poles and Czechs held that their revolutions had made them belligerents without a declaration of war. The Serbian Government denied its own existence and claimed recognition as the Government of Yugoslavia, an ally. The Italian Government

> denied the existence of Yugoslavia, and regarded the Yugoslavs as an enemy people.[36]

In the end, the French point of view triumphed, and the enemy countries were not invited, new Austria and Hungary being considered as belonging to that category.

When Wilson arrived in Europe, he immediately raised the issue of the agenda. He opposed the idea of a formal Inter-Allied Conference, and suggested that all preliminary consultations should be informal. This stand was probably determined by the realization that the United States Senate was now in unfriendly hands, and might use its constitutional power of non-ratification to delay the fulfilment of the President's plans. Wilson wanted to make the League the centre of the formal Peace Treaty.

> The logic of the position was that if the League should be evolved first, not only would its acceptance be assured, but it would strike the key note of the whole Conference and affect the decision of all other points in the treaty. Its protection could be offered as a substitute for strategic frontiers.[37]

The British government showed little inclination to take sides in this dispute between the United States and France, but the Italians definitely supported Wilson. They not only resented the French idea of abrogating all "Secret Treaties," but Orlando also probably hoped that his positive attitude towards the League would be reciprocated later on by Wilson when Italy's claims under the Treaty of London came up for settlement. The French replied on January 8 with the "Tardieu Draft." It tried to meet the Americans and Italians half-way by allowing a certain precedence to the statutes of the League of Nations, but only as a "directing principle" along with nine other directing principles, some of which were

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[36]Binkley, Political Science Quarterly, XLVI, p.352.

[37]Ibid., p.355.

not Wilsonian, for instance, war responsibility. It dropped the proposal to abrogate the Secret Treaties and maintained the right of nations to self-determination. It also abandoned the idea that the Fourteen Points were unsuitable as basis of the settlement. Its suggestions on representation were similar to those of Pichon's Note of December 13.

The Tardieu Draft was still under discussion when the Conference began on January 12 with a meeting of the Supreme Council. It was decided that at these Great Power meetings each Power should be represented by the Head of Government and the Foreign Minister. When the Japanese delegates arrived on the following day --the London Conference had agreed to give Japan full equality with the other four victorious Great Powers--the Supreme Council became the "Council of Ten." The membership of this Council of Ten consisted of President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing of the United States, Premier Lloyd George and Foreign Minister Balfour of Britain, Premier Clemenceau and Foreign Minister Pichon of France, Premier Orlando and Foreign Minister Sonnino of Italy, Chinda and Matsui, Ambassadors Extraordinary, of Japan. "The long interval between Armistice and Conference had produced neither a preliminary treaty nor a comprehensive agreement concerning the Conference itself."[38]

## C. THE EARLY STAGES OF THE CONFERENCE

### 1. The Council of Ten and the Plenary Conference

The January 12 meeting of the Supreme Council[39] is generally

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[38] F. S. Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919: Organization and Procedure (London: Oxford University Press, 1944), p.53.

[39] On certain occasions, for instance, when the chief military men were included in its meetings, the Council of Ten reverted to the original title of Supreme War Council.

regarded as the start of the Paris Peace Conference. An essential question was still not solved: who would dominate the Conference, the Great Powers or the smaller states. The Great Powers were determined to keep control of the proceedings, although they differed on the degree: the French insisted on a maximum, while the Americans were content with a minimum measure of control. French and Americans also differed on the question of formality: Clemenceau, probably because he wanted to maintain a greater measure of control over the Conference, desired a larger degree of formality than Wilson. The French eventually won their point, and it was decided to hold a plenary session of the Conference on January 18.

The other problems were the establishment of rules of procedure, a decision concerning the invitation of states which had broken off relations with the enemy, and the number of plenipotentiaries allotted to each state participating at the Conference. The Council of Ten met throughout the whole week, and reached an agreement on January 17 on both questions.[40] Other important decisions were the future practice of reaching a unanimous agreement at the meetings of the Council of Ten, and to hold these meetings in private. The rules of procedure, which were not to be submitted to the Plenary Conference for endorsement, ensured the control of the Conference by the Great Powers:

> After an opening speech by the President of the French Republic, M. Clemenceau was to take charge of the proceedings, and his subsequent formal election as President of the Conference was inevitably to follow. In his hands would be the appointment of a Secretary-General and his assistants who would together form the General Secretariat of the Conference . . . .
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> . . . . . .

The two organs of the Conference, which, according to the Rules

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[40]See Appendix G concerning representation at the Conference.

> of Procedure, were to be established by the inaugural session, the Credentials Committee and the Central Drafting Committee, were to be composed of nominees of the Great Powers only.[41]

The drafting of the treaties was also to remain in the hands of the Great Powers by the rule that their experts alone would prepare the actual draft.

Everything went according to plan at the first plenary session of the Conference. From now on the Paris Peace Conference consisted of two parallel conferences: the Council of Ten,[42] and the Plenary Conference which was made up of all the states attending the Peace Conference. The Great Powers, however, had no plans ready on the division of work between the two bodies; neither were they yet agreed on an agenda, because the Council of Ten had completely ignored the sections of the Tardieu Draft which dealt with agenda and organization, and because a proposal by Wilson who had on January 13 suggested the following topics: "League of Nations, Reparations, New States, Boundaries, Colonies," to be dealt with in the order given, had been sidetracked by his colleagues as too general for this stage.

The relationship between the two bodies determined the subsequent actions of the Council of Ten. The Plenary Conference would have to be given something to do, and, as President Wilson point out, "this should be something definitely connected with the process of peacemaking and not merely the appearance of work."[43] Yet, the Great Powers were determined to keep the agenda under their own control. This was achieved by asking the delegations of the attending states to submit all suggestions

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[41]Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919, pp.66-67.

[42]The Japanese delegates of the Council of Ten usually stayed away from the meetings, unless specifically Japanese interests were involved.

[43]Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919, p.72.

to the General Secretariat which would consider them and finally submit them to the Great Powers for approval. The Council of Ten then turned over the problems of War Guilt, International Labour Organization, League of Nations, Reparations, and Transit (Ports, Waterways, and Railways) to the consideration of the Plenary Conference, having fixed beforehand the terms of reference and the number of members of the commissions which were to be set up.

At the second meeting of the Plenary Conference on January 25, some of the delegates of the "Lesser Allies" protested against this dictation by the Great Powers but were quickly put in their place by Clemenceau.[44] After that, the predominance of the Great Powers was never in question. Several more commissions were set up in March, dealing with Finance, Economics and Aviation, and in each the delegates of the Great Powers outnumbered the others.

> It will be clearly seen that the role of the full Inter-Allied Conference was in actual practice a very restricted one. The Great Powers entirely reserved for their own handling all matters affecting three most vital classes of problems before the Conference: colonial, territorial and military.[45]

The work of these commissions is beyond the scope of this thesis with the exception of the League Commission under President Wilson's chairmanship, because of the great influence which the League was meant to exercise in the shaping of the terms of peace and their future application, and also because it determined the attitude of the United States Senate towards the ratification of the peace treaties later on. The Commission reported back to the fourth session of the Plenary Conference

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[44]Clemenceau said: "I will remind you that it was we who decided that there should be a Conference at Paris . . . . If we had not kept before us the great question of the League of Nations we might have perhaps been selfish enough to consult only each other. It was our right." U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, III, pp.196-97.

[45]Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919, p.95.

on February 14, despite the opposition of Clemenceau who feared that this might create a precedent, and its final report was approved by the fifth session on April 28. It had used the United States plan as the basis of discussion. Lansing, Wilson's Secretary of State, later voiced the opinion that Wilson's intense preoccupation with the League delayed the conclusion of the Peace Treaties considerably.[46]

While the Plenary Conference met only six times between January 18 and May 6, the Council of Ten met eighty-four times between January 12 and March 24, usually attended by a variety of technical experts. There was still no fixed program, and matters were dealt with as they presented themselves. This may have been a survival of the war-time habit of waiting upon events.[47] On January 23 the "Small Powers" were asked to register their claims with the Secretariat before February 1, possibly to conciliate them for their lack of importance at the Conference,[48] and the interval was used to deal with colonial matters. At the same time, the Council of Ten, as the successor of the Supreme Council, had to deal with all military and economic matters which arose out of the war, especially the execution and periodic extension of the armistice terms, and the supply of starving Europe. "Never in all history had there been such complete centralization of power in the hands of a few men, coupled with such a vast field for its exercise."[49] Several commissions and other bodies dealing with these problems were

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[46]Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921), pp.173-74.

[47]Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919: Being Reminiscences of the Paris Peace Conference (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1933), pp.101-02.

[48]Marston, The Peace Conference 1919, p.100.

[49]Ibid., p.104.

established during February. Eastern Europe was still in turmoil, and in Russia civil war between the Bolsheviks and their enemies was now in full progress; both sides having declined an invitation by the Peace Conference to send delegates for an exchange of views to the island of Prinkipo in the Sea of Marmara. The problem of Bolshevism and the threat of its advance into Central Europe were continuously present at the Peace Conference. The major issue of the Peace Conference, the settlement with Germany, had not even begun to be discussed by the end of February. The main reason for this delay probably lay in the fact that the Council of Ten was unsuitable for the tasks confronting it. It was too large, and the presence of Premiers and Foreign Ministers precluded any division of labour.[50] However, with the establishment of Territorial Committees, between February 1-27, the Council had taken a large step towards the settlement of the territorial problems.

It should be remembered that, apart from the officially invited delegations, many other delegates, who had not been invited, also arrived in Paris. They represented a motley of countries and causes; very frequently several delegations claimed to represent the same country but belonged to different factions. They all hoped to secure the aid of President Wilson, the prophet of a new and better world, in order to have their wrongs righted.

2. The Territorial Committees.

It was in the Territorial Committees that the numerous experts of the various delegations found scope to apply their knowledge. On

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[50]This is Marston's opinion, The Peace Conference of 1919, p.109. Binkley, however, has a more favourable estimate of the Council's work: "About half of the Treaty was written by commissions appointed between January 21 and January 27." Binkley, Political Science Quarterly, XLVI, p.530.

January 22 Wilson complained about the slow progress of the Conference owing to the lack of organization.[51] The continuation of the various little wars in Central and Eastern Europe also created a sense of urgency. On January 24 the Council of Ten warned all belligerents that "possession gained by force will seriously prejudice the claims of those who use such means."[52] On January 29, having listened to the lengthy statements of the Poles and Czechs on their conflict over Teschen, most of the delegates of the Council of Ten realized that the time had been wasted because the experts of the various delegations had prepared different approaches to the problem. This led Wilson to suggest to some members of the Inquiry[53] to approach the British experts in order to draw up joint recommendations. On the following day, Colonel House contacted Sir William Tyrrel of the British delegation for that purpose.

> The new and officially inspired co-operation . . . led also to co-operation among experts of all the Great Powers as members of committees duly appointed by the Council. The move to establish these was made by Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson . . . . [They] both contended that such committees ought to be established and their reports received before there were any further discussions of the claims of the Small Powers by the Council of Ten . . . .[54]

However Balfour, the British Foreign Minister, was in favour of postponing the establishment of such committees until after hearing the delegates of the minor states in each case, in order to enable the experts to come face to face with the problems they were to consider, and perhaps also

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[51] The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, p.274.

[52] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, III, p.715.

[53] Above, pp.39-40.

[54] Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919, p.114.

to satisfy the vanity of the smaller states.[55] His view finally prevailed, and "efficiency was sacrificed to courtesy."[56] On February 1, after the Rumanians and Serbs, who both had claims to the Banat in southeastern Hungary, had concluded their appearance before the Council, Lloyd George again pressed for the appointment of a joint committee of experts to examine these claims. Wilson remarked that the United States had a body of experts and scholars at their disposal whose opinions would guide him in future unless the British proposal was accepted. He also stated, probably as a hint to the Italians, that the United States were not bound by "any of the treaties in question," referring to a "Secret Treaty" upon which Rumania had entered the war in 1916, and therefore could "approve a settlement on a basis of facts."[57] In spite of the Italians who objected on the ground that the drawing of boundaries had political implications which concerned the Great Powers alone, and who also had an obvious interest to uphold the Secret Treaty with Rumania, the Anglo-American proposal prevailed, and a Rumanian Affairs Committee, consisting of delegations of the Great Powers, was set up "to reduce the questions for decisions within the narrowest possible limits, and to make recommendations for a just settlement."[58]

Orlando had reluctantly agreed, provided that the establishment of the Rumanian Affairs Committee did not create a precedent. Nevertheless, the establishment of such committees became the practice, and

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[55] Binkley, Political Science Quarterly, XLVI, p.535.

[56] Ibid.

[57] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, III, p.854.

[58] Ibid., p.855.

during the following eleven days three more committees, dealing with Greek, Czechoslovak, and Belgian claims respectively, were created. The Yugoslav claims were referred to the Rumanian Committee, and those of Albania and Denmark to the Greek and Belgian committees respectively. The Polish Affairs Committee began with the establishment of an Allied Mission in Warsaw on January 22 which was to deal with the fighting between the Poles and Ukranians in Eastern Galicia; three weeks later a Liaison Committee was set up in Paris to deal with reports and requests from the Warsaw Mission. On January 31, the Chairman of the Allied Mission to Poland reported on the Teschen situation and suggested the stationing of an Inter-Allied Commission there. Thus the Teschen Commission was created on February 3.

The instructions furnished to these committees were not precise. Wilson's original idea that general principles should be laid down first before the experts began their labours was not accepted. However, the Council of Ten agreed with Wilson's suggestion that the experts were not to consider political aspects. Only the Italians realized that "any recommendation for a settlement must, in effect, take political factors into account."[59]

> There was, it would appear, an unwritten understanding that the experts were to endeavour to draw the frontiers in accordance with the principle of nationality and that the application of this principle did not constitute an incursion into the sphere of political issues; but the extent to which, if at all, other factors of the supposed wishes of the inhabitants were to be considered, was not defined.[60]

This made even the application of the principle of self-determination difficult because it was a political factor. Nationality, then, one of

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[59] Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919, p.117.

[60] Ibid.

the main planks of Wilson's program, came to matter most in the drawing of frontiers, but other factors could not be entirely ignored:

> If a chain of mountains or a river offered a natural frontier, it might seem advisable to depart slightly from the linguistic line. If an agricultural district of Jugo-Slavs were economically dependent upon a German-Austrian city, it might be wise to leave the district in Austria. If the linguistic line were crossed and recrossed by a railway or canal, it would be questionable policy not to arrange the political frontier in such a way as to leave the railway or canal entirely within one state or the other, so as to avoid troublesome customs interference with trade. It might even be necessary to consider whether a district should not be assigned to one state because it needed its agricultural or mineral wealth in order to secure economic independence, whereas the rival state did not.[61]

On February 18, after the Yugoslav claims had been heard by the Council of Ten, Sonnino declared that "Italy could not take part in any Commission or in any discussion outside the Conference, or allow any Committee to make recommendations, regarding questions outstanding between Italy and the Yugo-Slavs.[62] Clemenceau immediately added that "this question resembled that of the Rhine which also could not be entrusted to a Committee. Such questions had to be dealt with in the Council . . . ."[63] It was decided to reserve frontier questions concerning any of the Great Powers for the Council of Ten.

The members of the Territorial Committees assumed their function to be merely advisory, and this had probably been the original intention of the Council of Ten;[64] however, most of their findings were eventually accepted without alteration. The Committees were set up to investigate the claims of a particular state; as a consequence there was no co-ordination between the various Committees as to the effects of their work

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[61]House and Seymour (ed.), What Really Happened at Paris, p.99.

[62]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, IV, p.54.

[63]Ibid., p.55.

[64]Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p.129.

on an individual enemy state. The Central Territorial Committee was created on February 27 to coordinate the activities of the various Territorial Committees, and also to deal with enemy frontiers not yet under discussion, but it was not very successful.[65] Thus a very great responsibility fell on the delegates of the Territorial Committees. The Japanese did only in a few instances appoint delegates, and the interests of the Italians were rather limited. The American experts, while extremely learned, lacked political experience, and the British members were often inexperienced or unsuitable for this type of work, largely because Lloyd George apparently wanted to keep the delegates from the Dominions busy. Nicolson, who was a British delegate at various Territorial Committees, conveys the impression that the British and American delegates agreed on a fairly wide range of topics,[66] while Seymour, United States Territorial Expert, states that the British supported the pro-Czechoslovak and pro-Rumanian policy of the French, while the Americans desired absolute justice because it promised better chances of permanence.[67] Thus the experienced French delegates, who usually acted as the Chairmen, and who were ably led by Tardieu and J. Cambon, exercised the main influence in the Territorial Committees.[68] Their consistent policy was to expand the frontiers and resources of the friendly new states whom they regarded as their future clients and eastern bulwarks against Germany. The Committees had authority to consult delegates of the states concerned but were discouraged from

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[65]All authorities on the Paris Peace Conference agreed on this point.

[66]Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p.259.

[67]House and Seymour (ed.), What Really Happened at Paris, pp.97-98.

[68]Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919, p.122.

leaving Paris for on the spot investigations. Their Paris consultations, however, became more repetitions of the "auditions" before the Council of Ten, "and just as wasteful of time."[69] Enemy representatives were, of course, not consulted. This led to an unforeseen result: expecting the enemy delegates to come and bargain, the claimants had put forward their maximum demands, and these now became the final demands.[70]

Working steadily throughout February and March, the Territorial Committees which, as the Conference progressed, were with increasing frequency also called "Territorial Commissions," drew up their reports in the last days of March and early April.

3. The Establishment of the Council of Four

Wilson, Lloyd George, and Orlando had to leave the Paris Conference in the middle of February: Wilson went to the United States in order to dispel the increasing suspicion about the League of Nations, Lloyd George had to render account to the new House of Commons, and Orlando tried to calm the very turbulent public opinion in Italy. They returned in March. Meanwhile, the armistice with Germany was due for renewal, and Foch, the Allied Commander-in-Chief, began to fear that the Allied forces would demobilize too quickly while peace was still not in sight. He therefore began to urge that the next renewal of the Armistice terms should be final. As a consequence, on February 12 the Supreme War Council decided to renew the armistice and to arrange for the drawing up of the final military terms.[71]

The question arose now whether these terms were going to be clearly

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[69] Ibid., p.123.

[70] Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace, p.214.

[71] The expression "military" also covers naval and air armaments in this context.

"final" or part of the preliminary settlement.[72] The temporary absence of the British and the United States leaders made it, for the moment, quite impossible to clarify the situation, but the realization grew that the drafting of the final military terms would have to include other related matters. From his meeting with the Germans on February 16, Foch concluded that, at the moment, they would accept any terms, and he at once composed a document, suggesting the settlement of the frontiers and the first reparation installment.

Meanwhile Balfour and House attempted to speed up the Conference proceedings. On February 16 they decided to approach the delegates of the other Great Powers. Agreement was reached quickly, and on February 22 Balfour introduced several resolutions in the Council of Ten, proposing the consideration of other preliminary peace terms with Germany besides the military clauses, and asking several Commissions to have their reports ready soon. These resolutions, amended under Sonnino's pressure to include all enemy countries, were adopted on the 24. Whether these resolutions of Balfour's really affected the progress of the Conference, is a matter of debate among historians,[73] but the legal experts at the Conference felt that separate military terms would have to be associated with an armistice rather than with a peace treaty.[74] The other delegates, however, still did not realize that these developments would probably create a final treaty.

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[72]The Rules of Procedure of the Conference used the title "Preliminary Peace Conference", thereby creating the impression that, after the arrangement of such preliminaries, enemy delegates would be included to form the Final Peace Congress. Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919, p.137.

[73]Marston feels that the Council of Ten "appears to have taken no effective steps to ensure that they [the resolutions] should have definite results" while Binkley asserts that "preliminary peace was telescoped with the general peace by expanding its agenda." Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919, p.147; Binkley, Political Science Quarterly, XLVI, p.545.

[74]Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919, p.145.

> The phraseology which maintained the fiction that the Conference was engaged upon the preparation of the preliminaries of peace, though quite meaningless by the early days of March, was nevertheless still used for some time . . . . By the end of April, however, there was a belated official recognition of the true facts of the case . . . .[75]

Wilson returned from the United States on March 14 with the bitter realization that the opposition at home to his new world order based on the League of Nations was very substantial.[76] At first he toyed with the idea of negotiating a Preliminary Treaty which would include the League of Nations, believing that such a Treaty could be concluded without ratification by the Senate; this would have meant that the League would have functioned by the time the Final Treaty came up for ratification.[77] However, the President's legal advisers at the Conference quickly convinced him that this plan was unconstitutional, and it appears that only then Wilson abandoned the idea of a Preliminary Treaty.[78] It was also apparent that many important problems still awaited solution.

During the absence of Wilson, Lloyd George and Orlando, an "inner group" had developed within the Council of Ten. The Council was not only too cumbersome for efficient work but the large number of people so frequently in attendance owing to the continuing presence of experts also led to most embarrassing leakages to the press. Consequently, House, who represented the absent Wilson, Clemenceau, who spoke English

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[75] Ibid., pp.149-50.

[76] "Evidently the President is in a highly nervous condition and the confidence that animated him as he left for Washington is gone" observed Stephen Bonsal, member of Colonel House's staff, on March 24. Stephen Bonsal, Suitors and Suppliants: The Little Nations at Versailles (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1946), p.263.

[77] Lansing, The Peace Negotiations, pp.206-07.

[78] Ibid., p.212.

fluently, and Balfour began to hold informal conferences where they, quite alone, discussed questions which could not be settled by commissions,[79] while, at the same time, the regular meetings of the Council of Ten were continued. Colonel House's diary refers to meetings on March 4, 7 and 10, and mentions the "encouragement" which the three men derived from the speed of their progress.[80] After his return to Paris on March 5, Lloyd George replaced Balfour at these meetings. "It would appear that at the meeting of the 10th . . . [they] came to the tentative agreement to suspend the regular meetings of the Ten on the return of President Wilson."[81] On March 12 House arranged for a meeting between Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau on March 14, and Clemenceau adjourned the usual Council meeting of that afternoon (March 12); it did not meet daily after that.[82]

> On the afternoon of Wilson's arrival, March 14, was held what may be regarded as the first meeting of the 'Council of Four,' although on this occasion Orlando was absent. Thereafter, all the more important decisions of the Prime Ministers were taken at these informal meetings . . . .[83]

On March 19 the Council of Ten met to discuss the Polish-German frontier but failed to reach agreement owing to the differences between Britain and France. A decision had to be postponed, and, at the same time, there were new leakages to the press.

> The meeting of the 19 was of great importance in the development of the Conference because it demonstrated conclusively that the Council of Ten was completely unsuitable for the discussion of big

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[79] The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, p.342.

[80] Ibid., pp.355-60.

[81] Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919, p.162.

[82] The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, pp.386-87.

[83] Ibid., p.387.

controversial issues of this kind, affecting the vital interests of the Great Powers.[84]

Another meeting on the 22 was still unable to agree on the Polish-German frontier, and the extremely delicate question of the Rhineland was not even touched.

By now four months had elapsed since the conclusion of the armistice, and two months since the Peace Conference had assembled, but peace, for which the peoples of Europe were impatiently waiting, was still not in sight. Public anxiety and anger at the slow progress in Paris mounted steadily, kindled by the press which, excluded from the deliberations, had to rely on "leakages" and guess work. One must also remember that in a democratic country with a responsible government the Premier is very sensitive to public pressure. "The Prime Ministers were far from exercising supreme power. They might compromise, if they possessed the skill, but they would not be permitted [by their respective publics] to yield."[85] At the same moment, events in Central and Eastern Europe took a grave turn. Fighting between Bolsheviks and anti-Bolsheviks[86] in the Ukraine, and between Poles and Ukrainians in eastern Galicia increased in intensity, and on March 21 the Communists seized power in Hungary. The dangers of delay in Paris were now obvious. Therefore, at the end of the meeting of the Council of Ten on March 22, it was decided to have the Secretary-General draw up a list of questions ready for immediate discussion, giving priority to Germany, and to hold a private meeting of the Heads of Government before the next Council of Ten meeting. Although not the first meeting of this kind, the meeting

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[84]Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919, p.160.

[85]The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, p.378.

[86]Since the establishment of the Third International in Moscow in March, 1919, the Bolsheviks were usually referred to as Communists.

of the Heads on the afternoon of the 24 became the first "official" meeting of the new "Council of Four," and the following meeting of the Council of Ten proved to be the last of that body.

Thus the Council of Four was officially established. Japan was excluded because it had only "special," not "general," interests. This new body ensured speed and complete secrecy, only a secretary and an interpreter being present in addition to the four Heads.

> The decisions had to be made by the 'Big Four' because they alone could assume political responsibility for what they were doing. The result was that these four lone men, who were experts in nothing had to become experts in everything.[87]

This complete secrecy enabled compromises to be made without creating difficulties at home. Of the four participants, Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau formed the "inner group"[88] or "Big Three," Orlando absenting himself for two weeks after April 21 and then again, in May and June. Altogether, the Council of Four held more than 200 meetings in a little over three months.

The executive and general work of the former Council of Ten was taken over by the simultaneously established Council of Foreign Ministers, also called "Council of Five" because Japan was represented. Its conferences were formal, and it met thirty-two times. Its main labours were concerned with the blockade of Germany and the processing of the reports of the Territorial Committees. Both Councils met jointly five times, reverting on these occasions to the title of "Supreme War Council."

The Council of Four decided to tackle the main problems of the Conference immediately. During the three months of its existence it concluded the German Treaty and completed most of the Austrian Treaty. It

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[87] Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace, p.162.

[88] Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919, p.167.

was during this period that President Wilson, his health undermined by overwork, and his prestige weakened by lack of support from home, had to fight for his principles against the claims of France, Italy, and Japan. While the claims of France and Japan do not concern this thesis, the territorial demands of Italy fall within its scope, and were destined nearly to wreck the Peace Conference.

# CHAPTER III

## III. THE EARLY PHASE OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

### A. THE FRONTIERS OF ITALY

#### 1. Italy and the World War

##### a. Italy and the World Before 1914

After nearly 1500 years of political disunity, Italy became an independent and unified nation in the second half of the nineteenth century under the parliamentary rule of the royal family of Savoy. This independence was achieved after a bitter struggle against the rule of the Habsburgs. The next decades of Italy's history were taken up by internal problems. However, other tasks confronted the new country, too: some Italians were still under the rule of the Habsburgs,[1] and in the age of imperialism, overseas expansion was the aim of all large and many medium-sized Powers except the Habsburg Monarchy. Italy established the colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland on the east coast of Africa, and later on conquered Libya on the Mediterranean coast from the Turks. The main target of her early colonial desires was Tunisia, but in 1881 France seized that prize. The disappointment made Italy aware of the weakness of her international position. Thus, when invited by Germany, she agreed to join the Dual Alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary in 1882, making it the Triple Alliance. In spite of this partnership, Italy's relations with the Habsburg Empire remained uneasy: there were the "unredeemed" Italians under Habsburg rule, and, furthermore, both countries were

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[1]See Appendix A and Map I.

rivals in the Adriatic and the Balkan peninsula. An Italian diplomat summed up the situation when he said that both countries had to be, of necessity, either allies or enemies.[2] On the other hand, both for sentimental and strategic reasons Italy was determined to remain on friendly terms with Great Britain: during the nineteenth century Britain had consistently supported her struggle for unity and independence, and furthermore, Britain's control of the Mediterranean made the retention of British friendship imperative for the safety of Italy's extended coast line.

The passage of time helped to assuage Italy's anger against France. By the turn of the century the relations between the "Latin sisters" were undergoing a marked improvement, while, after Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia in 1908, the relationship of the incongruous allies deteriorated. Italy, in order to check further Habsburg progress in the Balkans, reached an understanding with Russia. At the same time, the certainty that in case of war Germany and Britain would fight on opposite sides weakened Italy's loyalty to her German ally as well. Thus it is not surprising that, when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on July 28, 1914, Italy declared a policy of strict neutrality. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss Italy's technical justification for her attitude under the terms of the Triple Alliance. The basic fact of the matter is that to "have joined Germany and Austria would have put Italy in the position of waging war in furtherance of interests inimical to her own."[3]

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[2]Maxwell H. H. Macartney and Paul Cremona, Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy 1914-1937 (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), p.19.

[3]René Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938), p.13.

b. The Treaty of London

Right from the start of the crisis in July, 1914, Italy showed concern over the possibility that Austria-Hungary's position in the Balkans might be strengthened by the acquisition of Serbian territory, and began to hint to the Central Powers about "compensations" for herself.[4] Italy's views were supported by the German government which began to impress on Austria-Hungary the necessity of conciliating Italy. However, at first the Habsburg statesmen refused to consider any concessions to Italy at all. When the possibility of a long war became apparent, Salandra, the Italian Prime Minister, and Sonnino, his Foreign Minister, began to prepare for future developments. They were confronted by several alternatives. Having adopted a neutral attitude, Italy could not expect anything from the Central Powers if they won the war. On the other hand, should the Allies be successful, they would not be under any obligation to consider Italy either. Neutrality, then, would probably lead to future insignificance. This consideration pointed towards participation in the war on the side of the Allies. As fall and winter progressed, public opinion in Italy gradually began to favour that course.

In December 1914 Italian pressure on Austria-Hungary began in earnest and the Italians specifically stated that they wanted Austrian territory. Once more Germany, of necessity if not conviction, supported Italy's stand, but the new Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Burian was as intransigent as his predecessor Berchtold. He felt that Italy had no right to ask for Austrian territory, although he was ready to make

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[4]Article VII of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance stated that, should the status quo in the Balkans between Austria-Hungary and Italy be disturbed in favour of one Power, the other Power would be entitled to "compensation."

concessions in Albania, and he also feared that any cession of Habsburg territory in war time would have bad repercussions at home, especially on the morale of the army, and might also encourage Rumania to ask for Transylvania. On February 12, 1915, Sonnino threatened to break off discussions, and, four days later, he sent a memorandum to the Italian Ambassador in London, stating under what conditions Italy would be prepared to enter the war on the side of the Allies. On March 4 the Italian Ambassador handed the memorandum to the British Foreign Secretary, stating Italy's aims as

> the liberation of the Italians under foreign rule, the obtention [sic] of a secure Alpine frontier; the securing in the Adriatic of sufficient guarantees against the danger of leaving too extensive a stretch of coast in the hands of the Slavs; and finally, the safeguarding of Italy's interest as a Mediterranean Power.[5]

In order to achieve the fulfillment of these aims, Italy demanded the Trentino, and South Tyrol to the Brenner Pass, all of Istria, all the Adriatic islands, most of Dalmatia, Valona in Albania, full sovereignty over the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean Sea,[6] and a share of Turkish territory should the Ottoman Empire be partitioned. The Allied statesmen were prepared to meet Italy's conditions; there were serious misgivings only about Dalmatia because the Russians felt that Serbia needed a larger share of the eastern Adriatic coast than there would be left if all of Italy's demands were granted.

Meanwhile, under strong German pressure, the Austro-Hungarians on March 27 offered the cession of the Trentino, but Sonnino rejected this offer as insufficient and on April 10 revealed Italy's demands:

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[5]Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.26.

[6]Italy held the islands of the Dodecanese off the southwest coast of Asia Minor in temporary military occupation since the war of 1911-1912 against Turkey, pending the final settlement.

cession of the Trentino and part of South Tyrol including Bolzano,[7] Gorizia and Gradisca, the Adriatic islands of the Curzolare group, and Valona; Trieste and surrounding territory were to become an autonomous state, independent of Austria-Hungary. The ceded territories and Trieste were to be evacuated at once by the Habsburg authorities and military personnel. On April 16 Austria-Hungary rejected most of the Italian demands, and on May 4 Italy formally denounced her alliance with Austria-Hungary. Meanwhile the negotiations between Italy and the Triple Entente in London continued, and on Russia's insistence Italy relinquished her demands of southern Dalmatia and some of the Adriatic islands. On April 26 Britain, France, and Russia signed the Treaty of London with Italy.[8] It gave Italy the Brenner frontier in the north, the whole Austrian Littoral in the northeast, most of the Adriatic islands, northern Dalmatia, Valona, the Dodecanese, and the prospect of colonial acquisitions. Mainly due to Sonnino's insistence, the Treaty was to remain secret, largely because Serbia would have bitterly resented Italy's acquisition of parts of Dalmatia.[9]

> The real basis of the Treaty of London must be seen as an application of the doctrine of the balance of power. In 1915 the total dismemberment of the Habsburg Empire . . . was hardly an immediate prospect. The Treaty, therefore, did not attempt to go beyond a division of spoils . . . . Austria-Hungary was to retain an outlet on the Adriatic, and Serbia was to become the Greater Serbia favoured by Russia. To compensate [for this increase of Russian influence in the Balkans] . . . Italy was to have secure control of the Adriatic through the possession of Pola, Valona, and Northern Dalmatia.[10]

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[7]This cession would have brought a considerable number of Germans under Italian rule.

[8]See Appendix F.

[9]Carlo Sforza, Contemporary Italy: Its Intellectual and Moral Origins, trans. Drake and Denise DeKay (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1944), p.197.

[10]Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, pp.30-31.

The Treaty ignored the principle of nationality by handing over 700,000 South Slavs, 230,000 German Austrians, and some Albanians and Greeks to Italy, and thereby ran counter to the strongest sentiment of the age. It was, thereby, bound to create trouble in the future. On May 23, 1915, Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary. It is not the task of this thesis to discuss the ethics of Italy's conduct of foreign policy; the leading historian of Italy's role at the Peace Conference feels that Italy's policy was both blackmail, and, at the same time, "sane and sound national policy."[11]

c. Italy in the World War.

Italy's involvement in the war proved to be much heavier than she had anticipated because the Russian armies were badly weakened by a series of defeats in the summer of 1915 and disintegrated two years later. Thus the Italians found themselves confronted by a substantial proportion of the Habsburg forces, and fought them with small success. Eleven Italian attacks on the Isonzo between 1915-1917 brought little territorial gains but heavy losses in manpower, and a great attack by German and Austro-Hungarian troops at Caporetto in October 1917 forced the Italians to retreat to the Piave. Only as the year of 1918 progressed and the demoralization of the Habsburg forces increased, were the Italians able to score substantial successes. Furthermore, as Britain, France and, later on, United States concentrated their efforts against Germany, by far the stronger of the Central Powers, Italy found herself rather apart from her associates in the conduct of the war. "There was a tendency among the other Powers to come to decisions among themselves, then, as if by afterthought to remember Italy and ask her acquiescence."[12] This

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[11] Ibid., p.17.

[12] Ibid., p.53.

frame of mind was later on to have repercussions at the Peace Conference.

The contents of the Treaty of London nevertheless soon became known to the Serbs,[13] and, consequently, there was no military cooperation between the Serbian and Italian armies in the late spring and summer of 1915. Furthermore, no love was lost between the Italian government and the Yugoslav movement which could have functioned far more efficiently in Italy than in far-away London. Only after Caporetto there was a temporary improvement in Italian Yugoslav relations.[14] However, although liberal elements in Italy pursued a policy which was sympathetic towards Yugoslav aspirations, the attitude of the government remained cautious, and Sonnino never concealed his suspicion of anything that might tend towards modification of any part of the Treaty of London.[15] The entry of the United States in the war gave that country the leadership of the Allies. From the beginning, Sonnino prevented the drafting of an Inter-Allied resolution clarifying Inter-Allied war aims.[16] President Wilson, although informed of the provisions of the Treaty of London by a British Mission to the United States in the spring of 1917,[17] regarded it of only minor importance, and was confident that the strength of the United States would suffice to ensure its revision after the war.[18]

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[13]Macartney and Cremona, Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy, pp.52-53.

[14]Above pp.20-21.

[15]Above, pp.38-39.

[16]Colonel House, most patient of men, entered in his diary on December, 1917: "It is perfectly hopeless trying to get Sonnino into anything progressive or constructive. . . ." The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, III, p.284.

[17]Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, ed. Ray Stannard Baker (8 Vols.; New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1939), VII, pp.74 and 512.

[18]The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, III, p.51. The book also refers to Wilson's habit of "delay in meeting vexatious problems." Ibid., I, p.124.

Under the terms of the armistice with Austria-Hungary on November 3, 1918, the Allies occupied regions which, to a very large measure, corresponded with the territories given to Italy by the Treaty of London.[19] The inevitable fact that these troops were nearly exclusively Italian "tended to obscure the difference between the line of the Treaty of London . . . and the Armistice line which had no value except for military purposes."[20] The armistice agreement with Austria-Hungary did not mention the Fourteen Points,[21] but during the simultaneous armistice negotiations with Germany which were concluded on the basis of the Fourteen Points, the Allies defined their respective attitudes towards, and interpretations of, Wilson's pronouncements. These discussions took place in Paris between October 30 and November 4. Britain made certain objections to Point II of the Fourteen Points (freedom of the seas), and the Italian delegates, Orlando and Sonnino, objected to Point IX (readjustment of Italy's frontiers along clearly recognizable lines of nationality). Sonnino wished to add strategic, geographic and historic factors, but was overruled by Orlando who was under pressure from Lloyd George, Clemenceau and House.[22] On November 3 Italy's objections to Point IX were stated again, this time by Orlando. But he was overborne by his colleagues who pleaded that there should be as few exceptions as

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[19] Above, p.26.

[20] Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, IV, p.123.

[21] As Austria-Hungary had originally asked for a cease-fire based on the Fourteen Points, this omission appears inexplicable, unless, in the excitement of rapidly following events of monumental importance, simply an oversight occurred. Yet the consequence was far-reaching. "Whether or not the Fourteen Points applied to the Austrian peace settlement . . . was never clearly decided." The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, p.177.

[22] Ibid., p.174.

possible to the Fourteen Points.[23] "Thus it came to pass that despite the Italians' awareness of the situation . . . no trace [of Italy's objections to Point IX] appears in any of the exchanges, either between the Allies or Wilson, or between him and the Central Powers."[24] This situation was bound to lead to future difficulties.

During the first week of November the question of recognition by the Allies of the Yugoslav National Committee in London, which since October 30 represented independent Yugoslavia, consisting of all Slovene, Croatian and Serbian lands of former Austria-Hungary, became acute. Recognition would have converted these regions into Allied territory and would have made it impossible to apply the terms of the Treaty of London.[25] Although at least Clemenceau was ready to extend such recognition, the Italians were able to prevent it.[26]

d. Italy After the Armistice

It has been stated that the Fourteen Points "were idealistic enough and vague enough to make a splendid platform for waging the war but they were too illusory and contradictory to make an adequate platform upon which to construct the peace."[27] Yet, in the Inter-Allied discussions at Paris between October 30 and November 4, 1918, Colonel House

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[23] Ibid., p.177. Nicolson, a little facetiously, made the following observations: "One of the most persistent disadvantages of all diplomacy by conference is the human difficulty of remaining disagreeable, to the same set of people, for many days a stretch. Many of Signor Orlando's troubles were also due to his temperamental dislike of behaving unpleasantly. His reservations on Point Nine of the Fourteen Points was conveyed in a mumbled aside--so irksome was it to Signor Orlando to embarrass all those charming friends of his around the table." Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p.68.

[24] Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.62.

[25] Ostrovic, The Truth about Yugoslavia, p.86.

[26] Ibid., p.93.

[27] Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace, p.26.

managed to get the Fourteen Points, with certain stated and unstated reservations,[28] accepted by the other Powers as the basis of the armistice with Germany, and, in his own view, with Austria-Hungary as well.[29] In order to demonstrate to his British, French, and Italian colleagues the practical application of the Fourteen Points to the vast problems on hand, House asked two of his assistants in Paris, Lippmann, Secretary of the Inquiry, and Cobb, a brilliant editorial writer, to prepare a detailed commentary. This commentary on the Fourteen Points was cabled to Wilson on October 29 and received his immediate approval. "Wilson's approval made the commentary the closest approximation to an official American programme drafted . . . ."[30] With regard to Point IX the commentary proposed, for strategic reasons, the granting of all of Italy's claims in the north, because, in case German-Austria joined Germany, Italy needed a secure northern frontier. The German population thus put under Italian rule should be given complete autonomy. The "agreement reached with Jugo-Slavs"[31] might be allowed to stand, but both Trieste and Fiume should be free ports. In this connection it is of interest that Wilson's approval of the Brenner frontier was given without consulting the other members of the Inquiry who, unlike Lippman, were still in the United States.

Meanwhile, both the government and public opinion in Italy were

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[28]Above pp.73-74.

[29]The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, p.178.

[30]Ibid.

[31]All writers dealing with this direct quotation from the commentary believe that it referred to the "Congress of Oppressed Nationalities" held in Rome in April 1918; however, there had been no binding agreements and, legally speaking, there was no Yugoslavia at that time. Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.65.

divided over their attitudes towards the Treaty of London. The government consisted of heterogeneous elements who, after Caporetto, had sunk their differences in the face of military disaster. The supporters of the Treaty, conservatives and nationalists, were led by its architect, Sonnino, while the proponents of an understanding with the Yugoslavs, liberals and moderate socialists, were led by Bissolati, the Minister of War Relief. Italian opinion was irritated over the unforeseen heavy casualties in the war, and during the month of November nationalist feeling became ever more intense. On December 14, Jay, the United States Chargé in Rome, reported: "Opinion crystallizing an absolute necessity of firm policy."[32] Bissolati resigned on December 27, and three days later Page, United States Ambassador in Italy, reported that Bissolati's following in Italy did not appear to be large, and expansionist feeling along the eastern Adriatic gaining in enthusiasm, supported by "tremendous propaganda."[33] Orlando, "a man of not-too-deep personal convictions, who could easily be drawn by one current or another,"[34] followed the stream and came more and more under Sonnino's sway.

Meanwhile, the high-handed and repressive behaviour of the Italians in the South Slav regions occupied under the armistice agreement caused deep ill-feeling between Italians and Yugoslavs.[35] The Italians looked

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[32]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, I, p.464.

[33]Ibid., p.472.

[34]Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.71. Clemenceau, more direct in his utterances, described Orlando as "all things to all men." George Clemenceau, Grandeur and Misery of Victory, trans. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930), p.149.

[35]The official unification of the Kingdom of Serbia and the Yugoslavs of former Austria-Hungary into the "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes," commonly referred to as "Yugoslavia," took place on December 1, 1918. Below, p.129.

askance at the Slovenes and Croats who, until very recently, had fought against them, and now claimed to be their allies. Bitter mutual recriminations and accusations became daily occurrences. Linked with Italian-Yugoslav affairs was the relationship between Italy and her allies, especially France. The French-Serbian Balkan Army claimed Fiume, soon to be the centre of conflict, as a base. "Something in the nature of a race had developed between the Italians moving northward in Albania, and the Serbians and the French, to reach points along the coast and in Montenegro."[36] The Italians accused the French of intentionally thwarting Italy's ambitions, and, in the light of France's attempts to scrap the Secret Treaties,[37] their suspicions may not have been wholly unjustified. On November 20 there was a bitter argument between Orlando and the French Ambassador in Rome over the occupation of territory beyond the armistice line by Italian troops,[38] and on November 22 a lengthy conversation took place between the American Assistant Secretary of State, Phillips, and the Italian Ambassador, di Cellere. According to Phillips, "the Ambassador frequently showed great bitterness towards France and French diplomacy and repeated several times that if Italy was deprived of her just claims under the pact of London, a revolution would surely follow in Italy."[39] This line was adhered to by the Italians during the following months. It must be remembered, however, that di Cellere was a great admirer of Sonnino.[40] Italian activites in the eastern Adriatic

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[36]Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.67.

[37]Above, p.44.

[38]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, II, pp.305-06.

[39]Ibid., p.310.

[40]Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.55.

aroused the annoyance not only of the Yugoslav and French, but also of the British and United States forces in that area. On December 15 Admiral Bullard, Commander of the U.S. Naval Forces Eastern Mediterranean, reported deportations of people from Pola by the Italians.[41]

When President Wilson arrived in Europe, the Treaty of London immediately became a topic of serious all-round discussions.[42] "Just how far Wilson committed himself or may have given to the Italians the impression of committing himself at this time, it is impossible to determine."[43] However, he seems to have agreed to Italy's demands for the Brenner frontier during his visit to Italy in the last days of December.[44]

Britain's attitude towards Italy's claims under the Treaty of London was laid down in a secret memorandum by the Political Intelligence Department of the Foreign Office on December 24, 1918. While stating general adherence to the Treaty of London, it found some of the Italian claims "difficult to justify": South Tyrol only on strategic grounds; northeastern Istria, the Adriatic islands, and Dalmatia not at all.

> Unless Italy herself . . . takes the initiative in proposing a revision, some means must be found of bringing her to reason. Persistence in her present attitude towards the Southern Slavs will certainly lead, sooner or later, to a renewal of war . . . .

The document suggested limitation of Italy's European claims to the Trentino, South Tyrol, western Istria, a few island bases in the Dalmatian

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[41] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, II, p.330.

[42] James T. Shotwell, At the Paris Peace Conference (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937), passim, pp.96-97.
Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, p.253.

[43] Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.80.

[44] Ibid., p.85, n.75.

archipelago, a temporary protectorate of Albania, permanent possession of Valona, and one or two islands of the Dodecanese.[45]

2. Italy's Northern Frontier[46]

According to the Treaty of London Italy claimed the Austrian province of Tyrol south of the Brenner Pass.[47] This region consisted of two clearly separate districts: the Alto Adige or South Tyrol, which was overwhelmingly German-speaking, and to the south of it, the Trentino which was overwhelmingly Italian-speaking. A small number of Ladins who spoke a Romance tongue but were not necessarily of Italian sympathies lived on the eastern fringe of both regions.[48] Thus the Treaty of London promised to put approximately 230,000 German Austrians and 12,000 Ladins of Tyrol under Italian rule. Under the terms of the armistice Italian troops occupied these territories, and the Sexten Valley and Innichen as well. It has already been pointed out that President Wilson quickly approved these northern claims of Italy. As future events were going to show, Wilson, by compromising on his principles, demoralized his followers and fatally weakened his own position at the Conference.[49]

After the start of the Peace Conference in January, 1919, the various Powers began to define their attitudes on boundary questions.

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[45]Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, Memorandum on Italian Claims December 27, 1918. Arthur L. Sifton Collection, Documents of the Peace Conference 1919 (16 Vols., Rutherford Library, University of Alberta), III, pp.238-44.

[46]The Town of Tarvis will be dealt with later in this Chapter within the problem of the Italian-Yugoslav frontier.

[47]See Map IIIb.

[48]Karl Gottfried Hugelmann (ed.), Das Nationalitätenrecht des alten Österreich (Wien: Wilhelm Braumüller, Universitäts-Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1934), p.748. U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, XII, p.283.

[49]"If Wilson swallowed the Brenner he would swallow anything."
. . . . . .
"It was his early shambling over the Italian question that convinced us that Woodrow Wilson was not a great or potent man." Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, pp.170 and 184.

On January 21 the Inquiry, whose personnel had come over to Europe with Wilson, presented the recommendations on Italy's territorial claims. Not realizing that the President had already committed himself, the report suggested a northern frontier for Italy which would not quite reach the Brenner but would transfer 161,000 German-speaking people to Italy. A British memorandum on Tyrol suggested two alternatives: one line would follow, with some minor exceptions in Italy's favour, the linguistic border, while the other was nearly identical with the line suggested by the American experts on January 21.[50] The French, from the beginning, were more willing to grant Italy the Brenner frontier; already in their first suggestion on the organization of the Peace Conference on November 15, 1919, they suggested, for "a certain homogeneousness of States," some exceptions to the peoples' right of self determination, listing Tyrol as one of the examples.[51] The French felt that giving South Tyrol to Italy had the advantage of satisfying Italy and would also create a deep-seated grievance between Italy and Germany.[52] This seems to prove that the French experts realized that, on its merits, the Italian claim was unsound. During the private meeting between Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and House on March 10, Italy's frontiers came under discussion. "None of us thought that Italy should have the Tyrol . . . . "[53] was the entry in House's diary.

On March 12 the Italian government announced its official demands

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[50] Nina Almond and Ralph Haswell Lutz (ed.), The Treaty of St. Germain; A Documentary History of Its Territorial and Political Clauses (Stanford University California: Stanford University Press, 1935), pp.337-39.

[51] Above, p.44.

[52] Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.158.

[53] The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, p.360.

in a note dated February 7. They included not only South Tyrol, but in addition to the Treaty of London line also Innichen and the Sexten Valley. However, mainly owing to Wilson's absence in the United States, there was little reaction in Paris. Another memorandum of the United States Territorial Experts, who had examined the Italian demands, reiterated their previous opinions about Italy's northern frontier, although it made the suggestion of neutralization of South Tyrol under an Italian mandate.[54] At the same time the reports of Professor Coolidge, Head of the United States Field Mission to Central Europe, from Vienna, urged the United States delegates at Paris not to surrender German-speaking Tyrol south of the Brenner to Italian rule for national, economic and sentimental reasons: "I have been surprised by how widespread and deep is the feeling throughout Austria and I believe throughout Germany in regard to this small section of land . . . ."[55] There is no evidence that all these various opinions exercised any influence on Wilson. On April 19, in the Council of Four, he approved of Italy's northern claims in order to provide her with "natural boundaries."[56] Four days later, at the height of the great crisis of the Peace Conference over Italy's Adriatic demands, he alluded in his public manifesto to the people of Italy to his approval of the Brenner frontier. At the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on May 10 Balfour stated that the acquisition of the Brenner frontier by Italy, although criticized on ethnic grounds, could be justified by geographical reasons. He thereby indicated that Britain was prepared to let Italy have South Tyrol. Finally, on May 29, at the meeting

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[54] Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.118. No exact date is given.

[55] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, XII, p.277.

[56] Ibid., p.85.

of the Council of Four, Wilson announced that the Heads of Government had decided that Austria's southern frontier should correspond with the Treaty of London line, except that the Sexten Valley, including Innichen, would also go to Italy. On the same day it was decided to instruct the Central Drafting Committee to draw up the peace terms with Austria accordingly.

It is evident that President Wilson's views were the decisive factor in the transfer of the German-speaking South Tyrol to Italy, although this act was generally recognized as a striking violation of his Fourteen Points and the principle of nationality. Furthermore, the fact that he had approved very quickly, and without any counter argument, caused much surprise. However, the riddle was soon solved. In May, 1919, Wilson admitted to Charles Seymour that his approval of Italy's northern claims had been "based on insufficient study."[57] Professor Coolidge wrote that "the well founded belief among our people was that he gave his consent without due consideration and frankly regretted it afterwards, but felt bound by his word."[58] Ray Stannard Baker, a great admirer of Wilson, thinks that he may have felt that "a concession in the Alps might mitigate Italian claims in the Adriatic; but the Italians wanted both!"[59] Another historian of that period, Bailey, who is not unsympathetic to Wilson, is even more incisive. He feels that Wilson's "premature surrender on the South Tyrol indicated to the Italians that he was not only prepared to recognize but even support the unsavory Treaty

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[57] The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, p.435.

[58] Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p.170.

[59] Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, II, p.146.

of London."[60] Bailey feels that by asking for nothing in return, Wilson only encouraged further demands. "Apologists for Wilson speak of the Tyrol decision as a 'slip'. It was more than a slip; it was a blunder. And a blunder, as the proverb has it, may be worse than a crime."[61]

### 3. The Italian-Yugoslav Frontier

#### a. The Problem of Fiume

The town of Fiume, at the head of the Gulf of Quarnero, although not a part of Austria, became in the course of the peace negotiations so inextricably interwoven with the fate of the Austrian Littoral and Dalmatia that this thesis is forced to deal with it at length. A possession of the Habsburgs since the second half of the fifteenth century, Fiume was assigned in 1779 to Hungary as a corpus separatum with far-reaching autonomy in local affairs. Fiume was attached to Croatia in 1848, but after the Ausgleich of 1867 the town went back to Hungary, although it remained a source of disagreement between Hungary and Croatia which never abandoned its claim to it. As Hungary's only outlet to the sea and rival of (Austrian) Trieste, Fiume's commercial possibilities were carefully promoted by the Budapest government; the Magyars also systematically favoured the Italian section of Fiume's population against the Croats. In 1910, according to the last Austro-Hungarian census, there were 22,488 Italians and 13,351 Slavs, mainly Croats, in Fiume; however, if the adjoining suburb of Susak was added, the Slavs outnumbered the Italians by 24,351 to 23,988. The surrounding countryside was entirely Slav.[62]

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[60] Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace, p.255.

[61] Ibid., p.256.

[62] See Map IIIc.

On October 18, 1918, Ossoinack, member of the Hungarian Parliament for Fiume, declared the town's right of self-determination "by virtue of its status of corpus separatum";[63] on October 30 the Italian National Council of Fiume, a self-appointed body, proclaimed the union of the town with Italy, and units of the Italian navy entered the port. The reaction of the Croats was swift: on November 5 the National Council at Zagreb called for Serbian troops who occupied Fiume on November 15. Two days later the Allies persuaded the Serbs to evacuate the town, and Inter-Allied troops replaced them. Most of these Inter-Allied troops, including the command, were Italians, and the Italian National Council assumed the administration. The Yugoslavs afterwards claimed that the Italians had broken their promise not to land troops in Fiume if the Serbs withdrew. These events increased the tension between Italy and the Yugoslavs; during the interview between Orlando and the French Ambassador on November 20, Orlando stated that Fiume had been occupied "upon positive information of ill-treatment of Italians in that city . . . ."[64] A communication of the Serbian Legation in Washington to the U.S. State Department on December 13 complained that the Commandant of the Italian troops in Fiume "conducted himself as if he were on enemy territory . . . ."[65] In his report from Fiume on December 15, Admiral Bullard stated that Fiume appeared to be under permanent Italian occupation, adding that he saw no need for the presence of troops at all.[66] Meanwhile, after

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[63] Albrecht-Carrie, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.51. It must not be forgotten that a member of the Hungarian Parliament was not necessarily representative of the views of his constituency owing to the undemocratic franchise.

[64] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, II, pp.305-06.

[65] Ibid., p.325.

[66] Ibid., p.331.

lengthy negotiations, a French base, serving the French-Serbian Balkan Army, was established in the town by agreement with Italy and the Italian National Council in the middle of December.

At that time Italian public opinion was still undecided about its future attitude towards Yugoslavia. At the beginning of January 1919 Bissolati, the champion of understanding with Yugoslavia and a supporter of Wilson's ideals, suggested that Italy should renounce the Treaty of London and give up her claims to Dalmatia, but take Fiume instead. However, Italian nationalist feeling became more and more inflamed, after the beginning of the year, and fastened upon Fiume as a symbol of national triumph. On the other hand, the report of the United States Territorial Experts of January 21 recommended that Fiume should belong to Yugoslavia, being "vital to the interests of the latter."[67] On February 18 Yugoslavia officially claimed Fiume as the only commercial access to the sea for Croatia-Slavonia, Serbia, Bosnia, and Hungary. The Italian "Memorandum on Claims" which was published in March 12 claimed Fiume in addition to the territory given to Italy under the Treaty of London as a reward because, owing to Russia's separate peace with the Central Powers, Italy's sacrifices in the war had been much greater than originally anticipated, and because small Yugoslavia would not have the means to maintain adequate commercial facilities for the town. Furthermore, the memorandum claimed that only 13% of the entire trade of Croatia-Slavonia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia passed through Fiume whose main traffic was with other countries, especially Hungary. "Trieste and Fiume in Italian hands could have combined maritime services of wider range, and more economical and perfect in organization, without giving

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[67]Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.365.

rise to any conflict of interests . . . ."[68] By now nationalist fervour in Italy had reached a fever pitch and the Italian delegates at the Peace Conference were under extreme pressure: "It was perhaps already too late in January to give up Fiume and survive politically . . . ."[69]

b. Italian and Yugoslav Claims

President Wilson's attitude was bound to become an extremely important factor in the problem of Italy's territorial demands. It was apparent that Britain and France were unhappy about the provisions of the Treaty of London and would be glad to have them modified, but that, in the last resort, they would have to stand by their pledged word.[70] The United States had never officially recognized the Secret Treaties, especially as their spirit ran counter to Wilson's ideals. Yet Wilson never repudiated them; he simply chose to ignore them.[71] This avoidance of an unequivocal stand gave rise to speculation and misunderstanding. A memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State Phillips about a conversation with the Italian Ambassador di Cellere on November 26, 1918, reveals that Wilson had told di Cellere that the Treaty of London could now be disregarded because Austria-Hungary had ceased to exist.[72] In a letter written to Commissioner Bliss on December 13, Miller, Technical Adviser on International Law to the United States delegation in Paris, recognized

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[68] Ibid., p.386.

[69] Ibid., p.103.

[70] After the intense Allied war propaganda about the "a scrap of paper" phrase of the German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg no other course was possible. Macartney and Cremona, Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy, p.59.

[71] Above, p.72 n.18.

[72] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, II, p.315.

that the Treaty of London had not been formally abrogated, but he felt that the Note of the Allies to Germany of November 5 which had accepted the Fourteen Points as the basis of peace "must be considered to have modified the Pact of London in any respect in which the same is inconsistent with the Fourteen Points . . . ."[73]

The first official Italian statement on the Adriatic problem was issued in early January 1919, when General di Robilant, Italian Military Representative with the Supreme War Council, gave Commissioner Bliss a lengthy statement. It claimed for Italy all of Dalmatia for various reasons: historical, because Dalmatia had always been linked with Italy; geographical, because "Dalmatia is geographically a unit completely divorced from the remainder of the Balkan peninsula in spite of territorial continuity"; ethnic, because Austria had artificially denationalized Italian Dalmatia by promoting infiltration "by a new semi-barbaric race"; moral, because Italy had staked her existence for that reward; military, because, while the east coast of the Adriatic was protected by reefs and islands, the west coast was defenceless: "[Italy], in order to be safe within her own frontiers must possess Dalmatia from Zara to Spalato, as well as the isles in front of the coast and adjoining it"; economic, because the Treaty of London gave Italy one one commercially and economically important port, Trieste, while the Slavs got seven: Fiume, Spalato, Metcovich, Cattaro, Ragusa, Antivari, Dulcigno; political, because the Yugoslavs were "Austria's heirs, who up to the last moment have staunchly supported the Habsburg cause . . . ." The conclusion was even more sweeping: "The Treaty of London is

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[73] Ibid., I, p.463.

a minimum below which it is impossible to fall, while it admits of higher claims . . . ."[74] Judging by his comments to Lansing, the document was an unpleasant surprise to Bliss.

Although the Peace Conference started in the second week of January, 1919, the question of Italy's frontiers remained in the background for a while because the United States, Britain, and France were more concerned with Germany. Yugoslavia presented a difficult problem because it claimed to be an ally although a considerable part of its population had been loyal to the enemy. President Wilson, although preoccupied with the establishment of the League of Nations, was determined not to approve any settlement which was not in accordance with his ideals. His early activities after his arrival in Europe had indicated his interest in the Treaty of London, and the report of his Territorial Experts of January 21[75] greatly influenced his subsequent stand. The report, which was not made public at the time, recommended in the Austrian Littoral a frontier east of the ethnic line, thereby giving 370,000 Yugoslavs to Italy and an adequate hinterland to Trieste and Pola, but west of the Treaty of London line, leaving 75,000 Italians within Yugoslavia.[76] Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands were to be given to Yugoslavia, Valona to Italy, the Dodecanese islands to Greece, and the rest of Albania should become a mandate of the League of Nations, under Italy.

> These recommendations of the American Territorial Experts may perhaps best be characterized as a sane and fair-minded analysis of local situations. The American Report took into account first ethnographical, then economic and strategic considerations, and struck a moderate compromise between them.[77]

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[74] D. Robilant's Memorandum to Bliss, U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, I, pp.475-87.

[75] Above, pp.80 and 85.

[76] See Map IIId.

[77] Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.94.

The report gave Italians and Yugoslavs equal consideration and ignored the Treaty of London.

Wilson, guided by these recommendations, had a bitter argument with Sonnino on January 27.[78] On the following day Professor Herron, whom Wilson regarded as an authority on Adriatic questions, saw Sonnino "who not only rejected all idea of a compromise upon the Secret Treaty of London, but talked of preparing for another war a few years hence . . . ."[79] On February 3, after some pressure from Wickham Steed, a staunch friend of the Yugoslav cause during the war and editor of "The Times," the most respected British newspaper, the Yugoslavs produced a map which indicated the extreme Yugoslav and Italian claims. It left the centre of Istria as debatable ground, assuming that the western part would go to Italy and the eastern part to Yugoslavia.[80] Steed gave the map to the United States delegation, and Wilson had a meeting with Trumbic and afterwards with Orlando. Trumbic was willing to submit to Wilson's arbitration, but Orlando stated that he would have to consult his cabinet. Probably angered by Orlando's delaying tactics, Wilson officially recognized Yugoslavia on February 5. On February 11 the Yugoslavs sent a letter to Clemenceau, declaring their readiness to submit their dispute with Italy to Wilson's arbitration. The question was not debated for the moment because both Wilson and Orlando were preparing to leave Paris for their respective countries, Lloyd George having already done so.

> In mid-ocean, however, President Wilson received by wireless the news that the Italian Cabinet had rejected his arbitration, Sonnino having apparently declared that he would resign rather than accept it. Thus the Italians missed a chance . . . of setting an example which would have created a precedent for the treatment of other controverted territorial questions.[81]

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[78] Steed, Through Thirty Years, II, p.273.

[79] Ibid., p.275.

[80] Ibid., p.279.

[81] Ibid., p.281.

On February 17 the Council of Ten debated Yugoslavia's proposal of arbitration. Sonnino declared that Italy could not accept arbitration on her war aims. After some discussion it was decided to hear the Serbian delegates[82] on the following day but not to have a discussion in their presence.

The Yugoslavs appeared before the Council on February 18 and based their stand on the Allied principles of nationality, self-determination, and freedom of the small nations. They refused to be bound by arrangements to which they had not been a party, and laid stress on the anti-Austrian activities of the Yugoslav volunteers during the war. After stating their territorial claims in the east, northeast, and north, the Yugoslavs dealt with their frontier with Italy. Here they asked for the former Austrian-Italian boundary with the exception of western Gorizia-Gradisca which they recognized as Italian. The regions claimed by Yugoslavia were predominantly Slav except for a few towns like Gorizia, Trieste, Pola, Fiume, Zara. These Italian elements were described as "oases in Slav surroundings, without any national continuity binding it to the Italian peninsula."[83] Thus even Trieste was claimed for Yugoslavia because separation from its Slav hinterland would harm its trade. These claims, if granted in their entirety, would have given 302,000 Italians to Yugoslavia and 6,000 Yugoslavs to Italy, according to the Austrian census of 1910. After the Yugoslavs had withdrawn, Sonnino, supported by Clemenceau, forced through a resolution reserving

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[82] As the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was not officially recognized when the Peace Conference assembled, it sent its delegation under the name of Serbia; see Appendix G.

[83] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, 1919, IV, p.50.

all frontier questions which concerned Italian interests for the exclusive attention of the Council of Ten.[84] On March 11 Clemenceau read a letter from the Yugoslav Prime Minister Pasic to the Council in which the Yugoslavs objected to the "rumoured" exclusion of the Yugoslav-Italian frontier from discussion outside the Council, and also protested against any attempt to regard Yugoslavia as anything but an ally. This led to a stormy debate in the course of which Orlando declared that to him the Croats and Slovenes, whose frontiers were under discussion, were enemies who "had merely taken the place of the Austrians."[85] This statement was disputed by Lloyd George and Lansing who felt that they were simply dealing with an enlarged Serbia, and eventually the debate was adjourned for a later meeting.

On March 12, just before Wilson's return, the Italians released their Memorandum of Claims dated February 7.[86] In the north they demanded, in addition to the Treaty of London line, the German-speaking Sexten Valley with Innichen and the town and valley of Tarvis. Against Yugoslavia they demanded a frontier east of the Treaty of London line including Adelsberg, Zirknitz and Fiume[87] for reasons of "geographical separation, natural defence, historic tradition, and natural redemption."[88] Drawing attention to the Italian character of the cities of Gorizia, Trieste, Pola and Fiume, the memorandum stressed the economic dependency of the (Slav) countryside upon these cities, and claimed that the Italian

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[84]Above, p.56.

[85]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, IV, p.323.

[86]Above, pp.80-81.

[87]See Map IIId.

[88]Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.374.

population possessed a superior culture. It was asserted that the Austrian census figures were falsified in favour of the Slavs against the Italians and that the claimed regions contained 482,000 Italians and 411,000 Slavs. In Dalmatia Italy insisted on the Treaty of London line and claimed that out of a population of 287,000 there were not 12,000 but 50,000 Italians. Alleging that brutal Austrian persecutions had Slavicised the formerly Venetian Dalmatia,[89] the memorandum emphasized Italy's great need for security in the Adriatic: "Dalmatia if in the hands of one Power represents a danger to Italy; a portion of Dalmatia in possession of Italy . . . represents a danger to no one."[90] The memorandum pointed out that if all Italian claims were granted, Italy would contain within her boundaries a foreign population of 3%--far less than was the case with the newly formed states.

The most significant addition to Italy's claims in excess to the Treaty of London was Fiume. This was probably originally conceived by Orlando as a means of exchange for yielding in Dalmatia without endangering his own political position at home.[91] However, a few days later Italy also claimed Spalato.[92]

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[89]It is true that the Italian population in the whole of Dalmatia had diminished from 27,000 in 1880 to 18,000 in 1910, while the Slavs had increased from 441,000 to 611,000 and that Italian, although still important in the cultural and commercial life, had ceased to be the official language, but historic evidence shows that this process was not the work of the Austrian authorities who behaved in a heavy-handed but impartial manner: Hugelmann (ed.), Das Nationalitätenrecht des alten Österreich, pp.632-83. The decrease of the Italian element can be best explained by absorption and emigration.
The fact that at the Peace Conference both the American and British experts used Austrian census figures seem to indicate that they were fairly reliable.

[90]Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.382.

[91]Ibid., p.102.

[92]Ibid., p.117, n.9.

c. The Attitude of the Delegates of the United States

When Wilson returned to Paris on March 14, the aims of Italy and Yugoslavia stood clearly revealed. Italy had increased her demands in excess of the Treaty of London and wished to see the Croats and Slovenes treated as defeated enemies. Aware of the possibility of encountering resistance from her allies with regard to her war aims, Italy insisted that the Austrian settlement should be attended to simultaneously with the German,[93] and because she had "real nuisance value as a Power which, if dissatisfied, might not sign the peace treaties,"[94] she had her way. The main difficulty Italy had to face was the fact that her allies simply refused to regard Yugoslavia in the same way as Germany. On the other hand, Yugoslavia's claims were excessive, too, although they were obviously put forward for bargaining purposes and not expected to be fulfilled in their entirety. The Yugoslav offer of accepting arbitration by the President of the United States made Wilson inevitably the "champion of the Yugoslav cause"[95] and could, therefore, be considered a clever manoeuvre. Yet, as will be seen later, the move, in the long run, turned out to be disadvantageous to Yugoslavia, because the United States eventually changed their policy.[96]

On March 10, during the meeting between House, Clemenceau, and Lloyd George, Italy's frontiers were under discussion. Both the British and French leaders stated their preference for the line suggested by the

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[93]Above, p.59.

[94]Robert J. Kerner (ed.), Yugoslavia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949), p.96.

[95]Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.107.

[96]Kerner (ed.), Yugoslavia, p.97.

United States experts to the Treaty of London line. "Neither of them were in favour of giving the Italians Fiume, but thought, as a compromise, it might be internationalized" entered House in his diary.[97] This was the first time the idea of avoiding the surrender of Fiume to either claimant was considered. Meanwhile, the American Territorial Experts had examined the claims of either side and reported unfavourably on both. While maintaining their original stand in Tyrol, the Americans stated that there were no Italians in the Tarvis region, that the eastern part of the Isonzo-Trieste-Istria region (called the "Julian Venetia" by the Italians) was nearly entirely Yugoslav, and that, in that region, the Treaty of London line would give Italy 400,000 Italians and 455,000 Yugoslavs. The additional claims in that area would give Italy another 55,000 Slavs and 100 Italians. Furthermore, the only direct railway line between Ljubljana and Fiume would be cut to the disadvantage of Fiume, and Italy would obtain the extremely important quicksilver mines of Idria. With regard to Dalmatia, the Treaty of London line would deprive Yugoslavia of economically valuable land which, with the exception of Zara, was Slav in character and sympathy. Fiume was described as a very important outlet for Central Europe, but of "no economic significance for Italy. Italian capital did not develop the port . . . ." The report then examined Fiume's importance to Yugoslavia:

> It should be noted also, that Fiume is the only practicable outlet to the sea for three-fifths of the population of the Jugo-Slav state, because all other parts are either physically incapable of proper development or can be reached only by costly transportation across a broad and difficult mountain barrier.

In the case of the Conference finding it impossible to give Fiume to Yugoslavia, the Americans recommended three possible solutions: cession

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[97] The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, p.360.

to Italy; municipal autonomy with an intricate relationship to the League of Nations, Italy and Yugoslavia; or establishment of a Free City and port, with Italy as the mandatory Power.[98] It is assumed that these recommendations were made as a result of an on-the-spot report of Lieutenant-Colonel Sherman Miles, a member of a United States Field Mission, from Fiume which reported the existence of a strong local party favouring autonomy.[99]

At that time a division of opinion began to appear within the United States delegations. While the Territorial Experts, led by Johnson, Chief of the Division of Boundary Geography of the Inquiry, maintained their refusal to yield to Italy's "excessive"claims, another group, led by House and Miller, felt that in the long run it would be better policy to secure Italian goodwill in order to reach a stable settlement. "It is possible that Colonel House's anxiety to achieve the successful establishment of the League led him to appreciate more fully than he otherwise would the desirability of compromise with the Italians . . . ."[100] This entailed making substantial concessions to Italy.[101] On March 16 Mezes, nominal head of the Inquiry, in a letter to House, proposed to yield to nearly all Italian demands with the exception of Susak which should go to Yugoslavia. The South Tyroleans and Dalmatians were to be

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[98]American Memoranda on Italian Claims and the Italian Northern and Eastern Boundary. Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, pp.417-20.

[99]Ibid., p.429.

[100]The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, pp.437-38.

[101]A Memorandum by the "House group," suggesting the handing over to Italy of the larger part of the city of Fiume, while giving to the League of Nations Susak and part of Fiume's port for 99 years, is printed in: Allan Nevins, Henry White: Thirty Years of American Diplomacy (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1930), pp.503-06.

given autonomy, and Fiume to become a free port. In return Italy would have to give up her claims in Albania, the Dodecanese, and Asia Minor. This letter was immediately countered by a memorandum from Johnson who stated "that he understood that the French and British were in general agreement with the Americans and wanted the Americans to insist on a full discussion of the problem."[102] By making additional claims, continued the memorandum, the Italians had departed from the Treaty of London; however, a compromise might be arranged by giving Italy Tarvis and a mandate over Albania under the League of Nations provided that all Italian claims would be considered on their individual merits. On March 18 three American Territorial Experts, the Chiefs of the Austro-Hungarian, Balkan and Italian Divisions, in addition to Johnson, issued another report on Dalmatia and Fiume. They emphatically denied any "historic rights" of Italy to Dalmatia, stating that the Slavs had been settled there for twelve centuries. The possession of Pola, Valona, and an island base in the Adriatic would ensure Italy's naval safety. The report rejected the contention that the possession of Fiume was an economic necessity for Italy, and maintained that the town was Yugoslavia's best port. "Fiume in Italian hands would probably have its development sacrificed to that of Trieste."[103] The main consideration in determining the fate of the town ought to be the commercial interests of Central Europe, and these would be served best if Trieste went to Italy and Fiume to Yugoslavia.

This rift within the American delegation encouraged the Italians to persist in their demands, especially as House was known to be Wilson's

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[102]Albrecht-Carrié, Italy and the Paris Peace Conference, p.121.

[103]Ibid., p.428.

alter ego. However, this hitherto close relationship gradually began to give way to an estrangement because Wilson sided with the experts, and the Italians soon found themselves in the delicate position of opposing Wilson. The Council of Four was still occupied with the framing of the German Treaty and, in particular, with the problem of the French demands. Meanwhile Italian public opinion became even more heated over the delay and uncertainty, while the Yugoslavs grew bitter and restive because of the continued repressive Italian occupation of their western regions. Only at the beginning of April did the Italian question begin to move towards its decisive stage. On April 3 the Adriatic problem was touched upon by the Council of Four, and it became apparent that Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau did not wish to give Fiume to Italy. On April 4 the Territorial Experts addressed themselves directly to Wilson, once more emphatically recommending that Fiume should become part of Yugoslavia, but "if for reasons not connected with the best interests of the city and its hinterland it is deemed necessary that Fiume be made a free city,"[104] Yugoslav interests should be safeguarded by keeping port facilities and all means of communication with the interior under Yugoslav sovereignty.

During the following ten days the problem of Italy's eastern frontiers was under continuous discussion behind the scenes. The suspicion grew among many Allied delegates that Italy wanted Fiume in order to strangle her trade for the benefit of Trieste.[105] All these talks were conducted against the background of a chauvinistic Italian press campaign

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[104] Ibid., p.441.

[105] Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, II, p.135.

over Fiume. "From the distance of Paris . . . it might easily seem as if the Italian government were deliberately working up opinion at home in an effort to exert pressure on the decision of the Conference."[106]

d. The April Crisis

During the last two weeks of March and first two weeks of April, the Council of Four dealt with the question of the Franco-German frontiers. France's demands were regarded as excessive by Wilson and caused many bitter debates. However, Wilson's position had suffered through the unconcealed hostility of an "isolationist" section of the United States Senate to the League of Nations, and a severe attack of influenza in the first week of April probably helped to undermine his power of resistance. He also believed, that the League of Nations would, in the long run, "mitigate the necessary evils of the territorial and economic settlements;"[107] therefore France's adherence to it had to be gained, even at the cost of a compromise.

On April 14 Wilson and Orlando had a meeting on Italy's demands but failed to reach an understanding. Wilson approved of Italy's claims in the north but rejected the Treaty of London line in the northeast and the Adriatic area because he felt that the dissolution of Austria-Hungary had changed the situation in these regions. He gave Orlando a memorandum which contained the American point of view on Italy's demands. It proposed , in accordance with the findings of the American Territorial Experts, the division of Istria along a natural strategic line, since then commonly called the "Wilson line,"[108] and suggested a large measure

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[106]Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.126.

[107]The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, p.410.

[108]See Map IIId.

of self-government for Fiume within Yugoslavia's boundaries. In the Adriatic Italy was to get the island of Lissa, in Albania Valona; all former Austrian fortifications on the islands and along the coasts of the Adriatic would be dismantled. The Italian minorities in the eastern Adriatic would be protected by the League of Nations. Wilson, at that stage, seems to have been willing to make Fiume independent as a compromise.[109] Orlando rejected Wilson's suggestions, and during the following day he made calls on House, Clemenceau, and Balfour. House, still optimistic about the chances of a settlement, asked three experts, Johnson, Miller, and Miller's assistant Warrin, to prepare a draft for the settlement of the problem of Fiume which House recognized as the main obstacle to an understanding. This document, composed on April 16, proposed to make Fiume a Free City under the League of Nations. At the same time, Warrin worked out a proposal for the settlement of northern Dalmatia, suggesting its transfer to the five Great Powers, under the government of a Commission appointed by the League of Nations. A plebiscite after ten years would decide whether that territory wished to join Yugoslavia. Meanwhile Pasic, in a letter to Clemenceau, had suggested a plebiscite for the districts disputed by Italy and Yugoslavia. None of these suggestions were adopted.

On April 17 the five American experts who had made their appeal to Wilson on April 4, now reinforced by Bowman, the United States Chief Territorial Expert, sent another letter to the President, urging him in the strongest terms not to let Italy have Dalmatia and Fiume: "Better a League of Nations based on justice than a League of Nations based on

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[109]Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, II, p.146.

Italian participation bought at a price."[110] Even House, although he seems to have bitterly resented the experts' letter,[111] became now doubtful about a successful outcome. "I have about come to the conclusion that since we cannot please the Italians by compromise, we might as well do what seems best in the judgment of our experts . . . ."[112] was the entry in his diary for April 18, and he now advised Wilson in that sense. However, Lloyd George and Clemenceau were unwilling to declare themselves unequivocally in favour of giving Fiume to Yugoslavia, as Orlando might then insist on the Treaty of London line which they were pledged to support; thereby they would come into conflict with Wilson. Thus House, probably with reluctance, suggested one more plan of compromise on April 19: eastern Istria was to go to Italy, and Fiume and northern Dalmatia were to be put under the control of the League of Nations for several years, and their final disposition to be decided later on.[113] Wilson thought that the proposal yielded too much to Italy, but said that he would consider it if Lloyd George and Clemenceau adopted it as their own idea. Consequently, Lloyd George suggested it on April 20 to Orlando who rejected it because he feared the fall of his cabinet if he did not get immediate possession of Fiume.

> He [Orlando] was impressed by the fact that Wilson had made broad concessions to France; why not also to Italy; Wilson, on the other hand, because he had just yielded to France, was so much the less inclined to yield to Italy.[114]

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[110] Ibid., III, pp.279-80.

[111] Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1941), pp.281-82.

[112] The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, p.444.

[113] Ibid., pp.444-45.

[114] Ibid., p.446

Meanwhile the Germans had been invited to send a delegation to Paris. Simultaneously, in order to satisfy Italy, the work on the other treaties was speeded up. At Orlando's suggestion, the Council of Four decided on April 18 to begin the discussion of the Italian frontiers. On the same day, also, at a meeting of Lansing, White, Bliss, and Herter,[115] the three Commissioners took a very strong stand against Italy's claims to Fiume, and House who arrived during the meeting agreed, stating that "he felt . . . that the time had gone by when any further compromise could be made."[116]

Thus the fateful discussions of the Council of Four on Italy's frontiers started on April 19 between Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, Orlando, and Sonnino.[117] Orlando presented Italy's case, basing his arguments not on the Treaty of London but on what he considered the general principles of the Peace Conference. In the north and northeast he claimed the natural frontier on grounds of security, and Fiume on the basis of self-determination, adding that, in a parallel case, Danzig, far more vital to Poland than Fiume to Yugoslavia, had not been given to the Poles. "If . . . Fiume is not given to Italy, it will be said in Italy . . . that the enemy has been better treated than the friend."[118] Dalmatia

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[115]The later American Secretary of State attended the Paris Peace Conference as an adviser on German reparations.

[116]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, XI, p.157.

[117]This thesis relies on information concerning the discussions of the Council of Four between April 19-24 on U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, V, pp.80-227, and the entries of Count Aldrovandi, the Italian interpreter at these meetings in his diary, translated and published by Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, pp.458-97.

[118]Aldrovandi's Diary, quoted in Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Conference, p.460.

and the islands he claimed for strategic and historic reasons. Wilson, in reply, emphasized that it was not reasonable to depart from the principles on which the German Treaty was being concluded, obviously meaning the principle of national self-determination. "At every point the question had to be asked whether the lines of the settlement would square with the new order."[119] For reasons of Italy's security he agreed to her demands for the Brenner frontier and for Trieste and Pola, but in the case of Fiume he felt the argument was different from Danzig where the principle of nationality had prevailed; Fiume was not linked with Italy by an intervening Italian population. "To give Fiume to Italy would be an arbitrary act . . . ."[120] With regard to Dalmatia he felt that the Italian argument was mainly strategic. Only if Yugoslavia became the ally of another Power would Italy be threatened, but the new order with its League of Nations would prevent such a contingency. The interference of the Great Powers had hitherto been the cause of the strife in the Balkans; none of them should have a foothold there, and it was for this reason that he rejected Italy's strategic argument.

A lengthy debate followed Wilson's statement. Sonnino claimed that Italy's demands in Dalmatia were purely defensive, and that, in any case, northern Dalmatia was entirely outside the Balkans, for all of its economic and commercial relations were with Italy.

> After a war [Sonnino continued] requiring such enormous sacrifices . . . it was not conceivable that we should return to a worse situation than before the war; certain islands on the Dalmatian coast were conceded to us even by Austria-Hungary to secure our neutrality. Italy would not understand why she had gone to war . . . ."[121]

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[119] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, V, p.84.

[120] Aldrovandi's Diary, quoted in Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.463.

[121] Ibid., p.465.

Furthermore, he concluded, one could not expect everything from the new League of Nations. Clemenceau stated that France was bound by the Treaty of London, but he was "astonished" how Italy could claim Fiume. "It was impossible for Italy to claim one clause of the Treaty and to cancel another clause."[122] Lloyd George agreed with Clemenceau. Pointing out that France's losses had been even heavier than Italy's, he stated that, nevertheless, the French had compromised on their demands on the Rhine. Wilson, at cross purposes with Italy and also with Britain and France, declared at the end of the meeting that "it would put the United States in an impossible position to make a decision on the basis of the Pact of London."[123] Thus the first day of discussion ended in a complete deadlock.

The meeting of April 20 took a similar course. Orlando declared that unless Italy got Fiume there would be a violent internal upheaval. Wilson was as unyielding as before but he agreed that he would have been more willing to accede to Italy's demands if Austria-Hungary still existed, and he also admitted that Italy was not bound by the Fourteen Points in making peace with Austria. Lloyd George said that, while he appreciated Wilson's principles, he also understood Sonnino's difficult position. He suggested that the signatories of the Treaty of London should hold a separate meeting in order to try to find a way out. Wilson agreed but suggested that Fiume should go to Yugoslavia, northern Dalmatia be temporarily handed over to the five Great Powers, while Lissa would be given to Italy. The Italians rejected the offer, and it was decided that the three signatories of the Treaty of London would meet on the following morning.

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[122] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, V, p.90.

[123] Aldrovandi's Diary, quoted in Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.470.

The morning meeting of April 21 was therefore conducted without Wilson. Once more Clemenceau and Lloyd George affirmed their stand by the Treaty of London, but Lloyd George warned of the political and economic consequences of proceeding without the United States. He vainly urged the Italians to make concessions. Feeling free in the absence of Wilson to express his views openly, Sonnino avowed his distrust in Wilson's principles, asking whether "diplomats sitting in a room would ever change the world."[124] He also cast doubts on Wilson's consistency: "Now President Wilson, after having forgotten and violated many times his Fourteen Points [by making concessions to France], wants to restore their virginity by enforcing rigorously those which apply to Italy."[125] He also said that when the armistice line was drawn up to correspond with the Treaty of London line, there had been no opposition from the United States, and Italy had assumed that this implied approval of her aims.

In the meantime Wilson had composed a statement on the situation with the intention of publishing it. House suggested that he should first consult Lloyd George and Clemenceau, and be governed by their advice. In the afternoon of April 21, Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau resumed their discussion, while the Italians, making good an earlier threat, stayed away. Lloyd George suggested that Italy might be compensated in Asia Minor, but this idea was rejected by Wilson who said that he disliked the idea of giving the Italians something to which they had no right. An attempt to induce the Italians to attend the meeting failed. Clemenceau and Lloyd George then asked Wilson not to publish his statement for the

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[124] Ibid., p.479.

[125] Ibid.

moment, and Wilson "in deference to his colleagues"[126] agreed. In the morning of April 22 the Italian delegation composed a letter which demanded the execution of the Treaty of London. In the early afternoon Orlando saw Lloyd George and read the letter to him, declaring that the Italians would stay away from the Conference until their problems were settled. This meant in effect that Italy would not sign the German treaty. Lloyd George, in turn, informed Orlando of Wilson's document. This did not seem to perturb Orlando, but he promised that he would consider the resumption of negotiations on the following basis: the whole of Istria to go to Italy, and Zara, Sebenico, Trau, and Spalato to be Free Cities under the League of Nations pending a plebiscite.[127] Lloyd George then went to the Council meeting and reported the whole conversation, but Wilson remained unyielding and wanted to publish his statement which, he felt, would move the Italians towards accepting cooperation with the United States rather than insisting on their claims. It was then decided that Lloyd George should submit the following proposals to Orlando: Fiume and its surrounding territory were to form a Free City, the strategically important islands were to go to Italy, and Zara and Sebenico were to be Free Cities under the League of Nations without any definite provision for a plebiscite.[128]

When Orlando received the proposal in the evening, he did not regard it as satisfactory and drafted a counter-proposal: Italy was to receive all of Istria and Fiume, and all Adriatic islands mentioned in

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[126] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, V, p.109.

[127] Aldrovandi's Diary, quoted in Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, pp.484-85. These proposals showed a striking resemblance to House's proposals of April 19.

[128] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, V, pp.135-36.

the Treaty of London except Pago, while Zara and Sebenico were to be placed under the League of Nations with Italy as the mandatory Power. This proposal "would have implied a fairly complete capitulation on the part of Wilson, especially in eastern Istria; it can only be that the Italians were labouring under a misapprehension."[129] Lloyd George who read out the proposal to the Council on April 23 himself felt it to be unacceptable. Wilson then said that he would publish his statement in the evening. Lloyd George and Clemenceau, while cautiously refraining from either encouraging or dissuading Wilson, stated once more that, if Italy abandoned her claims on Fiume, Britain and France would stand by the Treaty of London. Several hours of confused negotiations followed and it is obvious that the British and French were still trying to prevent a complete rupture of negotiations. "Orlando and Wilson were each maneuvering to get the weight of Franco-British support on his side, while the French and British were seeking, above all, to avoid making definite commitments to either."[130] While these feverish activities were still in progress, Wilson's Manifesto appeared in the evening edition of the Paris newspaper "Temps," and by the following morning it was published everywhere, causing an international sensation. The Manifesto was an appeal to the Italian people to accept the international "new order" as outlined in the Fourteen Points and embodied in the League of Nations. It pointed out that the Treaty of London had been directed against Austria-Hungary, but with the disappearance of that empire entirely new circumstances had arisen. It stated Wilson's arguments on Fiume and

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[129] Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.137.

[130] René Albrecht-Carrié, "New Light on Italian Problems 1919," Journal of Modern History, XIII (1941), p.501.

Dalmatia, and stressed the role of the League of Nations in ensuring Italy's safety and the safeguarding of the rights of the Italian minorities in Dalmatia.

It must be remembered that Wilson firmly believed that the common people of Europe, including Italy, supported his ideas, and, if informed of the true state of affairs, would express their support for them. He failed to realize the intensity of the nationalist feeling which had developed in Italy. Thus "his Manifesto could be interpreted only as an appeal to Italian opinion, against the Italian delegation."[131] Orlando, in his reply of April 24, pointed out that Wilson's way of appealing to peoples "almost in opposition to their Governments . . . has been before this occasion used only against enemy Governments . . . ."[132] He accused Wilson of "ignoring and denying the high degree of civilization which the Italian nation has attained in these forms of democratic and Liberal rule . . . ."[133] As to Italy's territorial claims, Orlando argued that Italy's security in the east was still as important to her as before, while the small size of Fiume was no valid argument against self-determination. This reply, directed solely to Italian national pride, could not fail to be effective.

Just before Orlando published his reply in the morning of April 24, he had another conversation with Lloyd George. The British leader warned of the danger of breaking with the United States, and urged the continuation of negotiations. Orlando agreed to attend the next Council meeting, provided he was invited. Lloyd George then reported the conversation to the Council which issued a unanimous invitation to Orlando to

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[131] Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.144.

[132] Ibid., p.501.

[133] Ibid.

resume negotiations, and Lloyd George and Clemenceau also arranged the final drafting of a joint Franco-British Note to Italy which had been prepared by Balfour. Thus Orlando and Sonnino were present at the afternoon meeting of the Council of Four. Orlando declared that Wilson's Manifesto forced him to return to Italy to find out whether he still possessed the authority to conduct the peace negotiations, while Wilson, denying that he had intended to undermine Orlando's authority at home, asked him to explain the attitude of the United States to the Italian parliament. Lloyd George hinted that, if Italy modified her stand on Dalmatia, he might be able to do something about Fiume. He then inquired about Italy's position regarding the German treaty, as the arrival of the German delegates was expected shortly. Would Italian delegates be present, or allow their country to be represented by its allies? Orlando was not sure but pointed out that Britain and France were pledged not to sign a separate peace without Italy. Sonnino then inquired whether Britain, France, and the United States could agree among themselves on a new proposal to Italy. However, as Wilson stood by his principles, and Lloyd George and Clemenceau by the Treaty of London, the ensuing discussion had no positive results. Orlando then left for Rome and Sonnino followed him two days later, while the rest of the Italian delegation remained in Paris.

Just before the end of the last meeting, Balfour's Memorandum, outlining the position of Britain and France, and signed by Lloyd George and Clemenceau, was handed to the Italians. The Memorandum expressed regret over Italy's threat to separate from her allies, and drew attention to the favourable change of her position which had resulted from the disappearance of Austria-Hungary. Reaffirming their loyalty to the

Treaty of London, Britain and France denied the justice of Italy's claims to Fiume, and also doubted the strategic value of Dalmatia to her. Both Powers felt that it would be in Italy's interest to gain Yugoslavia's friendship. The Memorandum concluded with an appeal to Italy not to quarrel with her allies, and thus play into Germany's hands. Despite Wilson's urgings, Britain and France refused to publish the Memorandum because they felt that such a step would only alienate Italy further. France, especially, preoccupied with the German danger, did not wish to make an enemy of Italy. Thus both countries were satisfied "to take shelter behind Wilson, hoping that his insistence would suffice to invalidate the Treaty of London without involving their own responsibility."[134] Wilson thus faced the Italians in apparent isolation.

Wilson's Manifesto caused a violent and bitter outburst in Italy against himself, and all sections of the population, from the extreme nationalist partisans of the poet Gabrielo d'Annunzio to the conciliatory followers of Bissolati, were quite unanimous in their condemnation of the American President. On April 26 the National Council of Fiume declared the city to be part of Italy. Orlando and Sonnino, enthusiastically welcomed at home, received an overwhelming vote of confidence from parliament. "But in fact the situation was little changed, for, if Wilson's appeal had failed to achieve its purpose, neither was the reaction in Italy likely to change Wilson's views . . . ."[135] The Council of Four, now reduced to the "Big Three," continued its meetings, and Britain and France recognized the Yugoslav government. Before long, the attitude of Italy began to change from defiance to apprehension.

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[134] Ibid., p.151.

[135] Ibid., p.149.

e. After April

Although Orlando and Sonnino had left the Conference, the British and French continued their attempts of mediation. On April 30 Tardieu, Clemenceau's right-hand man at the Conference, saw Crispi who led the remaining members of the Italian delegation at Paris, and proposed an arrangement for Fiume similar to that of the Saar[136] "as the best that could be hoped for in the face of Wilson's determination."[137] The proposal was transmitted to Orlando in Italy who promptly turned it down.

On April 30, also, the Council resumed its discussion on Italy. Lloyd George stated his view that Italy's claim to the Adriatic islands was based on security, whereupon Wilson retorted that Italy's claims to Dalmatia under the Treaty of London "would upset the whole peace of the world."[138] It was decided to invite the Austrians to Paris for consultation on May 12. Clemenceau also announced that Italy had dispatched warships to Smyrna. On May 1 and 2 the Italian situation was again under discussion, and Lloyd George and Clemenceau came to the conclusion that Italy would be breaking the Treaty of London if she did not sign the impending German treaty. The Italian delegates were informed in that sense, and, in order to put even stronger pressure on her, Italy was notified of the anticipated date of the meeting with the German delegates. The debate over Italy was continued on May 3 and revealed once more the different positions which the United States on one side, and Britain and France on the other, had taken up. The weakening of Wilson's position

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[136]The Conference had decided to put the Saar region under the administration of the League of Nations for fifteen years with a plebiscite as to adherence to France or Germany at the expiration of that period.

[137]Albrecht-Carrié, Journal of Modern History, XIII, p.502.

[138]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, V, p.354.

after his failure to appeal to Italy was clearly shown when Lloyd George frankly told him "that there was a growing feeling that Europe was bullied by the United States. In London this feeling was very strong . . . ."[139] Wilson replied that he was sure "that the so-called bullying was recognized by the common man as based on the principles which inspired the Peace . . . ."[140] On May 5 and 6 the discussion centred on Dalmatia, where the Italians had been reinforced, Asia Minor, where they had now landed troops, and Albania, where they had announced a protectorate without informing their allies. These actions irritated Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau and provoked retaliation. "The refusal to grant the Italian request for a day's postponement of the meeting with the Germans perhaps evinces best the temper of the Three . . . ."[141] On May 6, also, the Council distributed the German colonies in Africa, and the Italians, in their absence, received nothing. The Greeks were suddenly invited to occupy Smyrna in Asia Minor, obviously in order to forestall the Italians. "It is difficult to avoid the feeling that all parties were resorting to rather undignified tactics" is the judgment of Albrecht-Carrié on these events.[142] However, the firm stand of the United States, and the pressure exerted by Britain and France convinced Orlando and Sonnino of the necessity of returning to Paris.

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[139] Ibid., p.430. On April 27 Lord Riddell, British Press Chief in Paris, made the following statement at a meeting of members of the British delegation: "Our people are fed up with Wilson. They are tired of playing second fiddle, considering what we have done in the war." George A. Riddell, Intimate Diary of the Paris Conference and After, 1918-1923 (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1933), p.60.

[140] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, V, p.430.

[141] Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.158.

[142] Ibid., p.219.

The return of Orlando and Sonnino to the Peace Conference on May 6 put them in a weaker bargaining position than before, and a meeting of the Italian cabinet on May 4 had revealed a division of opinion over Fiume. Nevertheless, Orlando and Sonnino did not intend to yield. In the early days of May several foreign diplomatic sources in Rome had begun to suggest the construction of a Yugoslav port at Buccari, southeast of Fiume. This would enable Italy to gain possession of Fiume without damaging the economy of Yugoslavia.[143] On May 8 Johnson, who together with the other United States experts had once more examined the Italian problem, including the question of Buccari, wrote a memorandum: in the north, Italy was to receive the Brenner frontier, the Sexten Valley and Tarvis; in the northeast, the Wilson line should become the temporary frontier and a plebiscite would decide the disposal of the regions claimed by Italy to the east of it; the islands of Unie, Lussin, Sansego, Asinello and the Pelagosa group would go to Italy, and a plebiscite might be held in the rest of the islands and northern Dalmatia, while Zara would become a Free City; in Albania Italy was to receive Valona with an extensive hinterland. The city and district of Fiume were to be put under the administration of the League of Nations until the holding of a plebiscite. In the case of a result favourable to Italy, she would receive the right to annex Fiume but first would have to build a port and railway connection at Buccari not inferior to Fiume. "Since Italy claims that Fiume had already manifested its unanimous desire to be Italian, and also claims that Buccari can serve Yugoslavia as well as Fiume, the the formula is fair to the Italian claims," concluded the memorandum,

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[143] Ibid., p.160.

tongue in cheek.[144] In order to ascertain Wilson's attitude, Johnson also suggested an American loan to Italy on favourable terms.

During the next few days the question of the frontier between Austria and Yugoslavia occupied the attention of the Council of Four, and here the Italians supported the Austrians. Meanwhile House, with Wilson's permission but working under severe restrictions which greatly limited his freedom of action, resumed his efforts to work out some compromise with the Italians. On May 12 he saw Sonnino and Orlando, and arranged a conference with the latter for the following day. Miller and di Cellere were asked to prepare the ground for the meeting. Miller's suggestion was to postpone the settlement of the Italian-Yugoslav frontier by letting the League of Nations administer the disputed territory for five years, excepting those islands which Italy should have at once. Fiume was to have a regime like the Saar,[145] while Zara and Sebenico were also to be administered by the League, possibly as an Italian mandate. Di Cellere immediately informed the Italian delegates of Miller's idea and was instructed, after a hurried conference between Orlando and Sonnino, to inform Miller that the Italian delegation would consider it, Orlando adding that "if it represented the extreme and final concessions of the Americans, it was unacceptable, but that, with certain possible modifications, it could be used as a basis for further discussion."[146] This was done at once by di Cellere who also complained to Miller about the division by France and Britain of Germany's African colonies and Italy's

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[144] Ibid., pp.163-64. The reasons why it was impossible to build an adequate port and railhead at Buccari are enumerated: Ibid., pp.161-62. Johnson, perfectly aware of this, simply wanted to enable the Italian politicians to save their faces: Ibid., p.510.

[145] Above, p.110.

[146] Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.169.

sudden difficulties in getting credit from American sources. In the evening of May 12 Wilson conferred with House whose suggestion was to place Fiume and Dalmatia under the League of Nations "for such a period as was deemed necessary to allow good sense and calm judgment to prevail."[147] Wilson, although obviously interested, did not commit himself.

On the same day, May 12, Piacentini, one of the Italian colonial experts, met Beer, Chief of the Colonial Division of the United States delegation. Beer belonged to the "House group" and was sympathetic towards Italy's claims. During the conversation Piacentini put forward an unofficial "feeler" from Orlando: Fiume, without Susak, to be a free port under Italian sovereignty; Zara and Sebenico to be Free Cities; three or five islands to go to Italy. "This proposal . . . is further evidence of his Orlando's almost hypnotic concentration on Fiume, entirely out of proportion to its real value. This fixation is undoubtedly one of the main reasons for the failure to reach a settlement . . . ."[148] In the morning of May 13 Miller reported to House the result of his activities during the previous day. Afterwards Orlando visited House, as had been previously arranged. House suggested the provisional turning over of the disputed territory to the League of Nations, and it was decided that Orlando and Miller should meet later on in the morning "to discuss the legal means by which a settlement could be brought about through the League of Nations or otherwise."[149] Di Cellere also attended the subsequent meeting between Orlando and Miller. Miller repeated his

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[147] The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, p.463.

[148] Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.170.

[149] The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, p.463.

suggestions of the previous day, but little progress was made. Orlando admitted "that Fiume was of no real importance to Italy, but . . . feeling on the matter had become so strong in Italy that he could not be sure that, if he ordered its evacuation, the order would be obeyed by the army."[150] Still determined to prevent Yugoslavia from obtaining Fiume, he now proposed to make it a Free City. Finally, it was agreed that Orlando and Miller should meet again on the following day, May 14. Miller felt that progress had been made, and he proceeded to work out a "Definite Solution" of the problem. Meanwhile, Beer and Piacentini also had met again. This time Piacentini's proposals were more concrete: Fiume, without Susak, to be a free port under Italian sovereignty; Dalmatia to go to Yugoslavia except for Zara and Sebenico which should either go to Italy on the same terms as Fiume, or, at least, become Free Cities with native Italian commissionaries; Veglia to go with Fiume, Curzola, Lissa, Lessina and Lagosta to go to Italy. Piacentini insisted that these proposals should be kept strictly unofficial and no names mentioned. Beer brought the plan to the attention of Kerr, Lloyd George's secretary, and reported to House on the next day.

On May 13, although there were no Italian representatives present, the Council once more discussed Italy's boundaries. Wilson put forward Johnson's suggestions[151] whose Adriatic sections he claimed to be rather similar to those worked out by members of the British delegation.[152] He emphasized that "the decision from which he could not depart was that

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[150]Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.171.

[151]Above, pp.112-13.

[152]Some extremely flexible British suggestions, developed on April 27, are mentioned by Nicolson. Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, pp.317-18.

the Conference had no right to hand over people to a sovereignty they did not wish."[153] In the ensuing discussion Lloyd George stated that "if the Italians obtained Fiume, the British and French were entitled definitely to say that they must give up Dalmatia."[154] He then showed his broad understanding of the situation by stating that

> Italy had a good deal of national pride. The feelings they had, sprang not merely from their treatment in regard to Fiume, but over the whole field of the Treaty of Peace. They were not being treated quite as a great first class power. They realized that there were a certain number of backward people to be taken in hand by more efficient nations. No one, however, was asking Italy to undertake this burden. Consequently, their pride of race was hurt. It would be much better to settle the question of Fiume in this sort of atmosphere.[155]

When Wilson agreed, Lloyd George suggested that Italy "should be worked into the picture"[156] with respect to taking charge of a part of Asia Minor; some cession in Somaliland might also be discussed. Eventually the debate shifted back to the Adriatic. Wilson said that, if the Italians obtained Fiume under the plebiscite proposed by him, they should renounce all claims to Dalmatia and the islands except Lissa and a group south of Cherso which was inhabited by Italians. Furthermore, the Wilson line in Istria should be the frontier.

Meanwhile Miller had worked out the details of his "Definite Solution." He recommended that Fiume was to become an independent city and free port under the League of Nations, the Italian frontier in Istria to exclude the Fiume-Vienna railway, Yugoslavia to receive all of Dalmatia except Zara and Sebenico which, under Italian sovereignty, were

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[153] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, V, p.580.

[154] Ibid.

[155] Ibid., p.580.

[156] Ibid., p.581.

to become free ports. Furthermore, all of Dalmatia, including Zara and Sebenico, was to be neutralized. Of the Adriatic islands, Pago was to go to Yugoslavia, while Italy would receive all the other islands she claimed. Valona was to become an Italian possession, and the rest of Albania an Italian mandate under the League of Nations. In the evening Miller took these proposals to House who, a little later on, showed them to Wilson. The President feared Orlando might think that the proposals came from him but was assured by House "that Orlando understood just how matters were."[157] When Miller and di Cellere saw Orlando in the morning of May 14, Orlando refused to go into the "Definite Solution" but suggested direct negotiations between Italy and Yugoslavia on the basis of some entirely unofficial negotiations which had taken place in the middle of April between some Italians and Yugoslavs. He wanted to know whether Wilson was agreeable to this course of action. Miller reported this new development to House who immediately drafted a letter to Wilson, asking, on behalf of Orlando, whether he would approve of any settlement freely reached between the governments of Italy and Yugoslavia, and, if that was the case, whether he would be willing to have these conversations carried on "through the friendly medium of a representative of the American Government."[158] Wilson returned an affirmative reply, and Miller informed Orlando accordingly. In the morning of May 15 House attempted to win Trumbic over to the idea of direct negotiations with the Italians. Later on House and Miller spoke to Orlando. Orlando, whose position at home was growing increasingly precarious, desired a

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[157] The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, p.463.

[158] Ibid., p.464.

settlement in the shortest possible time: "the question for him was, what would Italy have to give up in order to secure Fiume politically: he was willing to make large concessions to the Yugoslavs for the use of the port."[159] A conversation between Miller and Johnson clearly brought out wide difference of opinion between both factions within the United States delegation. House, however, was very optimistic: "The Italians are now talking sense" he noted in his diary.[160]

Early on May 16 Trumbic visited House and, certain of Wilson's backing, showed himself extremely reluctant to enter into direct discussions with the Italians; it was only with difficulty that House eventually obtained his consent for such a meeting in the afternoon. Meanwhile, Orlando and di Cellere had several conversations with Miller, in the course of which the Italians delivered their reply to the "Definite Solution": they demanded, as a permanent frontier, the armistice line from the Brenner to the vicinity of Fiume whose corpus separatum should receive the status of a free and independent city and free port, guaranteed by the League. With regard to Dalmatia, the Adriatic islands, and Albania, the Italians were willing to accept Miller's proposals. This meant that Miller's suggestions were now out of line with all parties concerned: Italians, Yugoslavs, and Wilson.[161] Before the afternoon meeting began, House saw Wilson who "showed no inclination to be conciliatory to the Italians."[162] The meeting which constituted the climax of House's efforts, began at 5:30 in the afternoon and lasted till 9 p.m.

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[159]Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.176.

[160]The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, p.464.

[161]Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.179.

[162]The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, p.466.

The Italians and Yugoslavs sat in separate rooms, each assisted by members of the United States delegation sympathetic to their cause: Beer and Miller staying with the Italians, and Johnson and Frazier, who was a member of House's staff, with the Yugoslavs. House, positioned in a room between both groups, acted as intermediary.

> As to the Americans acting as seconds, while they naturally did not feel so strongly as the Italians or the Yugoslavs, they had nevertheless committed themselves to the extent of appearing as supporters of the opposing delegations . . . thus losing the prestige of disinterested arbiters. They almost came down to the level of advocates pleading the case of their own clients.[163]

During the meeting the Yugoslavs agreed to Italy's possession of the Tarvis district and of Lussin, Lissa and Pelagosa, while the Italians agreed that Fiume, including Susak, should become an independent city and free port under the League of Nations. The Italians were also content to leave Yugoslavia in possession of most of Dalmatia, provided it was neutralized, and also of Pago. However, no agreement could be reached over Istria where the Italians were determined to obtain a land connection with Fiume, while the Yugoslavs insisted on the Wilson line, over Zara and Sebenico which Italy wanted to be free cities under her own sovereignty, and over the remaining Adriatic islands included in the Treaty of London on whose possession the Italians insisted. Trumbic, who was tied down by definite instructions from his own delegation,[164] refused to make any further concessions and the meeting ended in failure. On the following morning, May 17, Miller, Frazier, and Beer had another meeting with Orlando and di Cellere. The Italians gave a little way in Istria but

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[163] Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.180. "It is incredible, but this world-incident has narrowed down to an internal dispute in the Inquiry" noted Shotwell, Chief of the History Division and Libraries of the United States delegation in his diary on May 16. Shotwell, At the Paris Peace Conference, p.322.

[164] Steed, Through Thirty Years, II, p.333.

refused to yield any further. Wilson, consulted by telephone, remained "inflexible in his determination to yield nothing."[165] Thus not only had attempts to bring Italians and Yugoslavs together failed, but the scheme of Miller and Beer to force the Yugoslavs to come to terms through an agreement between the United States and Italy, obtained by some modification of the Italian claims, had also proved incapable of execution.

The attitude of the Italians became even more resentful after Colonel House's failure; they felt that self-determination was to be applied only in their own case but overlooked in the case of others.[166] Another complication arose when Lloyd George, who only a few days earlier had suggested extensive concessions to Italy in Asia Minor, completely reversed his stand under heavy pressure from his cabinet.[167] At the Council meeting on May 19, in the temporary absence of Orlando, he expressed the hope that "if the Italians could be got out of Asia Minor altogether, it would . . . be worth giving them something they were especially concerned in . . . ."[168] meaning, of course, Fiume. He quoted the Aga Khan, leader of the influential Moslem Ismaili sect and member of the Indian delegation, who had told him "that no-one who knew Fiume could think of it as anything but an Italian city."[169] Once more Buccari, Yugoslavia's supposed compensation for Fiume, became the object of a futile debate. Two days later, while the Italians were away at a cabinet meeting at Oulx on the French border, Lloyd George submitted to the

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[165] The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, p.468.

[166] Ibid.

[167] Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, pp.340-43.

[168] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, V, p.710.

[169] Ibid.

Council a scheme prepared by himself, dealing with Italy's claims on Fiume and Asia Minor: Italy should build, at her own expense, an Adriatic harbour for Yugoslavia as a substitute for Fiume. On completion of the new harbour, Fiume and Cherso would be given to Italy. Italy would have to resign all her claims to the mainland of Dalmatia but receive all those islands south of Cherso which were predominantly Italian, including Lissa. Asia Minor should not be partitioned in order to avoid great bitterness among the Moslems. The ensuing discussion was barren of results, mainly because Wilson refused to make any further concession to Italy on Fiume.

f. The Fall of Orlando

By the middle of May the composition of the German treaty which was the main concern of the United States, Great Britain, and France was far advanced, but the treaty with Austria which interested mainly Italy was only in its early stages. Thus public opinion in Italy began to become aware of the country's isolation, and the press began to show signs of deep anxiety. Criticism of Orlando's policies increased in vehemence, and the cabinet meeting at Oulx of May 21 dealt with the precarious position of the government.

Meanwhile the Austrian delegation had arrived in Paris and demanded to be informed of the peace terms. This compelled the Council of Four to attend to the Italian problem once more, and on May 26 Italy's territorial claims were again debated. Orlando stated that, if it was not possible to reach a settlement, he would have to insist on the terms of the Treaty of London. Wilson once more declared that the situation had changed since the conclusion of that Treaty: the common people of the world had entered into a partnership as the basis of peace. He eloquently reiterated his principles: the League of Nations and the

right of the small nations to self-determination. Therefore, he said, he wanted the problem of eastern Istria and Dalmatia to be settled by plebiscite. Orlando replied that the Treaty of London itself was a compromise because Italy had renounced Fiume and half of Dalmatia "including the Italian towns of Spalato and Trau."[170] He rejected the idea of a plebiscite, partially because, in the northeast, it "would not give the right results to Italy." In that case he had to seek a principle different from the ethnic, namely "that the line of the Alps was the defence of his country." He drew a parallel to Poland which, he claimed, now contained a minority of 1,700,000 Germans, and he went on to say that even "if the whole of the Italian claims were granted . . . not half this number of aliens would be assigned to Italy."[171] Towards the end of this fruitless debate Clemenceau twice remarked that Orlando had never made a proposal himself, and suggested that he should make one. This Orlando promised.

On May 27 Tardieu, who had been in touch with Crespi since the end of April, handed him a draft proposal which was subsequently known as the "Tardieu Plan." It is quite possible that the initiative came from the Italians themselves,[172] and Tardieu was known to be rather sympathetic towards Italy's claims.[173] At any rate, late in the same night Crespi took Tardieu's proposals to Orlando who agreed to them as

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[170] Ibid., VI, p.50.

[171] Ibid., p.52.

[172] Albrecht-Carrié, Journal of Modern History, XIII, p.512.

[173] Bonsal quotes him as saying: "The good will of Italy is more important to the peace of the world that the ultimate disposition of a miserable Dalmatian fishing village." Bonsal, Suitors and Suppliants, p.124.

a basis for negotiations. The Tardieu Plan suggested the establishment of a State of Fiume, under the League of Nations, consisting of the city and an extensive hinterland with boundaries which in the west gave all of Istria to Italy, and in the east corresponded to Italy's claims of February 7.[174] Veglia was to belong to Fiume. The administration of the new state was to consist of a five-member body: two members to be named by Italy, one by Fiume, one by Yugoslavia, and one by the League. The city itself was to retain its corpus separatum, the port was to become a free port, and after fifteen years a plebiscite, conducted by communes, was to decide the future of the state. Zara and Sebenico were to go to Italy, the rest of Dalmatia, neutralized, to Yugoslavia. Italy would also obtain all the Adriatic islands except Pago, and receive a madate over Albania. The Assling triangle[175] would go to Austria. On the following morning, May 28, Tardieu secured the approval of Clemenceau and Lloyd George, and also the support of House. Lloyd George, House, and Orlando then met to discuss the Tardieu Plan.[176] Lloyd George, who had spoken to Wilson just before the meeting, revealed the President's objections: Wilson did not agree to Italy's ownership of all the islands, especially Veglia, and he still regarded the consent of Yugoslavia as essential for a settlement. House repeated a suggestion made by a British source tnat Zara and Sebenico be attached to Fiume, a proposal that met with opposition from Orlando. House and Lloyd George then went to see Wilson who by that time had Clemenceau with him. Wilson wished to leave the matter to the Yugoslavs but met

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[174]See Map IIId.

[175]Below, pp.142-46; also, see Map IVb.

[176]This meeting is listed as an official Council of Four meeting by the United States publication of the Paris Peace Conference: U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, IV, pp.78-80.

with opposition from Lloyd George and House who felt that the Yugoslavs should be told that the Tardieu Plan was a fair proposal which they ought to accept, especially as there were several other nations concerned in their side of the controversy. According to House, Wilson "finally yielded."[177] In the afternoon the whole Council of Four met. The debate centred around Cherso which Orlando claimed to be inhabited by a majority of Italians while Wilson maintained that only its northern part was Italian. Wilson also intimated that he wanted eastern Istria and Cherso to belong to the State of Fiume. Orlando stated that he was willing to relinquish Italy's claims on Lessina, Curzola, and Meledea, but that was as far as he could go. "He would not say that further renunciations were impossible, but it would be very difficult for him to put them before his colleagues."[178] Wilson said that he would do his best to use the proposal as a basis for acceptance by both parties.[179]

On May 29 the Council officially gave Italy the Brenner frontier, the Sexten Valley, and Tarvis, thereby freeing the Italians from the fear that their allies would retaliate in the north if a settlement of the Adriatic question was not reached. On May 30 House handed the Tardieu Plan to the Yugoslavs who submitted their reply on the following day. They would accept only the Wilson line as the western boundary of the proposed State of Fiume, and in addition demanded Susak and, if possible, Veglia. For Zara and Sebenico they demanded autonomy under Yugoslav sovereignty, and the islands claimed by Italy were to have their fate

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[177] The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, p.471.

[178] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, VI, p.91.

[179] Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.190, places this discussion on May 29, but this is contradicted by U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, VI, pp.89-102.

decided either by a plebiscite within three to five years, or by a decision of the League of Nations. On June 2 this Yugoslav reply was officially presented to Johnson. "They did not leave a single loophole for the Italians to win. When I told the President this, he declared they were right . . . ." is House's entry in his diary for May 31.[180] It is obvious, then, that the Yugoslavs could still rely on Wilson's complete support. House, having lost the President's confidence owing to his different viewpoint, took no further part in the Italian negotiations after that.

On June 5 Orlando sent Clemenceau a map indicating the boundaries which Italy proposed for the State of Fiume. Probably on the same day, Orlando also sent a letter to Wilson, claiming the right for Italy to suggest boundary changes for the new state. As a result, the Council of Four again dealt with the Adriatic problem on June 6 in the absence of an Italian delegate. Wilson, opening the discussion, rejected Orlando's claim, stating that the Yugoslav counter proposal "was in line with the other settlements made in the Treaty of Peace, whereas the Italian proposals were not."[181] He had been impressed by a Slovene delegation which had visited him the day before about Klagenfurt[182] and touched by their humility. He felt that the liberation of the Yugoslavs must be real. Italy, he concluded, really cared only for Fiume, not the islands. Lloyd George, in reply, pointed out that the Adriatic coast had real military importance for Italy. He then drew Wilson's attention to the potential menace of Russia and Panslavism. "Serbia had always been treated as a as a younger brother by Russia. If he were Italian he would feel much

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[180] The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, p.473.

[181] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, VI, p.211.

[182] Below, p.153.

happier if the islands in the Adriatic were not Slav."[183] The transfer of the islands to Italy did not involve a large population. Wilson countered that strategic considerations were important for Yugoslavia, too; furthermore, the Yugoslavs felt that Italy's possession of Cherso would bottle up Fiume. "The Italian commercial interests of Trieste were determined to stifle Fiume and that was the basis of the argument for the Assling junction."[184] Replying to a question by Clemenceau, Wilson stated that Cherso was inhabited by 2,200 Italians and 5,816 Yugoslavs, the city of Sebenico by 858 Italians and 9,031 Yugoslavs. These figures were a little more favourable to the Italians than those of the Austrian census of 1910. Clemenceau said that he was willing to let the Italians have Zara, but Sebenico should go to the Yugoslavs. Wilson agreed with Clemenceau on Sebenico but suggested that Zara should become a Free City and be represented by Italy in external affairs. Neither Lloyd George nor Clemenceau agreed to Italy's claims to a hinterland for Zara. After a lengthy debate on Fiume it was decided that Wilson would draft proposals which were to be based on the discussion and "would include the creation of a free state in Fiume commencing in the north from the point where the Treaty of London line joined the American line, and extending the Tardieu line so as to include the islands of Cherso as well as Veglia."[185]

During the Council meeting on the following day, June 7, Wilson, on behalf of himself, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau, handed his counter-proposals to Orlando. It proposed to extend the territory of the State

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[183] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, VI, p.212.

[184] Ibid., p.214.

[185] Ibid., p.215.

of Fiume to the north so as to include Idria, and added to it the north-eastern corner of Istria and the island of Cherso. The new state would have complete self-government under a Commission of the League of Nations, which was to consist of one Yugoslav and two Italian citizens, one representative of the new state itself, and one representative chosen by the League Council. Fiume would become a free port. A plebiscite taken after five years within the whole state would determine whether the population wanted to join Italy, Yugoslavia, or to remain a Free State under the League. All the Adriatic islands were to go to Italy except those near Sebenico, Zara would become a Free City under the League with Italy representing it diplomatically, and the Assling junction would go to Yugoslavia. Wilson added that this was the furthest concession he would make. Orlando replied that the original Tardieu Plan was the furthest concession he could make and, in the case of Fiume, a "terrible sacrifice" had been involved.[186] Should the new proposal be less favourable than the Tardieu Plan, he would have to reject it. The meeting ended with a discussion on the Italian frontier in Istria, and Orlando left for another cabinet meeting at Oulx where Wilson's counter proposal was examined. Returning to Paris immediately after the meeting, Orlando submitted his government's reply. His statement pointed out that the counter proposal was in many respects less advantageous to Italy than the original Tardieu Plan, and therefore had to be rejected.

> The kernel of the issue was still the Italian frontier in Istria. In this region, the Italians and the Americans stood essentially on the same positions which they had assumed at the beginning of the controversy. That difference could not be disguised by any proposal to erect the disputed territory into a distinct entity so long as the Italians kept thinking of it in terms of a temporary device that would merely postpone their securing Fiume, while Wilson kept

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[186] Ibid., p.247.

looking upon it as a means to achieve the exact opposite.[187]

The failure of the Italian delegation in Paris to achieve a satisfactory settlement of the eastern frontier aggravated the discontent at home. This reacted on the cabinet and even on the delegation in Paris. On June 19 Orlando was defeated in parliament on a technicality and his government resigned. It must be realized that he had been confronted by a difficult task, for the Treaty of London was extremely unpopular not only with the United States but also with Britain and France, Italy's co-signatories. Orlando's preoccupation with Fiume and the temper of Italian public opinion aggravated the situation to such a degree that a flexible policy at the Peace Conference became impossible, and led Orlando and Sonnino to neglect Italy's colonial claims. Consequently, Italy secured little more than promises of limited gains in the colonial field. Perhaps the most poignant comment on Sonnino's policy was made by his successor Tittoni when he arrived in Paris: "He has bound us to a few rocks in the Adriatic while forgetting colonies, mandates, raw materials, war debts, everything, everything that counts."[188]

## B. THE FRONTIERS OF YUGOSLAVIA

### 1. The Creation of Yugoslavia

With the collapse of Austria-Hungary, the National Council of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, also frequently referred to as the Yugoslav National Council, which had been formed in Zagreb on October 6, 1918,[189]

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[187] Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.193. Plebiscite by communes might give the town of Fiume to Italy; plebiscite within the whole state was bound to lead to a majority for Yugoslavia.

[188] Albrecht-Carrié, Journal of Modern History, XIII, p.516.

[189] Above, p.24.

assumed the direction of the new "State of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs," comprising all the South Slavs of the former Dual Monarchy. This state, which existed in the same form only from October 29 to December 1, 1918, immediately asked the victorious Allies for recognition but was unsuccessful because, out of consideration for Italy, the other three Great Powers hesitated to take this step. Even the Serbian government showed reluctance. A conference between representatives of Serbia, led by Pasic, and the Zagreb National Council took place at Geneva from November 6-9, and Pasic recognized the National Council as the government of the Southern Slavs of former Austria-Hungary only under French pressure.[190] Pasic was still at heart a supporter of the "Greater Serbia" ideology, and was not eager to commit himself with regard to the territorial claims of the Slovenes and Croats in the north and northwest. Thus the Serbian government rejected an agreement reached at the meeting at Geneva between Serbian and "Yugoslav" delegates in early November which would have given both sides equal representation in the common state to be founded.

This rejection, and the Italian occupation of Croat and Slovene territories under the terms of the armistice, put the Zagreb National Council into a difficult situation which was aggravated by internal quarrels. However, the threat from Italy determined the Council on November 24 to send a delegation to Belgrade in order to conclude a union with Serbia without safeguards. This union was proclaimed on December 1, leaving the drafting of the constitution to a future Constituent Assembly. As Montenegro had declared its union with Serbia on

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[190] Martin Wutte, Kärntens Freiheitskampf (Weimar: Verlag Hermann Böhlau's Nachfolger, 1943), p.61.

November 12, the new "Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes," or "Yugoslavia," had come into existence. Trumbic, who had been the leading figure of the Yugoslav movement throughout the war, became Foreign Minister, and, after Prime Minister Pasic, the leading figure in the Yugoslav delegation at the Peace Conference. The new state was not immediately recognized by the Allies and therefore attended the early part of the Peace Conference under the name of "Serbia".[191]

2. Yugoslavia's Territorial Claims

The Yugoslav delegates appeared before the Council of Ten for the first time on January 31, 1919. They demanded a large portion of the Banat, a claim which led to a dispute with the Rumanians. On February 18 the Yugoslavs presented the rest of their territorial claims.[192] Vesnitch, a Serb, spoke first and stressed that the Yugoslavs had persistently placed obstacles in the path of the German tendency to expand towards Asia Minor. After pointing out the services of the Yugoslavs to the Allied War effort and denouncing all secret arrangements engaged in without the knowledge of the Yugoslavs, Vesnitch spoke about the Yugoslav frontiers in the south and east, topics which lie outside the scope of this thesis. Zolger, a Slovene and former Austrian Minister, then stated the claims of the Yugoslavs with regard to their northern frontier (with Hungary and Austria). He demanded "that the proposed boundary with the Germans and Magyars was to be drawn in such a way as to include all the Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes along the Drave."[193] He stated that the Austrian census figures could not be trusted because

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[191]See Appendix G.

[192]Above, p.90.

[193]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, IV, p.48.

they favoured the German element, and then spoke of the great misery undergone by the Slovenes as a result of the persistent drive of the Germans to the Adriatic. Turning to Carinthia, Zolger admitted that the proposed frontier included areas which did not contain Slovene majorities.[194] He justified these demands by the claim that the Austrian authorities had practiced forcible Germanization since 1850, and presented examples of the persecution of the Slovenes. He also stated that Klagenfurt, the capital of Carinthia, had been two-third Slovene in 1850. "It was therefore fair to say that the reduction of the Slovene element was not a process of natural evolution but the work of a deliberate and forcible policy . . . ."[195] Therefore the Slovenes ought to be compensated for the losses they had suffered. "Wherever it was possible to establish an ethnic claim . . . it should be admitted."[196] Trumbic then spoke on the Yugoslav-Italian frontier.

Trumbic's claims led to the long and bitter controversy between Yugoslavia and Italy already described. Yugoslavia's claims on her northern frontier were, as long as they did not affect Italy's interests, by a resolution of the Council of Ten, referred for examination to the Committee which had been established to consider the problem of the Banat. That body thereby officially became the "Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions relating to Rumania and Yugoslavia."

3. Events in Southern Styria and Carinthia

According to the Austrian census of 1910, southern Styria was inhabited by 162,077 Germans and 406,809 Slovenes. The cities of Marburg,

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[194]See Map IVa.

[195]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, IV, p.49. According to Wutte, the part of Carinthia claimed by the Yugoslavs contained 140,000 Germans and 80,000 Slovenes. Wutte, Kärntens Freiheitskampf, p.73.

[196]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, IV, p.49.

Cilli and Pettau and the larger market towns were predominantly German while the countryside was Slovene. North and northwest of Marburg, on the linguistic boundary, there were several mixed districts.[197] The relationship between both races before the war, though not bad, was not always harmonious.[198] In Carinthia, according to the same census, there were 301,000 Germans and 80,600 Slovenes. The Slovenes lived in the southern part of the province, but even there the larger settlements contained many Germans. Unlike in southern Styria, the Slovene element in Carinthia was declining: from 30% of the population in 1880 it fell to 21% in 1910.[199] This state of affairs, however, is claimed by the Austrians to have come about peacefully, because the Slovenes of Carinthia were, in their majority, in outlook Carinthians first and Slovenes second, and on good terms with the Germans under whose influence they had come during the Middle Ages, and whose language many of them had adopted for economic and cultural reasons. This process was speeded up by the modern means of communication. Thus most of the Carinthian Slovenes had little understanding of the nationalist sentiments of their co-nationals in southern Styria and Carniola.[200]

On August 16, 1918, the Slovenes formed a Slovene National Council in Ljubljana which later subordinated itself to the Council in Zagreb. Nevertheless, the Slovenes retained for a while far-reaching local authority and during the last days of the Dual Monarchy the Ljubljana authorities laid claim to large stretches of Styria and Carinthia: all

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[197] Hugelmann, Das Nationalitätenrecht des alten Österreich, p.467.

[198] Ibid., p.474.

[199] Wutte, Kärntens Freiheitskampf, p.17.

[200] Both Hugelmann and Wutte are most emphatic on the last point. The result of the Klagenfurt plebiscite of 1920 seems to bear out their point of view.

of southern Styria, in excess of the territory inhabited by Slovene majorities, and more than half of Carinthia, including the principal cities of Klagenfurt and Villach. These demands were adopted by Yugoslavia and presented at the Peace Conference.[201]

Meanwhile the state of Austria, consisting of the German parts alone of the Habsburg Monarchy, had formed itself to the north of Yugoslavia. A declaration of the newly constituted "Provisional Diet" of Carinthia on November 11, 1918, declared adherence to the new Austria of all German and those mixed parts of Carinthia which wished to join it. Thus a serious quarrel between the Slovene National Council and the Carinthian diet was inevitable. When in the early days of November Slovene military units began to attempt the occupation of the parts of Styria and Carinthia which the Slovene National Council claimed, an armed conflict began which lasted intermittently for several months and eventually involved not only the local authorities but also the governments of Belgrade and Vienna, and finally the Allies as well. The Serbs were at first very reluctant to intervene, and, as will be seen, the Austrian government adopted a similar attitude.

In Styria, the Slovenes met with little resistance. The Styrian provincial government, preoccupied with internal problems, did not wish to engage in warfare, and the Austrian military command at Graz declared its forces to be insufficient for successful defence. Resistance came from local volunteers, and was quite stubborn at some points, especially at Radkersburg. Marburg, the most important city in southern Styria, fell into the hands of the Slovenes on November 23, and a pro-Austrian demonstration of its inhabitants at the arrival of the United States

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[201]Above, p.131.

Study Commission on January 27, 1919, was bloodily suppressed.[202] On February 13, with the help of the French Balkan Command, an armistice was concluded which was extremely favourable to the Yugoslavs: it left all of southern Styria, including its German towns and the mixed districts along the linguistic border, in the hands of the Slovenes. When in early May, under the influence of the developments in Carinthia, the German population of Styria showed great desire to take up the fight once more, both the Styrian and Austrian authorities discouraged such action, partially because of the threat of Communist Hungary to Styria.[203]

In Carinthia events took a difference course. The new provincial government displayed great energy and determination from the beginning. It organized armed forces consisting of volunteers, mainly returned soldiers. When in the beginning of November Slovene units began to advance into southern Carinthia, the Carinthians at first withdrew under protest. This attitude changed when the Slovenes advanced towards Klagenfurt. Attacks by Carinthian forces, in which local Slovenes participated, expelled the invaders from a large part of the Carinthian territory they had occupied. On January 14, truce negotiations began at Graz. Meanwhile the Carinthian government had approached Professor Coolidge, Head of the American Field Mission to Central Europe, at his headquarters in Vienna. Coolidge sent one of his assistants, Lieut.-Colonel Miles, as an observer to Graz, and on January 22 both parties agreed to the armistice terms which Miles suggested, mainly on the basis

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[202] Wenzel Jaksch, Europas Weg nach Potsdam. Schuld and Schicksal im Donauraum (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1958), p.207.

[203] Heinrich Benedikt (ed.), Geschichte der Republik Österreich (München: Verlag R. Oldenburg, 1954), p.81.

of the status quo. Miles' action embarrassed Coolidge and the United States delegation in Paris because it appeared to commit their country,[204] but it put an end to hostilities in Carinthia for the next three months. Miles, accompanied by three more members of the American Field Mission, then went to Marburg, and from there visited various localities in southern Carinthia in order to investigate the situation on the spot. Returning to Vienna on February 7, Miles submitted a lengthy report to Coolidge in which he expressed the opinion that all of Carinthia except the Seeland district, which lay south of the Karawanken Mountains, should remain part of Austria because it was a geographic and economic unit, and because the majority of the population did not appear to wish to see Carinthia divided. "The Slovene who does not want to be a Jugo-Slav is a curiosity we should have never believed in, had we not seen him, and in large numbers"[205] was perhaps the most important observation. With regard to Styria, Miles proposed that both Marburg and Radkersburg stay with Austria. Coolidge accepted the report and sent it to Paris where it henceforth exercised a decisive influence on the attitude of the majority of the United States delegation.

By now the Paris Conference had begun to examine the problem of the Austro-Yugoslav frontier. Owing to the hostility of Italy towards Yugoslavia and the stand of the United States, the course of events developed unfavourably for the Yugoslavs. Perhaps in order to improve their position,[206] the Slovenes began a new attack in southern Carinthia

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[204]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, XII, pp.498-500.

[205]Ibid., p.505.

[206]Wutte, Kärntens Freiheitskampf, p.197.

on April 29, without the knowledge of the Belgrade government.[207] The attack was a complete failure, and between May 2-8 the Slovene troops were expelled from the whole of Carinthia with the exception of Seeland. This event seems to have persuaded the Belgrade government to come to the aid of the Slovenes with regular units of the Serbian army. The new military attack coincided with a Yugoslav diplomatic offensive at the Peace Conference.[208] It began on May 28 and was completely successful. The southern part of Klagenfurt Basin was overrun by the Yugoslavs who entered the city on June 6. A further advance was prevented by the direct intervention of the Paris Conference.

The Austrian government in Vienna showed less determination than the Carinthians to resist the Yugoslavs. It rejected armed resistance because it feared unfavourable repercussions at the Peace Conference and because food supplies for starving Vienna from Allied sources were being transported through Ljubljana.[209] Once the fighting had commenced, the Austrian government pursued the policy of asking the Allies for either a plebiscite or the appointment of a Court of Arbitration, requests which met with refusal. During the fighting of late April and early May the Austrian government sent some non-commissioned officers and military supplies to Carinthia but prohibited any offensive action; however, this prohibition was ignored by the Carinthians. While waiting at St. Germain for the peace terms, the Austrian delegation repeatedly drew the attention of the Conference to the situation in Carinthia. These notes, and the efforts of the Italians, eventually led to an order of the Council

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[207]Benedikt (ed.), Geschichte der Republik Österreich, p.78.

[208]Below, p.149.

[209]Wutte, Kärntens Freiheitskampf, p.113.

of Four to the Yugoslavs to evacuate the northern part of the Klagenfurt Basin, including the city.

The consequences of the armed conflict turned out to be extremely important because the attention of the Peace Conference was drawn to the fact that a considerable proportion of the Carinthian Slovenes seemed to be averse to becoming citizens of Yugoslavia. This realization played a decisive role during the subsequent developments.

4. Early Developments in Paris

a. The Groundwork of the Territorial Commission.

There is no indication that, before the conclusion of hostilities, the Allies were aware of a racial problem in Carinthia or Styria. The first sign of trouble seems to have been a message of the Austrian government to Washington in early December, transmitted through the Swedish government,[210] protesting against the occupation of German-speaking areas by the Yugoslavs, and asking "that the said territory be neutralized and a company of American troops be detailed to Klagenfurt and one to Villach."[211] After the exchange of several notes no action was taken by any of the Great Powers, but the warning against the use of force, issued by the Council of Ten on January 24,[212] was also directed to the Slovenes.

During the succeeding weeks the Great Powers had time to determine their stand in the Austro-Yugoslav dispute. The French delegates stood unequivocally by Yugoslavia. The Italians took precisely the

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[210] No diplomatic contact existed between the Allies and the new administration in Vienna.

[211] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, II, p.199.

[212] Above, p.53.

opposite stand. They did not want the Yugoslavs astride the railway line linking Trieste and Vienna via Tarvis, nor did they desire the Yugoslavs to possess the Assling Triangle and thus control a part of the line which linked Trieste and Vienna via Klagenfurt.[213] Therefore, the Italians did their utmost to thwart the aims of the Yugoslavs. Great Britain showed little interest in the dispute, while the United States delegation, trying to apply Wilson's principle of self-determination, generally relied on the Miles Report and assumed the leading role in the subsequent negotiations.

As has already been stated, the Council of Ten heard Yugoslavia's claims on February 18, and the establishment of the Committee or Commission for the Study of Rumanian and Yugosalv Affairs was the result. This body met three times. At the first meeting on March 2 great differences of opinion revealed themselves. Seymour, the United States delegate, wanted the whole of southern Styria, including Radkersburg, to go to Yugoslavia, while the whole of Carinthia should remain with Austria both for economic reasons and because of the principle of self-determination. He also pointed out that Carinthian Slovenes had often actively supported the Austrians during the fighting in early January. Leeper, the British delegate, proposed a similar frontier, except that he felt that in Styria Radkersburg should remain with Austria, while in Carinthia the valley of the Mies should go to Yugoslavia. Vanutelli-Rey, of Italy, wanted Marburg to belong to Austria because, he claimed, the entire economic life of the city was linked with the north. Le Rond, the French delegate, declared his basic agreement with

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[213]See Map IVb.

the ethnographical views of Seymour and Leeper. However, with regard to the Klagenfurt Basin, he felt that its economic relations were directed towards the Slovene south. He doubted the supposed hostility of the Carinthian Slovenes towards Yugoslavia. Laroche, the other French delegate, complained "that the French Delegation appeared to be the only one which thought that Klagenfurt ought to go to Jugo-Slavia." Tardieu, the Chairman of the Commission, warned not to "perpetuate the violence done by a foreign administration to the natural inclinations of under-developed peoples . . . ."[214] It was then decided to hand the questions of Marburg and Klagenfurt to a Sub-Committee for further study.

The Commission met again on March 11. Le Rond reported that the findings of the Sub- Committee had not been unanimous: the United States, British, and French delegations wanted Marburg to go to Yugoslavia while the Italians made a "provisional reservation" on that point. As to the Klagenfurt region, the British and French considered that the sentiments of the (mixed) population still had to be determined, while the Americans and Italians felt that the local sentiments were hostile towards Yugoslavia. A lengthy discussion followed, in the course of which it became apparent that the Italians wanted to keep the Yugoslavs away from the Klagenfurt-Marburg-Graz railway in order to be able to maintain connection with Hungary through Austria. Finally, the question was put aside for the moment. With regard to Carinthia, the British and French wanted Bleiburg to go to Yugoslavia while the Americans disagreed; the problem was then referred to the Sub-Committee for examination.[215]

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[214] March 2 meeting of the Committee for the Study of Territorial Questions Relating to Rumania and Yugoslavia, Procès Verbal No.9, Sifton Collection, Documents of the Peace Conference 1919, V, pp.230-49.

[215] Ibid., VIII, March 11 meeting, Procès Verbal No.15, pp.20-36.

The Commission met again on March 13, and Le Rond read out the conclusions of the Sub-Committee: the American, British, and French delegates wanted Yugoslavia to have Marburg and the Mies Valley, while Bleiburg should stay with Austria; the Italians maintained their reservation concerning Marburg and the regions to the west of it. Concerning the Klagenfurt Basin, the Americans, British, and French felt that "an investigation or consultation" might be necessary. The Italian delegation presented a minority report which stressed Italy's interest in a secure railway connection with Hungary; moreover, the loss of the railway centre of Marburg would have a disorganizing effect on Austria. After some debate, the Commission accepted the recommendation to consult the population of the Klagenfurt region. The problem of the Carinthian territory west of the Klagenfurt-Ljubljana road was not touched because the Commission felt Italy was directly concerned.[216]

On April 6 the Commission presented its report to the Supreme Council. It embodied the previous conclusions of the Commission and Sub-Committee, and represented the opinion of the United States, British, and French delegates, with the Italians reserving judgment. The report recommended that in Styria, Marburg with the surrounding district should go to Yugoslavia, mainly because it was felt that the city's markets lay to the south, and political union with Yugoslavia would weaken the links with the north. In Carinthia, the Yugoslavs should get Unterdrauburg and the valley of the Mies, but Bleiburg was to stay with Austria. With regard to the Klagenfurt Basin, the report felt that the available information was insufficient to determine the national aims of the population,

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[216] Ibid., March 13 Session, Minutes No.16, pp.291-307. With regard to the Klagenfurt Basin, the Sub-Committee's report avoided the word "plebiscite."

but stated that the economic interests of the region were linked with the north rather than with the south. Therefore, the report was of the opinion that the Austro-Yugoslav frontier should run along the crest of the Karawanken Mountains. Simultaneously, it suggested that the population of the Klagenfurt Basin (whose boundaries the report defined) should be given the opportunity to express its preference for Austria or Yugoslavia. Thus the Commission's report recommended that Yugoslavia would receive 69,687 Germans and 397,570 South Slavs in Styria and 2,847 Germans and 10,947 South Slavs in Carinthia, excluding the Klagenfurt Basin.[217]

b. The Problems of the Assling Triangle and Klagenfurt Basin

After the presentation of the Commission's report there were no further developments in Paris concerning the frontier between Austria and Yugoslavia for a whole month because the attention of the Conference was focused on the settlement with Germany. On May 7 the German delegation received the draft of the peace treaty, and while it studied it, the Supreme Council was free to deal with other matters. On May 8 the Council of Four, acting on a suggestion from Orlando, agreed

> that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be asked to consider at once, and to make recommendations in regard to the territorial boundaries of Austria and Hungary, and of the new States created out of former Austro-Hungarian territory, and States contiguous thereto, as dealt with in the reports of the various Commissions . . .[218]

Consequently on the following day the Council of Foreign Ministers discussed the Austro-Yugoslav frontier. Tardieu, the Chairman, and several

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[217] Ibid., XII, Report No.2 presented to the Supreme Council: Frontiers of Yugoslavia, pp.219-54.

[218] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, V, pp.513-14.

other members of the Commission for Rumanian and Yugoslav Affairs also attended. Tardieu informed the Foreign Ministers about the Commission's report of April 6. Pichon then inquired whether the Commission should not receive authority to study the frontier problem up to the Italian border, and not only up to the Klagenfurt-Ljubljana road (which crossed the Karawanken Mountains at the Loibl Pass),[219] whereupon Sonnino suggested that the problem should be considered right now. He then said that he understood that the Commission had given careful consideration to the railway situation of the regions under discussion "with the result that it had been decided to leave the railway line between Klagenfurt, Assling, and Trieste free, that is to say, outside the territories allotted to Jugo-Slavia."[220] Therefore, he concluded, the Austro-Yugoslav frontier should run from the Loibl Pass in southerly direction until it met the Italian frontier.

Sonnino's suggestion would have left the Assling Triangle with Austria. That region, occupied by the Yugoslavs immediately after the armistice, was, according to the Austrian census of 1910, inhabited by 1,690 Germans and 31,917 Slovenes.[221] Lansing stated that the Council of Foreign Ministers had not received any specific reports on the question and suggested that the Commission should examine it; Sonnino said that he would not object, provided the Commission would "clearly lay down the principle . . . that the main line of railway communication between Trieste and Vienna via Assling and Klagenfurt should pass wholly through Italian and Austrian territory."[222] A discussion ensued in the course

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[219]See Map IVb.

[220]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, IV, p.681.

[221]Wutte, Kärntens Freiheitskampf, p.185.

[222]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, IV, p.682.

of which the other Foreign Ministers felt that further study of the problem was necessary. Tardieu then pointed out that the Commission had not yet made any final proposals because there was not yet full agreement on the Klagenfurt Basin. After some further debate it was decided that the Commission for Rumanian and Yugoslav Affairs should, on the following day, submit recommendations "in regard to the frontiers between Jugo-Slavia and Austria, up to the Italian Frontier, based on ethnic and economic considerations."[223]

During May 9 and 10 the Commission met three times. The Italian delegation, in accordance with Sonnino's views, demanded that the Assling Triangle should be left with Austria. It justified its stand on several grounds: economic, because the free use of the railway line Gorizia-Assling-Rosenbach was indispensable to Trieste, military, because Italy's defences would be jeopardized by an attack from the east by an enemy in possession of the above mentioned line, ethnographic, because, if a certain number of Slovenes was included in Austria, this would be offset by the inclusion in Yugoslavia of the equally numerous group of Germans living at Marburg and Gottschee.[224] In the course of its meetings the Commission unanimously decided that it was not competent to deal with the military argument. The economic argument of the Italians was rejected by the three other delegations on two grounds: any obstacle to unhampered traffic along the Gorizia-Assling-Rosenbach line could be removed by special customs stipulations under international supervision; furthermore, a secondary line might be constructed from Tolmino to Tarvis through the Predil Pass. The three delegations felt that the question

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[223] Ibid., p.684.

[224] Gottschee was an isolated German settlement in southern Carniola.

was a part of the general problem of the frontiers between Italy, Austria, and Yugoslavia--well beyond the Commission's scope. Therefore, in order not to delay the drafting of the clauses of the treaty with Austria, it was proposed, as a temporary solution, that Austria should cede to the Allied Powers the district of Tarvis and the Assling Triangle. To prevent the railway line Trieste-Rosenbach-Villach-St. Veit-Vienna from passing across Yugoslav territory in case the population of the Klagenfurt Basin should choose Yugoslav sovereignty, the three delegations narrowed the limits of the Klagenfurt Basin suggested on April 6, thereby excluding about 60,000 Germans.[225] This proposal reduced the population of the area for which some sort of a plebiscite was proposed to 71,000 Germans and 48,000 Slovenes.[226]

The Council of Foreign Ministers met in the late afternoon of May 10 and discussed the Commission's proposals. Sonnino once more stressed the importance of an uninterrupted railway connection between the port of Trieste and Austria and Bohemia. "For this purpose the Railway line should not pass through the territory of any third State which had no direct interest in the development of the line . . . . Similar consideration had been given weight in dealing with Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary . . . ."[227] Therefore the Assling Triangle should be given to Austria; Italy did not want it because she wished to avoid the inclusion of non-Italians, except where her safety was concerned. He was answered by Balfour who, referring to the Slovene population of the region, objected to "the handing over to an enemy of the natural subjects of a

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[225]Almond and Lutz (ed.), The Treaty of St. Germain, p.380.

[226]Wutte, Kärntens Freiheitskampf, p.239.

[227]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, IV, p.697.

State it was intended to create."[228] Furthermore he felt that the Italian proposal disregarded the natural frontier and would bring Austria south of the mountain range. Therefore it violated both ethnographic and geographic considerations. He added that there was another railway line connecting Trieste with Austria further to the west, although it was inferior to the eastern line. He also refuted by the use of "crushing logic,"[229] an earlier comparison by Sonnino of the situation of Trieste and Danzig. Lansing supported Balfour's stand. He felt that an argument similar to Sonnino's might be used in the case of Fiume:

> If this territory must not be Jugo-Slav, because the Jugo-Slavs might use it to interrupt communications with an Italian port, the Hinterland of Fiume, it might equally be argued, must not be Jugo-Slav because the railways feeding the port might similarly be interfered with.[230]

Sonnino countered by stating that nobody suggested that Yugoslavia ought to be deprived of the Hinterland of Fiume because "the contest was really between two ports and the natural flow of commerce to each should be kept as far as possible separate and no entanglement between them should be allowed."[231] He felt that this was the best way to ensure the development of both. The argument then became increasingly acrimonious, and Lansing remarked that "the process of giving to friends rather than to enemies was being reversed."[232]

Sonnino, isolated, eventually gave way. However, he insisted that the area of the Assling Triangle was to be narrowed in such a way as to preserve direct communication between Trieste and Austria through

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[228] Ibid.

[229] Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p.331.

[230] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, IV, p.699.

[231] Ibid.

[232] Ibid.

the western railway line which ran through Udine, Tarvis and Villach. This was agreed to by the other Foreign Ministers, and on Pichon's suggestion it was decided to ask the Commission to formulate a proposal for consideration by the Heads of State, based on the discussion just concluded.

On May 12 the Council of Four and the Council of Five, or Foreign Ministers, met in a joint session to make a decision on the frontiers of Austria and Hungary. The members of the Commission for Rumanian and Yugoslav Affairs, the Commission for Czechoslovak Affairs, and several other experts also attended. The first item on the agenda was the Austro-Yugoslav frontier. Tardieu explained the findings of the meeting of the Commissions for Rumanian and Yugoslav Affairs of May 10, and the principle of a plebiscite for the Klagenfurt Basin was approved. Sonnino suggested additional plebiscites for Marburg and "other doubtful corners of the proposed frontier,"[233] but this was rejected by Balfour who felt that the Conference already had sufficient knowledge of those areas. The meeting then dealt with the Assling Triangle. Sonnino wished to settle the fate of that region speedily, both, as he said, in the interests of Italy and of Austria, but this suggestion was successfully opposed once again by Balfour who, supported by Clemenceau, felt that the final attribution of the Triangle should be considered when the Conference was going to decide the boundaries of Yugoslavia. After a lengthy debate the meeting decided, on Clemenceau's suggestion, that "the limits of Austria should be fixed provisionally, and that the final attribution of the triangle in question be reserved . . . ."[234] This meant acceptance of the Commission's report of May 10.

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[233] Ibid., p.502.

[234] Ibid., p.504.

c. The Diplomatic Efforts of the Yugoslavs

Although the discussions of the various Councils, Commissions, and Committees at the Peace Conference took place in secrecy, the Yugoslav delegates seem to have been kept well informed by highly placed friends about the developments concerning their country. "Especially fruitful of results was the link with Tardieu . . . . Through him the delegation received information about the decisions of the Territorial Commission in very short time. With the Americans Johnson and House, too, there was steady contact."[235] Thus the Yugoslavs learned of the proposed plebiscite and tried to prevent it. On May 12 memoranda were sent to the Great Powers which declared that Yugoslavia regarded the proposed plebiscite in Carinthia as an injustice and could agree to it only if there would also be one in the Austrian Littoral. At the same time, the Yugoslavs worked out a compromise proposal: the Klagenfurt Basin was to be divided into a northern and southern zone; the northern zone, which included Klagenfurt, was to go to Austria, and the southern zone to Yugoslavia, without plebiscite. They won over the French delegation and their friend Johnson.[236] On May 20 the Yugoslavs were able to present their point of view before the Territorial Commission, and stated that a plebiscite would only serve to intensify national strife, and that the southern part of the Klagenfurt Basin was not only inhabited by Slovenes but also was economically linked to Yugoslavia. Klagenfurt's food, they maintained, could be adequately supplied by its German neighbourhood. These arguments moved the British, French, and Italian delegates to ask

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[235] Wutte, Kärntens Freiheitskampf, pp.183-84. Wutte derived his information from documents of the archives from the Yugoslav Foreign Office captured by the Germans during the Second World War.

[236] Ibid., pp.240-41.

the Supreme Council to accept the Yugoslav proposal, contrary to their own stand of April 6 and May 10. The United States delegates, however, with the exception of Johnson, remained opposed to partition without previous popular consent.

In their morning meeting of May 26 the Council of Four discussed the attitude to be adopted towards a letter received from the Austrian delegation waiting at St. Germain which requested the beginning of negotiations as soon as possible. Lloyd George and Wilson felt that the clauses of the proposed treaty which were ready should be handed to the Austrians right away, while the others were to be reserved. This procedure would have meant a different treatment for Austria as compared to Germany whose delegation had been kept waiting until the entire draft of the treaty was ready. This difference was objected to by Orlando who felt that, as the Italians regarded Austria as the principal enemy, it "would create a very painful impression in Italy."[237] In the ensuing debate Clemenceau pointed out that the decision to give Austria a different treatment had been taken during the time when the Italians had absented themselves from the Conference.[238] Referring to unrest and pro-German manifestations in Italy, he asked Orlando to cooperate with the Allies. After some conciliatory remarks by Wilson, Orlando gave way, and it was decided that the peace terms except those sections which were not yet ready should be handed to the Austrians in the course of the week. On May 27, at a joint meeting of the Council of Four, the Foreign Ministers, and several other territorial experts, Wilson stated his view that the southern part of the Klagenfurt Basin, although inhabited by Slovenes, was "indissolubly tied up, economically, with the northern part." He drew a parallel between

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[237] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, VI, p.27.

[238] April 24-May 6. Above, pp.108-11.

the Klagenfurt Basin and the problem of Istria where "many Slovenes resided on the Italian side." Therefore, "the Council would have to decide whether an unnatural arrangement should be accepted for political expediency, or a natural arrangement, thus disregarding purely political consideration."[239] The meeting then decided to adjourn further consideration of the problem. On May 27, also, a memorandum on Klagenfurt by four American Territorial Experts, Johnson, Miles, Day, and Seymour was submitted to Wilson and the other United States Commissioners. It once more examined every aspect of the case but its conclusions were not unanimous: Miles, supported by Day and Seymour, maintained the viewpoint expressed in his earlier report to Coolidge while Johnson favoured the division of the Klagenfurt Basin along ethnic lines.

On the same day, as a result of repeated urgings from the Yugoslav delegates at the Conference, a Slovene delegation from Ljubljana arrived in Paris. On the following day, May 28, a Yugoslav diplomatic offensive commenced in Paris, coinciding with the start of the Yugoslav military offensive in Carinthia. However, the attempts of the Slovenes to influence important Allied personalities met with little success, and House told them that "their demands exceeded their prudence . . . ."[240] On May 29, after the Council of Four had decided the Austro-Italian frontier, the Austro-Yugoslav frontier came under discussion. It was decided that there would be a plebiscite in the Klagenfurt Basin within six months of the conclusion of the Austrian treaty; meanwhile, an International Commission in collaboration with the local authorities was to administer the area of the plebiscite. The fate of the Assling Triangle was going to be decided later in

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[239] Council of Four afternoon meeting, May 27. U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, IV, p.72.

[240] The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, p.471.

connection with the final agreement of the frontiers of Yugoslavia. The experts were then instructed to draw up the appropriate articles for the Central Drafting Committee in accordance with those decisions. On May 30 the Yugoslavs received the draft of the treaty with Austria, and on the following day it was submitted to the Plenary Conference. There Trumbic, speaking for Yugoslavia, objected to the articles dealing with Carinthia, commenting "on the untenable situation in which the Slovene people would find themselves if their sacrifices in the Adriatic were aggravated by the loss of the Slovene Carinthia . . . ."[241] During the meeting Pasic handed Clemenceau a written protest against the section dealing with Carinthia which claimed that even according to Austrian statistics about 100,000 Slovenes lived in the contested territory.

For a moment the Yugoslav delegates even considered absenting themselves on June 2 when, at the session of the Plenary Conference, the peace terms were to be submitted to Austria, but under pressure from Wilson they changed their mind.[242] However, they issued a declaration in which they stated that they were unable to agree with the clauses concerning Carinthia. They persisted in their efforts to influence members of the British, French and United States delegations in their favour, and on June 1 Zolger actually succeeded in persuading Nicolson and Leeper of the British delegation to try to change the procedure of the proposed plebiscite in the Klagenfurt Basin from single block voting (which did not even give the Yugoslavs a chance at all) to voting by communes (which might give them the southern zone). Early on June 2 Nicolson tried to persuade Lloyd George--successfully, as he thought--"to accept the

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[241]Almond and Lutz, The Treaty of St. Germain, p.568.

[242]Wutte, Kärntens Freiheitskampf, p.248.

Klagenfurt voting by communes, or at least not as a unity."[243] Nicolson then asked Hurst, another member of the British delegation, to win over Wilson and Clemenceau. Hurst approached them in St. Germain, just before the start of the meeting of the Plenary Conference. Wilson refused to alter the draft of the treaty but Clemenceau simply tore out the part which dealt with the Klagenfurt Basin.[244] Thus the Austrians received the territorial clauses incomplete.

When the Council of Four, in the absence of Orlando, met a few hours later, the problem of voting in the Klagenfurt Basin was discussed. Lloyd George and Clemenceau eventually suggested that the views of the Yugoslavs should be heard. On the same day, Johnson gave Wilson a lengthy memorandum which had the approval of House and Tardieu.[245] The memorandum cast doubts on Miles' assumption that the Slovenes of the Klagenfurt Basin wanted to remain under Austrian rule, and denied that a partition would create permanent economic damage. It also stated that the economic connections of the Basin were rather with the (Yugoslav) south and east than with the (Austrian) north. While admitting that the Karawanken mountains constituted the best geographic boundary, the memorandum felt that the line proposed by the Yugoslavs was still better than some of the boundaries drawn by the Conference, especially as it approximated the national boundary. Drawing attention to the plight of the Slovene nation, already threatened with severe losses to Italy, the memorandum concluded with the suggestion that, if the national boundary line in the Klagenfurt Basin was accepted, the local Slovenes ought to be assured of a future opportunity to object to incorporation in Yugoslavia, while,

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[243] Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p.356.

[244] Ibid.

[245] Wutte, Kärntens Freiheitskampf, p.285.

if no such objection was raised, the German population of the Klagenfurt area should be given the right to vote for joining Yugoslavia.

On June 4 Vesnitch presented the Yugoslav point of view before the Council of Four. He began to draw attention to what he described as the German program of expansion towards the Adriatic and Aegean Seas which had, in the past, inflicted great losses on the Slovenes. Austria, he said, was German, would later on unite with Germany, "and the German policy of pushing towards the sea would again recommence . . . ." Therefore, Austria ought not to be strengthened by the inclusion of elements which could be utilized to thwart such a policy. His delegation, Vesnitch continued, demanded an area in the Klagenfurt Basin which was inhabited, according to official Austrian statistics, by 60,000 Slovenes and 24,000 Germans, while it was ready to abandon 21,000 Slovenes to Austria. He asked that his claims should be granted without a plebiscite which "would only maintain the present effervescence and cause delay in the consolidation of the new State." Wilson maintained that the Klagenfurt Basin was a geographic unit; he then showed Vesnitch a map which divided the region into two zones: zone A, the southern part; zone B, the northern part. Perhaps six months after the signature of the peace, Wilson continued, the inhabitants of zone A should decide by plebiscite whether they preferred to belong to Austria or Yugoslavia. Should they vote for the latter, the inhabitants of zone B also should vote on the same choice. "The testimony as to the desire of the people to hold together was conflicting." Vesnitch thereupon stated that the people were still under the impression of fifty years of German propaganda. He felt that voting by communes might be more acceptable to his delegation, but this idea did not meet with favour from Wilson and Lloyd George (in spite of Nicolson's efforts two days earlier). Vesnitch then remarked that the Slovenes should be

freed from German influence for a while; then "he was quite certain how they would vote." Wilson then asked Vesnitch whether he would prefer the plebiscite to take place within six months or a longer period. Vesnitch replied that he would consult his delegation. Finally the Council of Four decided to ask the experts who had been considering the Klagenfurt problem to arrange for a plebiscite in the A zone, the date to be arranged after the views of the Yugoslavs had been heard. In the interval between the signature of the peace treaty and the plebiscite, the region would be administered by a local government under the League of Nations.[246]

On June 5 Wilson received the Slovene delgation. The Slovenes attempted once more to gain possession of the southern zone of the Klagenfurt Basin without plebiscite, telling Wilson, who could not understand their reluctance to let the Slovene population decide by a free vote, that German pressure was preventing the Slovenes from declaring for Yugoslavia. However, Wilson, although he showed great sympathy,[247] remained firm, and on the following day most of the members of the delegation returned to Ljubljana.

d. The Arrangement of the Plebiscite in the Klagenfurt Basin

After June 5 the Yugoslavs realized that the Allies were determined to proceed with the plebiscite in the Klagenfurt Basin. They therefore adjusted their tactics accordingly. On June 6 Vesnitch, on behalf of the Yugoslav delegation, submitted two proposals: zone A was to be joined to Yugoslavia but within three to six months following the entry into force of the treaty its inhabitants would have "the opportunity of expressing

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[246] Council of Four afternoon meeting June 4. U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, VI, pp.173-80.

[247] Cf. Wilson's statement on June 6, p.125.

their desire to see this territory placed under Austrian sovereignty,"[248] while the inhabitants of zone B, joined to Austria, would have the opportunity to express themselves in favour of Yugoslavia; the other proposal was similar except that a proper plebiscite within two to six months was suggested. When these proposals were discussed by the Council of Four in the morning of June 7, they met with rejection: Wilson said that Yugoslavs wished the plebiscite to take place under their own auspices, while Lloyd George remarked that Vesnitch had not answered the questions put to him on June 4. A letter was sent to Vesnitch accordingly.

Meanwhile, on June 6, the Territorial Commission had met in order to arrange the plebiscite according to the instructions the Council of Four had issued on June 4. During the meeting difficulties arose because Vesnitch's reply was not yet known; furthermore, several members complained about the absence of precise instructions from the Council of Four. The Italian delegation submitted a new proposal: the Klagenfurt Basin should be divided not into a northern and southern, but eastern and western zone, because the suggested north-south division "corresponded perhaps to ethnographic facts but not to economic necessities."[249] The Italians also wanted to see the Rosenbach tunnel excluded from the plebiscite zone in order to safeguard Trieste's communications.[250] The Commission then worked out a recommendation to the Council of Four, suggesting that, owing to the difficulty of finding personnel for a competent and impartial local administration in the plebiscite area, zone A should be provisionally administered by Yugoslavia, and zone B provisionally by Austria, while a Commission appointed by the League of Nations

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[248]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, VI, p.237.

[249]Wutte, Kärntens Freiheitskampf, p.458.

[250]See Map IVb.

would ensure the freedom of expression in both zones. These recommendations were accepted by the American, British, and French delegations, but the Italians still recommended the division of the Klagenfurt Basin into an eastern and western zone, and also the exclusion of the Rosenbach tunnel and adjoining area to the north from the plebiscite.[251]

The Council of Four discussed the Commission's report on June 7, and Orlando declared that the proposed plebiscite appeared to him of no purpose because, seeing that the zones were divided along the lines of nationality, the result was a foregone conclusion. Therefore, he felt, zone A should be given to Yugoslavia, and zone B to Austria. However, he wished to reserve "a small section of the area which was traversed by the Assling-Villach railway"[252] because he now claimed Assling for Italy. This statement evoked a sharp reply from Wilson

> that he had gone out of his way in order to assign the junction of Tarvis to Italy on the understanding that Villach should be Austrian and Assling should be assigned to the Yugo-Slavs. He could not assent, however, that both the lines together with all three junctions should go to Italy.[253]

Lloyd George felt that, judging by Vesnitch's attitude, it was not at all certain that zone A would vote for Yugoslavia. Orlando then agreed to the plebiscite but objected to the recommendation of the Commission with regard to the provisional allocation of zone A to a Yugoslav administration. Lloyd George and Wilson were of the same opinion, and the Commission was informed that the Council adhered to its original instructions which provided for the use of local authorities. On June 7 and 9 the Yugoslav

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[251] Wutte, Kärntens Freiheitskampf, p.289. Wutte, a member of the Austrian delegation himself, believed that the Italians were afraid that the Yugoslavs would win the plebiscite in zone A, and therefore suggested the east-west division. This theory also helps to explain Orlando's changed attitude towards the holding of the plebiscite and the disposal of the Assling Triangle on June 7, Below.

[252] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, VI, p.442. Orlando meant the Rosenbach tunnel and its northern entrance.

[253] Ibid.

delegation, in three more letters to the Council of Four, agreed to the idea of a plebiscite, at first in zone A, and three weeks later in zone B. By now, however, the Conference was occupied with the final arrangements of the treaty with Germany, and it was not until June 17 that the problem of the Austro-Yugoslav frontier was again discussed.

While the Conference was thus preparing the plebiscite in the Klagenfurt Basin, it also had to deal with the military situation which the Yugoslav offensive on May 29 had created.[254] On May 25 and 30 Orlando drew the attention of the Council of Four to the military events in Carinthia, and as a result a letter was communicated to Belgrade on May 31, requesting the Yugoslav troops to leave the Klagenfurt Basin. An identical request was made to Austria. At the same time the Austrian delegation at St. Germain drew the attention of the Conference to the Yugoslav advance. The Yugoslav government replied on June 4 that all hostilities had ceased, but in actual fact the Yugoslavs continued their offensive and entered Klagenfurt on June 6. This state of affairs was pointed out to the Conference by the Austrian delegation in a new note on the same day, and on the following day Orlando gave the Council of Four a written memorandum to the same effect. As a result, the Council decided to instruct the French Minister in Belgrade to "demand explanation" from the Yugoslav government, and to "insist on immediate compliance with the requests . . . of May 31."[255] On June 10 Orlando informed Clemenceau that the Italian government, in accordance with the provisions of the armistice of November 3, 1918, felt compelled "to take the necessary measures"[256] and on June 12-14 Italian troops occupied the railway line

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[254]Above, p.136.

[255]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, VI, p.247.

[256]Wutte, Kärntens Freiheitskampf, p.278.

Tarvis-Villach-St. Veit.

The Italian action and the arrival of an Inter-Allied Military Mission in Klagenfurt prevented further Yugoslav advances, but, on the other hand, the Yugoslavs refused to leave the Klagenfurt Basin. This situation was brought to the attention of the Council of Four by Sonnino on June 17. Consequently, the Council of Foreign Ministers discussed the matter on June 18 and 19, and finally, against the vote of the Italian delegate, decided, in order to avoid the outbreak of unrest, that the Klagenfurt Basin should not be evacuated by the armed forces of both sides, but that the Yugoslav troops should be withdrawn into zone A while the Austrians should remain in zone B. The decision was accepted by the Council of Four on June 21 when Wilson justified it by stating that in the case of unrest in the Klagenfurt Basin only Italian troops would be on hand, "but as the Italian claims conflicted with the Yugo-Slavs in this part of the world, it might cause trouble to introduce Italians." The meeting then reached several decisions concerning the plebiscite area. The opposing forces were to be withdrawn into their respective zones: the Yugoslavs to the southern zone A, and the Austrians to the northern zone B. The Commission on Rumanian and Yugoslav Affairs was asked to draw up the articles of the plebiscite. The Austrian and Yugoslav troops in their respective plebiscite zones "should be reduced to the dimensions necessary for the observation of order, and should act to that end under Inter-Allied control." Both forces were to be replaced as rapidly as possible by a locally recruited police force. The plebiscite was to be held within three months of the coming into force of the treaty with Austria. Zone A was to vote first, and should the result be favourable to Yugoslavia, a plebiscite was to follow in zone B within three weeks. The International Commission which was to supervise the plebiscite was to consist of one

representative of each of the Great Powers with an Austrian representative to be added when zone B was discussed, and a Yugoslav representative to be added if zone A was being dealt with.[257]

## C. THE FRONTIERS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

### 1. The Birth of Czechoslovakia

The Czech National Committee which assumed control in Prague on October 28, 1918,[258] based its authority on the declarations of May 30, 1917, by the Czech deputies in the Austrian parliament, and of January 6, 1918, by most of the prominent Czech politicians in Prague. The core of these declarations had been the demand for the unification of the "Historic Provinces" of Bohemia, Moravia and (Austrian) Silesia with the Slovaks into a self-governing national state. Full agreement between the Czechoslovak interim government in Paris under Masaryk, which had been recognized by the Allies earlier in the month, and leading Czech politicians from Prague, whom the collapsing Austrian government had permitted to go to Switzerland, was reached at a conference at Geneva on October 28.[259] On October 29 the Slovaks declared their unity with the Czechs.[260] On November 13 the Czech National Committee issued a provisional constitution which declared Czechoslovakia a free and democratic republic, and on the following day the newly convened National Assembly, consisting of Czech and Slovak delegates, elected Masaryk, the spiritual

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[257] Council of Four afternoon meeting, June 21, U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, VI, pp. 581-88, See Map IVc.

[258] Above p. 25.

[259] Edward Benes, My War Memoirs, trans. Pal Selver (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1928), pp. 440-47.

[260] Above, p. 25.

father of the new state, president.

The territory claimed by the new state contained not only Czechs and Slovaks but also a large German element in the Historic Provinces, Magyars in southern Slovakia, and also Ruthenes (or Carpatho-Ukrainians) to the east of Slovakia. The last-named group, having been oppressed by the Magyars for nearly 1000 years, was claimed by Czechoslovakia mainly to provide a railway link with Rumania. These territories were at the beginning of November 1918 not in the possession of the new state; even a large part of Slovakia was still under Magyar administration. The subsequent events in Slovakia and Ruthenia are outside the scope of this thesis; it is sufficient to state that the claims of the Prague government with respect to these two regions were realized, with a few minor exceptions, at the Peace Conference. The problem of the Germans of the Historic Provinces, and the Czechoslovak-Polish differences over Teschen however, is the topic of this section of Chapter III.

### 2. The Problem of the Germans of the Historic Provinces

According to the Austrian census of 1910, Bohemia was inhabited by 6,712,944 people of whom 2,467,724 were Germans and 4,241,918 Czechs; for Moravia the corresponding figures were 2,604,857, 719,435 and 1,868,971 (there were also 14,924 Poles); for Austrian Silesia 741,456, 325,523, and 180,348 (and 235,224 Poles).[261] Thus the Germans in the Historic Provinces numbered over 3,500,000 and the Czechs nearly 6,300,000. The Czechs lived in the largely agricultural interior, and the Germans inhabited the mainly industrial northern, western, and southern fringes.[262]

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[261] Hugo Hantsch, Die Geschichte Österreichs (2 Vols., 2d ed.; Graz: Verlag Styria), II, Appendix. These figures vary slightly from those given by Kann, The Multinational Empire, II, pp.300-301, used in Appendix I of this thesis.

[262] See Map Va.

There were also inumerable mixed regions and linguistic islands on either side of the ethnographic boundary. The Czechs had settled in Bohemia and Moravia during the fifth and sixth centuries A.D., and the Germans had arrived between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries. Although both groups had sometimes lived peacefully side by side, they had very frequently quarrelled, mainly because the Germans, socially and economically much further advanced than the Czechs, refused to be assimilated to what they considered an inferior race. On the other hand, the Czechs regarded the Germans as "invaders and robbers."[263] Crushed by the Habsburgs in the early seventeenth century, the Czechs were reduced to "a nation of servants and doorkeepers, despised in their own home by their German masters."[264] Thus it was inevitable that the relationship between both races underwent a steady deterioration as the Czech national revival progressed and developed, at first, Czech demands for equality, and finally, domination within Bohemia. Ill-feeling reached its climax during the World War when loyal Austrians, especially the Germans of the Historic Provinces, quite understandably from their point of view, came to regard many Czechs as traitors and rebels.

When the collapse of the Habsburg Monarchy occurred, the Germans of the Historic Provinces, thereafter very frequently, but not quite correctly, referred to as "Sudeten Germans"[265] after the Sudeten Mountains which separate Bohemia and Moravia from Prussian and Austrian Silesia, acted swiftly. On October 29, 1918, an autonomous government of German-

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[263]Elizabeth Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans. A Study of the Struggle in the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), p.1.

[264]Robert J. Kerner (ed.), Czechoslovakia: Twenty Years of Independence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1940), p.177.

[265]This thesis will henceforth refer to the Germans of the Historic Provinces under the title of "Sudeten Germans."

Bohemia was proclaimed in accordance with President Wilson's principles. Attempts at negotiation between this government, which comprised the Germans of northern and western Bohemia, and the Czech leaders in Prague failed. Two other German administrations were set up, one for the Germans of southern Bohemia, and one for the Germans of southern Moravia. A fourth German administration was created at Troppau in Austrian Silesia, claiming to be responsible for the German element in Austrian Silesia, northern Moravia, and northeastern Bohemia. All four administrations sent deputies to the parliament in Vienna and agreed enthusiastically when on November 12 the new regime of Austria declared their territories part of the German Republic, for as the map clearly shows the majority of the Germans of the Historic Provinces were neighbours of Germany and could not possibly have been part of an independent Austria. Furthermore, many of these Germans had been ardent admirers of Germany throughout the last two decades of the declining Habsburg Empire.

The autonomy of the Sudeten Germans did not last long because from the middle of November onwards the Czechs began to occupy their territory. The terms of the armistice, whose co-signers the Czechs were, allowed them to occupy all the strategic points they considered to be necessary; "they interpreted this permission as covering the whole German territory in the Historic Provinces."[266] They met with hardly any active resistance for a variety of reasons: the Sudeten German population was war-weary, and the defeat had broken its spirit; many people believed that armed resistance would prejudice their case in the eyes of the Allies, and that the Peace Conference would arrange a plebiscite for them; the industrial interests needed a united Bohemia and feared, in the event

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[266]Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans, p.82.

of Austria joining Germany, to be exposed to the competition of Germany's powerful industries; the spread of Communism in the industrial areas alarmed the middle classes of the towns and the peasants; and last, but not least, the bourgeois government in Prague seemed to many conservative elements safer than the Socialist-dominated regimes of Vienna and Berlin. The government in Vienna did little to help the Sudeten Germans because it feared conflict with the Czechs and their Allied supporters, mainly because Austria and especially Vienna had to depend on the victors for coal and food. Its suggestion that all disputed areas should decide their own fate by plebiscite was rejected by the Czechs. Austrian notes to the Great Powers, protesting against the occupation of the Sudeten regions by the Czechs, met with no success. Germany too, defeated and in internal turmoil, was unable to do anything for the Sudeten Germans. By Christmas all Sudeten German territory was in the hands of the Czechs.

The quiescent attitude of the Sudeten Germans began to change when they realized that they would not be permitted to participate in the Austrian general election of February 16, 1919. On March 4, the day on which the new Austrian parliament assembled in Vienna, protest meetings were held in all larger Sudeten German communities which ended in the killing of fifty-two and the wounding of eighty-four persons by Czech police.[267] A general strike throughout Sudeten German territory was held on July 14 but was ignored by the Allied press.[268] Thus the great political changes in Central Europe did not imporve the relationship between the Czechs

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[267] Ibid., p.84. The term "Czech" is sometimes used for "Czechoslovak."

[268] Jaksch, Europas Weg nach Potsdam, p.209. The reliability of this source may be open to question.

and Germans in the Historic Provinces.

3. The Problem of Teschen

The Duchy of Teschen,[269] representing the eastern part of Austrian Silesia, was a very important territory for a variety of reasons: strategically, because, as the eastern part of the Moravian Gap, it was the link between the regions of the Danube and the Vistula, and consequently the meeting place of several railway lines running from north to south, and from east to west; economically, because it contained considerable coal mines. There were iron works, chemical industries and oil refineries in the western part, close to the great coal fields of Karwin, while the eastern part was mainly agricultural. According to the Austrian census of 1910, the region had 426,370 inhabitants, of whom 233,850 were Poles, 115,604 Czechs, and 76,916 Germans. The Poles were the predominant element in the eastern part, the Czechs formed the majority in the west, while the Germans mainly constituted the middle classes of the urban and industrial regions. The Poles were not a homogeneous element because large numbers of them were miners who had only recently arrived from neighbouring Galicia, while another Polish-speaking group, the "Slonzaks" or "Slazaks," who were the original inhabitants of that area and lived mostly in its eastern part, spoke a different dialect. "The province formed a natural unit, and under Austrian rule there was broad tolerance between Poles, Slonzaks, Czechs and Germans . . . ."[270]

The importance of Teschen made it inevitable that both Poland and Czechoslovakia became interested in the possession of that region. During the last phases of the war discussions between leading Polish and

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[269]See Map Vc.

[270]Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, IV, p.351.

Czech politicians took place, and although it was agreed that Teschen's future should be settled by friendly negotiations, there were serious differences of opinion. "In this overlapping of claims I descried a certain danger for the Poles" stated Masaryk later, indicating the determination of the Czechs to vindicate their claims.[271] Diplomatically, the Czechs were in a far stronger position than the Poles because they had been recognized by the Allies in October 1918, while Poland did not receive official recognition until February 1919.

When Austria-Hungary disintegrated, a Polish National Council and a Czech National Committee assumed authority for their respective states in the Duchy of Teschen. Both bodies concluded an agreement of November 5, 1918, which established a provisional frontier between their zones of authority on an ethnographic basis, with the proviso that nothing should be done by either side to prejudice the decisions of the Peace Conference. This agreement was never recognized by the Czechoslovak government. Friction developed between both parties in the former Duchy. When on December 10 the Polish authorities announced that on January 26, 1919, elections to the Polish parliament in Warsaw were going to be held in their zone of Teschen, the Czechs were extremely indignant. A series of political and military manoeuvres by both sides followed, and on January 23 Czechoslovak troops attacked the Poles, and after some fighting occupied Oderberg and the city of Teschen. An armistice was concluded on February 3 in which the Czechs kept most of their gains.

These events had their repercussions in Paris where the Peace

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[271] Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Making of a State. Memories and Observations 1914-1918 (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1927), p.285.

Conference was now assembled, and on January 24 a warning against the use of force was issued to all belligerents.[272] On January 29 Dmowski, the leader of the Polish Delegation at the Peace Conference, spoke before the Council of Ten and urged that the Czech troops should be withdrawn to the line agreed upon on November 5. Benes, the Foreign Minister, and Kramar, the Prime Minister, of Czechoslovakia spoke then on behalf of their country. Benes doubted the reliability of the Austrian census figures; Kramar said that he had been informed by the British and French governments that the Czechoslovaks were entitled to occupy the historical boundaries of the Czech Kingdom.[273] The Poles had invaded the territory and had left two Czechoslovak protests unanswered. He implied that Bolshevism was rampant in the Polish zone of Teschen and then emphasized "that the Czecho-Slovak Republic could not exist without the large coal area which was within the disputed area."[274] He concluded with the statement that he wished to place the dispute in the hands of the Conference. In reply, Dmowski denied the charge of a Polish invasion. On Balfour's suggestion it was then agreed that Polish and Czechoslovak representatives should meet with the members of the Allied Mission to Poland[275] on the following morning "so that they could commence the work of pacification."[276]

On January 31 Noulens, Chairman of the Allied Mission to Poland, reported on the meeting and the Teschen situation. He said that the Czechs had been the aggressors who had explained their action by stating

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[272]Above, p.53.

[273]Below, p.201.

[274]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, III, p.783.

[275]Established by the Council of Ten on January 22; above, p.55.

[276]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, III, p.784.

> that the Teschen District in reality formed part of Czecho-Slovakia for ethnological, geographical, historical and economic reasons, but in addition their Government had been forced to occupy this territory to prevent the spread of Bolshevism which was rampant in the Polish provinces.[277]

The Mission had tried to reach a provisional solution, but the Czechoslovak delegates had declined to withdraw their troops, maintaining that the Poles were unable to keep order in the mining districts and, as a result, Bolshevism would spread into Czechoslovakia. However, they were ready to agree to a mutual withdrawal of troops if the contested region would be occupied by Allied troops. The Mission, continued Noulens, felt that this proposal ought to be submitted to the Great Powers, and suggested that Czechoslovak troops should occupy the mining districts and railway north of Teschen, while the Poles should occupy the southern part of the region. In other matters, the agreement of last November ought to remain in force until the Peace Conference reached a final decision. The Czechoslovak delegates had accepted these proposals reluctantly, fearing that direct contact between the troops of both countries would create trouble. Thus, Allied occupation of the contested territory would solve all difficulties; should this be impossible, Noulens concluded, an Inter-Allied Commission ought to be permanently stationed there until the final settlement. This last suggestion, coming from the Poles, had been accepted by the Czechoslovaks who also had declared that their troops would stop any further advance in the Teschen district.

After a brief discussion the Council of Ten agreed that Czechoslovak troops should remain in occupation of the railway line north of

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[277] Ibid., p.819.

Teschen while the southern section, including the town itself, was to be controlled by Polish troops. Furthermore, an Inter-Allied Control Commission should be immediately sent to Teschen to supervise the mining operations in the Karwin-Ostrava area and secure part of the output for the Poles. Two days later Clemenceau reported to the Council that the Czechs and Poles had reached an agreement along the lines suggested by Noulens; their respective governments ratified it on February 3.

At the same time the United States Field Mission under Professor Coolidge in Vienna made enquiries into the Teschen situation. A study of its observations and reports[278] leads to the unavoidable conclusion that the Allies favoured the Czechs. Most significant is a passage from Coolidge's report of January 31, 1919:

> In a conversation I had yesterday with Mr. Tusar, the Czecho-Slovak Minister here [in Vienna], he intimated that the fact that the Czechs were going to take action was known and approved in Paris by the Entente but said that formal permission could not be given because Poland was an Allied nation.[279]

Thus Polish complaints about the attitude of the Allies were perhaps justified; at any rate, the Czech action "had far-reaching consequences for future relations between Czechoslovakia and Poland . . . ."[280]

### 4. Allied Attitudes Towards Czechoslovakia

As has been shown before , the United States government did not envisage the disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy until the spring of 1918. This necessitated a revision of Point X of the Fourteen Points,

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[278] Ibid., XII, pp.312-29.

[279] Ibid., p.323.

[280] Titus Komarnicki, Rebirth of the Polish Republic: A Study in the Diplomatic History of Europe (Melbourne: Willian Heinemann Ltd., 1957), p.360.

a task performed by Lippmann and Cobb towards the end of October 1918.[281] Their "commentary" specifically mentioned "Czecho-Slovakia" and stated that its territories would include at least a million Germans. This indicates that even well-informed Americans were generally unaware of the number of Germans in the Historic Provinces. Seymour, who became the senior United States delegate on the Czechoslovak Territorial Commission, confirms this view by stating that Wilson only learned on his passage to France "that there was a great mass of Germans in northern Bohemia."[282] On the other hand, Commissioner Bliss, in a memorandum of December 15, 1918, to Secretary of State Lansing pointed out that the creation of a "strategic" Czechoslovak frontier would entail the inclusion of "some 2,500,000 Germans and Magyars in compact bodies (besides some 600,000 Germans and 250,000 Magyars . . . scattered throughout the Czecho-Slovak State)." He added the following warning: "Now, if we have to consider strategic frontiers as such, we are committed to a mere revision of the Marquis of Queensbury rules for the European prize ring. And our work will be futile in our life time."[283] Benes who was Masaryk's second-in-command during the years of emigration, dealing with the occupation of the Sudeten territories, has the following to say about the American attitude:

> It was the Americans who caused the greatest difficulty. Already at that time the Americans were paying close attention to all arguments which were based upon the historical frontiers of the new States. They were not opposed to our point of view, but they

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[281] Above, p.75.

[282] Charles Seymour, Geography, Justice and Politics at the Paris Conference of 1919 (New York: The American Geographical Society, 1951), p.9.

[283] General Tasker H. Bliss to the Secretary of State. U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, I, pp.294-96.

were unwilling to commit themselves before the Peace Conference . . . .[284]

On January 21 the United States Territorial Experts recommended that, with certain modifications, the historic frontiers should be maintained.[285] Seymour summed up the attitude of the United States delegation by stating that it gave careful consideration to the linguistic frontier but came to the conclusion that a decision based on such considerations would make the existence of an independent Czechoslovakia impossible.[286]

The British government had envisaged the possible dissolution of Austria-Hungary two years earlier than the United States did.[287] The Allied peace proposals, transmitted to Wilson on January 10, 1917, included the liberation of the Czechs and Slovaks from foreign domination.[288] There is no indication that the problem of the Sudeten Germans engaged the attention of the British Foreign Office before the end of hostilities. A communication of Foreign Secretary Balfour to the United States Ambassador on November 13, 1918, discussed the situation in Bohemia and referred to the question of its German population as "a very difficult problem" which had not yet been "the subject of official considerations." Balfour concluded by asking the Americans for an exchange of views.[289] Masaryk, reviewing the situation at that time felt that "the question of the German Bohemians was always serious, and the Americans and the

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[284] Benes, My War Memoirs, p.483.

[285] Charles Seymour, "Czechoslovak Frontiers," Yale Review, XXVIII (December, 1938), p.279.

[286] Ibid., p.282.

[287] Lloyd George, The Truth About the Peace Treaties, I, p.41.

[288] See Appendix E.

[289] Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State. U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, II, pp.376-77.

British insisted upon abstract definition of the right to self-determination."[290] Nicolson who served on the Czechoslovak Territorial Commission recorded in his diary that the British members reached their conclusion on Czechoslovakia's claims on January 29, 1919.[291] It is interesting to note that the British and American delegates, working independently, reached nearly identical conclusions.[292]

The French government, as has been pointed out before, was an ardent friend of Czechoslovakia, France's ally in Central Europe. The French proposal of November 15, 1918, concerning the Peace Conference, specifically excluded self-determination with regard to Bohemia in favour of "a certain homogeneousness of States,"[293] and in the second half of December the French supported the occupation of the Sudeten German territory by Czech troops.[294] In contrast to the Americans, who three months after the Peace Conference had begun were less pro-Czech than before,[295] French support for Czechoslovakia never wavered. The Italian government, however, had less interest in supporting France's ally, and remained rather reserved towards the country of Masaryk.

### 5. Czechoslovakia During the Early Stages of the Peace Conference

#### a. Czechoslovak Claims

Of all the newly created states, Czechoslovakia's position at the

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[290] Masaryk, The Making of a State, p.284.

[291] Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p.252.

[292] Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans, p.89.

[293] Above, p.44.

[294] Below, pp.200-201.

[295] Seymour, Yale Review, XXVIII, p.279.

Peace Conference was the most favourable. Czechoslovak troops had fought side by side with the Allies in Russia, France, and Italy, the Czechoslovak government had already received recognition from the Allies before the end of hostilities, and Masaryk was held in universal esteem as the champion of democracy, truth, and justice. The Czechoslovak government had prepared several memoranda which presented their claims at the Peace Conference. It must be said that these memoranda "were hurriedly and badly written and that they were thoroughly tendentious." They were "deliberate propaganda and as guilty or innocent as the propagandistic statements made by governments then or now."[296] There is no evidence that the British or American delegates were influenced by them--Nicolson's diary makes a reference to "Benes' maps designed for the use of children"[297]--they had sufficient and reliable information of their own.

On February 5 the Czechoslovak delegation stated its country's claims before the Council of Ten. Benes, speaking for three and one half hours,[298] started by stressing the "practical sense of politics," unity, democratic spirit and Western background of his people who would be "prudent, reasonable and just to its neighbours." He then claimed Bohemia, Moravia, Austrian Silesia and Slovakia for ethnic reasons. For historic considerations, because "they deeply affected public opinion" and "had armed the Czech people against the German masses around them,"

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[296] Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans, pp.87-88. Compare Maps Va and Vb. Two of these memoranda are available in: Sifton Collection, Documents of the Peace Conference 1919, I, pp.283-336, and II, pp.33-57.

[297] Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p.273.

[298] Ibid., p.278.

Benes repeated his claim to Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia; these provinces, he stated, had been united since the sixth century. He then drew attention to the strategically exposed position of the Czechoslovaks who were the advanced guard of the Slav world in the West, and therefore constantly threatened by German expansion. Hence the special importance of the Czecho-Slovak frontiers in Central Europe. He then said that the three Historic Provinces "formed a geographical and ethnographical whole." Referring to the Germans of Bohemia, he declared the official Austrian statistics to be misleading, and the official figure of 2,400,000 Germans greatly exaggerated. "According to Czech calculations they numbered about 1,500,000." Furthermore, the "presence of these Germans was the result of centuries of infiltration and colonization." In reply to a question by Lloyd George, Benes stated that there were 4,500,000 Czechs in Bohemia. He added that "in the Bohemian territory represented as German there was an autochthonous Czech population representing about one-third of the whole." However, he felt that the best argument of the Czechs was economic. "The Czecho-German parts of Bohemia contained nearly the whole of the industries of the country. Without the peripheral areas Bohemia could not live. The centre of the country was agricultural, and the two parts were so interdependent that neither could exist without the other." He claimed that most of the workers in these industries were Czech, especially the miners. "If the Germans were to be given the outer rim of Bohemia they would also possess the hinterland."

A discussion followed, in the course of which Benes once more stressed the point that most of the people engaged in the industries were Czech although most of the employers were German. He then asserted that the Bohemian Germans realized that they had to remain in Bohemia

because the competition from Germany's great industries would otherwise ruin them. "They were prevented from making open declaration of this feeling because they were terrorized by a small number of Pan-German agitators from Vienna." However, when pressed by Lloyd George, Benes admitted that, if they had any choice, the Germans of Bohemia would vote against inclusion in Czechoslovakia. He added that the Czecho-Slovak government did not intend to oppress the German Bohemians, but would, on the contrary, grant them full minority rights.

Benes then turned to Teschen where he claimed that the Austrian census had "for political reasons favoured both the Poles and Germans at the expense of the Czechs." At least 50,000 Teschen Poles were really domiciled in Galicia, and had been introduced as cheap labour. Others spoke a half-Czech and half-Polish dialect, while others still called themselves Silesians. Teschen itself was a German town, and the industrial and mining districts were really inhabited by Czechs. "The people as a whole, if given the choice would elect to join the Czecho-Slovaks rather than the Polish state as being the richer of the two, and the one which offered the greater likelihood of order and freedom." Benes also stated that Teschen's coal was vital to Czechoslovakia's industry. "By losing this region the Czecho-Slovak State would lose one of the essential things on which its life depended." The coal fields extended across the Vistula, and Czechoslovakia claimed the whole basin. Benes then pointed out that the only important railway system linking Bohemia and Moravia with northern Slovakia passed through Teschen; economically backward Slovakia could only be developed through this railway. The only mountain pass which provided this connection crossed the Teschen territory.

Benes also asked for certain rectifications of existing frontiers,

"mostly for economic reasons, but also with the object of including outlying Czech towns . . . ." He mentioned the district of Ratibor which was a continuation of the Teschen coal fields, and part of the County of Glatz which, he claimed, was historically Czech and had been ceded by Austria to Germany in 1867. Next, Benes dealt with Slovakia, the Slovak-Hungarian frontier, the Ruthenes and the Serbs of Lusatia, topics outside the scope of this thesis. His last territorial demand was the suggestion to create a corridor between the Germans and Magyars to assure Czechoslovakia's access to the Adriatic by close relations with Yugoslavia and Italy. He concluded by stating that the Czechoslovak government "wished to do all in their power to assist a just and durable peace." The Council of Ten then decided to create a Committee to examine Czechoslovak territorial interests.[299]

Czechoslovakia's claims, as presented by Benes, were identical with the aforementioned memoranda[300] and contained several misrepresentations: Glatz, for instance, became Prussian in 1742 and not 1867; also, the official Czechoslovak census of 1921 which favoured the Czechs as much as the Austrian census of 1910 had favoured the Germans, showed that Bohemia was inhabited by 4,382,000 Czechs and 2,173,239 Germans.[301] Unknown to Benes, the British delegates, who had reached their own conclusions a week earlier, had printed them in a memorandum on February 3.[302] With regard to Bohemia and Moravia, the British felt that, for

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[299]Council of Ten meeting June 5. U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, III, pp.76-87.

[300]Above, p.171.

[301]Figures in Kerner (ed.), Czechoslovakia, p.174. Benes seems to have tried to create the impression that the problem of the Germans existed only in Bohemia and that there were no Germans in Moravia. Jaksch, Europas Weg nach Potsdam, p.295.

[302]Available in: Sifton Collection, Documents of the Peace Conference 1919, II, pp.21-25.

economic grounds, the historic frontiers should be maintained; in Silesia, the western part was purely German and the Czechoslovak claim entirely unjustified, while central Silesia was Czech and eastern Silesia mainly Polish. However, for economic reasons the Karwin coal fields were essential for Czechoslovakia, and for geographic reasons--on account of the railway--the town of Teschen as well. With regard to the demanded frontier rectifications, the British rejected Glatz and were unfavourably disposed towards Ratibor. They reserved their opinion on two minor rectifications at Gmünd and Themenau, on the Austrian frontier, which the Czechoslovak memoranda had demanded for ethnographic reasons. The corridor with Yugoslavia was regarded as unjustifiable and impracticable. This document was probably the reason why Lloyd George was not at all impressed with Benes' presentation, as his question about the probable outcome of a vote by the Germans of Bohemia indicates.[303]

The subsequent attitude of the United States delegates indicates that they, too, were not too deeply impressed by the argument, although Benes himself seems to have made an excellent impression on them. Nevertheless, they realized the necessity of making Czechoslovakia viable. Wilson himself does not seem to have discussed Czechoslovakia's frontiers with the American members of the Czechoslovak Commission.[304] It is also interesting to note that in all the numerous publications about the Peace Conference by the United States delegates, Czechoslovakia received only little mention. Professor Coolidge's memorandum of March 10 drew

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[303]Nearly twenty years later, at the time of the Sudeten crisis, Lloyd George wrote that "Benes larded his speech throughout with phrases that reeked with professions of sympathy for the exalted ideas proclaimed by the Allies and America . . . ." Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties, II, p.931.

[304]Seymour, Yale Review, XXVIII, p.275.

attention to the lack of consistency in the claims of the Czechs who rejected the national principle in favour of the historical in the case of the Germans of the Historic Provinces but did just the opposite in the case of the Slovaks who had belonged to Hungary. He warned not to give the Czechoslovaks all the territory they wanted because it "would be not only an injustice to millions of people unwilling to come under Czech rule but it would also be dangerous and perhaps fatal to the future of the new state." He suggested several very considerable modifications of the historic borders of Bohemia and Moravia: in the south, the Austrian frontier should coincide, "as nearly as possible," with the ethnic frontier; in the west, the Eger district should be given the choice of going to Bavaria; the Germans of northwestern Bohemia should either be permitted to secede from Czechoslovakia with the doubtful regions going to the Czechs, or if secession was not permitted, "the territory of Eger should be extended and wherever it is feasible, other modifications should be made;" the Germans in northeastern Bohemia should be allowed to be incorporated within Germany. With regard to Austrian Silesia, Coolidge felt that the Germans, too, had some rights in that region.[305] His findings do not appear to have carried much weight.

b. The Sudeten Germans

On the day on which the Council of Ten decided to create a Committee on Czechoslovak Territorial Questions, Nicolson, who was to do the main share of the work of its British delegation, entered in his diary that he and Seymour, who was going to head the United States delegates, had identical views on the Czech frontiers.[306] The Committee, usually

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[305] Memorandum of Professor Coolidge: Czechoslovakia. U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, XII, pp.273-75.

[306] Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p.259.

called the Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs, was established on February 27 and consisted of two delegates of each of the four Great Powers with Cambon, the senior French delegate, as President. The delegates decided that questions on which there was general agreement would not be discussed, and that Czechoslovak delegates would only be called for the purpose of answering specific questions. "The question before us was how to draw a frontier that would exclude as many as possible of the minorities without depriving this state . . . of the means of national life"[307] is Seymour's summary of the Commission's task. The problem of the Germans of the Historic Provinces came up for discussion on the same day, and finally the delegates agreed to leave the boundaries of Bohemia and Moravia intact, subject only to minor rectifications. It was also decided to deal with Czechoslovakia's claims to Silesia in cooperation with the Polish Liaison Committee[308] and several joint meetings followed.

Unfortunately, information on the meetings of the Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs is not available in Canada, and this thesis had to rely on the meagre entries in Nicolson's diary[309] and a few chance remarks by Seymour.[310] The Commission met frequently: "under extreme pressure at the demand of the Supreme Council."[311] The diary refers to meetings on February 27, 28, March 1, 2 and 3. On March 4 the diary mentions a Sub-Committee which questioned Benes. On March 5 a decision was reached on the Czechoslovak Polish frontier, and on March 8 the

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[307]Seymour, Yale Review, XXVIII, p.275.

[308]Above, p.55.

[309]Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, passim, pp.221-371.

[310]Seymour, Yale Review, XXVIII, passim, pp.273-91.

[311]Ibid., p.277.

delegates rejected the establishment of a corridor to Yugoslavia. On the morning of March 11 the Sub-Committee reached agreement on the whole frontier of Bohemia and Moravia with Germany and Austria, with the exceptions of Eger and Rumburg, and received the Commission's approval in the afternoon. On March 12 the Commission submitted its report on the boundary between Austria and Czechoslovakia to the Supreme Council. The report recommended that the basis of the frontiers should be the old administrative boundary between Upper and Lower Austria on one hand, and Bohemia and Moravia on the other. With regard to the various rectifications demanded by Czechoslovakia, the report approved of three: on the border between Lower Austria and Bohemia at Gmünd, on the border between Lower Austria and Moravia at Feldsberg, and on the boundary between Lower Austria and Slovakia along the river Morava.

Nicolson mentioned in his diary on March 13 a discussion in the Sub-Committee about the Rumburg and Eger enclosures: the Americans wanted to take both from Czechoslovakia and give them to Germany but were opposed by the British and French. As any topographical map shows, the loss of these areas would not have weakened the strategic position of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Commission then drafted its final report which was passed by the Central Territorial Committee on March 25 and submitted to the Supreme Council. The Council of Foreign Ministers discussed the report on April 1. On Lansing's suggestion only the part dealing with Czechoslovakia's German frontier was considered because the treaty with Germany was drawing near. Cambon began his report by stating that the Commission had endeavoured "to do justice to ethnic claims but economic and strategic considerations had also to be given weight as a purely racial frontier would have left Czecho-Slovakia defenceless and economically crippled." His Commission's recommendations on Teschen and

Ratibor did not agree with those of the Allied Mission in Warsaw; therefore these areas were reserved, pending a joint investigation. In the region of Glatz, the German salient had been diminished in favour of Czechoslovakia in order to improve the latter's strategic position. Lansing then said that, while he did not desire to debate the question of Glatz, he wished to point out

> that the fixing of frontier lines with a view to their military strength and in contemplation of war was directly contrary to the whole spirit of the League of Nations, of international disarmament, and of the policy of the United States as set forth in the declarations of President Wilson.

Cambon replied that a discussion of general policy was outside his sphere, and that the American delegation had not made any general reservations, but only reserved two specific points. The ethnic principle was not the only one to be applied. "If a nation was to be composed strictly according to the national sentiments of each village, the result would be a country as discontinuous as the spots on a panther's skin."

Cambon then continued to trace the proposed frontier which was identical with the former boundary until it reached Friedland. That salient would be ceded to Germany to compensate her for her losses near Glatz. Further to the west, at Rumburg, the British, French, and Italian delegates wanted to leave the salient with Czechoslovakia while the United States delegation had made a reservation. Cambon explained that the Rumburg salient, which according to Lansing contained 90,000 Germans and no Czechs, had been left with Czechoslovakia for historical and geographical reasons. Furthermore, the Commission "had thought it inadvisable to make a gratuitous offer to Germany of additional population, and thereby create a precedent . . . ." Lansing pointed out that precisely such a precedent had been created in the case of Friedland. After some further debate in which the French delegates stressed the point that the people of Bohemia

were used to living together, Cambon said that the Czechoslovak government had agreed to give up Asch, but that the American delegation had wished to cut off the salient as well. Lansing countered with the argument that the Asch salient was inhabited by 175,000 Germans and 3,000 Czechs, and that it did not contain anything essential for Bohemia; he finally made reservations on that point. The discussion continued and the French Foreign Minister Pichon made a significant statement:

> He could not allow Germany to be fortified by populations taken from what had been Austrian Dominions, taken, moreover, from Bohemia, which, he trusted, would remain an Ally of France, and handed over to Germany, which, as far as he was concerned, still remained a country to be feared.

In the end the Council of Foreign Ministers decided to wait until the differences between the Czechoslovak and Polish Commissions had been adjusted.[312] Nevertheless, it was clear that most of Czechoslovakia's territorial demands would be accepted, for the Commission on Czechoslovak Questions had come to the conclusion that, if Czechoslovakia's minorities were taken from her, "the remaining core would have its economic organization shattered, and would have been at the mercy of its German neighbour to the north."[313]

After it had submitted its final report, the Czechoslovak Commission, according to Seymour, met at irregular intervals to study specific problems.[314] On April 14 the Joint Committee of the Czechoslovak and Polish Commissions reached agreement on Ratibor. This enabled the Council of Foreign Ministers to deal with the remaining parts of the

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[312]Council of Foreign Ministers meeting April 1. Report of the Czech-Slovak Commission. U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, IV, pp.543-47. The proposed territorial exchanges at Friedland and Glatz were abandoned afterwards.

[313]Seymour, Yale Review, XXVIII, p.291.

[314]Ibid., p.277.

western frontiers of Czechoslovakia on May 9. Laroche, speaking for the Czechoslovak Commission, reported that it had arrived at the unanimous conclusion that the Czechoslovak-Austrian frontier should coincide with the former administrative boundaries of Bohemia and Moravia on one hand, and Upper and Lower Austria on the other. Most of the rectifications demanded by the Czechs could be decided by a Boundary Commission on the spot, but the important railway junction of Gmünd should go to Czechoslovakia, while the town, some distance off, was to stay with Austria. Czechoslovakia also ought to have both banks of the Morava River to enable her to construct canals to serve Slovakia, while the railway line running parallel with the western bank should remain in its entirety within Austria. The Foreign Ministers accepted these recommendations without discussion. Three days later, on May 12, at the joint session of the Councils of Four and Five, Cambon repeated Laroche's statement about Gmünd and the Morava, and recommended another border rectification near Feldsberg which Czechoslovakia had originally requested. Once more these recommendations were accepted without debate.

At the meeting of the Plenary Conference on May 31, Kramar, speaking for Czechoslovakia, asked for another rectification concerning the railway station of Gmünd. It was decided, after a short conversation between Clemenceau, Cambon, and Kramar, to clarify the issue as soon as the meeting adjourned. This was done at a "drumhead meeting of the Czech Committee"[315] in an adjoining room; two of Kramar's three suggestions were rejected, one adopted, and Cambon immediately informed the Council of Four. Two days later the Austrian delegation received the Allied peace terms and began their study. It is interesting to

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[315]Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p.355.

compare the little amount of time the leading statesmen of the Conference had spent on Czechoslovak affairs--they had been busy with more important (German) and more controversial (Italian and Yugoslav) matters.

c. Teschen

On February 12, nine days after the conclusion of the armistice between the Czechs and Poles, the Inter-Allied Control Commission set up by the Peace Conference arrived at Teschen, and was instructed by the Allied Mission at Warsaw[316] to enforce the decisions of the Peace Conference without delay. This task proved to be difficult, as a telegram which Noulens sent from Warsaw to the Peace Conference on February 21 shows: the Czechs refused to cooperate and to evacuate the town of Teschen. "The prestige of the Powers and the authority of the Inter-Allied Commission render it necessary to carry out the Convention of February 3" urged Noulens.[317] On the following day Benes informed the Peace Conference "that he was sending new instructions to Prague that the agreement of February 3 should be immediately and completely carried out.[318] At the same time he sent a letter to the Great Powers in which he claimed that he had information from Teschen about Polish terrorism, and that a large portion even of the Polish population of that area was opposed to Polish occupation.[319] On February 25 a Military Convention was drawn up, arranging the respective occupation zones in accordance with the agreement of February 3. On February 27, at its

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[316]Above, p.55.

[317]Message from Warsaw. Sifton Collection, Documents of the Peace Conference 1919, III, pp.198-99.

[318]Ibid., Secretary-General of the Peace Conference to British Delegation, p.197.

[319]Ibid., Supplementary Information, pp.204-05.

first meeting, the Czechoslovak Commission realized that the Czechoslovak claim with regard to Ratibor in Prussian Silesia affected the work of the Polish Commission as well, but joint meetings between the Czechoslovak Commission and the Polish Liaison Committee at Paris were unable to reach agreement at first.[320]

The Military Convention of February 25 did not terminate the difficulties of the Teschen Commission, and on March 24 the Council of Ten dealt with the problem. At that meeting Professor Lord, United States Technical Expert on questions relating to Russia and Poland, presented a plan to make the work of the Commission at Teschen more effective. This proposal, which had the support of the American and British members of the Teschen Control Commission, set forth the difficulties under which that body had to operate: it had to report both to the Allied Mission at Warsaw and the Peace Conference at Paris; when dealing with the local authorities it had to secure approval for its suggestions from the Polish and Czechoslovak governments; the Czech local authorities were unwilling to withdraw their troops to the arranged line of demarcation. Therefore, it was recommended that the Great Powers "request the Czecho-Slovak and Polish Governments to accept the principle that . . . the decisions of the Inter-allied Teschen Commission are to become effective the moment they are promulgated without requiring the assent of the Governments of Prague and Warsaw."[321] After some discussion the Council of Ten agreed to adopt the proposal and to inform the governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia of the decision.

Meanwhile the Teschen Commission had drawn up an extensive

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[320] Above, pp.177 and 180.

[321] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, IV, p.474.

report on the situation in the former Duchy. This most impressive document was sent to Paris on March 26. All four delegations were basically agreed on the material facts of the case. These facts have been mentioned before except for the observations of the Commission on events in Teschen since the collapse of Austria-Hungary. The Commission felt that the local agreement of November 5, 1918, between the Czechs and Poles had been concluded "in a real spirit of conciliation," but the officials and troops sent in by the Czechoslovak and Polish governments "arrived there as strangers in a conquered land, complicated and envenomed the situation." Furthermore, "the Czech Government was merely waiting for a pretext for armed intervention . . . ." Referring to the mutual accusations and recriminations, the Commission felt that, while it was difficult to ascertain the precise facts, it was certain that both parties "were a good deal to blame."

It was in their conclusions, however, that the delgates differed. The majority report, signed by the Americans, British, and Italian delegates, felt that, in the face of such a heterogeneous population, it was impossible to apply the principle of national self-determination. Historic tradition had given the region "a real unity and tradition of custom" which enabled all diverse elements to live in remarkable concord. Industrially and agriculturally this unity was even more marked because the mining and industrial districts of the western part needed the products of the agricultural eastern part. Therefore, if the region was partitioned, the unrest and strife of the last three months would be indefinitely prolonged, because both neighbouring states and a considerable proportion of the local population were bound to be dissatisfied. The creation of a little neutral state under the guidance of the Great

Powers was the best solution, both in the interests of the local population and of the Great Powers. It would also end the rivalry between both countries and be economically advantageous to them. "The customs system and the exchange of products (raw materials from Czecho-Slovakia, food supplies from Poland) could be arranged in such a way as to give complete satisfaction to both countries." Should the creation of a little neutral state be an impossibility, the majority report felt that there were only two feasible alternatives. One possibility was partition between Czechs and Poles on ethnographic lines. This would be easy to arrange, because the ethnic line of division corresponded closely to the boundaries arranged on November 5, 1918, but would have several disadvantages: it would cut the mining district with its mixed population in two, and thereby create continuous economic and racial friction, with possible international repercussions; it also would not satisfy the Czechs either from the strategic or the historical viewpoint; nor would it please a considerable section of the population because many Slonzaks in the eastern part of the region were opposed to Polish rule; finally, commerce and industry would suffer because the mines and the works would be divided between Czechoslovakia and Poland. The other possibility was the division of the country according to the limits of the basins of the Vistula and Olsa. That arrangement would satisfy Czechoslovakia both strategically and economically, would also please the local German population and remove the Karwin area from the frontier, zone; moreover, it would give the Allies the whole-hearted support of Czechoslovakia which was more stable and better organized than Poland. The disadvantages were that such a solution might cause disturbances in the mining districts, would not satisfy a considerable portion of the

Polish population with the possibility of future complications, and, on the other hand, would meet with opposition from those Slonzaks and Germans who lived in the districts given to Poland.

The French delegate, while admitting that both popular sentiment and economic conditions favoured independence and neutrality, felt that such a solution was not feasible. His minority report emphasized that the big German capitalists of the area were in favour of independence, and that neither Czechs nor Poles would accept it but would continue their struggle. Teschen was looking westward both culturally and economically; the coal produced by the Moravska Ostrova-Karwin Basin was insufficient to supply the Czechoslovak industries. Poland, with her prospective gains in Prussian Silesia, did not need this coal. The excess agricultural demands of the local mining population could be satisfied with supplies from Moravia and Slovakia. The Oderberg-Jablunka-Kaschau railway, too, while not of vital importance to Poland, was essential to Czechoslovakia for strategic and economic reasons. The development of national feeling promoted by Polish school masters and Roman Catholic priests and favoured by the Austrian authorities had begun only in the second half of the nineteenth century among the Poles of Teschen and still was not very strong; as a consequence many of them were opposed to annexation by Poland. Nevertheless, Poland was an ally, and the whole of Teschen could not be given to Czechoslovakia without arousing violent Polish hostility. Therefore, Teschen should be partitioned, but without breaking up the mining district or cutting the Oderberg-Kaschau railway. Poland should be given the eastern part which

was not vitally important to Czechoslovakia, including the textile town of Bielitz. If this solution was accepted, Czechoslovakia would receive 326,500 people, of whom 115,000 were Czechs, 44,000 Germans and 167,500 Poles. However, a considerable number of these Poles preferred Czech rule and many others were either recently arrived immigrants or "international revolutionaries."[322]

A joint meeting of the Czechoslovak Commission and the Polish Liaison Committee in Paris on the subject of Ratibor and Teschen on March 31 reached no agreement. Another joint meeting took place on April 6, and a report was composed which was forwarded to the Supreme Council on April 14. There was unanimity concerning Ratibor where a protruding salient was given to Czechoslovakia. With regard to Teschen, the United States, British, French, and Japanese[323] delegates suggested a boundary which would give Frystat, Frydek, and Teschen city to Czechoslovakia, Skotschau and Bielitz to Poland, thereby leaving the Karwin coal field and the Oderberg-Jablunka-Kaschau railway with Czechoslovakia. This arrangement would give to Czechoslovakia 167,702 Poles, 114,798 Czechs and 50,638 Germans and others, to Poland 66,148 Poles, 799 Czechs and 34,436 Germans and others. The report also advocated that there should be a considerable amount of local self-government. The Italian delegation proposed a line which approximated more closely the ethnic division of the area, and left Frystat, part of the Karwin coal field, and the

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[322] Inter-Allied Teschen Commission. Report on the solution of the Teschen Question. Sifton Collection, Documents of the Peace Conference 1919, IX, pp.15-73. This and the preceding two paragraphs are based on this report.

[323] A Japanese delegate served on the Polish Liaison Committee in Paris, and, therefore, participated in the joint meetings of that body with the Czechoslovak Commission.

city of Teschen to Poland. This proposal attributed 50,000 Poles, 98,000 Czechs, 12,000 Germans and others to Czechoslovakia, and 183,000 Poles, 17,000 Czechs and 75,000 Germans and others to Poland.[324]

The majority report which was more favourable to Czechoslovakia than the agreement of February 3 was adopted by the Central Territorial Committee on April 15 and passed on, together with the minority report, to the Supreme Council. Meanwhile, on April 12, at a meeting of senior United States delegates, Lansing made the statement that he had suggested to the Polish Premier and Foreign Minister Paderewski that they ought to try to reach an agreement with the Czechs, having emphasized the necessity of Polish-Czechoslovak cooperation "in view of the menace to which both countries are exposed."[325] This suggestion was referred to several times when the Council of Foreign Ministers discussed both reports on Teschen on April 23. Laroche, explaining the joint findings of the Polish and Czechoslovak Commissions, once more presented the Teschen problem, stressing that the issue "was really a larger question--that of reconciling the Czechs and the Poles." The proposal of creating an independent state had been rejected because it would have been unable to survive. This had placed the Commission before a dilemma because "it must either reject the ethnological principle or sacrifice the economic future of the country." Many of the delegates had been reluctant to abandon the ethnic principle, but had done so, hoping that "in a few years the passions of the moment would be appeased and that economic

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[324]Note presented to the Supreme Council of the Allies by the Commission on Polish Affairs and the Committee on Tchecho-Slovak Questions. Sifton Collection, Documents of the Peace Conference 1919, XII, pp.105-08.

[325]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, XI, p.153. Lansing obviously referred to Germany, but perhaps also meant Russian Communism.

interests would preserve their importance." The Italian delegation had suggested a different line, but the majority had not completely neglected ethnic considerations either and suggested a large measure of local autonomy. Martino, speaking for the absent Sonnino, felt that the majority report did not sufficiently take account of ethnic conditions, and damaged Polish economic interests. "Many Polish industries in these areas [the eastern part of Teschen] depended on local coal; these industries should not be sacrificed." The line proposed by the Italian delegation divided coal resources equitably. Martino also stated that there were more than 20,000 Poles living in the Karwin area who were "absolutely determined to be attached to Poland." Therefore, concluded Martino, he would request the Council to give consideration to the Italian proposal. White, speaking for Lansing who was absent, said that the Secretary of State felt that a decision on Teschen was not very urgent at the present. He felt that it would be better if the Czechs and Poles could get together and discuss the problem. "Mr. Lansing's impression was that there had already been conversations between Mr. Paderewski and Mr. Benes and that little remained to bring about an agreement between them." Balfour said that, although he was not aware that both statesmen were close to an agreement, he felt that such a solution was the best because it would avoid any dictated agreement. Therefore he suggested adjourning the discussion. There was universal agreement with Balfour's suggestion, and it was decided to postpone the solution of the Teschen problem.[326]

After that meeting the question of Teschen ceased to attract

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[326] Council of Foreign Ministers, Meeting April 23. Report on Teschen. U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, IV, pp.608-12.

more than fleeting attention at the Peace Conference for several months, but intermittent Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations were carried on behind the scenes. There was a reference to Teschen in the Council of Four on May 17 when Wilson referred to a conversation between himself and Benes and Kramar, in the course of which Benes had remarked that "in Poland it [Teschen] was a party question and no party could afford to give way. This was not the case in Czecho-Slovakia."[327] Lloyd George then made an uncomplimentary reference to Polish claims in general, and Wilson concluded the brief discussion by saying that

> one of the strongest arguments in favour of the Czecho-Slovaks was that this part of Teschen had been the acknowledged boundary of Bohemia in the days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He had received a letter from Mr. Hoover[328] to the effect that the coal output of Teschen had been reduced owing to the uncertainties of the situation to 25% of the normal.[329]

For the moment, however, the German treaty took precedence over everything else, including Teschen and the relations between Czechoslovakia and Poland.

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[327] Ibid., V, p.678.

[328] Chairman of the American Relief Administration for Europe and later President of the United States.

[329] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VI, p.678.

# CHAPTER IV

## IV. AUSTRIA AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

### A. THE NEW AUSTRIA

#### 1. The Creation of New Austria

When the inevitability of Austria-Hungary's dissolution became apparent, the German members of the Austrian parliament on October 21, 1918, declared themselves the Provisional National Assembly of an independent German-Austrian state, comprising the whole contiguous area of German settlement with the Habsburg Monarchy, and basing itself on the principle of self-determination.[1] The Provisional Assembly met again on October 30 and adopted a temporary constitution for the new state which, although republican in content, left the issue of monarchy open. A Council of State was elected to assume supreme executive authority and a message sent to President Wilson, informing him of the creation of "German-Austria" with special reference to the position of the Sudeten Germans. On October 31 the Council of State appointed a government and assumed control of the armed forces on its territory. It refused, however, to assume any responsibility with regard to the armistice negotiations which began on November 1. "Its reasons were that it wished to decline even any formal responsibility for the war and that it thus hoped to create a more favourable situation in the coming peace negotiations."[2]

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[1]Above, p.24.

[2]Charles A. Gulick, Austria from Habsburg to Hitler (2 Vols., Berkeley: University of California Press, 1948), I, p.58.

In other respects there was cooperation between the Council of State and the Emperor's "Ministry of Liquidation."

Meanwhile the internal situation was rapidly deteriorating: the army had completely disintegrated, great masses of undisciplined and starving soldiers of several nationalities were making their way home from the Italian front across the country, and the working classes of the industrial centres were rapidly developing revolutionary tendencies. Councils of workers and soldiers were forming themselves and a social revolution after the Russian pattern seemed imminent. The old authorities were completely paralyzed. Under these circumstances, the importance of the Social Democratic Party which controlled the allegiance of the organized part of the industrial working class rose swiftly.[3] The Social Democrats had become during the last two years, especially under the impression of the Russian events, more and more opposed to the war, and finally, on October 3, 1918, adopted a program which demanded "the establishment of a sovereign constituent assembly for every local area in which a specific language was spoken, the settlement of boundary disputes by means of a plebiscite, and the right of each nation to form whatever political ties it desired."[4] This programme enabled the Social Democratic Party to adjust itself to the colossal changes which were taking place, and its hold over the workers made it the strongest political force in the country, once the old parties were temporarily discredited. Its leaders desired the establishment of a democratic republic as the immediate

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[3]The Social Democrats of the Slav regions of Austria, especially the Czechs, had, in the decade prior to the war, repudiated the (German) leadership in Vienna, and cooperated in many instances with the bourgeois parties of their own nationality. This was the case in October 1918.

[4]Otto Bauer, The Austrian Revolution, trans. H. J. Stenning (London: Leonard Parsons, 1925), p.38.

goal, and, in order to achieve this aim without civil war, they were willing to cooperate with the weaker bourgeois parties. Thus Social Democratic influence within the government of the new state increased swiftly. A revolution in Germany forced Emperor William to abdicate on November 9, and a democratic republic under Social Democratic leadership came into being. This event had immediate repercussions in German Austria, especially among the working class. The Social Democrats, who considered German-Austria incapable of separate existence, and for a while had wavered between a free federation of the peoples of the Habsburg Monarchy or the Anschluss (union) with Germany, saw German-Austria deserted by Czechs, Hungarians, and Yugoslavs, and now decided for the Anschluss. On November 11 Emperor Charles renounced "every participation in the business of the state,"[5] and on November 12 the Provisional Assembly proclaimed German-Austria a democratic republic and a part of Germany although the Anschluss was at the moment only "a statement of principle"[6] and was not intended to be carried out immediately.

The Law of November 22 defined the frontiers of German-Austria by restating the claim to all territory of the former Dual Monarchy where there was a majority of German population. "Also to be included were any cities or language islands which were thoroughly German or with a German majority."[7] At the moment, however, German-Austria was unable either to take possession of some of these regions, or to hold them by force. Therefore, the view has been advanced that the law was simply "a formal

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[5]Gulick, Austria from Habsburg to Hitler, I, p.60.

[6]David F. Strong, Austria (October 1918-March 1919). Transition from Empire to Republic (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), p.117.

[7]Ibid., p.131.

statement of territorial ambitions, passed in part for the benefit of the Entente and the future Peace Conference."[8] Renner, a Social Democrat who was largely responsible for his party's pre-war nationality policy, Chancellor of Austria 1918-1920, and later its President, maintained more than a generation after the event that the purpose of the law was to gain a "tolerable measure of autonomy, reached with the consent of their own delegates"[9] for some of the outlying regions. Whatever the intention of its framers, the law brought the young state into violent conflict with its neighbours to the north, east, and south at the very moment when it needed their help most desperately.

It can be argued that German-Austria came into existence, not out of the desire of her population but because she was "left over" after the break-up of the Danubian Empire. The demand for the Anschluss is an indication of a lack of self-confidence. Moreover, in the provinces, which had led rather undisturbed political lives for several centuries, there existed strongly hostile sentiments towards the new state. The staunchly Catholic peasants looked upon "Red" Vienna, the seat of the socialist-dominated central government, with deep suspicion and were determined to be neither controlled nor exploited by the hungry city of two million people. Particularly strong was this negative attitude in the western provinces: Vorarlberg repeatedly tried to join Switzerland, and Tyrol attempted to become independent in order to save its German-speaking northern part from Italian rule. In Vienna the Social Democrats had trouble to thwart Communist attempts to seize power, especially after a Communist government had established itself in Hungary. This

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[8] Ibid., p.133.

[9] Karl Renner, Österreich von der ersten zur zweiten Republik. Nachgelassene Werke (2 Vols., Vienna: Verlag der Volksbuchhandlung, 1953), II, p.24.

Communist threat was aggravated by the miserable plight of the lower classes. The greatest problem of all lay in the economic sphere. There were not only great shortages of finished products after four years of war and the continuing blockade by the enemy, but the new states, too, closed their frontiers against German-Austria, thus cutting her off from the coal of northeastern Bohemia and Teschen, and the food supplies of Bohemia, Slovakia, Galicia, and Hungary. The results were famine, especially in Vienna, continuous stoppages in the industries, already badly hit by the change from war production to peace time manufacture, and of the transportation system. Only the immediate assistance of Switzerland and the large scale importation of food by the Allies, organized by Hoover, saved Vienna from a catastrophe.

> But even our scanty supply of coal could only be maintained with help of the inter-Allied commission. Had this assistance been withheld, the whole of the railway traffic and of industrial production would have come to a standstill.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Stores of food no longer existed. What came into the country to-day was consumed to-morrow. If Hoover had suspended his food trains for only a few days, we should have been without food. Thus we were quite in Hoover's hands.[10]

These are the observations of Otto Bauer, Foreign Secretary of German-Austria 1918-1919.

## 2. The Allies and New Austria

Right from its beginning, the new state maintained the position that it was not a continuation of Habsburg Austria but one of its succession states, with the obvious implication that it was not responsible for the actions of the dissolved Dual Monarchy. It would appear, however, that any possible success in vindicating this assertion was gravely endangered by the Anschluss statement of November 12. France was determined

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[10] Bauer, The Austrian Revolution, pp.81-83.

not to permit any increase of the strength of Germany and immediately adopted an extremely unsympathetic attitude towards German-Austria. Furthermore, the desire for the Anschluss was bound to be regarded as a statement of sympathy with Germany. The French proposals to Colonel House of November 15, 21, and 29, 1919, concerning the organization of the Peace Conference, listed German-Austria as an enemy. On February 23, 1919, House recorded in his diary that Clemenceau had insisted that Austria should be given an "intimation" that the Allies did not want her to join Germany.[11] As will be seen, in the second half of April Clemenceau secured approval of the separation of Austria from Germany from the Peace Conference.[12] On May 12 he referred to the status of new Austria in a letter to Lord Cunliffe of the British delegation:

> The Republic of Austria is the successor of the former Monarchy; it cannot be placed on the same footing as the states to which territories of the former Empire of Austria have been transferred or as the states born of the dismemberment of the Empire: these states form part of the Allied and Associated Powers . . . .[13]

In contrast to France, Italy's attitude was relatively friendly because of her difficulties with Yugoslavia. "Italy, therefore, once her own claims were satisfied, might be considered as having common cause with German-Austria in checking the general drive for territory by their Slav neighbours."[14] In the quarrel over southern Styria and Carinthia, Italy tried to thwart Yugoslavia at every turn. Italy also seems to have considered the policy of introducing her influence in the basin of the Danube by being on friendly terms with Austria.[15] According to Bauer,

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[11]The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Seymour, IV, p.335.

[12]Below, p.204.

[13]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VII, p.912.

[14]Strong, Austria (October 1918-March 1919), p.219.

[15]Ibid., p.220.

Italy was not opposed to the Anschluss because she feared nothing more than the restoration of the Habsburg Empire in the form of a Danubian Federation.[16]

Little material has so far been published about the attitude of the United States and Great Britain towards German-Austria. This very scarceness seems to indicate a certain lack of interest. Both countries were more interested in Germany, the main enemy. There are indications of some British sympathy, for instance Lloyd George's remark on May 26, 1919, before the Council of Ten that he believed that Austria and Hungary were "not unfriendly,"[17] and Nicolson's reference to his "saddened reflection as to what would remain of her [Austria] when the new Europe has been created."[18] According to Bauer, however, Britain was hostile to the Anschluss and "obscure projects for a federation of the succession states found most supporters in England."[19]

The attitude of the United States towards the new Austria was even more reserved than Britain's. That Secretary of State Lansing favoured the Anschluss is proven by his private memorandum to members of the United States government on September 21, 1918,[20] but the influence of the State Department on President Wilson was not very great. The American delegates at the Peace Conference "on the whole" approved of the Anschluss because it had been requested by the Austrians themselves.[21] Wilson himself was generally silent on the topic of Austria in his public

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[16]Bauer, The Austrian Revolution, p.113.

[17]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VI, p.26.

[18]Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, p.34.

[19]Bauer, The Austrian Revolution, p.113.

[20]Ibid., p.112.

[21]House and Seymour (ed.), What Really Happened at Paris, p.108.

utterances, whether due to lack of knowledge or lack of interest or sympathy it is difficult to judge without access to his private papers. It is known that he regarded the new Austria as an enemy state, and that he urged the Council of Four to adopt his views.[22] In his reply on November 5 to Bauer's note of October 30 he advised German-Austria to be firm and cautious. On November 12 the newly constituted German-Austrian state informed Wilson of the Anschluss, asked for the right of self-determination for the German people of former Austria-Hungary, and closed the message with an appeal for food. In his reply on November 24 Wilson promised food "upon condition that unquestioned peace and order be maintained";[23] Bauer regarded this as an order to halt the social revolution.[24] The Austrian Foreign Minister then attempted to enlist United States support for German-Austria's territorial claims by sending several notes to Wilson through neutral diplomatic channels. In a note on November 26 he protested against outrages committed by Czech troops in the German part of southern Bohemia and southern Moravia, and a week later he protested against the threatened advance of Yugoslav troops in Carinthia, asking for American troops to be stationed there. On December 7 the State Department rebuffed the Austrian government by declining unilateral contact, stating that "the Government of the United States would prefer not to receive further communications of the above nature from the Government of Austria unless it is clear that they are being simultaneously communicated to the other governments concerned."[25] Not

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[22]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VII, p.516.

[23]Strong, Austria (October 1918-March 1919), p.24.

[24]Bauer, The Austrian Revolution, p.80.

[25]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, II, p.200.

discouraged by this chilly attitude, Bauer sent another message on December 13 in which he proposed decision by arbitration of German-Austria's disputes with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, appealing "to the sense of justice of the Powers . . . to kindly use their influence with a view of bringing it about . . . ."[26] The note was sent not only to Wilson but also to the French and other Allied governments. Once more the State Department replied with a rebuff, stressing in a note of December 21 that there could not be direct contact between Allied and "Austro-Hungarian" representatives till the signing of a peace treaty.

Meanwhile the Czechoslovaks, too, had taken action. When Benes learned about the Austrian note of December 13, he "at once intervened with the French, English and Americans, both verbally and in writing." He pointed out that Czechoslovakia had been recognized as an Allied state with historical frontiers, drew attention to the threat of Bolshevism around Czechoslovakia--a line of argument which was always fairly certain to achieve the desired results--and also emphasized that Czechoslovakia's plan of economic stabilization was impossible to carry out until the country's provisional frontiers had been defined. "It was therefore, he said, necessary to confirm, at least for the time being, Czechoslovakia's historical frontiers, since upon this depended the peace and order of central Europe."[27] Benes found great sympathy in Paris. On December 21 he was informed by Berthelot, Director of Political Affairs in the French Foreign Office, that a note had been sent to Vienna which rejected the Austrian demands for arbitration of the frontier disputes with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, adding that, until the settlement of the

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[26] Ibid., p.203.

[27] Benes, My War Memoirs, pp.481-82.

question by the Peace Conference, Czechoslovakia was to have "the existing frontiers of the historical provinces of Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia."[28] Benes admitted that he had more difficulty with the British and Americans; however, they eventually followed France's example.[29] Bauer tried once more to get direct contact with the Allies. On December 27 he proposed to the Great Powers the establishment of a mixed commission, consisting of representatives of Great Powers and Austria, on neutral territory

> to discuss German-Austria's desire for peace, the economic and ethnographic conditions of their people and the international position of the German-Austrian State, as well as to demand support against the imperialistic tendencies which are now manifesting themselves in the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.[30]

This attempt, too, failed. Thus the remark of the sympathetic Professor Coolidge that there was no antipathy or ill-will towards German-Austria in Paris[31] was rather a reflection of his own views than of actual fact.

Bauer continued his Anschluss policy even after these failures. He had conversations with the German Foreign Minister Brockdorff-Rantzau in January and March 1919, and it was agreed that the Anschluss would be brought about gradually. On March 14, 1919, the newly elected German-Austrian National Assembly repeated the Anschluss declaration. However, there was opposition to this policy in Germany herself, because many Germans feared that their country, not likely to be permitted to emerge from a lost war with more territory and population, "would have to pay

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[28] Ibid., p.482. The Czechoslovak government justified its future action against the Poles in Teschen by referring to the French note. Above, p.165.

[29] Ibid., p.483.

[30] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, II, p.208.

[31] Schicksalsjahre Österreichs 1908-1919. Das politische Tagebuch Josef Redlichs, ed. Fritz Fellner (2 Vols., Graz: Verlag Hermann Böhlaus Nachf., 1954), II, p.340.

for the incorporation of Austria with the loss of the territories coveted by France and Poland."[32] Thus, while no immediate benefit could be derived from Germany, the Anschluss policy created powerful enemies for Austria. This fact was, of course, recognized by many responsible Austrians. Professor Redlich, who had been Minister of Finance in the "Cabinet of Liquidation," in the entry in his diary of December 4, 1919, bitterly attacked Bauer's foreign policy adding that the political "guerilla warfare" against the Czechs and Yugoslavs was hopeless.[33] On December 11 his entry described a conversation with Meinl, a leading Viennese industrialist, who told him of his recent negotiations in Switzerland where at first the British and Americans had received him well and had offered to supply food for Austria. "The proof [of this intention] is the telegram of Lansing among the papers Meinl gave me" is the most significant sentence. However, Meinl continued, the situation had changed completely when the Anschluss decision of the new government became known. It was regarded as open hostility towards the Allies.[34] Count Oldofredi, who went to Switzerland in March 1919 in a forlorn attempt to interest the Great Powers in the German population of southern Moravia, had similar experiences; neutral and Allied journalists and politicians, sympathetic towards Austria, issued grave warnings against the Anschluss.[35] The words of de Witte who as representative of Associate Press yielded considerable influence over American opinion are worth recording:

If Austria insists on the Anschluss all of its German borderlands

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[32]Bauer, The Austrian Revolution, p.111.

[33]Schicksalsjahre Österreichs, ed. Fellner, II, p.323.

[34]Ibid., pp.324-25.

[35]Hieronymus Oldofredi, Zwischen Krieg und Frieden; Erinnerungen (Zürich: Amalthea Verlag, 1925), pp.146-47.

will fall under foreign rule, will be forfeited for ever! Do you understand? If Germany indemnified herself with Austria for the territories she is going to lose, that would be the last straw! I shall comply with your wish and interest the newspapers across [the Atlantic] in your country, but, as I said, unless Austria abandons the Anschluss, your country is lost![36]

It was not till July that the failure of Bauer's policy was acknowledged by the Austrian government. His office was then taken over by Chancellor Renner who also led the Austrian delegation at the Peace Conference. Bauer, defending his Anschluss policy, later declared that "it offered the new Republic a new national ideal, which gave soul, purpose and will to the body of the Austrian people . . . . This national ideal powerfully consolidated the young Republic."[37] In the light of Austria's history during the next twenty years, the accuracy of Bauer's judgment must remain doubtful.

## B. THE AUSTRIAN DELEGATION AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

### 1. The First Draft of the Peace Terms

#### a. Allied and Austrian Preparations.

The Austrian peace treaty moved, for the first time, into the limelight of the talks at the Paris Peace Conference on February 22 after Balfour had proposed to speed up the conclusion of the German treaty, and Sonnino, who as Italy's representative regarded Austria as his country's main enemy in the war, had managed to extend Balfour's suggestion to all enemy countries. As this thesis deals with the territorial aspects of the treaty, only the subsequent activities of the Territorial Committees and Commissions and the negotiations affecting Italy's territorial claims are our concern; by May 12 the main work on the Czechoslovak-Austrian frontier

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[36] Ibid, p.166.

[37] Bauer, The Austrian Revolution, p.124.

was completed, while the frontier between Yugoslavia and Austria with the exception of the Klagenfurt Basin and the Assling Triangle was settled on May 29. On that day the frontier between Italy and Austria, although decided much earlier, was officially defined by Wilson. On April 20 at a private meeting, Clemenceau prevailed upon Wilson to agree to the separation of Germany and German Austria; two days later this was approved by the whole Council of Four.[38] Meanwhile the internal troubles of new Austria were not quite forgotten by leading statesmen: on March 12 Lloyd George remarked that he had information that in Austria "the situation was daily more nearly approaching that of Russia."[39] On the same day the Supreme Economic Council of the Peace Conference resolved to lift the blockade against Austria, and the decision was approved by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

Meanwhile the Conference made progress on the problems concerning Austria, and on April 26 at the meeting of the Council of Four, Wilson recalled an earlier suggestion by General Smuts, the representative of the Union of South Africa, that the Austrians should be invited to come to Paris. He also felt that such a gesture would have a stabilizing effect on Austria's internal situation, and suggested May 15 as the date. After some discussion the matter was dropped but taken up again four days later when Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau--Orlando and Sonnino were absent from the Peace Conference at that time--were unanimously in favour of sending an invitation to the Austrians. Wilson added that the other four United States chief delegates (Lansing, House, White, and Bliss) had

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[38]Actually only Lloyd George approved; Orlando had absented himself from the meeting because of the Fiume quarrel.

[39]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, IV, p.333.

urged the same course. It was agreed to ask the Austrians to come to Paris on May 12. On May 2 the French Representative in Vienna handed a letter of invitation to the Austrian government to send delegates to St. Germain-en-Laye,[40] requiring that this delegation had "to restrict itself absolutely to its role and must comprise only persons who are qualified for their special duties."[41]

The Austrian government completed the composition of the delegation by May 9. The leader of the delegation was Chancellor Renner, a moderate Social Democrat and not as enthusiastic on the Anschluss as Bauer. The aims of the delegation were to try to save the German-speaking part of South Tyrol by either suggesting the neutralization of all of Tyrol or by permitting Italy to garrison the region south of the Brenner. Concerning Carinthia, the retention of the whole province with the exception of the Seeland district was the goal, and it was hoped that Italy would help Austria to retain Marburg in southern Styria. With regard to the Sudeten German territory, the endeavour of the delegation was to obtain self-determination for the population, or, if that proved unattainable, full autonomy within Czechoslovakia. The delgates also intended to press Austria's claim for German-speaking western Hungary. The Anschluss was still intended, but the delegation was authorized to agree to a postponement. In the economic field, the Austrians rejected liability for reparations but were ready to accept their share of the liabilities of the former Habsburg Monarchy in proportion to the size of their new state with the old. The publication of the Allied peace terms for Germany on May 7 was felt as a bad omen for new Austria: on May 8 Renner took leave

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[40] Situated 13 miles west-north-west of Paris.

[41] Almond and Lutz, The Treaty of St. Germain, p.39.

from the National Assembly with the words that he felt the journey to St. Germain would be "rather a walk of penance than a walk to the conference table."[42]

b. The Arrival of the Austrian Delegation.

Arriving at St. Germain on May 14, the Austrian delegation was comfortably interned and unable to have any direct contact with the other delegations at the Peace Conference. It then had to wait for nearly three weeks before the Allies were ready to hand over the peace terms. Meanwhile the delegates prepared themselves for their task, and were also kept busy by drawing the attention of the Peace Conference to the military situation in the Klagenfurt Basin. It is interesting to note that the reception of the Austrians by the Paris press was very unfavourable.[43] On May 24 Renner asked the Conference to open negotiations as soon as possible, pointing out that the delay might have serious repercussions within Austria—a delicate hint of Vienna's proximity to Communist Hungary. The reply to Renner's letter was a communication that the peace terms, except for the sections dealing with reparations and Austria's future future military forces, would be presented on May 30. However, there was another delay, and on May 30 Renner wrote another letter to Clemenceau, asking for a personal interview. This request was refused on the ground that the Conference had established the rule that "the exchange of views must take place only in writing. Therefore, if the Austrian Delegation wishes to present observations, it will have the liberty to do so in memorandums addressed to the President of the Conference."[44] The terms were finally presented on June 2.

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[42]Benedikt, Geschichte der Republic Österreich, p.61.

[43]Oldofredi, Zwischen Krieg und Frieden, p.179.

[44]Almond and Lutz, The Treaty of St. Germain, p.52.

There were several reasons for the repeated delay in presenting the peace terms. Already on April 30 when the Council of Four debated the question of inviting Austria, Hankey, Secretary at the meetings of the Council of Four, remarked that the Central Drafting Committee[45] was so overworked with the German treaty "that he felt confident that they could not possibly prepare the Austrian Treaty in so short a time."[46] At the meeting of the Council of Four on May 7 the discussion centred around the question of whether all the frontiers concerning the former Habsburg Empire should be settled simultaneously, or whether new Austria's frontiers alone should be settled first. Against the opinions of Wilson and Orlando, Lloyd George suggested "that a beginning had to be made somewhere."[47] The debate was continued on the following day, and Wilson, now in possession of a summary on the problem prepared by the United States delegates, was now in agreement with Lloyd George's views. It was finally decided to ask the Council of Foreign Ministers "to consider at once, and to make recommendations in regard to the territorial boundaries of Austria and Hungary, and of the new States created out of the former Austro-Hungarian territory . . . as dealt with the reports of the various Commissions . . . ."[48] As a result, the Council of Foreign Ministers met on the same afternoon, and again on May 9 and 10, in order to deal with these frontiers. A joint meeting of both Councils on May 12 concluded the work.

During the next two weeks, while the Austrians were already waiting

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[45]Usually referred to as "Drafting Committee."

[46]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, V, p.369.

[47]Ibid., p.500.

[48]Ibid., pp.513-14.

at St. Germain, the Conference concerned itself with the economic and military clauses of the Austrian treaty, although the German treaty and Greek-Italian rivalries in Asia Minor took up most of its time. Renner's letter of May 24 showed the Council of Four the urgency of a settlement with Austria, and after a lengthy debate during the morning session of May 26 it was decided to hand to the Austrian delegation those parts of the terms which were ready during the week. During the meeting Hankey drew the attention of the Council to a very important problem:

> Mr. Headlam-Morley[49] had come to see him that morning and told him that the Economic Clauses were based on the assumption that Austria was to be a continuation of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, but that the Financial Clauses were drawn on the assumption that Austria was a new state. He had urged that the whole Treaty of Peace wanted examination from this point of view.[50]

Headlam-Morley asked the same question in person during the afternoon meeting of the Council of Four, and it was decided to refer it to the Drafting Committee. On May 28 the Council of Four dealt with the question whether the designation of "German-Austria" was correct. Cambon, who attended the meeting, remarked that there was only one Austria: "There was the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Kingdom of Hungary, etc., but Austria was Austria."[51] Lloyd George felt that the other nations who had emerged from the Habsburg Empire should also be consulted. On May 29 at the meeting of the Council of Four a letter from the Drafting Committee was read which stated that all phraseology had been deleted from the wording of the Austrian treaty which would have committed the Allies to either view about the relationship between the old and the new Austria. This

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[49]The British delegate on the Committee of Political Clauses of the Treaty with Austria.

[50]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VI, p.30.

[51]Ibid., p.82.

solution was, however, not satisfactory to Orlando who emphasized the point that the question had a political bearing on the problem of war damages and reparations. It was therefore decided to refer it to the Reparations Commission of the Conference for comment. Later on during the meeting, new Austria's official designation came one more under discussion. Cambon reported the result of his conversations with the Yugoslavs and Czechoslovaks: both states wanted the word "German" to be eliminated, Yugoslavia because "the maintenance of this word would tend to encourage the belief that outside the Duchy of Austria there is an Austria,"[52] Czechoslovakia because the word appeared to indicate the future merger of Austria and Germany, and would therefore "create a bond between the Germans residing in Bohemia and those residing in Austria and serve as a pretext for a pro-German division in part of the territories of Czecho-Slovakia."[53] The Council then decided to inform the Drafting Committee that the new state would be recognized under the title of the "Republic of Austria."

The Plenary Conference met in the afternoon of the same day in order to be informed of the terms of peace to be given to Austria on the following day with the exception of the reparation and military clauses. However Bratianu of Rumania, speaking also on behalf of several other small states, asked for a postponement of forty-eight hours in order to be able to study the terms before they would be approved. The request was granted by Clemenceau who apologized "that it had been hoped to communicate the actual text before the present Session, but that it had not been

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[52] Ibid., p.106.

[53] Ibid.

possible."[54] The Plenary Conference reassembled in the afternoon of May 31 to hear the conditions of peace with Austria. As has been previously mentioned, during the session both the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak delegates suggested some changes in the territorial clauses regarding their respective frontiers with Austria. It was then decided to hand the peace terms to the Austrians on June 2. The changes suggested by the Yugoslav delegate Trumbic led to the removal of the clauses dealing with the Klagenfurt Basin from the terms given to Austria, while the objections of the Czechoslovak delegate Kramar were satisfactorily dealt with immediately after the meeting of the Plenary Conference.

c. The First Draft

The peace terms were presented to the Austrian delegation at a meeting of the Plenary Conference at the Chateau St. Germain on June 2, 1919, The draft did not contain the clauses dealing with Finance, reparations and military matters, nor had the political stipulations concerning Italy or most of the clauses relating to Yugoslavia been added. The Austrian delegation was given a maximum period of fifteen days to make written observations which would be answered, also in writing, by the Supreme Council. Thereafter, the Austrians were to be granted another delay for their final answer.

After the terms had been presented, Renner spoke. He said that the Habsburg Empire was dead and new and independent states had emerged in its place. Then came the main point: "Our young Republic has been constituted in the same way as all the other States; it is, therefore, in no greater degree than they are, the successor of the former Monarchy. That fact is the direct origin of the fundamental contradiction which must be cleared up in the presence of this high Assembly." He felt that all

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[54] Ibid., III, p.392.

succession states had to bear their respective share of the Habsburg inheritance--war, exhaustion, and crushing financial obligations. However, the new state had rid itself of "all the ambition to dominate other nations," and "all the reactionary tendencies which had made that ancient Empire a prison for those peoples." New Austria was therefore "the unfortunate victim of the terrible crime committed in 1914, a crime of the former governors, but not of the peoples." She had never been at war with anybody. In Vienna all the succession states of Austria-Hungary had set up commissions to liquidate the former community, but matters were different at Paris where distinctions were being made between the various succession states. Renner continued that he hoped "to enlighten the Peace Congress in regard to this confused situation." He hoped that the Allies would not refuse his state the right of self-determination which had been granted to the neighbouring states. He described the terrible economic consequences which the continued state of war was having on Austria and praised the Allied relief measures under Hoover. He stressed the fact that throughout these trials the Austrian people had preserved self-discipline, and, although a revolution had occurred, no blood had been spilled.

> Encouraged by its confidence in the decisions of this Congress, it [the Austrian people] has abandoned all military action for the defence of its territories, two-fifths of which are still occupied by its neighbours. It has remained as the support of a peaceful and sensible evolution in the middle of Europe. It will not deviate from this attitude provided that a just and democratic peace restores to us the indispensable means of economic existence.

Renner then remarked that the Allies so far had only heard the views of Austria's neighbours, and he made a plea for impartiality: it was fair to hear both sides. He ended with a pledge of collaboration "in the noble

task of the League of Nations."[55]

A general summary of the final peace treaty will be provided at the end of the chapter, but for the purpose of this thesis the territorial aspect is of main importance. According to the draft presented on June 2, Austria's frontiers with Switzerland and Lichtenstein remained unchanged. The frontier with Italy ran through the Brenner Pass, and thereby deprived Austria of both the Italian and German parts of South Tyrol.[56] Italy also received the Sexten Valley and the Tarvis region. Further to the east, Austria had to renounce her claims to the whole Klagenfurt Basin whose future disposal was "reserved" by the Allies. To Yugoslavia Austria lost southern Styria, including the towns of Marburg and Radkersburg. The boundaries between Austria and Hungary remained unchanged. The frontier with Czechoslovakia began south of the Danube near Pressburg, and then passed along the right bank of the Morava "so that the course of the river may be entirely at the disposal of the Czecho-Slovak State and that the railway Vienna-Dürnkrut-Hohenau may be entirely in Austria."[57] From the confluence of the Morava and Thaya onwards the frontiers coincided with the former administrative boundaries of Lower and Upper Austria with Moravia and Bohemia except for two fairly substantial rectifications in favour of Czechoslovakia, one at Feldsberg and the other near Gmünd. This meant that all the territories of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia inhabited by Germans were lost to Austria. The frontiers between Austria and Germany remained unchanged. Nothing was said about the Anschluss

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[55] Ibid., Plenary Session June 2, Statement by Renner, pp.427-30.

[56] The surrender of the Italian part, the Trentino, was not contested and played no part in the deliberations of the Conference.

[57] Almond and Lutz, The Treaty of St. Germain, p.160.

because an article had been inserted in the treaty with Germany in which that country recognized Austria's independence. The economic clauses of the draft prevented Austria from discriminating by tariffs or preferences against Allied countries. The assets of Austria and her citizens not only in the Allied countries but also in the so-called succession states of the Habsburg Empire—Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Poland—were to be confiscated.

"Everything, everything lost and nothing gained" was the opinion of a member of Renner's staff as the Austrian delegation returned from the Chateau to its quarters.[58] "A terrible document" was the opinion of Foreign Secretary Bauer.[59] On June 3 Renner met members of the Austrian cabinet at Feldkirch near the Austro-Swiss border to discuss Austria's next steps. The Austrian delegation at St. Germain then began to work on counter proposals.

2. The Second Draft of the Peace Terms

a. Austria's Counter Proposals

On June 10 the Austrian delegation handed a note, containing Renner's comment on the peace terms, to the Peace Conference. The note stated that the peace terms would deprive Austria "of the factors indispensable for its material existence as well as for the maintenance of both political and social order." Renner then described the economic importance of the territories which the Allies proposed to take from Austria. "We cannot understand from what point of view such measures are reconcilable with the principle of equity proclaimed by the Great Powers . . . ."

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[58]Oldofredi, Zwischen Krieg und Frieden, p.194.

[59]Bauer, The Austrian Revolution, p.118.

continued the note; the remainder of Austria could not live because it was only able to produce one quarter of the food and one seventh of the coal it needed; it also lacked many vital raw materials. Moreover, the country's transportation system would be ruined. At the same time, all Austrian capital in the succession states was lost, and Austria compelled to grant these countries a most favoured nation treatment without any obligation of reciprocity. Thus the whole financial life of Austria was threatened with inevitable collapse, especially as Vienna, the financial centre of the Habsburg Empire, was now facing ruin through the proposed expropriation of its financial enterprises and institutions in the succession states. "We do not think that the destruction of our State and the creation of a hotbed of social ferment which would ensue therefrom, can be consistent with the interests of Europe . . . ." ran the Austrian statement; it suggested that the arrangement of the relationships between the states which had arisen from the territory of Austria-Hungary could be left to those states themselves. "This process . . . requires patient and assiduous work, and cannot be conducted to a successful conclusion unless we are listened to." The note suggested that the Allies should set up a Commission of Inquiry into Austria's resources and ended with a warning that the collapse of the new Austria would involve her neighbours as well.[60]

On June 15 the Austrian delegation submitted a memorandum signed by the parliamentary representatives of the Sudeten German population in the last Habsburg parliament to the Peace Conference. This memorandum--which throughout referred to Czechoslovakia as the "Czech State"--began by quoting parts of Wilson's speeches dealing with national "self-determination" and "impartial justice to all," and then emphasized that the

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[60]Comment of the Austrian delegation on the June 2 draft of the conditions of peace with Austria. Almond and Lutz, The Treaty of St. Germain, pp.204-09.

desire of the Sudeten Germans to be part of the new Austria was in accordance with these ideals. The memorandum defended the Austrian census of 1910 as having been conducted in a completely impartial manner, and stated that the Germans had arrived in the disputed territories "as successors of the Celts, long before the Slavs."[61] After the end of the war the Czechs had simply occupied the Sudeten German territories by military force and introduced a regime of oppression. "There would be a terrible and disastrous disappointment if the Peace instead of putting an end to this slavery, made it permanent." The Czech government had by its action "poisoned in an intolerable way the relations between the two nations and destroyed all hope of a peaceful agreement between them." Thus Czechoslovakia would simply become a replica of old Austria, but under far more unfavourable economic and historic circumstances. This situation would become even worse if Czechoslovakia were to incorporate parts of Lower Austria. While the loss of the Sudeten German territories would deprive German-Austria of her means of independent existence, the Czech state had adequate means of livelihood; this could be statistically proven by the Sudeten German representatives. The memorandum concluded with an appeal to the Great Powers to have the fate of the Sudeten Germans decided "by a Plebiscite . . . by Communes under neutral control, in the absence of Czech troops . . . ."[62]

This memorandum was accompanied by a note from the Austrian delegation which warned the Allies that they were "in the course of committing a flagrant injustice towards the population of the above-mentioned

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[61]This claim referred to the Teutonic Marcomanni who invaded Bohemia, inhabited and named after the Celtic Boii, at the time of the Roman Emperor Augustus.

[62]Sudeten German memorandum in reply to the Allied peace conditions. Almond and Lutz, The Treaty of St. Germain, pp.452-60.

territories and to drag the Czecho-Slovak people itself into an adventurous and disastrous policy." The regions inhabited by the Czechs and Slovaks alone would be sufficient to make Czechoslovakia prosperous. By forcing the Sudeten Germans into Czechoslovakia the Allies "would create in the middle of Europe a centre of civil war . . . ." The note then compared the peace terms given to Austria to those given to France by Germany in 1871 and predicted the same consequences. Moreover, the Sudeten German territory was vitally important to Austria for its industries and natural products. Therefore the German-Austrian delegation joined the writers of the Sudeten German memorandum in asking for free elections to decide the fate of the Germans of the Historic Provinces. The Austrian note ended with a reference to the Teschen region which it called "one of the rare points of the surface of the world where three nationalities can lay equal claim, and with equal reason, to be the natural consumers as well as to be members of a native race." Therefore it recommended the establishment of a neutral and international regime in that region under the aegis of the League of Nations.[63] On June 19 Benes sent a note to the Czechoslovak Commission which was studying the Sudeten German memorandum. The note promised that the Czechoslovak state would treat its German citizens well, in accordance with President Masaryk's principles. The note also cited some results of the recently held municipal elections in the German parts of Bohemia which showed that there was a strong Czech element living among the German population. Finally, the note quoted several recent expressions of Sudeten German opinion in favour of remaining within Czechoslovakia.[64]

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[63] Ibid., Note from the Austrian delegation June 15, pp.448-51.

[64] Ibid., Note from Benes relative to the German Austrians in Bohemia, pp.460-66.

The Sudeten German memorandum was followed on July 16 by Austria's counter proposals to the June 2 draft. The Austrian note stated that the Allied peace terms delimited "unjust frontiers for this state from a national point of view, contrary to geographic configurations and absolutely untenable from an economic point of view." At the same time, these frontiers injured Austria's legitimate claims and did not correspond with the needs of her neighbours. Austria's proposed northern frontier was supposed to follow historical boundaries but, nevertheless, parts of Lower Austria were also included in Czechoslovakia. If the rights of the Germans of the Historic Provinces were not going to be respected, Austria was asking at least for the incorporation of the German districts of southern Bohemia and southern Moravia. These territories always had possessed Linz and Vienna as their natural markets. With regard to the proposed frontier on the western bank of the Morava, the note felt that this was a "strange contradiction of international law." It could only be designed to bar Austria from using the river, contrary to the general Allied policy of internationalizing waterways. Concerning the eastern frontier, the part of western Hungary claimed by Austria had been inhabited by Germans since the Middle Ages. Economically this region was linked to Austria because it supplied her capital city Vienna, and also Graz in Styria, with food. At the moment the Hungarian frontier was within the range of a long distance gun from Vienna, and within gun shot of the great industrial centre of Wiener-Neustadt. Hungary did not need the region claimed by Austria. Austria asked for a plebiscite to give the inhabitants the opportunity to decide their fate. To the south, against Yugoslavia, the linguistic boundary was extremely confused in places, because the races were inextricably mixed. German-Austria only wanted those regions

where the German element preponderated. In certain places Austria was asking for the inclusion of small minorities of neighbouring peoples "in the interests of natural geographic delimitation," but, on the other hand, she would have to give up many towns and villages in the Italian Trentino, Carniola and the Littoral largely inhabited by a German population. Austria claimed the German part of Tyrol and the whole Drave valley up to the Hungarian frontier. The draft proposed by the Allies would surround German-Austria with its 6,000,000 inhabitants "by former German towns, placed under the domination of conquerors of a foreign language." This would create hatred and lead to continuous discord. For all these reasons, the German-Austrian delegation asked the Peace Conference to consider these suggestions.[65]

This note was accompanied by several memoranda which dealt with Austria's boundaries. A memorandum which was concerned with general problems stated that Austria only claimed those territories which were inhabited by a compact national population, "as well as those border regions which are linked together by common economic interests and political solidarity." In doubtful cases Austria asked for a plebiscite under strict supervision. For these reasons Austria claimed the Sudeten German regions, and also the contested parts of Lower Austria which contained Austria's only remaining sugar refinery and valuable forests. With regard to the Morava, all international practice "according to which frontiers defined by a waterway follow the median line of the river" had been ignored. "A people is to be deprived of an advantage offered to it by nature and this for the sole purpose of prolonging its sufferings and misery and of preventing the

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[65] Ibid., Austrian reply of June 16 to the Allied conditions of June 2: memorandum on the boundaries of Austria, pp.276-81.

recuperation of its economic strength" was the bitter comment of the Austrian note. In western Hungary Austria demanded a plebiscite for a region of 5,000 square kilometres and 300,000 German people, economically closely linked with her. In southern Styria and Carinthia a clearly defined ethnographic boundary between Germans and Slovenes was impossible to establish, but there was a natural frontier consisting of the right bank of the Drave in Styria and the Karawanken Mountains in Carinthia. Diversity of speech could not affect the unity of those regions. This was particularly true in the case of Carinthia, where, the note claimed, a private referendum had proved that both the Slovene and the mixed communes wanted to be with German-Austria. With regard to Tyrol, there was no strategic necessity for Italy to incorporate the German southern part. "The power which occupies the heights along the linguistic boundaries commands from a military standpoint the entire contested territory from the South." Moreover, German-Austria was offering neutralization of the whole of Tyrol. The linguistic boundaries in Tyrol were clearly drawn and reinforced by "the geographic formation in agreement with the requirements of practical life . . . . The food supply and the economic reconstruction would be rendered impossible if the country should be dismembered." The note ended with a reference to Tyrol's proud traditions and spirit of liberty.[66]

Other Austrian memoranda dealt with the specific regions. The memorandum on Styria discussed the mixed region between the compact German and Slovene areas where, it claimed, the German element was predominant. Marburg, with its population of 35,000 Germans, constituted "an historical

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[66] Ibid., Austrian reply of June 16 to the Allied conditions of June 2: memorandum on the boundaries of German-Austria, pp.281-87. Austria's national hero of the Napoleonic era, Andreas Hofer, was a native of German South Tyrol.

bulwark of German civilization." The memorandum denied allegations of Germanization by the former Austrian authorities, stating that for the last two generations the ethnographic character of the territories in question hand hardly changed. The proposed frontier would destroy the unity of central Styria and embitter the population. The region north of the Bachern group had always formed an economic unit where the agricultural (Slovene) regions of the south had supplied the industrial (German) regions of the north with food. Also, the rail traffic of central German-Austria was based on the triangular system of Bruck-Villach-Marburg, "a system which would be cut up and blocked by the establishment of the frontiers marked in the Peace Treaty." Austria's communication with Italy and the Adriatic would be rendered impossible, and the livelihood of more than 4,000 German employees of the Southern Railway Companies who with their familes had permanently settled at Marburg would be destroyed. Furthermore, the projected frontier would lead to the ruin of all the enterprises for the exploitation of the hydraulic forces of the Drave between Marburg and Pettau. This would have disastrous consequences for Austria: "Styria, Lower Austria, and especially, the city of Vienna . . . would lose by the annihilation of all this natural energy their last hope of securing light by hydraulic power and of bringing back to life the industries which, should they remain idle, would make impossible the reconstruction of organized life . . . ." Therefore, the memorandum, on behalf of the people of northern and central Styria, asked for a plebiscite in the contested regions.[67]

The memorandum on Carinthia stressed the existence of strong natural frontiers in the shape of high mountain ranges around the whole

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[67] Ibid., Memorandum of the Austrian delegation of June 16 on Styria, pp.385-87.

province. The centre of it was the bed of the Drave. Thus the region had been an administrative unit for a thousand years. Without the two main cities Klagenfurt and Villach the rest of the country "would be doomed to ruin, because it would only be composed of small valleys without coherence among themselves, and deprived of the possibility of being united to neighbouring countries on account of the mountains, which prevent all communication." Separation of any part of the province would be ruinous to the whole. A narrow zone, widening towards the east, was of mixed German and Slovene character. All the German population and the greater part of the Slovenes were demanding the unity of the country.[68]

The memorandum on Tyrol denied the strategic importance of German South Tyrol to Italy, and maintained that the linguistic boundary would also make an excellent strategic frontier with Austria. In addition, German-Austria offered, to prove her military disinterestedness, "to neutralize, not only the contested region, but the whole of German Tyrol, and to forbid any military operations as well as the maintenance of fortifications, factories or depots of munitions, etc." The linguistic boundary was clear-cut, and the German parts of South Tyrol had been German partly for 500, partly for 600 years. "The fact that they belonged of old, like most of the world then known, to the Roman Empire, cannot justify historically the claims of Italy, who on the same ground might just as well claim Egypt, Spain, or part of the British Isles" remarked the memorandum. Economically, German South Tyrol was united to the northern part; the Brenner Pass had never been a separating administrative boundary, but on the contrary, had acted as a connecting link. The possession of German South Tyrol by Italy would place a section of the great international

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[68] Ibid., Memorandum of the Austrian delegation of June 16 on Carinthia, pp. 387-89.

railway line from France and Switzerland to the Near East across Italian territory close to the frontier of two watchful Great Powers.[69] The memorandum closed with an emotional note which indicated Austria's deep concern.

> As to the annexation of the Southern Tyrol to Italy every argument collapses before the firm desire of a people which refused indignantly to be united to the conqueror. This unanimous feeling at the time of the most cruel national collapse gives the certainty that this people, proud of its history and traditions, will never accept foreign rule.[70]

Another brief Austrian memorandum suggested the neutralization of Tyrol.

At the same time, Renner sent to the Conference a strongly worded note which emphatically denied that German-Austria was in any way identical with the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, or responsible for the actions of its government.[71] This note was followed by a similar communication on July 2.[72] On June 25 an Austrian note reiterated the request for plebiscites in the contested areas, and denied that Austria wished to seize any territory contrary to the wishes of its inhabitants. A note on July 10 provided the Peace Conference with a precise list of all the communities in the contested districts of Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, Lower Austria, western Hungary, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola, and Tyrol for which a plebiscite was requested. The note included suggestions for the practical execution of these plebiscites. Another note on July 10 objected to two passages in the preamble of the treaty which implied direct continuity between the former Imperial Austria and the new Austria. Renner's note emphasized that German-Austria had never been at war, and was one of the

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[69]Presumably after the Anschluss was consummated.

[70]Memorandum of the Austrian delegation of June 16 concerning the future of Tyrol. Almond and Lutz, The Treaty of St. Germain, pp.350-52. Also cf. Coolidge's remark above, p.81.

[71]See Appendix H.

[72]Ibid.

succession states born out of the collapse of Austria-Hungary. It appeared "inconceivable to attempt to treat only one of the States as a vanquished belligerent and the others as victors."[73]

b. Allied Reaction to Austria's Counter Proposals

While the Austrian delegation was occupied with the study of the peace terms of June 2, the Conference concentrated its attention largely on the completion of the treaty with Germany. The first mention of Austria's counter proposals occurred on June 17 when Sonnino raised the problem of dealing with them at a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was decided to refer the Austrian notes to the same commissions which were attending to the observations of the German delegation to the Allied peace terms. These bodies had been established by the Peace Conference at the beginning of May, and their work was now nearing conclusion.

After the conclusion of the Peace Treaty of Versailles with Germany on June 28, 1919, a reorganization of the Peace Conference became necessary because most of the more prominent participants returned home. The Council of Four and the Council of Foreign Ministers were replaced by the "Council of Heads of Delegations" which consisted of the senior delegates of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan.[74] At the first meeting of the Council of Heads of Delegations on July 1 Lansing stated that none of the notes sent by the Austrian delegation had so far been answered. He suggested that commissions should be appointed to deal with each section of the treaty affected by an Austrian note.

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[73]Almond and Lutz, The Treaty of St. Germain, p.238.

[74]Below, p.259.

Balfour mentioned that the committees which had dealt with the German notes were now concerning themselves with the Austrian notes. Lansing replied that the American experts on Austrian affairs were not identical with those on German matters. Dutasta, the Secretary General of the Peace Conference, then said that the various delegations had already been asked to nominate suitable people. It was finally agreed that Dutasta should report on the situation on the following day. On July 2 the Council of Heads of Delegations passed a resolution proposed by Lansing which allowed the Austrian delegation to make observations or counter proposals not more than ten days from the date on which it received the last section of the peace terms. On July 7 Fromageot, President of the Drafting Committee, reported to the Council that the remaining sections of the Austrian treaty would be ready by the following evening.

On July 10 the commission which had been set up to prepare replies to Austrian notes concerning territorial questions submitted its report on the Austrian frontiers with Hungary and Czechoslovakia to the Council. On the frontier between Austria and Hungary, the American, British, French, and Japanese delegations had granted most of Austria's territorial demands, while the Italians had advocated the maintenance of the old administrative boundary. With regard to the frontier between Austria and Czechoslovakia, the French and Japanese delegations had favoured maintaining the line suggested on June 2, while the American delegation had recommended a return to the historic boundaries of Lower Austria. The British delegation had been ready to support the American point of view if Czechoslovakia were to receive the territory on the right bank of the Danube, south of Pressburg, which contained an important railway junction, while the Italian delegation had been willing to agree to some modification at Feldsberg but had disapproved of giving

Czechoslovakia the bridgehead south of Pressburg. Tardieu, the President of the commission, after he had explained the report to the Council, made a suggestion of his own.

> He thought that Czecho-Slovakia could do without most of what had been conceded at Gmünd, and the bulk of the territory attributed to her at Feldsberg. Thus with a very slight alteration the historic frontier of Bohemia would be maintained.[75] The very slight alteration to this frontier, which he suggested, would be sufficient to safeguard the economic situation. In compensation for this, Czechoslovakia might be given the bridgehead of Pressburg.[76]

After some debate it was decided to postpone the discussion of Tardieu's proposal for the following day. On July 11, in the presence of several territorial experts, the debate was resumed. Tardieu, who had brought a map which indicated the changes proposed by himself, showed that the Austrians would get back half of their lost territory at Gmünd, but that Czechoslovakia would keep the railway junction. In the Feldsberg region two-thirds of the territory would be returned to Austria, but Czechoslovakia would retain the river and the railway. Moreover, the territory retained by Czechoslovakia was the only land in question which contained a number of Czechs. The discussion then centred around the Pressburg bridgehead which Crespi, the Italian representative,[77] did not want to be awarded to Czechoslovakia, while Lansing felt that the railway junction of Gmünd, too, should be returned to Austria. Balfour said that "Tardieu's compromise was like all compromises, open to criticism. Nevertheless, he accepted and supported it as the best way out of a difficult situation."[78]

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[75]Actually, Feldsberg is situated on the border between Moravia and Lower Austria.

[76]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations, 1919, VII, p.94.

[77]Italy was usually represented in the Council of Heads of Delegations by her Foreign Minister Tittoni.

[78]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VII, p.99.

Tardieu stated that the committee felt that the Morava and Thaya which now became a frontier should be internationalized. After some more discussion, Tardieu's proposal was completely adopted. On July 16 the Drafting Committee was instructed to alter the territorial provisions of the treaty accordingly. Meanwhile the Conference had also discussed the economic clauses of the Austrian treaty, and on July 20 the Allies handed to the Austrian delegation the second draft of the peace terms.

c. The Second Draft

The amended draft of July 20 also contained the clauses which had been missing in the first draft. Altogether it was more favourable to Austria than the draft of June 2. Austria received the larger part of the territory she claimed in western Hungary, and also recovered most of the territory of Lower Austria which she had lost to Czechoslovakia in the two frontier modifications. Her Carinthian frontier with Yugoslavia, in accordance with the decisions of the Council of Four of June 21, was going to be decided by a plebiscite in the Klagenfurt Basin; the only parts of Carinthia definitely given to Yugoslavia were Seeland--which Austria had never claimed--and the valley of the Mies. The Styrian part of Austria's frontier with Yugoslavia remained unchanged from the earlier draft, and the same applied to the Austro-Italian frontier. The economic provisions of the new draft showed a considerable improvement for Austria compared to the draft of June 2. An accompanying note stated that the Austrian delegation had been granted a time limit of ten days to present its observations in writing.

Foreign Secretary Bauer later on described the improved terms of the second draft as "one of the fruits of our campaign for union [with Germany][79]

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[79]Bauer, The Austrian Revolution, p.123.

because, according to his interpretation, France, in order to counteract the Anschluss policy, had offered better conditions to enable Austria to lead an independent existence. Most likely, the existence of Communist Hungary on the Austrian eastern frontier, too, had some bearing on the softening of Allied policy towards Austria, especially with regard to the contested territory of western Hungary.

3. The Third Draft of the Peace Terms

a. Austria's Second Counter Proposals.

On July 21 Renner and Bauer again met at Feldkirch in order to determine Austria's next moves. They decided on a change of tactics in foreign affairs: while Austria hitherto had been friendly towards Italy in order to persuade her not to annex South Tyrol, and also to enlist her help to save Carinthia and Marburg from Yugoslavia, the new policy aimed at gaining France's friendship. In order to facilitate this switch, Bauer resigned as Foreign Secretary and was replaced by Renner who had made a good impression on France at the Peace Conference. However, Austria's slight bargaining power disappeared with the collapse of the Communist regime in Hungary on August 1.

Renner's prolonged absence from Paris, caused by his assumption of the new office, delayed the work of the Austrian delegation at St. Germain. On his return to the Conference on July 27, Renner asked for at least one week's delay for the delivery of his reply to the draft of July 20. A week's extension was duly granted, and on August 4 Renner informed the Conference that he would forward his observations on August 6, but would be unable to furnish all the accompanying material on that date. The Austrian note of August 6 complained once more about the threatened cession of large numbers of Germans to Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and

Italy. German-Austria was incapable of existing within the narrow boundaries imposed upon her, and the "subjection of her nationals by the neighbouring States would bring about a serious ferment and a latent danger for peace and social order in the centre of Europe." The note warmly welcomed the League of Nations. With reference to the financial clauses of the peace terms, especially where the relationship between Austria and the other succession states of the Habsburg Empire was concerned, it emphasized that the provisions were "absolutely impossible of execution." The note concluded with the statement that German-Austria was ready to carry out all obligations which she could assume without compromising the existence of her population.[80]

On August 9 the Austrian delegation sent to the Conference a lengthy note which contained the observations and counter proposals to the July 20 draft of the peace terms. The note examined the proposed frontiers in great detail. Dealing with Czechoslovakia first, it drew attention to the results of the recently held Czechoslovak communal elections which, in the Historic Provinces, had given the Germans a vote of 31.33% compared to 68.21% for the Czechs. This proved that over 3,000,000 Germans had been handed over to foreign domination by an act which, at the same time, destroyed the viability of German-Austria. The note then made a special reference to the German regions of southern Bohemia and Moravia, inhabited by 360,000 people and economically linked to the industrial regions of Upper and Lower Austria which they supplied with their products. "There remains then only to insist on the fact that German Austria, deprived of its most indispensable regions for the supply of the working class, is not

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[80] Covering letter to the Austrian final observations, counter proposals, and proposed treaty draft. Almond and Lutz, The Treaty of St. Germain, pp. 215-18.

[illegible]

and will never be able to lead an organized life" commented the note. The partial improvement of the boundary between Lower Austria and Czechoslovakia was noted with gratitude, but it was observed that Lower Austria was still threatened with the loss of territory containing 18,000 inhabitants, a loss which, the note claimed, could be easily averted if the Czechs constructed two short stretches of railway. The note thanked the Conference for attaching to Austria the larger part of German western Hungary--the "Burgenland"--but asked for some additions to the northern part. The Allied decision to arrange a plebiscite for southern Carinthia was welcomed "with the keenest satisfaction," but all the greater was "the consternation of the people of Central Styria where the circumstances are absolutely analogous to those existing in Carinthia" owing to the rejection of the idea of a plebiscite by the Conference. Here German Austria claimed for ethnographic and economic reasons the Marburg Basin and the basin of the Mur, while abandoning with heavy heart her claims to the German city of Pettau whose possession was not absolutely essential for her economy. The note then discussed the Marburg Basin whose traffic tended towards the north.

> The agricultural products of the valleys of the Mur and the Drave have their natural outlets in the capital of the country [Graz] and in the industrial centres of northern Styria; all the economic life is inspired by the organizing spirit of the promoters working at Vienna and Graz . . . .

The note claimed that the proposed frontier would mean economic ruin for the basin of the Mur. The Austrian delegation would submit to the Conference signed statements of the inhabitants of the contested territory which asked "that the basin of the Mur be neither split up nor separated from the rest of Styria." For other parts of Austria the tracing of this artificial boundary would also mean disaster because the hydraulic energy of

the Drave could be utilized by Austria, especially at a time when the country was so desperately short of light and heating materials. "German Austria and notably Vienna are in great need of combustibles; the idleness of industrial enterprise through lack of coal is involving the misery of thousands of men as well as the most serious social dangers . . . ." For all these multiple reasons the Austrian delegation was asking the Conference to grant a plebiscite for the contested regions of Styria. With respect to the proposed plebiscite in Carinthia, the Austria note asked for the immediate evacuation of all armed forces from the area in question to exclude any possible pressure on the voters, and for a vote by communes instead of zones. It stressed that, in case the outcome should differ in both zones, it would be wise to arrange them according to economic viability. It was also "absolutely contrary to justice to proceed to the plebiscite . . . in two successive terms, in a way to allow the result of one of the two ballots to influence that of the others." Referring to Tyrol, the note described the province as "the most ardent home of liberty and resistance to all foreign domination, being sacrificed to strategic reasons, as in offering on the alter of militarism!" The ethnic frontier between German South Tyrol and the Italian Trentino corresponded exactly "to the needs of the people and to all the exigencies of practical life." The note then drew attention to Italy's continuously increasing territorial claims which now, in excess to the Pact of London and the armistice terms, included the Sexten Valley. The Conference had ignored both the wishes of the inhabitants and Austria's offers of neutralizing Tyrol. The proposed frontier would also harm the railway lines of the Puster valley and the Brenner, "reducing thus to inertia all commerce, all industry and agriculture." Moreover, Italy's strategic arguments were invalid because

the heights along the ethnographic frontier dominated the contested region. The incorporation of South Tyrol into Italy would cause future trouble because the freedom-loving Tyroleans would eventually rise to shake off the yoke. The note ended with the statement that German Austria could "bring forward no other reasons than those of truth and no other titles than those of justice."[81] The other points of the Austrian note fall almost entirely outside the scope of this thesis. Of interest is a passage on Austrian finances; here the note emphasized that "our present and also future financial conditions make it impossible to render any payment [of reparations] in the foreseeable future."[82]

There were several shorter memoranda attached to the note. One memorandum dealt with the preamble to the peace treaty and once more denied that the "Republic of German Austria" was in any way identical with the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and was therefore "precisely in the same situation as all the other states formed out of the former Monarchy." German-Austria, since her establishment, had never been at war with anybody and, for this reason, could not conclude a treaty of peace. What applied to the other succession states applied to her, too.[83]

Another memorandum concerned the contested regions of Styria: the Drave Valley, including the Marburg Basin, and the Mur Valley. According to the memorandum, the basin of the Drave belonged geographically to

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[81] Ibid., Observations of the Austrian delegation August 9 on the "Frontiers of Austria" in the Allied conditions of July 20, pp.310-23. According to L. B. Namier's presentation, the Italians were permitted to occupy the Sexten Valley under the terms of the armistice. Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, IV, p.122.

[82] Deutschösterreichs Antwort auf die Friedensbedingungen. Die Note der Deutschösterreichischen Friedensdelegation an den Präsidenten der Friedenskonferenz vom 6. August 1919, Z.914 (Vienna, Deutschösterreichische Staatsdruckerei, 1919), p.69.

[83] Observations of the Austrian delegation, August 9, 1919, on the preamble in the conditions presented to the Austrian delegation on July 20. Almond and Lutz, The Treaty of St. Germain, pp.239-40.

central Styria. From the ethnic point of view, it was a mixed region, inhabited by Germans and native "Wends." The cities and larger villages were overwhelmingly German, while the countryside was mixed. The local Wends differed strongly from the Slovenes of Carniola to the south; their customs and habits resembled those of northern Styria. With regard to economics and transportation "the valley of the Drave and central Styria, with the city of Graz, form a single unit, which could not be partitioned without great detriment to the inhabitants." All traffic led northwards and revolved around the very important railway centre of Marburg which was inhabited by 35,000 Germans and 5,900 Wends. The town with its large railway yards and machine shops was Austria's principal centre of communication with Carinthia, Italy, and the ports on the Adriatic. There were very valuable hydraulic forces on the Drave above Marburg whose further development was imminent. They were "intended to furnish, over a territory including Vienna, the electric energy indispensable to our industry, to replace the coal . . . no longer at our disposal." It was Austria's last hope of economic reconstruction. The population had clearly shown its desire to belong to Austria: the American Commission under Colonel Miles which had visited Marburg could confirm it. Even Slovene sources admitted the German character of the city. Therefore, Austria asked that the population of the Marburg Basin and the Drave valley, almost equally divided in number between Germans and Wends, should be granted the right of self-determination just as it had been granted in similar case of Carinthia. The memorandum then dealt with the Mur Valley which it stated to be geographically a part of central Styria, and ethnically inhabited by a German population with a Slovene minority of 25%. The centres of that region were Mureck and Radkersburg; the latter city was also economically linked to the southern Burgenland. The proposed partition with the

Mur as frontier would be economically harmful to the population because the regularization of the river had to be carried out on both banks according to uniform principles. Moreover, seven out of nine hydraulic power stations were deriving their power from the Austrian territory, while the establishments themselves would be in Yugoslavia. The population of the region had on several occasions clearly shown the desire to be with Austria and in February 1919 the peasants of the Mur Valley had offered armed resistance to Yugoslav occupation. Since then all communes, even those with a Wend majority, had asked to be incorporated within Austria. Concerning Radkersburg, the Slovenes themselves had not claimed the city. The memorandum concluded with the request for a plebiscite in the Mur valley.[84]

A brief Austrian memorandum dealt with the Sexten Valley. After reviewing Italy's steadily growing territorial claims, the purely German character of the region was emphasized, and the attention of the Conference drawn to the fact that Italy was expanding beyond the Adige Basin. This meant that Italy's strategic claims in that area were not at all defensive but purely offensive. Two more documents concerned Tyrol. One was a declaration signed by the communes of South Tyrol under Italian occupation, requesting their representatives at the Peace Conference "to leave no stone unturned and use every persuasion of which they are capable" to save them from Italian rule. They were ready for any sacrifice; all they were asking for was the right of self-determination. The declaration concluded with a grim and prophetic tone: "Italy can count upon us as

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[84] Ibid., Memorandum dated August 9, of the Austrian delegation on Styria, pp.390-94. With reference to the above used term "Wends," it should be remembered that since the ninth century the Slavs of Carinthia and the Styrian Drave Valley were referred to, both by themselves and the Germans, as "Windische." The general designation "Slovenes" for these people only came into use during the nineteenth century.

a frontier would be economically harmful to the population because regularization of the river had to be carried out on both banks according to uniform principles. Moreover, seven out of nine democratic cantons were surviving their power from the aristocratic majority, the establishments themselves could be in [illegible]. The population of the region had on several occasions clearly shown the desire to [illegible] with Austria and in February 1919 the peasants of the Mur Valley had [illegible] armed resistance to forcibly connection. Since then all communes, those with a Land majority, had [illegible] to be incorporated within [illegible]. Concerning Lombardy, the Slovenes themselves had not claimed [illegible]. The memorandum concluded with the request for a plebiscite in [illegible] valley.[4]

A brief American memorandum dealt with the Carnian Valley. After [illegible] Italy's obviously crowing territorial claims, one pur-ly [illegible] cover of the region was emphasized, and the attention of the conference drawn to the fact that Italy was expanding beyond the Adige basin. [illegible] means that Italy's strategic claims in that area were not at all [illegible] but purely defensive. Two more documents concerned Istria. The declaration signed by the communes of South Istrian [illegible] nation, requesting their representatives at the Peace Conference "to [illegible] no stone unturned and to every pressure of which they are capable" [illegible] them from Italian rule. They were ready for any sacrifices; all [illegible] were asking for was the right of self-determination. The conclusion [illegible] with a grim and prophetic tone: "Italy can count upon us as

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[illegible] memorandum entitled "Urgent", of the American delegation on Istria, pp.200-01. With reference to the above used term "Carnia", it should be remembered that since the ninth century the Alps of Carinthia and the Friulian Grave Valley were referred to, both by these two [illegible] communes, as "Kindsmone." The general continuation "Carnia" for these [illegible] only came into use during the [illegible] century.

loyal, true and sincere neighbours,--however, in us she would have profoundly unhappy subjects, shuddering with indignation and fomenting despair and bitterness during the years which we will live with a hope to again see born the bloody dawn of liberty." The other document was a resolution voted on July 4, 1919, by the Diet of Tyrol on behalf of its German and Ladine inhabitants, which insisted that "its unity and its right of self-determination be safeguarded." In case of dismemberment, the resolution threatened with active resistance.[85]

Another Austrian memorandum denied that the Germans had been the ruling nationality and the other seven nationalities the unwilling subjects in the Austrian part of the Habsburg Monarchy: only the Italians had wanted to leave it, and only the Ukrainians had been oppressed. The other nationalities had been partners, had frequently quarrelled and often been discontented, but still had participated in government and administration.

> It is a fact that all nationalities, some with more, some with less enthusiasm, each in their majority, but none without a protesting minority, at the outbreak of the war spontaneously and unequivocally proclaimed their will to defend their country against the foreign Powers and stand up for Austria's existence as a state.

The memorandum then examined the attitude of the Poles, Czechs, South Slavs, and Germans of Austria during the war, and, while admitting that the Czechs had been less enthusiastic in their war effort than the three other nationalities, quoted many examples of Czech loyalty to Austria. It concluded with the observation that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy perished because it lost the war; "on its soil there arose new states, each one and all of them together equal heirs of equal misfortune."[86]

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[85] Ibid., Documents on the Tyrol presented by the Austrian delegation to the Supreme Council on August 9, pp.355-57.

[86] Memorandum of the Austrian delegation concerning the attitude of the nations of old Austria towards the state, the war, and their co-responsibility for the consequences of the war. Deutschösterreichs Antwort auf die Friedensbedingungen, pp.143-71.

Lastly, the Austrian communication to the Peace Conference contained a complete draft of the peace terms. It was modelled after the Allied draft but contained several significant changes. The preamble implied that German-Austria was a succession state of the former Habsburg Empire with the same status as Poland, Yugoslavia, or Czechoslovakia, and that the agreement to be concluded was a "treaty", not a "peace treaty." With regard to the territorial and political clauses, the Austrian draft demanded plebiscites in many places: South Tyrol, the Marburg Basin, the Mur Valley, and the Burgenland with a certain extension of its northwestern part. It agreed to the plebiscite in the Klagenfurt Basin and demanded, on the Czechoslovak frontier, the incorporation of the German communities in the southern part of Bohemia and Moravia while suggesting plebiscites for contested communities. The Austrian claim to the bulk of the Sudeten German territory was abandoned. The neutralization of the whole province of Tyrol was offered if Italy gave up her claim to South Tyrol. With regard to the financial and economic clauses, Austria declared her readiness to accept her proportional share of the liabilities of former Austria-Hungary like any other succession state.

b. Allied Reaction to Austria's Second Counter Proposals

Two days after the Austrian delegation had submitted its counter proposals, the Yugoslavs replied with a statement of their own. Their note to the Peace Conference denied that there was any difference between the Slovenes of Styria and Carinthia and those of Carniola: there had never been any provisions in any of these areas but for Germans and Slovenes. The note also felt it to be unfair that the Conference imposed a plebiscite on Yugoslavia at Austria's request but refused a plebiscite where Yugoslavia demanded it--on her Italian frontier. A plebiscite in Styria would provide the Germans with "the formal right and possibility

of stabilizing the results of their Germanizing system of violence." The note also claimed that Marburg belonged geographically, commercially, and socially to southern Styria. Also, the territory claimed by Austria did not export agricultural products. The Marburg-Villach railway crossed purely Slovene territory, and was unimportant for Austria's Italian and Adriatic traffic. Austria had no need to claim the hydraulic power of the Drave--thereby also trying to incorporate 170,000 Slovenes--because her Alpine rivers possessed inexhaustible hydraulic resources. If the Austrian argument concerning the regularization of the Mur was allowed, the Yugoslav note felt that "no river, in general, could serve as a state frontier." Concerning Austria's criticism of the arrangements of the Klagenfurt plebiscite, these arrangements had a special end in view for which the methods applied were appropriate; "these methods cannot be replaced by forms which elsewhere would be possible."[87]

On August 12 the Council of Heads of Delegations discussed the fact that the Austrian delegation in its communications to the Conference still insisted on referring to its country as "German-Austria." The Council decided to maintain the title "Republic of Austria" in all its dealings with that country.

During the next two weeks the various commissions and committees concerned with the Austrian treaty studied Austria's counter proposals of August 9. In the economic field Austria was granted several concessions compared with the draft of July 20; the British delegation appears to have been the most favourably disposed towards Austria. On August 24 the work was finished, and on the following day the Council of Heads of Delegations,

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[87]Note from the Yugoslav delegation replying to the observations of the Austrian delegation with particular reference to the Austro-Yugoslav boundary questions. Almond and Lutz, The Treaty of St. Germain, pp.395-98.

in the presence of several experts, discussed the extensive report submitted to it. Cambon, President of the committees set up for the coordination of the replies to the Austrian counter proposals, explained the various clauses of the report. He began with Austria's frontiers with Czechoslovakia where all of Austria's objections and proposals had been rejected with the one exception of Gmünd: there the American and British delegates had wanted the area to go to Austria but the French, Italian, and Japanese delegations had still favoured its attribution to Czechoslovakia. Headlam-Morley, British member of the Coordination Committee, said that, as the principle of the historic frontiers had been accepted for Czechoslovakia, a large number of Germans had been included in that state. "It was undesirable to deviate from this principle in order to add still more Germans to Czecho-Slovakia." He stated that Gmünd junction had been attached to Czechoslovakia on grounds of railway communication, but General Mance (British representative on the Commission for Ports, Waterways and Railways) had told him that, even on purely technical grounds, it would be better to leave it with Austria. Tardieu emphasized that the problem had been carefully studied before, both by the Commissions and the Council, and that there also had been consultations with Czechoslovakia, while, in his opinion, Headlam-Morley presented only the view of an individual expert. Balfour said that he regretted having to re-open an already settled question, but here was a strong case: although there were too many Germans in Czechoslovakia, the history of Bohemia afforded some justification for preserving the country as a unit. However, the district of Gmünd had never belonged to Czechoslovakia, and the only reason for handing it over to the Czechoslovaks was economic; now the British railway expert thought that even that argument was faulty. Balfour concluded, rather sarcastically,

that Tardieu had said nothing on the merits of the case except that it had been the Council's decision. "If the Council was never to revise its decisions, its task would doubtless be rendered easier. It did not follow, however, that its results would be better." Tardieu replied that he had referred not only to the decisions of the Council, but also to an agreement with the Czechoslovaks. Thus there were not only economic but also political reasons to consider. All previous decisions had been unanimous. "The attribution of the junction of Gmünd to Czecho-Slovakia had been part of a general arrangement which extended to Pressburg and other places. If this arrangement were changed at the last moment, the Czecho-Slovak Delegation would have reason to complain of bad faith." Polk, Counsellor for the State Department, who had succeeded Lansing to the Council of Heads of Delegations, said that the original view of Lansing and the United States experts had been that Gmünd junction should belong to Austria, but they had yielded to the majority in order to reach unanimity. However, they still felt that "the rule established in favour of the historic frontier should not be broken" and therefore supported the British view. Tittoni, speaking for Italy, said that, as there seemed to be good arguments on either side, he was ready to accept either solution. Matsui, the Japanese member of the Council, said that he wished to stand by the former decision of the Council. Finally, after a lengthy debate, Balfour and Polk withdrew their objections to the previous settlement because it had been made as part of a compromise whose other parts had not been questioned.

The discussion then turned to Styria about which there were differences of opinion, too. The American, British, Italian, and Japanese delegates of the various commissions and committees had suggested re-examination

of the Austrian frontiers in Styria in view of the observations presented by the Austrian delegation. They wanted to extend the Carinthian plebiscite to the districts of Marburg and Radkersburg, because they doubted that the transfer of these regions to Yugoslavia would correspond to the sentiments of an important minority of the population or perhaps even to the interests of the majority. The French delegates had rejected this view. Cambon, explaining these findings to the Council, said that Marburg was German but the surrounding districts were Slovene. Tittoni felt that it was easy to extend the Carinthian plebiscite to Marburg; Clemenceau, too, tended to favour a plebiscite. Tardieu said that "he had no prejudice against plebiscites" but he felt that in this case the result would be a foregone conclusion because the city was German and the countryside Slovene. Thus no acceptable frontier would be obtained and the whole effort wasted. Tardieu's remark led to a lengthy debate, and the Council finally decided to extend the plebiscite to the districts of Marburg and Radkersburg.

The next topic to be discussed was Carinthia; here the British and Italian delegations had felt that Austria's objections concerning the arrangement of the plebiscite were justified and therefore had suggested a simultaneous plebiscite for both zones. The other three delegations had objected to these suggestions. After some debate the British and Italian delegations of the Council withdrew their proposals, and the plebiscite arrangements were left unchanged. No change had been proposed for Austria's frontiers with Italy and Hungary, and the Council agreed to these recommendations.[88]

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[88]Council of Heads of Delegations meeting August 25. Discussion of the reply to the Austrian delegation on the Treaty of Peace concerning the frontiers. U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VII, pp. 840-43.

On August 26 the Council of Heads of Delegations confirmed its previous day's stand on Gmünd and Carinthia, but excluded Radkersburg from the area of the Styrian plebiscite.[89] Later on during the meeting Tardieu said that the Council's resolution to arrange a plebiscite in the Marburg area had led to complete disagreement in the Central Territorial Commission. He suggested that the Council ought to hear the views of that Commission. After some altercation with Tittoni who strongly advocated a plebiscite in the Marburg area, Tardieu said that the suggested line of the plebiscite area "would give the Austrians an artificial majority."[90] Tittoni then said that he did not wish to refuse a hearing to the Commission but that he still stood by the decision of the previous day. It was then decided to hear the views of the Central Territorial Commission on the following day.

Meanwhile the Yugoslav delegation, having heard of the proposed plebiscite in Styria, had submitted a memorandum to the Peace Conference. It stressed the ancient administrative, ethnographic, intellectual, economic, and political unity of southern Styria with Marburg as the capital. The memorandum stated Marburg would be an entirely Slovene city if the old Austrian system of Germanization had not artificially created a German stronghold in a purely Slovene country. The memorandum then claimed that the Yugoslavs had been given to understand that they could expect a solution of the Styrian problem in their favour as a compensation for their unfulfilled claims elsewhere; now a plebiscite was going to be imposed upon them against their will but none granted where they desired it. They felt that such treatment was unjust. The memorandum closed with a hint that there would be internal repercussions in Yugoslavia if the Conference went

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[89]The official United States and British publications of the minutes of the meeting do not reveal any reasons for this change of mind.

[90]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VII, p.937.

ahead with the Styrian plebiscite.

At the Council meeting of August 27, Tardieu read the report of the Commission on Rumanian and Yugoslav Affairs regarding the plebiscite in Styria. The report was, as mentioned before, not unanimous: the views of the French and British had differed from those of the American and Italian delegations. The British and French point of view had been that the plebiscite line proposed by the Austrians was "unacceptable as having been drawn artificially by the Austrians with a purely political aim and as destroying the economic unity of the Marburg basin." Therefore they had asked for the inclusion of the Pettau and Luttenberg districts in the plebiscite zone. Furthermore, they had felt that the Drauburg region in Carinthia (the northern part of the Mies Valley) should participate as part of zone A in the Carinthian voting. On the other hand, the American and Italian delegates had been ready to accept the line proposed by the Austrians. They had rejected the inclusion of the Pettau and Luttenberg districts "because such a provision would destroy the balance of the vote in favour of the Yugoslavs and would impose a plebiscite on populations which do not desire one and for whom no one has requested any." For the same reason the Italian delegation had objected to the inclusion of the Drauburg region in zone A of the Carinthian plebiscite. Both sides, continued Tardieu, had developed their viewpoints at length. The British and French had drawn attention to the fact that a plebiscite would have serious disadvantages, regardless under what conditions it would take place: the Yugoslavs had requested a plebiscite over wide areas on their Italian, Austrian, Hungarian, and Rumanian frontiers, and it had been agreed to limit it to Carinthia; thus it was "scarcely fair to put aside the agreement in question, at the request of the Austrians, merely for the

Marburg region." Except for the city itself, there was a heavy Slovene majority in the Marburg district: 75,000 Slovenes against 18,000 Germans; thus the line originally adopted by the Conference had corresponded with the location of nationalities. Economically, the Marburg area was tied to Yugoslav railways although the Austrians had tried by artificial means to turn the traffic northwards. Finally, the Yugoslavs had occupied the territory in question with the authorization of the Allies. "Contrary to what happened in the case of Klagenfurt, no objections was ever made by the Conference" and, therefore, the Yugoslavs had the right to consider that the area was not disputed: any change would provoke tension and unrest. The Slovenes, continued the British-French statement, were in a bad position because nearly one-third of them would be placed under foreign rule by the treaty; any further aggravation of their situation could lead to violence. Considering these facts, and recalling that the Commission on Yugoslav Affairs, and previously the Central Territorial Commission and the Supreme Council, had discarded the idea of a vote, both delegations had come to the conclusion that it would be dangerous to hold a plebiscite. The American and Italian delegations, however, had felt that the Yugoslav request for a plebiscite in other regions had nothing to do with the Austrian treaty. When the time came to discuss other treaties, other plebiscites might have to be arranged, if necessary. Referring to the shootings at Marburg, on January 27, 1919, the statement drew attention to the fact that unrest already existed under Yugoslav rule. While there was admittedly a Slovene majority in the districts around Marburg and Radkersburg, "there is nevertheless sufficient basis for believing that many of these Slav peasants prefer to be again attached to Austria because of economic interests which closely tie these regions to those of

Klagenfurt and Gratz." Furthermore, official statistics proved that three-quarters of Marburg's traffic went in the direction of Austria. The statement maintained that the fact that the Slovenes were scattered over wide regions whose interests were sometimes even opposed to one another, the valleys of the Isonzo, Save, and Drave, was not necessarily an argument in favour of unity. If there had been objections against the plebiscite, they had been made before the study of the Austrian counter proposals. At any rate, concluded the statement, the plebiscite would "give the Slovenes of Marburg and Radkersburg a means of freely expressing their opinion."[91]

The discussion on the report was started by Tittoni who said that he did not see why the plebiscite area in Styria could not be divided in the same way as the Klagenfurt area. Italy had no direct interest in the region, but she was interested that the Austrian cabinet, dependent on the votes of the Styrian deputies in the National Assembly, should sign the treaty. He asked Clemenceau whether he "was ready to occupy Austria with French troops, but he [himself] must declare that Italy would find it extremely difficult to do so." Polk said that he had understood that the Austrian line had been accepted as the basis of the plebiscite. He had not realized that the British and French members of the Commission would propose such large additions. Whose influence, he asked, would prevail in the delimitation of the area: Austrian or Yugoslav? In the enlarged area the vote would obviously favour Yugoslavia. "In that case, he thought, it would be preferable to attribute the territory to the Jugo-Slavs outright." Tardieu emphasized that Marburg was an intellectual and

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[91] Ibid., Council of Heads of Delegations meeting August 27. Report of the Commission on Rumanian and Yugoslav Affairs regarding the plebiscite in Styria, pp.952-55.

economic centre of southern Styria. "In his view, the Jugo-Slav position should be maintained as he regarded it as entirely right." Tittoni countered by quoting statistics which proved that the bulk of Marburg's traffic moved northwards. He added that the city was divided from the south by a mountain range. Tardieu did not deny Tittoni's figures but said that they resulted from the "deliberate economic policy of the Austrian administration. The natural market of Marburg was the south." Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, said that, as the Yugoslavs had been in possession of that area for nine months, it would be difficult to evict them. Replying to a question of Polk, he stated that "no formal authorization had been given, but that no protest had been made." Balfour suggested that, in order to come to some decision, the whole idea of a plebiscite ought to be abandoned. Polk agreed with him, stating that he would rather adopt that course than arrange a compromise which would leave both parties dissatisfied. Tittoni, however, said that he would prefer to hold the plebiscite in the enlarged area. After some further debate, the Americans, British, French, and Japanese agreed to abandon the idea of the plebiscite in Styria and to revert to the terms presented to the Austrians; Tittoni reserved his approval and said that he would communicate his decision to the Secretary-General of the Conference during the afternoon.[92]

Tittoni's communication, handed in a few hours later, agreed to the British and French proposal of extending the plebiscite to the districts of Luttenberg and Pettau. Owing to his illness there was no debate on the Styrian question on the following day, August 28, but it is certain

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[92] Ibid., Discussion on the report of the Commission on Rumanian and Yugoslav Affairs regarding the plebiscite in Styria, pp.948-50.

that there was some activity in the Italian camp, because, when the Council met again on August 29, Tardieu stated that he had received a new proposal from Tittoni which abandoned the idea of a plebiscite anywhere in Styria except for Radkersburg and a small area in its neighbourhood. Asked by Clemenceau why he wished to hold a plebiscite there, Tittoni replied "that his main object was to get an Austrian signature to the Treaty." The area was entirely German, and seeing that Marburg was to remain Yugoslav, he felt that Austria should be satisfied elsewhere. Tardieu said that in his opinion Radkersburg should be attached to the (Yugoslav) region situated to the southeast of it; if Austria won the plebiscite, a bad frontier would result. Clemenceau then asked General Le Rond, President of one of the subcommissions in charge of delimiting Austria's frontiers, to comment on the question from the geographical point of view. Le Rond explained that, if the suggested plebiscite turned out in Austria's favour, as he felt it would, "the frontier in this area would be geographically unsound, cutting valleys in a capricious manner and leaving Radkersburg almost on the boundary line. There were 10,000 Austrians in the area in question, but hundreds of thousands of Slovenes were left outside of Yugoslavia. Polk remarked that these Yugoslavs would not be left in Austria. Tittoni said that the Drave would have been a more logical frontier than any other line; therefore geographical objections were not very valid. Le Rond explained that the line suggested by the Commission followed the crest of the hills. Balfour finally suggested that the river Mur should become the frontier and no plebiscite at all be held; Radkersburg would thereby remain in Austrian territory. This idea found general approval, and it was decided that there would not be a plebiscite in Styria, with

Marburg going to Yugoslavia and Radkersburg to Austria.[93]

On the same day the Yugoslav delegation submitted a memorandum concerning Radkersburg to the Peace Conference. It stated that the city was commercially tied to the regions to the southeast for their grain and to the southwest for their wine. A quarter of its inhabitants were immigrants from the southeastern region. The proposed frontier would separate Radkersburg from its hinterland and ruin it. The Slovene population which encircled Radkersburg by an arc of 320 degrees would suffer likewise. Historically, the city was of Slovene origin, and had been Germanized only during the second half of the nineteenth century. Even now one-third of its inhabitants were Slovenes and within the triangular region in its vicinity north of the Mur the proportion of the Slovenes was nearly 40%. The memorandum ended with the statement that the Council's decision was prejudicial to all interests concerned. On August 29 and 30 the Council also dealt with Article 61 of the new constitution of Germany which made references to the future Anschluss of Austria, and provided for Austrian members of the upper house of German Parliament. It was decided to request Germany to delete that part of her constitution, and at the same time to insert a clause in the treaty with Austria which expressly stipulated the independence of the country.

During the second half of August the Peace Conference also concerned itself with various difficulties arising from the projected transfer of the Burgenland from Hungary to Austria, and with those sections of the treaty which do not fall within the scope of this thesis. As will be seen, Austria achieved certain improvements. It is interesting to note

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[93] Ibid., VIII, Council of Heads of Delegations meeting August 29. Discussion on Marburg and Radkersburg, pp.2-3.

that, with an eye on the future, Italy acted as an ardent supporter of Hungary in her quarrel with Austria over the Burgenland.

c. The Final Draft

On September 2 the Austrian delegation received the final draft of the peace terms. Compared with the draft of July 20, it contained some more improvements for Austria, both in the territorial field because Radkersburg was returned to her, and in the economic field because the Allies made some concessions in the question of reparation payments. A limit of five days was provided for the Austrians at the end of which a reply had to be sent, signifying either total acceptance or rejection.

A covering letter to the terms contained the Allied reply to the Austrian observations of August 9. The Austrian assertion that the country was not an enemy state and therefore not liable for reparations was rejected in a few sentences which set the tone of the treaty, explained the Allied attitude, and identified the new Austria with the old.

> Had the people of Austria, in the years preceding the war endeavoured to curb the militarist and domineering spirit by which the Government of the Habsburg Monarchy was animated, had they made any protest against the war, or refused to assist and support their rulers in prosecuting it, some attention might now be paid to this plea. But the fact that the war was acclaimed on its outbreak in Vienna, that the people of Austria were its ardent supporters from the start to finish, and that they did nothing to dissociate themselves from the policy of their Government and its Allies until they had been defeated in the field, makes it clear, that according to any canon of justice, they must be held to bear their full measure of responsibility for the crime which has brought such misery on the world.

Moreover, continued the Allied letter, the inhabitants of Austria and of Hungary had vigorously supported the autocratic Habsburg regime because it had given them a dominant position over the other races of the Habsburg Empire. This policy of domination had led to unrest and dissatisfaction within, and dependence on Germany with her plans of domination without. Finally a situation had developed "in which the rulers of the Austro-

Hungarian Monarchy could see no other way of preserving their own power than to deliberately set to work to destroy the liberty of a small and independent State which kept alive the vision of liberty among their oppressed brethren . . . ." Therefore, the people of Austria shared the responsibility of their government, and the principles according to which the treaty had been drafted were valid. "Until the signing of the Peace the people of Austria are, and will remain, an enemy people." If Austria suffered hardships now, that was not the consequence of the peace treaty, but of her past policy of oppressing and exploiting other races. These races had now decided to set up independent states, and the rearrangement was bound to inflict severe damage on the city of Vienna which had been artificially set up as the universal political and economic centre. The Allies, continued the letter, had no wish to increase Austria's hardships but, on the contrary, were "anxious to do all in their power to assist her people to accommodate themselves to their new position and to recover their prosperity, provided always it is not at the expense of the new States formed out of the late Empire." It was obvious that the break-up of the Empire had created difficult problems with regard to the inter-relationships of its successors, and the treaty made allowances for Austria in that respect. Furthermore, the Reparation Commission would be instructed to have due regard for Austria's vital interests. With regard to territorial stipulations, after careful examination of Austria's observations, the Allies had not found any new arguments and therefore had not made any further modifications. The Allies had endeavoured to draw the boundaries in such a way as to ensure lasting peace in Central Europe and "guarantee the existence of all the people concerned, including the Austrian, without exposing them to anarchy or internecine competition."

With regard to Tyrol, the Allies had considered Italy's long suffering "from the menace deliberately directed at their heart by the retention in Austro-Hungarian hands of military outposts commanding the Italian plains." Therefore she had been granted her natural frontier of the Alps which she had long demanded. Finally, the Allies reminded Austria that smaller countries like herself were from now on protected by the League of Nations from threat by powerful neighbours; the clauses relating to Ports and Waterways guaranteed her access to the sea, the Labour clauses would protect the rights and raise the standards of the working population, and Minority treaties would safeguard the political, religious, and linguistic rights of all minority groups transferred to other states by the peace treaties. A detailed explanation of the treaty was attached to the letter, setting forth the reasoning behind the framing of each part. It is of great interest to note that, with reference to Austria's observations concerning South Tyrol, the Allies quoted a statement of the Italian Prime Minister Nitti to his Parliament to the effect that his government proposed "to adopt a very liberal policy towards its new subjects of the German race with respect to their language, culture and economic interests."[94]

On September 4 Renner asked the Conference to extend the time limit given to the Austrians for their reply to September 9 because he had to go to Vienna and put the peace terms before the Austrian National Assembly. This request was granted, and on September 6 the National Assembly passed the treaty under protest, proclaiming that it deprived the country of its right of self-determination and surrendered the Sudeten Germans, South Tyroleans and important parts of Carinthia, Styria, and

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[94] Ibid., Council of Heads of Delegations meeting August 30. Draft covering letter, pp.19-24. Nitti's statement: Ibid., VII, p.869.

Lower Austria to foreign rule.[95] At the same time, the representative of the Sudeten Germans, and of Carinthia, Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Styria, and Tyrol protested against the terms declaring that "the three million and a half Germans, forced by such a peace treaty to submit to foreign domination, will insist to the end of time to affirm their right to self-determination, a right which forms the only possible basis for national constitutions."[96] On September 10, at the Chateau of St. Germain-en-Laye, the Treaty of Peace with Austria was signed. The Austrian National Assembly ratified it on October 17 and four days later deleted the Anschluss clause from the Austrian constituion. On July 16, 1920, ratifications were exchanged, and the state of war with Austria officially ended. According to Bauer, the treaty discredited Austrian Social Democracy, the main driving force of the new state, and prepared the way for "bourgeois reaction."[97] It should be remembered that Austria afterwards never referred to the treaty as "Peace Treaty," but as "State Treaty."

4. The Treaty of St. Germain[98]

With the statement that the "former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has now ceased to exist, and has been replaced in Austria by a republican government . . . ." the preamble to the treaty clearly showed that the Allies regarded Austria as an old state--the continuation of Imperial Austria, reduced in size and with a new government. The treaty itself was divided into XIV Parts.

Part I began with a declaration of approval of the League of Nations by the signatories of the treaty. It consisted of the 26 Articles

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[95]See Appendix I.

[96]Almond and Lutz, The Treaty of St. Germain, p.79.

[97]Bauer, The Austrian Revolution, p.129.

[98]See Map VI.

of its Covenant. Of special interest to Austria was a passage in Article I which stated that any self-governing state could join if two thirds of the members approved.

Part II dealt with the frontiers of Austria, as laid down in the final draft of September 2.

Part III was concerned with the political clauses for Europe. It dealt with the financial obligations of the Austrian half of the former Habsburg Empire as affecting Italy, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, laid down the details of the plebiscite in the Klagenfurt Basin, stipulated the regulations governing the protection of Austria's racial and religious minorities, and clarified the rules concerning the citizenship of the inhabitants of the transferred regions. Article 88 declared the independence of Austria "inalienable otherwise than with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations."[99] Under Article 91 Austria renounced all rights and titles over the territories which had previously belonged to the Habsburg Empire and now lay outside her new frontiers. Article 94 permitted separate conventions between Austria and the succession states which had obtained Austrian territory.

Part IV dealt with Austrian interests outside of Europe. Austria renounced "all rights, titles and privileges whatever in or over territory outside Europe which belonged to the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy or to its allies, and all rights, titles and privileges whatever their origin. . . ."

Part VI dealt with prisoners of war and graves. The Allies

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[99]This consent, according to Article 15 of the Covenant of the League had to be unanimous, i.e., had to have French approval. Outright prohibition would have violated the principle of self-determination. Bauer, The Austrian Revolution, p.117.

undertook to repatriate all war prisoners as speedily as possible at Austria's expense; both the Allied and Austrian governments were to respect and maintain the graves of soldiers and sailors buried on their respective territories.

Part VII concerned offenders against the laws and customs of war. The Austrian government recognized the right of the Allies to try such persons before military tribunals.

Part VIII contained the clauses dealing with Reparations. By Article 177 Austria accepted responsibility of herself and her allies "for causing the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Austria-Hungary and her Allies." In Article 178 the Allies recognized the inadequacy of Austria's resources, but nevertheless required compensation for damage done to their civilian population and their property. The amount of such damage for which compensation was liable would be determined by an Inter-Allied Reparation Commission. This Commission, for whose upkeep Austria was responsible, would be guided "by justice, equity and good faith," and would have "wide latitude as to its control and handling of the whole reparation problem . . . ." It would also hear the views of the Austrian government. The Reparations Commission was to draw up a schedule of reparation payments for Austria to last for thirty years, beginning in May 1921, although some installments in gold, ships, securities, and other means would have to be made earlier. As an immediate reparation payment Austria was to surrender her whole merchant navy, and deliver altogether 18,900 heads of livestock to Italy, Yugoslavia, and Rumania.

Part IX contained the financial clauses of the treaty. They stipulated that Austria's assets and revenues would be liable for "the cost

of reparation and all other costs arising under the present Treaty . . . ." Moreover, Austria would have to bear the cost of all Allied occupation forces on her territory since the conclusion of the armistice. Each of the states which had received Austro-Hungarian territory, and each of the new states, including Austria, would assume responsibility for a share of the debt of the former Austrian government. Within a year all the states referred to above were to replace the notes of the former common currency circulating within their territory by notes of their own national or new currency.

Part X, the economic clauses, was the longest section of the treaty. Austria had to promise not to discriminate in her foreign trade against the Allied countries, and to give equal treatment to all of them. These provisions were to be valid for five years after the coming into force of the treaty, but the Allies agreed not to require fulfillment from Austria after three years except on the basis of reciprocity. Other Articles aimed at easing the transition from an economic unit to separate existence in respect to Austria's trade with Czechoslovakia and Poland. Austria also promised not to discriminate against Allied nationals on her territory. With regard to individual debts, each country was free to establish a Clearing Office which would handle claims and debts. These Clearing Offices were to cooperate in settling all outstanding cases. The Allied states reserved the right "to retain and liquidate all property, rights and interests which belong at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty to nationals of the former Austrian Empire, or companies controlled by them, and are within the territories, colonies, possessions and protectorates of such Powers . . . ." Persons who through the peace treaty acquired Allied nationality would be excepted. The proceeds of

this liquidation of enemy property, rights, or interests were to go either to the above Clearing Office and any credit balance accounted in favour of Austria, or, if the liquidating state had not established a Clearing Office, the proceeds would go to the government or individuals entitled to reparation payments; in case of the new states, the proceeds of these liquidations would be directly given to the owner. Austria was obliged to compensate her citizens for their loss of property, rights, or interests in the Allied countries. Within three months of the coming into force of the treaty a Mixed Arbitration Tribunal would be established between each of the Allied Powers on one hand, and Austria on the other. This body would decide all questions concerning Part X of the treaty.

In Part XI Austria promised to place aircraft of the Allied Powers on equality with her own, and to conform to international rules regarding aerial navigation.

Part XII dealt with ports, waterways, and railways. Under Article 290 of the treaty Austria was obliged to grant to citizens, vessels, and property of the Allied countries "in all Austrian ports and on the inland navigation routes of Austria the same treatment in all respects as Austrian nationals, vessels and property." If Austria were to grant preferential treatment to any country, it would have to be extended to all Allied countries as well. The Danube from Ulm in Germany together with any navigable parts of its tributaries was to be internationalized. Under Article 311 Austria was to have free access by railway to the Adriatic through the ports and territories of the former Habsburg Empire. Goods coming from or going to Allied territory through Austria were to receive the same treatment on Austrian railways as Austrian goods. Austria also undertook "to grant freedom of transit for telegraphic correspondence

and telephonic communications coming from or going to any one of the Allied and Associated Powers, whether neighbours or not, over such lines as may be suitable . . . ." The Allies were to have in this respect equal treatment with Austrian correspondence and transmission. Moreover, Austria had to provide and maintain across her territory trunk telegraph and telephone lines for Czechoslovakia for payment in accordance with international usage. These Czechoslovak-Austrian arrangements were to be open to modification ten years after the treaty had come into force. The other provisions of Part XII were, within three years of the treaty coming into force, either to be revised by the League of Nations, or reciprocity to be granted to Austria; otherwise the Allied states would forfeit the benefits granted to them.

Part XIII was called "Labour": it represented the attempt of the League of Nations to establish social justice as the foundation of universal peace. Social justice was to be attained through the creation of humane labour conditions. For that purpose a permanent International Labour Organization, consisting of a General Conference of representatives of member states and an International Labour Office, was to be created. The General Conference would meet whenever necessary, and was to consist of four representatives of each member: two government delegates and one delegate each representing the workers and employers. The International Labour Office was to be controlled by a governing body consisting of twenty-four persons: twelve representing the governments and six each representing the workers and employers. The task of the International Labour Office was to collect and distribute information concerning industrial and labour conditions throughout the world. All member states of the League of Nations were automatically to become members of the International Labour Organization.

Part XIV contained various miscellaneous provisions which could not be brought under any of the previous headings.[100]

Altogether seventeen political units signed the treaty with Austria: United States, British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Belgium, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Siam.

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[100]For the text of the treaty: Great Britain, Treaty Series, No.11, Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria together with the Protocol and Declarations Annexed thereto Signed at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, September 10, 1919, Cmd. 400 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1919).

# CHAPTER V

## V. THE PEACE CONFERENCE DURING SUMMER AND EARLY FALL OF 1919

### A. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE DURING ITS LATER PART

With the signing of the German treaty on June 28, 1919, the Peace Conference had concluded its most important task. "Though much work remained to be done, what followed was of the nature of an epilogue."[1] Wilson, Lloyd George, and several important members of the various delegations returned home, Wilson to fight his fateful battle with the Senate over the issue of ratification of the peace treaties, Lloyd George to attend to pressing internal and colonial affairs. Furthermore, with the resignation of Orlando's cabinet, the leadership of the Italian delegation in Paris also changed. At one of the last meetings of the Council of Four, on June 27, Wilson suggested that after his and Lloyd George's departure the Council of Ten should be reestablished as the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers of the Conference. This was approved of by his colleagues, but when the new body met for the first time on July 1, a debate developed about its composition. Balfour stated that he was opposed to a large number of delegates. "He thought conversation was simpler and more informal at a gathering of five. There had been many objections [,] no doubt [,] to the procedure in the Council of Four, but there had been this great advantage."[2] Clemenceau shared Balfour's point of

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[1]Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919, p.215.

[2]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VII, p.3.

view. Lansing said that, without insisting upon it, he preferred two delegates for each country. "The day's proceedings could be talked over with the second delegate with much advantage to both."[3] Tittoni tended to support Balfour's view. Balfour finally suggested "that they should start with a Council of Five and could alter its composition if necessary. His motion was carried.

The Council which emerged from this meeting, and was to represent the Supreme Council of the Allied and Associated Powers for more than six months, became generally known as the "Council of Heads of Delegations,"[4] although it was sometimes referred to as the "Council of Five." Although nearly identical with the former Council of Foreign Ministers, its decisions were final, as Clemenceau told Lansing on July 1.[5] Its members changed frequently; Pichon who acted as the Chairman was the French member, although he was replaced by Clemenceau whenever important decisions had to be made. Later on his place was taken by Cambon. Lansing was the original United States delegate, but he was soon replaced by Polk who, in turn, was followed by Wallace. In the British delegation, Sir Eyre Crowe succeeded Balfour after the signing of the treaty with Austria. Italy's Foreign Minister Tittoni resigned towards the end of November, and his place, both in the cabinet and at the Peace Conference, was taken by Senator Scialoja. The Japanese delegate was either Makino or Matsui, both senior diplomats. The meetings of the Council of Heads of Delegations were conducted without witnesses as had been the meetings of the Councils of Ten, Four, and Foreign Ministers; frequently experts were invited to attend. The Council functioned from July 1, 1919, to January 10, 1920;

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[3] Ibid.

[4] Above, p.223.

[5] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VII, p.3.

in this period it completed the treaties with Austria and Bulgaria, and did most of the remaining work of the treaty with Hungary. It also had to concern itself with many other problems, among which the more time-consuming were the question of the Italian-Yugoslav frontier, the quarrel over Teschen, and the position of eastern Galicia. Altogether it met 128 times.

Although, as has been stated before, the Council of Heads of Delegations was in theory the successor of the Council of Four, in practice its deliberations had to take account of the fact that some of its members did not have complete authority to make binding decisions of far-reaching importance. It is difficult to gauge Lansing's authority in Wilson's absence, but his successor Polk, who proved himself throughout the negotiations of the Council a man of considerable ability, was certainly not in a position of independence, as his actions concerning the Adriatic problem, when he transmitted all important new developments immediately to Wilson, clearly show. Balfour appears to have possessed complete authority in his field, and Tittoni explicitly stated to his colleagues that he had "full powers."[6] Eyre Crowe, however, in important matters, had to refer back to the British Foreign Office for instructions. Late November, after the United States Senate had refused to ratify the treaties, Polk's successor Wallace was instructed by his government to attend the meetings of the Council as an observer only and not to participate in its discussions. "When decisions had to be taken he would have to refer to Washington and would communicate to the Council the answers of his government."[7] The Conference was clearly drawing towards its conclusion.

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[6] Ibid., p.210.

[7] Ibid., IX, p.559.

## B. THE PROBLEM OF THE ITALIAN-YUGOSLAV FRONTIERS

### 1. The New Italian Government

The resignation of Orlando's cabinet on June 19, 1919, and its replacement by a cabinet led by Nitti, with Tittoni as Foreign Minister, did not immediately improve Italy's difficult situation, both internally and externally. The high cost of living and unemployment had created dangerous labour unrest and also strengthened the extreme nationalists who felt that Italy had been betrayed by her allies at the Peace Conference. In foreign affairs Italy had to face the fact that with the defeat of Germany and the destruction of Austria-Hungary the continent of Europe had fallen under French hegemony, and that thereby her own bargaining power which had obtained her the Treaty of London had disappeared. "At best she could attempt to counteract French influence in the Danube Valley and in the Balkans . . . ."[8]

Although Lloyd George later on described Nitti and Tittoni in rather favourable terms,[9] there are indications that the new government was unwelcome to Lloyd George and Clemenceau.[10] At the meeting of the Council of Four on June 26, in the absence of Orlando, a discussion took place which expressed universal rejection of Italy's policies; Clemenceau also complained that in Fiume the Italian troops behaved as if the city was part of Italy, and that the Italians, generally speaking, "were breaking their word there and anywhere else."[11] On June 27 some informal

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[8]Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.324.

[9]Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties, II, p.892.

[10]Albrecht-Carrié, Journal of Modern History, XIII, p.513.

[11]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VI, p.714.

exchanges regarding the future tactics to be pursued towards Italy took place between Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau. On the same evening Balfour prepared the draft of a joint British-French statement to be presented to Tittoni upon his arrival in Paris. On June 28, after some debate, Lloyd George and Clemenceau approved the draft, while Wilson said that he would forward a different statement because he was not bound by the Treaty of London.

Tittoni arrived on June 28 and was given Balfour's note by Clemenceau two days later. The note was drafted in what Balfour himself described "a style of somewhat undiplomatic candour."[12] The note drew Italy's attention to the fact that certain political and military events had occurred since the signing of the Treaty of London, presenting "complexities which only the utmost goodwill and most transparent loyalty can successfully deal with." The Treaty of London, asserted the note, had never been, from its beginning, strictly observed by Italy who had delayed her declaration of war against Germany for over a year, had not actively participated in the war against Turkey although she had promised to prosecute the common war against all common enemies, had declared a protectorate over all of Albania while she was entitled only to do so over the central part, and, against the provisions of the Treaty of London, had acted as if Fiume belonged to her. At the same time, the United States who had not signed the Treaty of London, had "declined to hand over reluctant Slav majorities in the Eastern Adriatic to Italian rule." All these difficulties, continued the note, had been increased by Italy's actions in Asia Minor where she had landed troops and occupied territory without even informing

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[12]Great Britain, Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series, ed. E. L. Woodward, Rohan Butler, and J. P. T. Bury, (8 Vols., London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1947-58), IV, p.10, n.3.

her allies and had ignored their remonstrances. The Greeks, on the other hand, had only moved troops with the permission, and usually at the request, of the Allied Powers, one of whom was Italy herself. The note felt that Italy's action was "difficult to understand." Many aspects of the world were changing rapidly and the various agreements and pronouncements bearing on the final settlement, for instance the Treaty of London and the Fourteen Points, were not entirely consistent and "in part obsolete or obsolescent"; therefore they could not be carried out in their entirety. For these reasons, suggested the note, a re-survey of the whole situation was necessary: the four Great Powers should "consider together with a fresh mind and perfect frankness, whether some solution cannot be found which is consistent both with the material interests of Italy, her enduring aspirations and the rights and susceptibilities of her neighbours." The difficulties were, admittedly, great but not insuperable; however, as long as Italy pursued "an independent and even antagonistic course of action," it was impossible to discuss matters as friends or associates. The note then uttered a threat: Italy's action in Asia Minor was "quite inconsistent with genuine alliance; its inevitable end (is) complete isolation." While this would be an "immense" loss to Italy's allies and the world, to Italy herself it would mean "the loss of all claim to further assistance or aid from those who were once proud to be her associates." The note concluded that such a result was inevitable unless Italy changed her policy.[13]

"It is not surprising that Italians have referred to the note with bitterness and resentment" is Albrecht-Carrié's comment on this formidable missive.[14] Tittoni obviously needed some time to consider the situation;

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[13]Council of Four meeting June 28. Draft of Balfour's statement, U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VI, pp. 760-62.

[14]René Albrecht-Carrié, "Italy and Her Allies, June 1919," American Historical Review, XLVI (1941), p. 839.

it was not until July 3 that Italian problems were discussed at an informal meeting between Clemenceau, Lansing, Balfour, and Tittoni which Clemenceau had called at Tittoni's request. The first part of the meeting dealt with Asia Minor, and Tittoni stated that he disapproved of the policy of his predecessors of sending troops there. He declared that Italian troops would not advance further, and that Italy was not interested in obtaining sovereignty over these regions but wanted their coal and oil. This led to a debate which showed Lansing rather sympathetic, while Clemenceau opposed the Italian claim, partly because Italy ought not to have landed troops in the first place, and partly because France already had some coal concessions in that area. Balfour then directed the discussion to the Adriatic. Tittoni stated that the Italian delegation still based its stand on the Treaty of London, and added that the Italian Government had to consider Italian public opinion. Lansing then asked Tittoni the key question "whether he would abide by the strict terms of the Treaty of London if the others consented to do likewise."[15] Tittoni evaded a direct reply, and Lansing, asked by Balfour, stated that he would accept those terms of the Treaty of London which were just. The discussion ended in a deadlock, and Balfour remarked to Tittoni that, regardless how the British and French felt about their commitment to the Treaty of London, it was clear that the Americans would not accept it in its entirety. Therefore he suggested that Tittoni should try to reach some agreement with Lansing. "It was very unlikely that any arrangement about the Adriatic which commended itself to America and Italy would be unfavourably regarded by Britain and France."[16] Clemenceau stated that he and his colleagues

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[15] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VII, p.18.

[16] Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series, IV, p.11.

had vainly pressed Orlando to make proposals; he hoped that Tittoni would act differently. Tittoni then said that he would present his views in a written statement.

Tittoni's promised reply to the British-French note was dated July 7 and was received by the Allies on July 9. The memorandum pointed out that the Treaty of London had not set a time limit for Italy's declaration of war on Germany, and that she had done so as soon as she had sufficiently prepared herself. Moreover, the expected support from the Serbian army against Austria never materialized. Russia's collapse alone "would have justified Italy in seeking greater compensation for the added burden thrown upon her . . . ." but she had not done so. She had been unable to send troops against Turkey, but had maintained armed forces in Macedonia, Albania, and Libya, and had repeatedly offered to send reinforcements to Palestine. The memorandum admitted that Italy had put all of Albania under her protection, but this simply meant "protection of Albania against her neighbours, and not a protectorate." Dealing with Fiume, it stated that the Treaty of London had attributed the town to a separate Croatia in deference to the wishes of Russia. Now, however, Croatia had joined Serbia and could use the ports of the southern Adriatic. "In any case, the question of Fiume was independent of the Treaty of London, inasmuch as the Powers were confronted with the expressed wishes of the population." Italy had always agreed to give Croatia and other interested countries all facilities in Fiume. The memorandum denied that Italy had interfered in Fiume; all actions committed there by the (local) Italian National Council reflected popular feeling. The number of Slavs to be incorporated into Italy by the Treaty of London was far smaller than the number of alien populations assigned by the Peace Conference to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. With reference to Asia Minor,

the memorandum stated that "Italy must assert her right to maintain her position as a Mediterranean Power." This had been one of her principal war aims, and several war-time agreements had given her some rights in that area. Concerning the Greek occupation of Smyrna, it had been authorized by the Peace Conference during the absence of the Italian delegation. With regard to the Fourteen Points, "formal reservations had been made in due time by Italy with respect to the formula and in reference to certain Italian interests." However, the Treaty of London was a formal agreement which could not be altered at the expense of one of the participants, even if changed conditions were taken into account. The memorandum concluded with a protest against any threat to cut off assistance and supplies from Italy: even under pressure "Italy would not consent to renunciations contrary to her honor . . . ."[17]

Albrecht-Carrié has described Tittoni's memorandum as "playing for position" because it "carefully avoided shutting the door to compromise"[18] without doing anything to change the situation. However, sudden developments in the city of Fiume diverted the attention of the Conference from the general issue of Italian territorial aspirations.

2. The Fiume Incidents

The Allied force which had been established at Fiume in November 1918 was in actual fact composed mainly of Italian troops with an Italian officer, General Grazioli, in command. A few British and some more French troops were also stationed there; the French had established at Fiume a base for the French-Serbian Balkan Army. Rivalry between the French and Italians was acute, and the Italian National Council which had assumed

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[17] Italian Note of July 7. Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, pp.238-41.

[18] Ibid., p.242.

government of the town "proceeded to great lengths of propaganda."[19] On May 10, 1919, it passed a resolution of loyalty to the King of Italy. During the following month, young Italians of the town raised a Volunteer Force which was armed and drilled "without, it would seem, interference from the Italian Supreme Command."[20] Soon they began to commit acts of violence against the Yugoslavs and the French troops.[21] Riots occurred on June 29 and during the night of July 2-3. On July 6 and 7 the most serious incidents took place which also involved troops and resulted in the death of nine and the wounding of fifty-eight French soldiers.

These events had their repercussions at the Peace Conference. On July 7, when the reports of the Fiume incidents were still incomplete, Clemenceau made a sharp statement during the meeting of the Council of Heads of Delegations. He complained not only about the events at Fiume but also referred to the bitter Italian press attacks on France, the knifing of French soldiers at Genoa, and the threats made against French Consuls in other Italian cities. He said that there also was evidence of action by the Italian government: supply trains to Poland and Czechoslovakia had been stopped at Modane (on the French-Italian frontier) on the pretext of collecting customs dues, Italian reinforcements had been sent to Asia Minor and had advanced further inland, the French Ambassador in Rome "had been told by General Albricci[22] that these attacks would cease if better news came from Paris" and the Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Navy, Admiral Thaon di Revel, "had put a stop to mine-sweeping, and had ordered that new mines be kept in readiness in case of war with France."

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[19]Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, IV, p.307. Also above, p.84.

[20]Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.237.

[21]Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, IV, p.307.

[22]Italian Minister of War.

Clemenceau then referred to certain sections of the French press which, he claimed, were manoeuvred by the Italian government against the French government. He stated that it was said these things had been done to influence the Peace Conference. He said that he had restrained himself in order not to make things worse, but now he wanted to know "what was at the bottom of all this." He had ordered all French troops out of Italy "where they once had been welcome in time of stress"--a delicate hint about French help after Caporetto--but he would keep them at Fiume "where they had a right to be." Tittoni, in reply, deplored the incidents at Fiume, but said that his information concerning them was not quite the same as Clemenceau's. He said that he wanted to see the friendship between the Allies restored, and proposed "that an Inter-Allied Commission be appointed to enquire into the events at Fiume, and that its findings should be awaited before any decision was taken." He announced that an Italian enquiry into the events at Genoa was already taking place. He would go to Milan on the following day, and he asked the Council to await his return before dealing with problems especially concerning Italy. He denied that there had been any threats aimed at the Conference. "As to the statements attributed to General Albricci and to Admiral Thaon di Revel, he felt certain that whatever they might have said had been greatly distorted." With regard to the Italian press, he said that he and Nitti could not muzzle it, and he denied that there had been any attempts to influence French newspapers. "He was ready, however, to do anything that might satisfy M. Clemenceau." Concerning Asia Minor, Tittoni said that he was unaware of the developments alleged by Clemenceau, but he had summoned the commander of the Italian forces in that area to Paris to give him personally instructions which would be in accordance with the confidential discussion he and

his colleagues had had on July 3. Referring to the stopping of supply trains, Tittoni said that they were proceeding into Serbian territory, and Serbia's present attitude made it doubtful whether she would pay custom dues. These trains shipped not only food but also arms and munitions. He mentioned a report that the Serbs had asked Czechoslovakia to join them in an attack on Italy. He promised to furnish fuller information on that subject at a later date. Clemenceau said that Tittoni's suggestion of an Inter-Allied Commission of Enquiry in Fiume satisfied him for the moment, and Balfour and Lansing also signified their approval. Clemenceau then said that "it could not be tolerated that Fiume should continue to be governed in the name of the King of Italy," whereupon Tittoni stated that this was not done by the Italian authorities but by the local municipality. The Council then decided to appoint an Inter-Allied Commission, consisting of military officers, to enquire into the incidents at Fiume and to recommend measures to improve the situation. The personnel was to be nominated on the following day.[23]

On the following day, July 8, full information on the events at Fiume was available, and Clemenceau opened the discussion at the meeting of the Council. He reported that nine French soldiers had been killed, and that on the day before General Grazioli had asked the local French General to withdraw his troops from the city. This had been refused, and the refusal had been followed in the morning by a mob attack on a small French post, encouraged by an Italian officer and supported by sailors and fire from Italian warships. Lansing said that he had similar information. Clemenceau then remarked that "this was more than could be endured." He accused the Italian government of ill faith in Fiume and said that he wished

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[23]Council of Heads of Delegations meeting July 7. Discussion on situation in Italy. U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VII, pp. 32-37.

to consult with Lansing and Balfour before deciding on his next step. Crespi, who represented the absent Tittoni, expressed his most sincere regret on behalf of his government for what had occurred. He stated that he did not have any additional news, but, according to his information, the rioting had been started by a French soldier, and French sailors had fired from their ships on Italians. Clemenceau said that before receiving the latest news he had been content with a Commission of Enquiry; now he felt that this was insufficient. The Italian General had no right to demand from the French to leave Fiume. Crespi denied that Grazioli had given such orders: he only had made a proposal to his French colleague and had done everything in his power to avoid disturbances. Clemenceau said that on the previous day he had been unaware of the action of the Italian warships. "He must therefore insist on consulting his British and American colleagues separately as to the action to be taken." After Crespi had withdrawn from the meeting, Clemenceau said that he intended to send a French warship to Fiume, but wished to know whether his colleagues approved. France had been insulted and "the French flag must be shown." Lansing felt that the Allied troops in Fiume should be rearranged in such a way that each Power's forces would be of equal strength. Both he and Balfour approved of the dispatch of a French warship. It was also decided to go ahead with the Commission of Enquiry. Crespi then rejoined the meeting, and instructions were issued for the Commission of Enquiry for Fiume.[24]

The Council discussed Italian affairs again on July 9. Balfour remarked that he still had not received any information from the British forces at Fiume. Crespi said that all was now quiet in the town and that the Italian government was determined to maintain order. Clemenceau stated

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[24]Ibid., Council of Heads of Delegations meeting July 8. Discussion on Italian matters, pp.45-47 and 56-57.

that the French Military Attache in Rome had confirmed the statement alleged to have been made by General Albricci, whereupon Crespi said that he was convinced that there was a misunderstanding. He then promised a reply for the next day to a note from Clemenceau concerning the train stoppages at Modane. At the meeting of the Council on July 10 the available members of the now nominated Fiume Commission were addressed by Clemenceau who stressed the great importance of their mission to the maintenance of good inter-Allied relations. Concerning the Modane situation, Crespi explained that food had been permitted to pass, but that the Italian authorities were apprehensive about the passage of arms into Serbia. He promised a written statement. On July 12 Asia Minor was under discussion: an Italian complaint about Greek actions in the area was rebuffed by Clemenceau. Concerning Modane, Crespi promised a written report for later in the day and said that an investigation had been made which had revealed that the trains had been held up only for a few hours on account of custom formalities.[25]

Meanwhile the excitement over the Fiume incidents had somewhat cooled down. Both Nitti and Tittoni appealed to their countrymen for moderation, while the French government and press adopted a moderate attitude. French public opinion, which had always regarded Germany as the great enemy, was also perhaps less affected by the Fiume riots because most of the French casualties had been colonial troops from Annam. "Both the French and Italian Governments agreed in feeling that the incidents were of secondary importance and must not be allowed to interfere with the more essential task of finding a settlement."[26] The Fiume Commission left

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[25]There is no further reference to the Modane incident after that either in the American or the British official documents.

[26]Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.238.

Paris to conduct a thorough on-the-spot investigation, and the Conference, busy with Austrian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian matters, did not touch upon the Adriatic problem for a while. This breathing space was utilized by the Italians to negotiate with the Greeks, and Tittoni, who had returned to Paris on July 15, quickly reached agreement with the Greek Prime Minister Venizelos. On July 18 Tittoni submitted to the Council the Greek-Italian agreement on Asia Minor which delimited the respective zones of occupation by both countries. The Council accepted it provisionally because it realized official approval "would regularize the position of the Italians, who had gone to the country [Asia Minor] without the authority of the Conference."[27] However, the Council did not realize that the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement was more far-reaching: it also settled all outstanding Greek-Italian issues concerning Albania and the Dodecanese Islands. The provisions clearly could not be final without the approval of the United States, Britain, and France, and were kept secret because it was "only intended to lay a common line of action before the Conference . . . ."[28] Most of the clauses of the agreement lie outside the sphere of this thesis, but it is important to note that Italy made great concessions to Greece with the obvious aim "of disposing of other quarrels in order better to concentrate her efforts on the Northern Adriatic."[29] Fiume remained the key to the solution of Italy's territorial aspirations.

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[27]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VII, p.197.

[28]Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.243.

[29]Ibid.

### 3. The Resumption of the Adriatic Negotiations[30]

It was only towards the end of July that the Adriatic problem came once more under consideration. On July 28 there was some mention in the Council concerning stoppages of trains to Yugoslavia by the Italian authorities in Fiume, but Tittoni once more behaved in a conciliatory manner. On July 31 Clemenceau and Balfour handed Tittoni a memorandum, signed July 29, which represented their reply to Tittoni's note of July 7. The memorandum, also composed by Balfour, pointed at the contradictions in Italy's aims: she desired to maintain the Treaty of London and also wanted Fiume; she subscribed to the principle of self-determination and yet demanded a large part of the Dalmatian coast; she realized the necessity of cooperating with the United States but opposed Wilson's interpretation of the Fourteen Points. The memorandum observed "that no one has yet suggested a scheme by which these apparent incompatibles may be reconciled." Thus it was up to Italy to provide a plan for the solution of the Adriatic question, because, of all the Great Powers, she alone had ambitions to satisfy in that area. Refuting Tittoni's claim that Italy had received less consideration than her allies, especially with regard to the principle of self-determination and nationality, the memorandum drew attention to South Tyrol and Bohemia where other, weightier, considerations had taken precedence; however, it stated that "no parallel case can be found among

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[30] Most of the Peace Conference's activities between the months of August and October 1919, concerning Italy's Adriatic claims were carried on behind the scenes and not at the regular meetings, largely due to Wilson's absence. For that reason Albrecht-Carrié's book, published in 1938, contains very little information on this stage of negotiations. The publication, since the end of the Second World War, of Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series, especially Volume IV, has been of great help in writing this section of the thesis.

the Italian populations sparsely scattered among the Dalmatian coast." The memorandum concluded with the remonstrance that "if Italy would apply to the Istrian and Dalmatian coast-line south of Pola the methods which, in conjunction with her Allies, she has applied elsewhere, the Adriatic question would not exist."[31]

On August 6 an informal Committee set up to find a solution of the Adriatic problem held its first meeting under Tardieu's chairmanship. The other members were Nicolson, Johnson, and Scialoja. Scialoja presented a proposal on behalf of the Italian government: Fiume was to become a Free State and the islands of Lussin and Cherso were to go to Italy. Italy would also obtain strategic control of the Fiume-Ljubljana railway. The corpus separatum within the Free State would be maintained. With regard to the Assling Triangle, Italy wanted a frontier rectification involving 14,000 people which would enable her, through the construction of a short branch line, to have a direct railway line through Italian territory from Trieste to Villach. In return, Italy was willing to abandon all her Dalmatian claims except the city of Zara which was to become either a part of Italy, or, together with the neighbouring territory and islands, a Free State. Concerning Albania, Italy desired the incorportion of Valona and a protectorate over most of the country. Altogether the plan bore great resemblance to the Tardieu Plan of May 27.[32] During the discussion Tardieu was "anxious to secure an agreement on any terms" while Johnston was "determined not to go a particle beyond President Wilson's original suggestions."[33] Nicolson agreed with Johnston concerning the Assling Triangle and Istria,

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[31]Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties, II, pp.893-96.

[32]Above, p.123.

[33]Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series, IV, p.45.

but was willing to yield to Italy's demands in the Adriatic. On August 12, after the official meeting of the Council of Heads of Delegations had ended, Clemenceau, Polk, Balfour, and Tittoni continued with an informal discussion concerning the Italian frontiers with Yugoslavia. Tittoni submitted a scheme which was based on Scialoja's proposals. It appears that Clemenceau accepted it as a basis of discussion.[34] Two weeks of intensive negotiations between all delegations followed whose course, from the documents available, is not clear.[35] After some discussions with Tittoni, Polk forwarded a new American proposal to Wilson, for approval, and on August 25 a scheme emanating from Washington was published. It seems to have suggested to give Fiume to Italy and Susak to Yugoslavia, while the League of Nations would be in charge of the port and inland communications. In Istria the Wilson line was to be maintained, thereby separating Fiume from the rest of Italy.[36] On August 19 Wickham Steed, the old friend of the Yugoslavs, submitted to the British Foreign Office a document which he stated to be "the last word of the Jugo-Slav Government in the matter of boundaries between the new State and Italy . . . ."[37] This Yugoslav proposal based the frontiers between both countries on the Wilson line; the municipality of Fiume was to be an autonomous state under the protection of the League of Nations; Zara would become a Free City with extensive local autonomy under Yugoslav sovereignty. Italy would obtain Valona and extensive privileges on the railways linking Trieste with the north through Yugoslav territory. Eastern Istria, the whole Dalmatian coast,

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[34] Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, p.244.

[35] Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series, IV, p.53, n.1.

[36] Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, IV, p.310.

[37] Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series, IV, p.50.

and the Adriatic islands, which all would go to Yugoslavia, were to be neutralized at Italy's request. The Yugoslav proposal also provided for extensive rights for the 23,000 Italians outside of Zara to be left in Yugoslavia, and for the 420,000 Yugoslavs to be left in Italy. This proposal seems to have been ignored by the Great Powers.

On August 29 Tittoni submitted new proposals to Lloyd George and Clemenceau for approval prior to communication to Polk who was to transmit them to Wilson. The Italian government was now willing to accept the Wilson line except for the inclusion of Albona in Istria. With respect to Fiume, two alternative solutions were put forward: either the establishment of an independent buffer state, stretching northward to the railway junction of St. Peter and including the island of Cherso, with "special status" for the town itself, or the town was to go to Italy while all the other territory which would otherwise be included in the buffer state would go to Yugoslavia but be neutralized. All of Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands were to go to Yugoslavia; Italy was only to receive the town of Zara and the island of Ugliano lying opposite, and the islands of Lussin, Unie, Lissa, and Lagosta. In Albania, Italy desired to annex Valona and obtain a protectorate over the rest of the country. With regard to the Assling Triangle, Italy abandoned all claims beyond the Treaty of London line. These proposals represented the greatest Italian concessions so far. Eyre Crowe felt that they "marked a great stage on the part of the Italian Government towards a moderate and reasonable point of view."[38] On August 30 Tittoni discussed the plan with Clemenceau and Balfour who appear to have approved of it, because Clemenceau immediately forwarded it to Polk who telegraphed it to Wilson on the following day. Wilson replied on September 2, rejecting either proposal on Fiume, insisting that Zara

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[38] Ibid., p.118.

should be independent, and refusing to agree to Italy's possession of Lagosta and Ugliano. Meanwhile, on August 31, Tittoni had had a conversation with Lloyd George who was then vacationing in Brittany and asked him to urge Wilson to accept the latest Italian proposals. Lloyd George was ready to do so provided two changes were made: he felt that Italy should be content with holding Zara and Ugliano as mandates from the League of Nations, and he also preferred the first alternative respecting Fiume, the buffer state. Concerning the suggested "special status," both statesmen agreed that it meant "that the inhabitants of Fiume should have full control of their purely municipal affairs, such as education, tramways and city Government. The state would have full powers of developing the port in any way which was necessary."[39] With regard to colonies, Tittoni declared himself perfectly satisfied with earlier British offers but not with those of the French.

On September 5, after some consultations, Lloyd George and Clemenceau agreed to forward Tittoni's proposals through Polk to Wilson. There was one change: of the two alternatives concerning Fiume only the "buffer state" idea was proposed, and the port was excluded from the "special status" of the city. However, as it was felt that Wilson would almost certainly reject this proposal, Kerr, Lloyd George's Private Secretary and later Earl of Lothian, contacted Johnson who suggested various modifications which Lloyd George accepted, but slightly altered after consulting Balfour. These Lloyd George-Balfour modifications suggested that the corpus separatum of Fiume, town and district,[40] was to become a sovereign city state, and the port "to be handed over with full facilities for its

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[39] Ibid., p.56.

[40] See Map IIIc.

development to the League of Nations, who may make any arrangements they think best for turning it to the best account for the districts it can serve, as well as for the town of Fiume itself."[41] The area within the Wilson line was to be permanently demilitarized, and the Italian character of Zara maintained by establishing it as a free and autonomous city guaranteed by the League of Nations. Italy was to receive the islands of Lussin, Unie, Lissa, Lagosta, Ugliano, and Pelagosa. These modified proposals were communicated to Tardieu who, together with Kerr, submitted them to Tittoni on September 8. Tittoni said that he was unable to accept the proposal of an independent Fiume corpus separatum instead of a Free State. He stated "that he felt that in the case of Fiume the President should have before him the two alternatives proposed by the Italian Government, not merely the one proposed."[42] Tardieu and Kerr thereupon reverted to Tittoni's original proposals with certain modifications but Polk, when these were shown to him in the morning of September 9, was certain that Wilson would reject the proposal in its present form. He said that, apart from Wilson's hostility towards an Italian mandate over Albania, there were three more objections: concerning Fiume, he believed a settlement to be possible provided that town and district (the corpus separatum) were to be set up as an independent Free State under the League of Nations outside Italian sovereignty; concerning Zara, he felt that Wilson would accept a solution which, while attributing the city to Yugoslavia, would preserve its Italian character through a guarantee by the League of Nations; and concerning the Adriatic islands, he thought that Italy should only ask for Unie, Lissa, Lussin, and Pelagosa. "He further made it clear that

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[41] Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series, IV, pp. 122-23.

[42] Ibid., p.119.

provided these concessions were made the whole weight of the American Delegation would be thrown in the scale to urge President Wilson to accept the settlement . . . ."[43] During the afternoon of the same day Balfour and Tardieu acquainted Tittoni with Polk's views. Tittoni wanted to know whether Wilson would accept Polk's suggestions. "He could not make any further advances if this was simply to be accepted as a further basis on which to start negotiations."[44] All three men then went to Polk and asked him to forward the Italian proposals with his three amendments to Wilson. Polk promised to do so.

However, on September 10 Lloyd George and Clemenceau submitted a new plan to Wilson which was also based on the discussions of the previous two days. The proposal was prefaced by a statement that Tittoni, in contrast to Orlando and Sonnino, has been most conciliatory and loyal towards the Allies. He has identified himself with the general principles of the Conference and agreed to reduce his demands considerably. It was now urgent to reach a settlement "in the triple interest of local calm in these regions, of the general peace of Europe, and of the necessary solidarity of the countries founding the League of Nations."[45] According to the plan, Italy accepted the Wilson line as eastern frontier with one modification which would give her Albona, an essentially Italian town. Two alternative solutions were suggested for Fiume: either the corpus separatum, would come under Italian sovereignty while Yugoslavia would receive the territory earmarked for the Free State, excluding Albona but including Cherso, permanently demilitarized, and the League of Nations put in charge of the port of Fiume including all its facilities and the

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[43] Ibid., p.60.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid., p.123.

railway termini; or Fiume would become an independent state, comprising all territory up to the Wilson line, excepting Albona but including Cherso, under the sovereignty of the League of Nations, which would establish a government and control port and railroads in the interests of the town and the countries for which it was the outlet; all facilities for developing port and railway would be provided. Also, special provisions would be made to protect the Italian character of the corpus separatum. All of Dalmatia, except Zara and Ugliano, was to go to Yugoslavia. Zara would become a free and autonomous city "under the guarantee of the League of Nations, which shall recognize and encourage its intimate connection with the Italian State and Italian culture."[46] The islands of Lussin, Unie, Lissa, and Pelagosa were to go to Italy. Albania would become an Italian mandate and Valona be incorporated into Italy. Finally, Italy proposed the general neutralization of all the coast and the islands from the south point of Istria as far and including Cattaro. This proposal obviously superseded the inquiries made by Polk at the behest of Kerr, Tardieu, and Tittoni one day earlier. While it was under study by Wilson, a new development occurred at Fiume.

### 4. D'Annunzio's Occupation of Fiume

The Inter-Allied Commission of Enquiry into the incidents at Fiume presented its report to the Council of Heads of Delegations on August 25. The report examined the events which had led to the riots and came to the conclusion that the sources of trouble were the uncertainty concerning the ultimate attribution of the city, the co-existence of two military commands—the mainly Italian Allied troops and the mainly French troops of the Balkan Army—in the town, and the attitude adopted by the local

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[46] Ibid., p.124.

Italian authorities, both military and Fiuman. With regard to the riots, the report blamed both the Italian troops and the Fiuman mobs, although it also mentioned some provocation by the French. The responsibility for the French-Italian tension was ascribed to several facts:

> the recognition of Jugoslavia by the Allies, except Italy; the Peace of Versailles, in which the settlement of all the questions relative to Italy was postponed to an indefinite date; the belief of the Italian nation in a Slavophile and Hellenophile policy on the part of France . . . .

The report then blamed the Italian National Council of Fiume, the de facto authority in the town, because it had "overstepped its rights in proclaiming the annexation to the Kingdom of Italy, as if there did not exist at Paris any Peace Conference to decide these great questions"; it had taken "irritating" measures against the Croats and tolerated the existence of organizations of young men who openly worked for Italy's annexation of Fiume, if necessary by violent means. The Italian military authorities, because they had openly supported the Italian National Council, and the French command and officers, because they had openly displayed their Yugoslav sympathies, also came in for severe criticism. Finally, the report stated that the best way of preventing the recurrence of trouble would be "to decide as soon as possible the fate of Fiume, to put an end to that period of waiting which encourages the subversive elements to act in order to obtain the solution they desire." In the meantime, the Commission recommended several far-reaching measures. First of all, the Italian National Council was to be supplanted by a government elected under the impartial supervision of an Inter-Allied Military Commission. This Commission would also possess supervisory power over the administrative and political affairs of the corpus separatum and of Susak. The personnel of the Italian command in Fiume and the troops which had been involved in the recent disturbances ought to be replaced. The strength of the Italian

troops in Fiume should be reduced to one battalion, and no other Power was to have more than that number stationed in the town either. The French troops in Fiume were to be relieved, too, and it was considered desirable to disband their base altogether in view of the hostile feeling of the population. Until local military police was formed, British or American police should maintain public order, and the Volunteer Force was to be suppressed immediately. The Commission also recommended the institution of a judicial inquiry against the Italian officers involved in the incidents. "Reparations of a moral and material nature due to France for the death of her soldiers and the damage caused to the depots of the base should be regulated according to diplomatic usages, by a direct agreement between the Governments concerned." Another recommendation was that the good comradeship between the French and Italian armies should be restored as quickly as possible. The Allies were urged to supply Italy "with all she needs to resume her industry and insure her prosperity. This would help a great deal to revive good feelings." Finally, the Serbs were solicited to remove their ban on tne export of food to Fiume and the Italian-occupied parts of Dalmatia.[47]

After a brief conversation, the Council agreed to accept the conclusions of the report, and both Clemenceau and Tittoni agreed to implement the recommendations. On the following day, August 26, the discussion continued. Polk inquired whether the report had been adopted in principle or in detail on the previous day. He said that he had been under the impression that only the principles had been accepted, but not the details such as the dispatch of American troops to Fiume. He was unable to do that without consulting his Military Advisers, and would therefore accept the

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[47]Council of Four meeting August 25. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Fiume incidents. U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VII, pp.845-55.

report only in principle. Balfour agreed with him, and referring to the recommendation of sending supplies to Italy, said that the sentiments expressed were admirable but "misplaced on a report of this kind."[48] Later on in the debate he suggested that the previous day's resolution should be amended in such a way as to make clear that the report was accepted "in principle" and that the French and Italian governments would implement the recommendations "as far as they were specially concerned."[49] These amendments were accepted. On August 29 Clemenceau told the Council that he had fulfilled the French part of the resolution and changed the French garrison at Fiume; however, the base could not be suppressed at the moment. Nevertheless, unpleasant incidents had again broken out. He thought that General Grazioli should be recalled immediately, and "Italy should take as prompt action as he had taken himself, otherwise further bloodshed would occur, as threatening posters were appearing in Fiume, directed against both the French and the British."[50] Tittoni, in reply, said that he would fulfill everything the Italian government had undertaken. During the next few days the Italian government actually implemented Tittoni's promise: Grazioli was replaced by General Pittaluga, and most of the Italian troops were withdrawn from Fiume across the armistice line into Istria.

The action of the Peace Conference concerning the events at Fiume was bound to have repercussions in Italy, if the unsettled state of the country and the strength of the national sentiment about Fiume are taken into account. Already on September 1, Kennard, First Secretary of the

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[48] Ibid., p.929.

[49] Ibid., p.930.

[50] Ibid., VIII, p.8.

British Embassy in Rome, in a letter to the British Embassy at Paris expressed apprehension over possible trouble in Fiume and advised that the Italian representatives at the Peace Conference should be warned. His prediction, based on information received from the British Military Mission at Fiume, proved to be correct. Gabriele d'Annunzio[51] published several inflammatory articles in Italian newspapers, and in collusion with extremists in Fiume and officers of the troops recently withdrawn from that town, collected a force of volunteers in Venice. On September 12, advancing from Istria, he occupied Fiume with his mixed force of volunteers, soldiers and sailors who had deserted their units, and supporters from within the town. General Pittaluga, forsaken by the greater part of his troops, offered no resistance and left Fiume with his remaining force, followed by British and French troops. Nitti, on September 13, denounced D'Annunzio's action in scathing terms, but before long it became clear that it had powerful support within the armed forces and of a large segment of public opinion.[52] Unable to rely on the loyalty of its armed forces, the Italian government restricted itself to a blockade of Fiume by land and sea which remained totally ineffective. Thus Nitti in Rome and Tittoni in Paris found themselves in a most embarrassing situation. Britain, France, and the United States adopted the attitude that d'Annunzio's action was an internal Italian affair in which they did not wish to get involved. They did, however, do their utmost to restrain the Yugoslav government when d'Annunzio began to make provocative gestures along the Dalmatian coast. D'Annunzio then set up a government at Fiume, called the "Regency of Carnaro," with himself as Regent.

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[51] Above, p.109.

[52] These were the conclusions drawn in the reports of the British diplomatic service in Italy. Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series, IV, passim, pp.66-95.

5. The Consequences of d'Annunzio's Action

D'Annunzio's occupation of Fiume did not interrupt the negotiations in Paris concerning the Adriatic. During the morning session on September 15, while Wilson's reply to the recent proposals of Lloyd George and Clemenceau was still awaited, the Council of Heads of Delegations, taking advantage of Lloyd George's presence in Paris, dealt once more with the problem of Fiume. Clemenceau, opening the discussion, revealed that he had reached an agreement with Tittoni on the following lines: the town of Fiume was to be handed over to the Italians, port and railway given to the League of Nations, and the Hinterland left to the Yugoslavs. He felt that he and Lloyd George should send a proposal along these lines to Wilson. Polk did not favour the idea, pointing out the fact that the last scheme had been sent only in the previous week to Wilson, and that, as yet, no reply had been received. Tittoni said that there were two alternatives: either Fiume should be a Free Town or part of a Free City, or the town would go to Italy, port and railway to the League of Nations, and the Hinterland to Yugoslavia. He emphasized that the Italian government was anxious to reach a settlement and would remain loyal to its allies, but stated—with an implied reference to Italy's reaction to d'Annunzio's action—that it "did not wish a wound to be inflicted on the Italian people. This was for Italy a moral reason of the first order in favour of the new plan."[53] It is obvious that this new proposal was the result of the pressure exerted by d'Annunzio' and Italian public opinion upon the Italian government. Polk said that the proposal sent to Wilson could not now be changed. He thought that the new proposal had been made before, but rejected by the United States and Britain.

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[53]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VII, p.215.

Lloyd George replied that the proposal had never been made in precisely the present form. The Italians, he said, had always wanted Fiume with the port and certain islands. He had had a private conversation with Pasic and thought he might find the new proposal more acceptable. "He himself would agree to anything which was acceptable both to Wilson and the Italians. The question was not one which ought to split the nations in two. It was really too trivial."[54] He felt that Fiume had become a symbol to the Italians, and recent developments at the town had increased the difficulties of reaching a settlement. Tittoni answered that the revolution of Fiume would have to be suppressed first. Lloyd George then suggested that Polk should telegraph the new proposal to Wilson. Polk said that he must know the exact terms of the plan. Clemenceau repeated that the town of Fiume would become Italian, port and railway handed to the League of Nations, and Yugoslavia would obtain the Hinterland. Tittoni added that the only islands to be given to Italy would be Lussin, Lissa, and Pelagosa. When Polk rejoined that Italy's occupation of Lussin and the mainland would give her a stranglehold, Tittoni said that the region would be neutralized. After some more discussion, it was agreed that Tittoni should put the project into writing.

When the meeting resumed in the afternoon, Tittoni gave his colleagues copies of the memorandum he had promised in the morning. Under the new proposal the corpus separatum of Fiume would become part of Italy, and Yugoslavia would receive the rest of the territory fromerly set aside for the Free State, permanently demilitarized, including Cherso and excluding Albona. The port and railway of Fiume with all facilities for their development were to be given to the League of Nations which would

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[54] Ibid.

make appropriate arrangements "both for the country of which this port is the outlet and for the city of Fiume itself."[55] All of Dalmatia was to become part of Yugoslavia, except Zara, which would be a Free City, guaranteed by the League of Nations, and represented diplomatically by Italy. The only islands to go to Italy were Lussin, Unie, Lissa, and Pelagosa. Albania was to be independent with Italy as mandatory Power; Valona and its Hinterland were to become part of Italy. Italy relinquished all demands in the Assling region but demanded the neutralization of the whole coast and all islands from the southern point of Istria up to and including Cattaro. Tittoni, explaining these proposals, said that Wilson favoured a plebiscite in the territory of the Free State but he himself was unwilling to agree to it. He favoured the present proposal over the one recently submitted (by Lloyd George and Clemenceau). Lloyd George pointed out that there were two points in Tittoni's new plan which would meet with objections from Wilson: Italian sovereignty over Fiume and Italian diplomatic representation for Zara. He said that, while he did not object to Italian sovereignty over Fiume, he felt that it would be better to say that Zara should choose its diplomatic representation. Tittoni replied that he did not object. Polk again pointed out that Wilson had not yet given his definite approval to the last scheme sent to him. He stated that Wilson had sent him a telegram concerning Fiume from which it appeared that Wilson was willing to accept the first of the two solutions which had been presented to him by the Conference.[56] He (Polk) was afraid that Wilson would be surprised to be presented with a new proposal. Tittoni replied that this was not the question of a new proposal,

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[55] Ibid., p.228.

[56] Above, pp.279-80. This is obviously an error, as Wilson was determined not to allow Fiume to be part of Italy. Polk must have referred to the second alternative.

but that the Conference would merely state that they preferred one of the two solutions presented to Wilson. Polk then went over the diplomatic events during the last two weeks and declared that he had urged the President to accept one of the variations of the Lloyd George-Clemenceau plan as a basis of settlement. He asked to be permitted to examine the new plan closely. Lloyd George said that he, too, felt it would not be fair to submit a new proposal to Wilson at the present stage. Tittoni stated that he would accept either of the two plans, although the Italian people would probably prefer the second, as long as no changes were made in these proposals. After a debate on the future relationship between Yugoslavia and Albania, the Council decided to wait till the following day for Wilson's reply to the Lloyd George-Clemenceau proposal of September 10. When Wilson's reply still had not arrived on September 16, Polk, in deference to the wishes of his colleagues, forwarded the latest proposal to the President, supported by a letter from Clemenceau.

Wilson's reply was sent to Polk on September 22. He "expressed his amazement and deep distress"[57] over the fact that Lloyd George and Clemenceau should now discuss the possibility of Fiume becoming part of Italy. He would not consent to it under any circumstances. He was disappointed that Tittoni had rejected his last proposals[58] which were only slightly different from those Tittoni himself had made. He was now willing to accept the idea of a Free State of Fiume, even without a future plebiscite, if this would help towards finding a solution, as long as the corpus separatum would have only the same measure of autonomy as it had possessed under Habsburg rule. This meant that Wilson wanted to

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[57]Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series, IV, p.125.

[58]Presumably the proposals published August 25; above p.275.

make sure that the Italian majority of the town could never sever its connection with the overall Slav majority of the Hinterland. The President's reply concluded that he desired "to serve Italy in any way consistent with the principles which had been adopted. He pointed out the uselessness of continuing these attempts at a middle course . . . ."[59] Although Polk did not notify the Allies of Wilson's reply for another ten days, its contents were published fairly accurately by the Italian press on September 26. It is of interest to note that Count Sforza, Italian Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs and later renowned statesman, denied that the Italian Government had received any official reply.

Meanwhile the position of Nitti's government had become even more precarious. On September 24, Kennard, who already has been noticed as an attentive observer, reported to the Foreign Office in London that Italian opinion had got out of control. "The spark . . . lit by d'Annunzio's adventure and favoured by Signor Nitti's severe condemnation and apparent subservience to the Allies, has burst into a flame which has now swept the whole country. Public opinion is . . . now for the annexation of Fiume, and it is only to be hoped that it may stop there."[60] A telegram sounded even more alarming:

> It is evident . . . that the movement in favour of annexation of Fiume is rapidly developing into one which aspires to occupy Dalmatia. It is now clear that Government is powerless and that general feeling in the country is so intense that it will be unable to find any solution satisfactory at once to Allies and Italian people.[61]

It was in this excited atmosphere that Italian Parliament assembled on September 27. Tittoni defended his policy in a long speech. He said

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[59] Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series, IV, p.125.

[60] Ibid., p.74.

[61] Ibid., p.75.

that the rule of unanimity passed by the Council of Ten on January 17, 1919, gave Wilson, who did not recognize the secret treaties made among the Allies, the power of veto. He emphasized that "Europe could not live without America, and Italy least of all." Britain and France had recognized the Italian character of Fiume and were, since the arrival of the new Italian delegation at Paris, much friendlier towards Italy, but they did not wish to come into conflict with the United States. Referring to Wilson's reply of September 22, Tittoni felt that it "had improved the situation somewhat," although the President still opposed the annexation of Fiume by Italy. He then said that he believed that Italy could not annex the town without the assent of the Conference, because such a step would endanger what had already been gained elsewhere: Zara, three islands, guarantees of the interests of the Italian minorities in Dalmatia, neutralization of the Yugoslav coasts and of the Corfu channel, an Albanian mandate, and concessions in Africa and Asia Minor. He pointed out that other Allied countries, such as France and Rumania, had had to modify their aims at the Peace Conference, and concluded that Italy, having broken with her former friends of the Triple Alliance, was committed to her new friends for many years to come. His speech was "generally well received."[62] On the following day, September 28, a very stormy session developed. Nitti made a speech in which he denied the accusation that he had renounced Italy's claim to Fiume. He challenged the opposition to suggest a better course. "If any present had the courage to demand the immediate annexation of Fiume, let him at once take over from him the responsibilities which such a step involved."[63] He then asked

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[62] Ibid., Report by British Ambassador to Italy to Foreign Office, pp.82-83.

[63] Ibid., pp.85-86.

for a vote of confidence. In the ensuing division many government supporters voted against him, and he only received a very narrow majority. On September 29 he announced the dissolution of Parliament and a general election for mid-November.

The Council of Heads of Delegations briefly discussed the Italian situation on September 30. Throughout the proceedings, Scialoja who deputized for Tittoni "had nothing whatever to say beyond that he had considered the situation very critical." Clemenceau made some scathing remarks about the impotence of the Italian government concerning its own armed forces and called the blockade of Fiume "a transparent sham." After the meeting, Polk approached Eyre Crowe and investigated the possibility of some strong joint American, British, and French action. He said that Wilson was determined not to let Italy annex Fiume. "So strongly did he [Wilson] feel on the subject that he was even considering the possibility of sending American troops back to Europe." Polk then expressed the hope that Britain would take similar action.[64] On October 3 he officially notified the Allies of Wilson's reply of September 22. A few days later Tittoni in Rome presented the Allies with another plan which agreed that Fiume was to be a Free State, but demanded that Italy's frontier should be pushed eastwards to the limits of the corpus separatum. This signified that Tittoni had felt unable to agree to Wilson's conditions as stated in his reply of September 22. The deadlock continued.

Thus by the beginning of October 1919 several new aspects of the Adriatic problem had revealed themselves. Fiume was the key to the solution of the whole question. Yugoslavia had written off most of the

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[64]Neither the American nor the British official publications of the minutes of the meeting contain any reference to this discussion. However, there exists a report of Eyre Crowe to the British Foreign Office dealing with it; Ibid., pp.90-92.

Littoral except northeastern Istria, while Italy had resigned herself to the abandonment of most of her claims in Dalmatia except Zara and a few islands. There remained Fiume whose possession was not vital to the economy of Italy, but whose control, if not annexation, had become, in the eyes of Italian public opinion and armed forces, the symbol of the successful realization of the nation's national ambitions. Orlando's and Sonnino's handling of the situation had made President Wilson a stubborn opponent of Italy's Adriatic claims and, for a while, also alienated Britain and France. However, before judging Orlando and Sonnino too severely, the unsettled condition of Italy must be kept in mind, which placed any Italian government in the position of "having a tiger by the tail." As a result, the new administration of Nitti and Tittoni found itself confronted by problems which would have been insoluble to any democratic government. Tittoni seems to have done his best to improve relations with Italy's allies and to jettison untenable claims. That he was successful in this respect is shown by his arrangement with Greece and by his steadily improving relations with the representatives of Britain and France at the Peace Conference. However, Nitti's and Tittoni's great moderation of tone towards the Allies led to the accusation of subservience to them by the extreme nationalists and finally climaxed in the successful attempt of d'Annunzio to capture Fiume. As has been seen, this action was extremely popular with a large part of the Italian nation, especially the armed forces, and revealed to the rest of the world the weak position of the Italian government. At the same time--and seen in the retrospect this is of utmost importance--the powerful impression created by d'Annunzio's success prevented the Italian government from yielding on this issue. Therefore, even if d'Annunzio stands condemned before history as an irresponsible

adventurer, nevertheless "it is a fact that he created the necessary premises for the future union of Fiume with Italy."[65] A brief remark should also be made about Yugoslavia's attitude: as the weaker of the two contestants the Yugoslavs were content to let Wilson carry on their struggle.

C. CARINTHIA

Although the decisions of the Council of Four of June 21[66] reached Carinthia three days later, the Yugoslavs were extremely reluctant to evacuate Klagenfurt and to withdraw into zone A. This attitude finally led to a sharp reaction at the Peace Conference: at the meeting of the Council of Heads of Delegations on July 28, when certain Yugoslav territorial claims concerning Rumania were supposed to be considered, Balfour stated that "before pursuing this discussion, he wished to remark that he preferred not to take up the Jugo-Slav claim, during such time as the Serbians refused to respect the decisions taken by the Council with regard to Klagenfurt."[67] Balfour's suggestion was adopted and the Yugoslav delegation informed accordingly. This communication had the desired effect, and on July 31 the Yugoslav troops left Klagenfurt and withdrew into zone A.

The Council's decisions of June 21 were, as events proved, final, and were incorporated into the terms of the Treaty of St. Germain. The line of demarcation between both zones was not based on geographic or economic necessities, as the Austrian delegation pointed out at the Peace Conference. Klagenfurt and Villach were cut off from their regions of supply, while zone A was cut off from its markets. Even the power plant

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[65] Macartney and Cremona, Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy 1914-1937, p.85. These words were written, of course, before the Second World War.

[66] Above, pp.157-58.

[67] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VII, p.360.

and the sources of water supply of Klagenfurt were situated in zone A.[68] A different outcome of the plebiscite in both zones would have had catastrophic consequences for Carinthia. As zone A was 68.6% Slovene[69] and had been put under Yugoslav administration according to the decisions of the Peace Conference, the Austrians felt that a Yugoslav victory in zone A might force zone B to follow its example or face economic ruin. Thus Austria's complaint that the arrangements gave Yugoslav an unfair advantage must be considered as justified.

## D. TESCHEN

### 1. Polish-Czechoslovak Negotiations

Between the months of April and July, 1919, the Peace Conference neglected the Teschen problem, and, in accordance with Lansing's suggestion of April 12, encouraged Poland and Czechoslovakia to find a solution by themselves. Precisely three months later, on July 12, the Council of Heads of Delegations mentioned Teschen for the first time in its deliberations. Clemenceau introduced a proposal by Lansing that the Polish and Czechoslovak governments were to be given ten more days to reach an understanding. Cambon, President of the Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs, said that it had been hoped that Paderewski and Benes would reach an agreement, but they had been unable to do so. Therefore, he thought that the Council should support Lansing's proposal. This was done by the Council, and as a result of this resolution the governments of Poland and Czechoslovakia established a Joint Commission which began its talks at Cracow on July 21. While the Polish government invited the Inter-Allied

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[68]Wutte, Kärntens Freiheitskampf, p.313.

[69]Ibid., p.472.

Teschen Commission to send observers, the Czechoslovak government discouraged the attendance of outsiders at the talks. The negotiations lasted for eight days, thus exceeding the time limit set by the Peace Conference. On July 25 Cambon, after having been approached by the Polish government, asked the Council for another ten days' extension. He advocated that, if both governments were still unable to reach an agreement, the Conference should decide the matter. After some discussion the Council granted the desired extension and also asked the Czechoslovak and Polish Committees to examine the problem to enable the Council to make a decision in case Poland and Czechoslovakia failed to come to an arrangement.[70]

The talks at Cracow revealed once again a great divergence in aims. The Poles suggested a plebiscite for the whole Teschen region, and, should it result in their favour, the Peace Conference was to discuss the economic privileges to be given by Poland to Czechoslovakia. The Czechs rejected the idea of a plebiscite because "historically, all Eastern Silesia was Czech, and, economically, Czecho-Slovakia must have the whole of the Kaschau-Oderberg railway and the whole of the Karwin-Ostrau minefield."[71] Colonel Pakenham Walsh, British representative on the Teschen Commission, considered the Czechoslovak claims "entirely extravagant," but also felt that the holding of a plebiscite would be dangerous "considering the temper of the inhabitants."[72] He correctly predicted a deadlock; and on July 29 the Cracow Conference ended without agreement. This was reported to the Peace Conference by Cambon on August 7.

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[70]From now on the previously mentioned Polish Liaison Committee in Paris is always referred to, both in the official documents of the Peace Conference and in this thesis, as the "Polish Committee" or "Polish Commission." The Inter-Allied Warsaw Commission had been dissolved at the end of April.

[71]Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, First Series, VI, p.93.

[72]Ibid.

He informed the Council that Paderewski had suggested a resumption of negotiations in Paris but Benes, "who felt that he would not be able to yield,"[73] had asked to be heard before the Council. Cambon continued that he thought that the Council, having gone over the question of Teschen earlier on, would be unwilling to listen to presentations on the subject again; he therefore suggested that Benes and Paderewski should appear before a joint meeting of the Polish and Czechoslovak Committees. "As neither side would yield, it was obviously to the advantage of both to have a solution imposed by the Conference."[74] A report would be made to the Council. Cambon's suggestion was accepted.

2. The Joint Report of the Commissions

As a result of the meeting of the Council of Heads of Delegations of July 12, the Commissions on Polish and on Czechoslovak Affairs had begun to examine the Teschen situation anew. The Commissions held joint meetings on July 23 and 24 and, after having considered the problem, set up a Sub-Commission which consisted of representatives of the United States, Britain, France, and Italy. Its Chairman was General Le Rond. This Sub-Commission met five times between July 26 and August 18, and heard presentations of their respective cases from Benes and Dmowski. On August 19, 20, and 22 both Commissions again met jointly and arrived at a unanimous conclusion which they put into a report.

The report stated that it had taken into consideration the observations of the members of the Teschen Commission who had studied the question on the spot for several months, and it had "agreed upon a line more favourable to the Polish claims than the line formerly proposed at Paris

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[73] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VII, p.612.

[74] Ibid.

by the majority of the members of the two Commissions, and very similar to the line favoured by the minority at the time."[75] By now, continued the report, the Commissions no longer had any doubts concerning the aspirations of the people of the Teschen region: very definite information showed that the local Polish population possessed national sentiments. Moreover, since the Conference had decided to institute a plebiscite in Upper Silesia,[76] Poland's future regarding coal production was doubtful. Therefore, the two Commissions had unanimously agreed that from the ethnographical point of view Poland's claims to the districts of Frystat, Teschen, and Bielitz were fully justified, while from the economic and railway points of view the attribution to Poland of the Karwin coal basin and the Oderberg-Jablunka railway would create serious hardships to the Czechoslovaks who would then have to depend on Poland for coal and coke, and also would be forced to construct railway links. Both Commissions felt that the political aspect did not fall within their sphere. Seeing that the economic considerations favoured the Czechs and the ethnographic arguments the Poles, the Commissions had decided to favour the ethnic factor because they felt that it would be impossible "to find any means of inducing the Polish population of the Teschen district . . . to live peacably under Czecho-Slovak domination." At the same time, they considered it possible to lessen the economic disadvantages arising for Czechoslovakia from their decision by making certain provisions which had yet to be determined. Thus the line proposed by both Commissions followed, on the whole, the ethnic line, but left to Czechoslovakia any districts of uncertain ethnic character and a larger number of Poles in the Jablunka

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[75]The report referred to was forwarded to the Supreme Council on April 14; above, pp.186-87.

[76]This decision had been taken in early June.

region "owing to the necessity for ensuring to Czecho-Slovakia the free disposal of the Jablunkau pass, which is indispensable to them for ensuring railway communications between the Mährisch-Ostrau mining districts and Czechoslovakia." Moreover, Czechoslovakia got the benefit of the doubt in the mining districts whose ethnographical position was not perfectly clear. The line thus proposed by the report gave, according to the Austrian census of 1910, 185,625 people to Czechoslovakia, of whom 105,161 were Czechs and 62,080 Poles, while Poland received 249,196 people of whom 10,443 were Czechs and 171,770 were Poles. According to the Austrian production statistics of 1913, the portion of the coal basin assigned to Czechoslovakia produced 4,595,000 tons of coal, and 1,198,000 tons of coke, and the portion assigned to Poland 3,000,000 tons of coal and 520,000 tons of coke.[77]

Although the report was not published for a while, the Czechoslovaks seem to have learned its contents quickly.[78] Already on August 22 Benes sent a letter to the Peace Conference in which he stated that, while he did not know the exact contents of the report, he knew that the Commission's findings were unfavourable to Czechoslovakia. He therefore asked for another opportunity to persuade the Supreme Council of the justice of his country's claims. He felt that the issue was "absolutely vital" to Czechoslovakia's future, and if her claims were not considered "the consequences would be far reaching."[79] On September 30, when the Czechoslovak press published the Committees' report, Gossling, British Chargé at Prague, reported that Czech feeling was running high. On September 1

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[77]Report by Commission on Polish Affairs and the Commission of Czechoslovak Affairs on Teschen. U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VIII, pp.87-92. Also, see Map Vc.

[78]See above p.147 for "leakages." As in the case of their Yugoslav allies, it may be assumed that the French also provided the Czechoslovaks with valuable inside information.

[79]U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VIII, p.86.

Pakenham Walsh reported from Teschen the existence of unrest among the local Czech element, directed against an allegedly unfavourable decision by the Peace Conference.

### 3. The Polish and Czechoslovak Presentations Before the Council

The Teschen situation came under discussion at the meeting of the Council of Heads of Delegations on September 3. Clemenceau referring to a letter of Benes, felt that his request should be granted, whereupon Baldwin rejoined that the Poles, too, would have to be heard. Cambon said that a solution ought to be found quickly. Polk suggested that the experts should be heard at once to prepare the Council for the hearing of the Czechoslovak and Polish delegates. General Le Rond then explained to the Council the joint report of the Commissions on Polish and Czechoslovak Affairs. He emphasized that the report had deliberately ignored the political aspect of the problem. Should the recommended line be accepted, the Council would have to arrange economic and railway agreements between both countries in order to make the frontier acceptable to the Czechoslovaks. These agreements might be prepared by the two Commissions. Tittoni advocated that the proposed line be accepted "and then the means of rendering it acceptable to the parties should be studied,"[80] whereupon Clemenceau replied that "he was unable to accept a line until he knew what was required to render it acceptable."[81] Polk felt that the line formerly proposed[82] would not have needed any additional agreements, although there had been the disadvantage of surrendering a Polish population to the

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[80] Ibid., p.81.

[81] Ibid.

[82] Polk presumably referred to the majority report of both Commissions of early April; above, pp.184-86.

Czechoslovaks. He said that the line which was now recommended broke up the economic unity of the area for ethnic reasons and therefore had to be supplemented by economic agreements. Clemenceau suggested that the Council should hear Benes and a Polish representative before making a decision. Tittoni said that any line suiting one side would for that very reason be unsuitable to the other. "The political effect in either case might endanger the existing Governments."[83] Nevertheless, he believed that economic and ethnic reasons should have preference. The Council then agreed to hear Benes and Dmowski on the following day.

On September 4, in the presence of Paderewski and Dmowski, Benes presented his case to the Council. He divided the problem into four aspects: ethnographic, historical, economic, and political. Beginning with the ethnographic aspect, Benes doubted the existence of a Polish majority in the Teschen area because he did not trust the Austrian statistics. He said that the Austrians had always favoured the German and Polish elements against the Czechs. He claimed that the population of Teschen "did not speak the proper Polish language but a dialectic mixture of Czecho-Slovak and Polish. This showed that the population of Teschen, from an ethnographical point of view, was in a transitional state." Moreover, the population tended to adopt Czech customs. His government felt that there were not more than 45% Poles in the Teschen area. Dealing next with the historical considerations, Benes stated that the Teschen area was part of Silesia which had belonged to the ancient Kingdom of Bohemia. Although the original Bohemian population had almost been wiped out in the sixteenth century, there had been a national revival later on, based upon historical tradition. The population had never

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[83] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VIII, p.81.

abandoned the view that the old Kingdom was an indivisible unit; this sentiment was very deep. Coming to the economic considerations, Benes stressed the great importance of the coal question to Czechoslovakia. "Statistics showed that the total capacity of the Polish coalpits amounted to 86 billion tons; the pits in Czecho-Slovakia, including Teschen, only had a capacity of 9 billion tons." As Czechoslovakia was essentially an industrial country, she was dependent on a secure supply of coal. In the past, most of the Teschen coal had gone to the regions which now formed Czechoslovakia. Concerning the railway problem, Benes, with the help of a map, explained the importance of possessing a railway leading from the Teschen region to Czechoslovakia. He maintained that it was impossible for his country to build a new railway line out of its own resources. This led him to the political considerations of the case. If an unfavourable decision to Czechoslovakia resulted, there would be great internal strain in the country. Czechoslovakia would become entirely dependent on Poland's good will. "He would like the Polish representatives to understand that Czecho-Slovakia was not demanding rights over Polish populations, but merely putting forward a claim for things necessary for her very life." Czechoslovakia was surrounded by unstable countries, and if she wanted to remain free of the existing political turmoil of Central Europe and become a rallying point of Western European ideas, she had to have the necessary means. He felt that Poland was, of necessity, involved in the affairs of Eastern Europe, especially of Russia. Therefore she would need the help of Czechoslovakia but this help could not be given if the latter country was to be deprived of Teschen, because public opinion would turn against Poland. Benes emphasized that he wished to counteract that unfortunate sentiment, and he therefore proposed a compromise which, he hoped,would satisfy both countries: instead of having the Vistula as

frontier, as Czechoslovakia had originally demanded, he had persuaded his countrymen to agree to the surrender of the whole Bielitz district to Poland. He had to reject the line now proposed by the Joint Polish and Czechoslovak Committees because it divided the mining district. This would be harmful to production, and would also force Czechoslovakia to construct a highly complicated railway line. "The German population were all in favour of maintaining the economic unity of the Teschen area. He did not wish to lay emphasis on this argument, which, none the less, could not be completely neglected." Polish workmen, too, did not want the Teschen Basin to be divided. The population was now profoundly disturbed. He felt that Teschen would always be only of secondary importance to Poland. The Poles, continued Benes, were now complaining that their ethnographic claims were challenged by an economic argument. However, they themselves had used economic arguments when it suited them. He asked the Conference to consider his arguments carefully, to weigh the possibility of grave consequences in case of a decision unfavourable to Czechoslovakia and "to take into account the immense sacrifices which Czecho-Slovakia had made in supporting the Entente throughout the war."[84] The Council then decided to hear the Polish representatives on the following day.

On September 5 Dmowski presented the Polish point of view to the Council. He emphasized the common interests of Poland andCzechoslovakia, and stressed that he had always been a warm friend of the Czechoslovak cause. He felt that the Poles of Teschen had the right to belong to Poland, but denied that the Polish claims were merely based on ethnographic reasons. "He was prepared to leave ethnography to savants and philologists.

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[84] Ibid., Presentation of the Teschen question by Benes before the Council of Heads of Delegations, September 4, pp.102-06.

Statesmen established their claim on the wishes of peoples. The Polish claim was based on the national sentiments of the population in question." The population of Teschen, continued Dmowski, was literate, and Polish in sentiment and culture. He could prove this assertion because, when the Polish delegation had suggested the holding of a plebiscite, the Czechoslovaks had rejected the idea. On November 5, 1918, the Teschen population had made its own settlement of the future of the country, but the political leaders had created difficulties and the Czech people had been led to believe that they would be given the whole of the Teschen district. Organized pressure had been brought to bear upon the region. Dmowski denied that Austrian statistics had been falsified in favour of the Poles. He claimed that the Austrian government "had been more anti-Polish in Teschen than anti-Czech, because their strongest adversaries in the area were Poles." As proof he quoted Austrian census figures which showed that the proportion of the Poles in the Teschen region had decreased from 60% to 54% between 1900 and 1910, while the Czechs had risen from 23% to 27%. In the economic sphere, Dmowski admitted that Czechoslovakia's argument was strong. However, "it could not be laid down that need makes ownership." He believed that the balance should be in favour of the national feelings of the population. This principle had deprived Poland of Danzig, her "lungs", which was far more important to her than was Teschen to Czechoslovakia. "It would not be possible to deprive the Poles of the advantage of a rule which had been made to operate against them in favour of defeated Germany." Poland needed the coal of the Karwin Basin because it was convertible into coke, and there was no other coal of that type in Poland. Poland needed it more than Czechoslovakia which possessed resources of coke-producing coal. Should Poland get Upper Silesia, she would gladly supply

Czechoslovakia with coal. Such an arrangement would be more satisfactory than an unfair settlement in Teschen. If the region was to be divided along ethnic lines, Poland would obtain 51% of its ordinary coal and 44% of its coke production. However, Dmowski continued, Poland was ready to yield several mining communities whose population was not "clearly Polish," thereby reducing the Polish share to 29% of ordinary coal and 22% of coke. Thus Poland's claims were not excessive: she, too, needed coke, even if she was less industrialized. A settlement along these lines, supplemented by a convention between both countries, would be a better solution than the perpetration of an injustice "against which Poland would always protest and which would always disturb the peace." Turning to the railway situation, Dmowski denied that the Oderberg-Kaschau line was, as Benes had alleged, the principal line of communication between Bohemia and Slovakia. It had never served that purpose, but was the main line between Berlin and Budapest, and carried coal from Upper Silesia to Hungary and the Balkans. He then explained that four other railway lines linked Bohemia with Slovakia: one of these needed a small connecting track of eight kilometres, and another line a track of twelve kilometres. The Hungarians had not constructed them because they had intentionally neglected the development of Slovakia, but these reasons did no longer exist. Dmowski said that he was "somewhat alarmed" about the line suggested by the two Commissions because, in order to attribute to Czechoslovakia the southern part of the Oderberg-Kaschau railway, it also handed over to her "the most Polish of the Polish areas in Teschen--he might almost say the most Polish population in Poland." In this area the population was 100% Polish and Protestant. These Protestant Poles had been most prominent in the Polish national movement. Dmowski concluded with the statement that he asked for "the application of the national principle which had been

applied with considerable severity against Poland in favour of Germany."[85]

Benes then delivered his reply. Referring to the agreement of November 5, 1918, he said that it had been concluded on the lines of already existing administrative districts, but had not been intended to prejudge the final settlement. The Czechoslovaks had not protested until the Poles had ordered mobilization in their part of the territory. Referring to Dmowski's allegations of coercive acts by Czechoslovak officials, Benes said that he could mention countless similar allegations made against the Poles. He emphasized that Czechs and Germans had never cooperated against the Poles: on the contrary, Poles and Germans had always allied against the Czechs. He said that Dmowski himself had admitted that Czechoslovakia would always depend on Upper Silesia, that was to say on Poland, for coal. "This was too true, and Czecho-Slovakia only asked for what was strictly necessary, in order not to be at the mercy of every eventuality." Moreover, Dmowski had omitted to mention Poland's immense resources of coal. Czechoslovakia required 30,000,000 tons a year and produced only 26,000,000 tons, out of which the peace treaty compelled her also to supply Austria. Concerning the railways, Benes said that it was true that there were connections between Bohemia and Slovakia, but the Oderberg-Kaschau line was the only line going across Slovakia from west to east. Slovakia's hills were running from north to south, and no other railway could be constructed across the country. He climaxed his case with the statement that Czechoslovakia felt about Teschen the same way as France felt about Alsace-Lorraine. He emphasized that the culture of the region was Czech. "This was evidenced by the habits of the people, their dress and the architecture of their houses."

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[85] Ibid., Dmowski's presentation of the Polish case, September 5, pp.118-21.

He concluded with the statement that a large part of the Poles of Teschen favoured union with Czechoslovakia, and that a plebiscite would confirm his assertion.[86]

Paderewski then spoke for the Polish cause. He expressed himself warmly in favour of Polish-Czechoslovak friendship. He felt that states were better off without alien minorities.[87] "Was coal so important a matter as to justify the subjugation of an unwilling population and the estrangement of a country nearly four times as big as Czechoslovakia?" Italy, for instance, was without coal, oil, or timber. Paderewski then quoted figures derived from a book written by Masaryk himself, which showed that Bohemia was one of the richest coal-producing countries in the world: in 1913 she had produced 34,000,000 tons of coal for 13,000,000 people, against Poland's less than 13,000,000 tons for 29,000,000 people. As Upper Silesia was by no means secure for Poland, "the Council could judge whether Poland could lightly abandon the coal of Teschen." Should Upper Silesia become Polish, Paderewski promised that Poland would do everything in her power to supply Czechoslovakia with all the coal she required. Concerning the railways, he referred to Dmowski's statement that all Czechoslovakia had to do was to build two railway links of eight and twelve kilometres length respectively. As Poland wished to be a good neighbour, she was willing to bear half of the cost of construction. Paderewski ended his speech with a plea for Polish-Czechoslovak friendship.[88]

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[86] Ibid., Reply of Benes to Dmowski, pp.121-22.

[87] It is difficult to reconcile this statement with Poland's simultaneous activites in Eastern Galicia; below, p.307.

[88] Paderewski's statement on Teschen. U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VIII, pp.122-23.

Benes then, speaking once more, said that Czechoslovakia wanted Teschen not only for its coal. "The country was connected with the rest of Czecho-Slovakia by history, culture and administrative bonds. Mere figures could not determine the question. The future needs of Czecho-Slovakia must be taken into consideration." He maintained that the figures mentioned by Paderewski were not conclusive because production was far more intensive in Bohemia than in Poland. However, Poland's potentialities were far greater than Czechoslovakia's. As the peoples of both countries were "passionate and excitable," he felt that it would be better if they were self-sufficient. The Peace Conference had sacrificed small minorities in other cases in order to create a lasting arrangement; this should also be done in the case of Teschen. He repeated that, if both countries were independent of one another in their vital needs, they would find it easy to agree. He concluded with his usual remark that "whatever the decision of the Conference, he would faithfully observe it . . . ."[89]

### 4. The Arrangement of the Plebiscite

During the following four days the Council of Heads of Delegations did not discuss the Teschen problem but it is obvious that there was considerable activity in connection with it, for when the Council took up the question again in the morning of September 10, Cambon reported that the Polish delegation had provisionally approved of the report of the Joint Polish and Czechoslovak Committees, while Tittoni referred to a visit by Benes who had admitted the ethnographic justice of the new line but had referred to the recent decision of the Conference to put four million Ruthenes in Eastern Galicia under Polish jurisdiction.[90] Benes

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[89] Ibid., Concluding remarks by Benes, pp.123-24.

[90] The decision to permit Polish troops to occupy Eastern Galicia without prejudice to the political status of the region had been taken on June 25. Benes said nothing about the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia.

had suggested that concessions might be made to the Czechoslovaks in the Teschen region to counterbalance these Polish gains. Balfour said that he did not think that there existed a valid analogy between the situation of Teschen and that of Eastern Galicia, while Clemenceau remarked that the Teschen problem "was quite difficult enough, without the Galician problem being added to it." Pichon said that it was obvious that the Czech interest in Teschen centred around the coal, and the Polish interest around the population. He felt that a solution might be found if the Czechs obtained the whole Karwin district and the Poles got the indisputably Polish districts in the remainder of the area. He did not think that the line suggested by both Commissions was sound. Polk said that the line proposed by Pichon would separate workers from their homes by a national frontier, whereupon Clemenceau remarked that such a situation existed in northern France, Belgium, and the Saar Basin without having given rise to serious difficulties. Balfour emphasized that the Poles quite rightly regarded the Karwin district as Polish. He did not think that a political division of the coal field was impracticable, because it was done in other parts of the world, for instance between France, Belgium, and Germany. However, Pichon's proposal, for reasons mentioned by Polk, would create future trouble. He agreed not only with the opinion of the Joint Committees, but also with that of the Teschen Commission which had studied the problem locally. "It was very dangerous to try to improvise another solution, more particularly as the line proposed by the Joint Polish and Czecho-Slovak Committees was really favourable to the Czechs, to whom it granted 60 per cent. of the coal produced, and 40 per cent. to the Poles." Tardieu deprecated the Polish argument that they could not count for sure on the coal fields of Upper Silesia; it was

certain that Poland would eventually get the greater part. Pichon said that the Poles had repeatedly stated that coal was not their concern. Berthelot, the French President of the Commission on New States, said that Benes had stated "that the situation in Bohemia was now so grave that it would be preferable to the Czecho-Slovaks to risk a plebiscite, rather than to consent to a solution which they regarded as so hopelessly unfavourable to them . . . ."

The discussion then revolved around Pichon's proposal which was strongly advocated by Berthelot. Berthelot said that the attitude of Benes had been very conciliatory, and that failure over Teschen would force him (Benes) to resign. This eager partisanship evoked Balfour's retort that the line proposed by both Committees had been adopted unanimously. Berthelot replied that the Committees had ignored the political considerations. The French representatives on these Joint Committees at first had strongly objected to the new line but eventually had given way in order to reach some solution. They had, however, only done so on the understanding that Poland would make concessions to Czechoslovakia concerning coal and railways. This remark brought Clemenceau into the debate. He said that he did not understand how the French members of the Joint Committees could have assented to a proposal of which they disapproved. He strongly supported Pichon's proposals. Balfour replied that there were grave objections to Pichon's solution. Cambon said that the Karwin Basin, which Pichon's proposal attributed to Czechoslovakia, contained 70,000 Poles. Clemenceau remarked that, as there was no agreement in the Council, he suggested that the whole question should be referred back to the Joint Committee "who, as they had already changed their minds several times, would certainly do so again, and present another report." He would never agree to the cutting in two of the coal field. Cambon agreed

but said that it was just as unwise to give the surface to one country and the underground deposits to the other. In the end, the Council decided to refer the Teschen question back to the Joint Polish and Czechoslovak Committees.[91]

Consequently, the Joint Polish and Czechoslovak Committees met in the afternoon of the same day to re-examine the Teschen question. This time there was no agreement, because the American, British, Italian, and Japanese delegations still adhered to the line proposed on August 22, while the French delegation proposed a new line which the majority did not accept. The majority report examined the two objections of the Council to the August 22 report: its partition of the Karwin coal field, and the fact that it was less favourable to Czechoslovakia than the April report. With regard to the first point, the majority report stated that similar situations could be found elsewhere, for instance on the French-Belgian and German-Dutch frontier. Concerning the second point, the April report had not been unanimous and had not been supported by the Teschen Commission; moreover the line suggested in the August 22 report was still more favourable to the Czechs than to the Poles because Poland lost 62,000 of her fellow-nationals to Czechoslovakia while only 10,400 Czechs were given to Poland. The majority report also felt that the Poles of the Teschen region would "no longer accept the solution which might have been imposed in April last."[92] Regarding coal, the majority report emphasized that Czechoslovakia would receive 60% of the coal basin and 69% of its coking coal producing portion. The minority report, composed by the French delegation, felt that the majority report did not take moral considerations

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[91]Council of Heads of Delegations meeting September 10, debate on Teschen. U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, VIII, pp.175-79.

[92]Ibid., p.195.

sufficiently into account and might create lasting discord between Poland and Czechoslovakia. Therefore, the French delegation recommended the cession of some additional territory to Poland in the Jablunka region while leaving the Oderberg-Kaschau railway in the possession of Czechoslovakia. The town of Teschen would be given to Poland, and in the northern part of the region the whole coal basin of Karwin would become part of Czechoslovakia. As they were unable to agree on a frontier line, the two Commissions recommended that the Council, if it did not accept one of the two reports, should settle the problem by a plebiscite. Both Benes and Dmowski had declared that they would agree to such a decision. The plebiscite, if the idea was accepted, should be carried out by communes, and the territory be occupied by Allied troops.

When the Council met again on the following day, September 11, Cambon explained the findings and recommendations of the two Commissions. Balfour expressed doubts as to the wisdom of having a plebiscite because he feared it would deprive Czechoslovakia of all of Teschen's coal, but Scialoja said that it was impossible to refuse a plebiscite if both sides agreed to it. The Council then approved of the holding of a plebiscite in the Teschen area and referred back to both Committees the examination of the arrangements. On September 22 the Joint Committees presented their recommendations of the plebiscite arrangements to the Council which, with minor amendments, accepted them, and signed the necessary documents on September 27. The plebiscite was to take place within three months.

It would be interesting to speculate why Benes suddenly approved of the idea of a plebiscite in a territory inhabited by 54% Poles. Most likely he wished to gain time and prevent an imminent unfavourable judgment by the Council, hoping that either "something would turn up" or that his diplomatic facility might still be able to find a way out.

# CHAPTER VI

## VI. CONCLUSION

### A. THE TERMINATION OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

While the Council of Heads of Delegations was still in existence, several meetings between Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Nitti were held in London during December 11-13, 1919, to deal with the still unsettled problems of the Peace Conference, especially the future of the former Turkish Empire, and the Adriatic question. The future of the Peace Conference itself also came under discussion, and a resolution, passed on December 13, determined that the present session of the Conference should be terminated at the latest in early January, 1920, and that afterwards the governments themselves should decide, by direct communication among themselves, the political questions while a Conference of Ambassadors at Paris was to settle the details. Consequently the last meeting of the Council of Heads of Delegations took place on January 10 in the presence of Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Nitti. It was decided to establish two bodies: a Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs which was to deal with the peace treaty with Hungary and questions of detail, and a Council of Heads of Governments which was to examine only the larger questions of general policy.

The Council of Foreign Ministers met three times at Paris between January 10 and 21, 1920, with a United States observer attending. It dealt mainly with the treaty with Hungary, but also touched upon the Adriatic problem and other matters. With its last meeting on January 21 the sessions of the Peace Conference of Paris can be regarded as terminated.

All questions of detail, arising mainly from the execution of the various treaties, were handed over to a Council of Ambassadors. The Council of Heads of Governments met nine times between January 9 and 20, 1920, also at Paris, also with a United States observer. Its main effort consisted of an intensive but fruitless attempt to achieve a solution of the Adriatic problem. At its last meeting Lloyd George, speaking for his colleagues as well, expressed deep appreciation to Clemenceau, who had just fallen from power in France, for his labours as President of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference. Clemenceau's reply contained a memorable warning: "If certain elements of discord should unhappily arise between us, how terrible would it be to think that the finest blood of the civilized world . . . had been shed in vain for hopes not to be realized."[1]

The Council of Ambassadors was set up after the winding-up of the Ambassadors to France by Britain, Italy, and Japan, with the United States Ambassador acting as observer, and a French representative, at first Clemenceau's successor Millerand, later on Cambon, acting as Chairman. The Council met for the first time on January 26, 1920, and from that time onwards it dealt with various items arising from the residue of the Peace Conference, and also with details concerning the Hungarian and Turkish treaties. "Since the Council could make decisions only on minor matters, its proceedings were necessarily often long-drawn-out and inconclusive, but it served a very real purpose as a clearing house for the presentation and discussion of the many complex problems of a post-war world."[2] As time went on, its scope was limited more and more by the governments of its

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[1] U.S., Papers Relating to Foreign Relations 1919, IX, p.938.

[2] Almond and Lutz, The Treaty of St. Germain, p.13.

members, the United States ceased to send observers after the Democratic eclipse of November 1920, and Japan gradually lost interest, but the Council of Ambassadors was not wound up until 1931. The Council of Heads of Governments, acting as the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference after January 1920, occasionally met in conferences, for instance at London, San Remo, and Spa in 1920 when the treaties with Hungary and Turkey of June and August respectively, and the solution of the Teschen problem of July were discussed; these meetings also witnessed several attempts to do something about the Adriatic. With the exception of the San Remo Conference, no United States observers ever attended, and Japanese participation gradually petered out. The Supreme Council finally came to an end in 1927.[3]

## B. THE FINAL DISPOSAL OF THE DISPUTED TERRITORIES

As has been indicated, many problems were still awaiting solution when the Peace Conference ended its regular sessions. Of these, this thesis is concerned with three only: the Adriatic, Teschen, and the Klagenfurt Basin. The last will be dealt with first, because it presented the least difficulties.

According to the decision of the Council of Four on June 21, 1919, a plebiscite was to take place within three months of the coming into force of the treaty with Austria. The ratification of the Treaty of St. Germain took place on July 16, 1920, and five days later the Inter-Allied Plebiscite Commission began to function in Klagenfurt. It consisted of a British, French, and Italian Commissioner; the United States did not participate in its work. No Allied troops had been made available to

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[3]The only article on this last phase of the Peace Conference published so far appears to be by C. P. Pink "The Conference of Ambassadors (Paris) 1920-1931," Geneva Studies, XII (No.4-5, February 1942), pp.187-204.

support it, but when the voting day approached, the Inter-Allied Control Commission in Vienna sent fifty-eight officers into the plebiscite zone to ensure complete fairness of the proceedings. The voting took place on October 20, 1920, without any incident, and of 39,291 persons qualified to vote, 37,304 or nearly 95% cast valid ballots. Of these, 22,025 or 59% were votes for Austria, and 15,279 or 41% votes for Yugoslavia. The high percentage of voters showed the great interest of the population in the outcome, and it is interesting to note that approximately 10,000 Slovenes voted for Austria.[4] Four days later Yugoslav troops occupied zone A, but a protest to Belgrade by the Plebiscite Commission, followed by a very strong note by the Council of Ambassadors, led to their withdrawal. On November 19 Austrian laws came again into force in zone A. Thus "the conclusion of Colonel Miles in his report was abundantly justified."[5] The election results also seem to have proved the correctness of the Austrian argument that the Slovenes of Carinthia regarded themselves first of all as Carinthians.[6] Economic considerations undoubtedly played a role because the Slovene regions of Carinthia might have been faced with the loss of their markets if they had become part of Yugoslavia. From Austrian sources it was alleged that the sixteen months of Yugoslav rule in zone A had been marked by acts of maladministration and intimidation which helped to maintain pro-Austrian sentiments among many Slovenes. Whether, as these sources maintained, pressure forced many Slovenes to vote for Yugoslavia is questionable, but it should be noted than in the Austrian general elections of June 19, 1921, the Slovene National Party in the former zone A

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[4]Wutte, Kärntens Freiheitskampf, p.398.

[5]Temperley, (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, IV, p.380.

[6]Above, p.132.

received only 8,548 votes.[7]

The problem of Teschen seemed to have reached its final stage by fall 1919 because it appeared that all that remained to be done was the plebiscite. Nevertheless, serious obstacles presented themselves before long. According to the arrangements which had been signed by the Council of Heads of Delegations on September 27, an International Plebiscite Commission vested with full authority was to supervise the proceedings. However, for reasons beyond the scope of this thesis because they are connected with the holding of the plebiscite in adjoining Upper Silesia, the Peace Conference decided on November 14 to postpone the departure of the Plebiscite Commission for Teschen, and thereby also the holding of the plebiscite. When it finally arrived in Teschen on January 30, 1920, the Commission which consisted of one British, French, Italian, and Japanese member--the United States government had declined participation--replaced the Czechoslovak and Polish forces in their respective zones by 1,200 French and Italian troops. The situation in the region soon became very explosive owing to the development of intense friction between the Czech and Polish elements whose agitation seems to have been supported by their respective countries.[8] During May serious riots and strikes occurred and the Commission was forced to impose martial law. Moreover, the relationship between Poland and Czechoslovakia deteriorated to the point that diplomatic relations threatened to be broken off. The defeats of the Poles by the Red Army also may have had their repercussions in Teschen; at any rate, both Germans and Slonzaks began to indicate their preference for Czechoslovakia.[9] By early June the Polish government declared that it

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[7]Wutte, Kärntens Freiheitskampf, p.400.

[8]Temperley (ed.), A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, IV, p.360.

[9]Ibid., p.361.

objected in advance to the results of the plebiscite. On June 5, after receiving representations from the Plebiscite Commission in Teschen, the Council of Ambassadors suggested that arbitration should replace the plebiscite. This idea was rejected by the Czechoslovaks. In the face of this complicated situation, prolonged conversations took place between Benes and the new Polish Foreign Minister Patek. On July 10, probably under the shadow of the Red Army which was now rapidly advancing into Poland, Benes who was the Czechoslovak delegate and Grabski who was the Polish delegate at the Spa Conference of the Supreme Council (June 5-16) agreed to let the Allies determine the frontier between both countries in the Teschen region. On the following day the Supreme Council decided to divide the region between Poland and Czechoslovakia in such a way as to leave the Karwin coal basin and the whole length of the contested railway line within Czechoslovakia,[10] while giving to Poland the city of Teschen and the Bielitz region. The Conference of Ambassadors was instructed to hear the representatives of both countries and then to work out the details of the settlement, including economic questions, in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Council. Consequently, the Conference of Ambassadors at Paris elaborated the territorial and economic arrangements between Poland and Czechoslovakia, and all interested parties signed the agreement on July 28. The final line was more favourable to Czechoslovakia than the line of February 3, 1919.[11] Besides attributing the coveted Karwin coal basin to Czechoslovakia, it also handed over to her sovereignty 140,000

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[10]The Oderberg-Kaschau railway passes through a western suburb of Teschen city which remained in Czechoslovakia's possession.

[11]See Map Vc.

Poles, leaving 94,000 Poles with Poland.[12] Poland accepted the verdict of the Supreme Council and of the Conference of Ambassadors under protest, but owing to the rapid advance of the Red Army towards Warsaw and her own dependence on Allied help in the face of this threat, she had no choice. However, the settlement left bitter memories. It would be of interest to know the precise reasons why the decision of Spa turned out to be so disadvantageous to Poland. In the absence of concrete information, only certain assumptions can be made. France had consistently supported Czechoslovakia in the Teschen quarrel, and Lloyd George's attitude towards Polish claims in general had been unfavourable throughout the Peace Conference. The United States, whose delegates had been rather sympathetic towards the Polish cause, no longer took any active part in negotiations, and Japan was not interested in European affairs. This left Italy who on principle was favourably disposed towards Poland. However, Italy had her own difficulties in the Adriatic and wanted the support of Britain and France. Thus, when the Italian delegate, Count Sforza, afterwards declared that he had vainly tried to get more favourable terms for the Poles,[13] he probably did not insist too strongly. Last, but not least, it must be remembered that at the time of the Spa Conference the Great Powers feared that, during the next few weeks, Poland might collapse or go Bolshevik as the result of her military setbacks. This must have been an additional reason for restricting her size and wealth in favour of democratic and "reliable" Czechoslovakia.

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[12]Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice, Series C: Acts and Documents Relating to Judgments and Advisory Opinion Given by the Court (No.4. Fourth Session) (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff's Publishing Company, n.d.), p.139.

[13]Sforza, Diplomatic Europe, p.21, quoted in Komarnicki, Rebirth of the Polish Republic, p.610.

The most complicated problem still to be solved was the question of the Italian-Yugoslav frontiers. As has been indicated before, by the beginning of October 1919 the difficulties had revolved around Fiume whose possession, or at least control, by means of an independent corpus separatum had become a political necessity to any Italian government. At the same time, President Wilson still refused to allow Italy to have possession or control of the town, and insisted on either its incorporation within Yugoslavia or the creation of a Free State wherein the Italian majority of the corpus separatum would be balanced by a large Slav Hinterland. Britain and France during late summer and early fall of 1919 had gradually become more sympathetic towards the new Italian government. After Wilson rejected one more plan proposed by Nitti in October, a temporary lull occurred in the negotiations, during which time Nitti's government survived the general elections of mid-November and Tittoni resigned, to be succeeded by his close associate Scialoja. By now the Peace Conference was drawing towards its conclusion, and on December 9 Clemenceau, Polk, and Crowe in a lengthy memorandum appealed to Italy to agree to a settlement along the lines approved by Wilson. The Italians replied on January 10, 1920, with a note whose gist was insistence both on a larger measure of autonomy for the corpus separatum than it had enjoyed under Hungarian rule, and its contiguity with Italy, which, incidently, would have placed all of Istria under Italian sovereignty. Meanwhile Nitti had met Lloyd George in London, and on January 6 had presented him with a memorandum which once more based Italy's claims on the Treaty of London but agreed to give up Dalmatia except Zara. The memorandum agreed to the creation of a Free State of Fiume adjoining Italy's Treaty of London boundary and demanded special guarantees for maintaining the Italian character of the corpus separatum. Two days later Lloyd George and Clemenceau replied with a joint note which,

for the first time, indicated a British-French departure from the American position: they approved of Italy's demand for contiguity with the corpus separatum and the possession of Lagosta, but declined to give her Cherso, and a larger measure of autonomy to the corpus separatum than it had possessed under Hungarian rule. What was even more important, both governments were now prepared to ask Yugoslavia to make concessions to Italy. Thus on January 13 Clemenceau presented a note to the Yugoslavs which proposed to give the corpus separatum to Italy, Susak to Yugoslavia, and to divide the rest of the territory of the Free State between both countries. Probably as compensation for the loss of Fiume, Yugoslavia would obtain northern Albania with its outlet to the Adriatic as an autonomous province. This scheme, known as the "Nitti Compromise," was rejected by the Yugoslavs on the following day, but they were immediately presented with a revised version which suggested the elevation of the corpus separatum into an independent state. Thus confronted by a united front of Britain France, and Italy, the Yugoslavs replied in a more conciliatory but still evasive manner. Consequently, on January 20 the Council of Heads of Governments presented the Yugoslavs with a four days' ultimatum to accept the second version of the Nitti Compromise: in case of rejection Italy would be permitted to enforce the Treaty of London. The Yugoslavs successfully countered by playing for time, hoping for the United States to come to their aid. They calculated correctly: on February 9 Wilson, in a sharp note to Britain and France, rejected the Nitti Compromise and threatened to dissociate the United States from all European affairs. During the following five weeks several exchanges between Britain and France on one hand, and the United States on the other, followed. Both sides agreed that the best solution would be an agreement freely reached between Italy and Yugoslavia and the Nitti Compromise was dropped.

The next and most important development was the final rejection of the peace treaties by the United States Senate on March 19, 1920. This event fatally weakened Wilson's European situation and thereby affected the attitude of the Yugoslavs who now began to realize that eventually they would have to come to terms with Italy. After several cautious approaches, Trumbic and Pasic met Scialoja at Pallanza on May 11. Both sides seem to have tried to reach an agreement; the main obstacles were the Istrian frontier where the Yugoslavs still insisted on the Wilson line, and Fiume where the Yugoslavs were now willing to let the Italians have the town but not the rest of the corpus separatum.[14] However, a cabinet crisis in Rome forced the negotiations to be temporarily abandoned. A month later Nitti's cabinet fell from power and was succeeded by a cabinet led by Giolitti with Sforza as Foreign Minister. Giolitti, the most skillful and experienced of Italy's politicans, was sufficiently realistic to see that the European situation had greatly changed since the conclusion of the Treaty of London. He was therefore willing to adjust his policies accordingly, as far as internal conditions would permit him. His idea was not to invoke the Treaty of London and not to continue the old negotiations but to make a new start.[15] Sforza was a proponent of good relations with the Yugoslavs and appears to have possessed their confidence. He was willing to make far-reaching concessions in Dalmatia and the Adriatic, but with respect to Istria and the Julian Venetia(the eastern part of Carniola) he felt that he "must impose on Belgrade our [Italy's] amplest and most complete geographic frontier line."[16] Giolitti first aimed at restoring

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[14]See Map IIIc.

[15]Giovanni Giolitti, Memoirs of My Life, trans. Edward Storer (London: Chapman and Dodd Limited, 1923), p.420.

[16]Carlo Sforza, Makers of Modern Europe. Portraits and Personal Impressions and Recollections (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merril Company, 1928),p.243.

Italy to more settled conditions, while Sforza solved the Albanian problem by evacuating Italian troops from that country and only retaining the strategic island of Saseno. Contact was maintained with Trumbic, and Italian-Yugoslav relations began to improve. Meanwhile Giolitti, having been moderately successful at home, met Lloyd George at Lucerne in August and Millerand at Aix-les-Bains in September and ensured their support, with the result that both statesmen urged the Yugoslavs to reach an agreement with Italy. In October the Yugoslavs lost the Carinthian plebiscite against Austria, and in early November, after Wilson's Democrats had been decisively defeated in the United States presidential elections, it became obvious that America was turning her back on Europe. This double blow forced the Yugoslavs, now completely isolated, to come to terms with Italy, all the more as the Italians were still in occupation of northern Dalmatia. On November 8 negotiations began at Santa Margherita which led to the signing of the Treaty of Rapallo on November 12. By its terms Italy obtained in western Carniola the Treaty of London boundary with a slight shift eastwards which included the quicksilver mines of Idria and the strategically important Monte Nevoso within her frontier. Zara with its immediate neighbourhood, and the islands of Cherso, Lussin, Pelagosa, and Lagosta also became part of Italy. All the other Adriatic islands and all of Dalmatia (except Zara) went to Yugoslavia. A Free State of Fiume was created which consisted of the corpus separatum and a coastal strip stretching eastwards to the Italian frontier; Susak and Fiume's Hinterland were given to Yugoslavia.[17] The treaty was quickly ratified by both countries although there was some opposition: in Italy from the extreme Nationalists, and in Yugoslavia from considerable sections of Croatian and Slovene

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[17]See Map IIIc.

opinion which felt that their interests had been sacrificed by the Serbs. Approximately 420,000 Croats and Slovenes passed under Italian sovereignty. In December Italian troops and ships advanced against Fiume whose population had by now become tired of d'Annunzio's flamboyant and exciting, but not very profitable, rule. After some minor skirmishes d'Annunzio evacuated the town which was entered by Italian soldiers on January 18, 1921.

The Rapallo settlement proved to be only a temporary solution of the Fiume question. Continuous and bitter internal strife between the Autonomists who wanted to cooperate with Italy and Yugoslavia in order to restore the prosperity of the town, and the Nationalists who denounced the Treaty of Rapallo because they wanted the Free State to become part of Italy, made the formation of a stable government impossible. As a consequence, the port stood idle and both town and Hinterland suffered. After several unworkable agreements, Italy and Yugoslavia, by the Treaty of Rome on January 27, 1924, divided the Free State between them: the town, the southern part of the corpus separatum and the southern part of the coastal strip which contained the railway line linking Fiume with the north became part of Italy, while the rest went to Yugoslavia.[18] A clause which granted Yugoslavia privileges concerning the port and railway facilities was added, and, in order to give all these arrangements permanence, Italy and Yugoslavia signed a general "Pact of Friendship and Cordial Collaboration." "At the close of the year 1924 the Adriatic Question had every appearance of being an extinct volcano."[19]

The question arises as to why Britain and France, during the

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[18] Ibid.

[19] Arnold J. Toynbee, "The Settlement of the Fiume Question (1921-4) [sic]," Survey of International Affairs 1924 (1926), p.422.

sixteen months following June 1919, gradually shifted from supporting Yugoslavia to backing Italy. As in the case of Teschen, assumption must take the place of certainty. It would seem that both Powers, exhausted from the war and their aims largely achieved, realized the necessity of restoring tranquility to war-torn Europe. To achieve this purpose the Italian problem had to be solved. Once the uncompromising government of Orlando and Sonnino had been replaced by the more accommodating Nitti and Giolitti administrations, which were threatened by extreme nationalism and social revolution at home, Britain and France probably felt it to be in their own interest to help them. France, although Yugoslavia's ally, during the latter half of 1920 was confronted with the practical, if not official, end of her alliance with Britain over serious disagreements on future relations with Germany and bitter rivalry in the Near East. Therefore she took care to be on good terms with Italy. With regard to the relationship between Italy and Yugoslavia, it can be said that both governments, at any rate in the beginning, did their best to heal the wounds the Adriatic contest had left, but there is ample evidence, from unpleasant popular demonstrations and bloody frontier incidents,[20] that the former mutual dislike between Italians and Yugoslavs had now turned into hatred. Fiume derived little benefit from the new scheme of things: by 1938 the port handled only 770,000 metric tons of merchandise as compared to 2,179,288 in 1913.[21]

A few sentences ought to be written about the disposal of the Austro-Hungarian territory not discussed in this thesis.[22] Of the Austrian

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[20] Ibid., The writer himself, in the summer of 1931, saw Italian and Yugoslav machine guns facing each other across the small bridge which linked Fiume and Susak.

[21] Kazimierz Maciej Smogorzewski, "Fiume," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 24th ed., Vol. IX., p.339.

[22] See Map VII.

part, Galicia with its strong Ukrainian minority became a province of the newly established Republic of Poland. The Bukovina, populated by Ukrainians in the northern part and Rumanians in the south, was given to the Kingdom of Rumania. Bosnia-Hercegovina, which had occupied a special administrative position within the Habsburg Empire, was incorporated within Yugoslavia. Hungary was reduced to her Magyar core. As has been seen already, her northern part, consisting of the regions inhabited by the Slovaks and Carpatho-Ukrainians, went to the Republic of Czechoslovakia. It should be noted that 750,000 Magyars, living all along the southern fringe of this territory, contiguous with the bulk of their co-nationals, were handed over to Czechoslovakia. Transylvania with a Rumanian population of nearly 3,000,000 joined Rumania; this province also included 1,550,000 Magyars and 520,000 Germans who lived in large compact groups in the midst of the Rumanian population cut off from the main body of their co-nationals. Rumania also obtained the eastern fringe of Hungary proper which contained a considerable number of Magyars and the central and eastern sections of the Banat with its largely Serbian and German population, although it contained some Magyars and Rumanians as well, sections of southern Hungary between the rivers Danube and Tisza with a compact population of Magyars in the north and Serbs in the south and numerous pockets of German settlements interspersed throughout the region. Finally, out of a total population of approximately 12,000,000 Germans and 10,100,000 Magyars according to the Austro-Hungarian census of 1910, post-war Austria numbered 6,426,000 and post-war Hungary 7,615,000 inhabitants. This means, if a modest inflation of the German and Hungarian population by the 1910 census is assumed and offset by the small ethnic minorities remaining within new Austria and Hungary, that approximately 4,500,000 Germans and 3,000,000 Magyars of the former Habsburg Empire, living either on the

fringe of their national territory or in isolated language islands among other nationalities, passed under foreign rule as the result of the territorial settlements following the war of 1914-1918.

## C. ANALYSIS

It is rather fashionable today to be severely critical of the peace treaties of 1919-1920, mainly because less than a generation later an even more destructive world war broke out. It is not the purpose of this thesis to deal with the whole enormous subject of peace-making; we are only concerned with the division of the territories of Habsburg Austria between Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Yugoslavia; whatever faults these arrangements may have had, they were not the cause of the Second World War. It must be remembered that the peacemakers of 1919 were forced to act within conditions they could neither safely ignore nor try to change: war-weariness, hatred caused by fear, losses, and propaganda, triumphant nationalism in Central and parts of Eastern Europe added to long traditions of international rivalry and national oppression. It is against this unpromising background that the actions of the arbiters of the post-war world must be observed and judged. Each of the Great Powers tried to attain certain objectives. The United States, primarily interested in establishing permanent peace in Europe in order to avoid getting involved in another world conflagration themselves, endeavoured to be as impartial as circumstances would permit in order to prevent the perpetuation of old, or the creation of new, injustices which would cause another catastrophe. This explains, in our case, Wilson's insistence on fair play for Yugoslavia, or the general American attitude concerning Carinthia. Britain had fought the war mainly in order to prevent the continent of Europe from falling under German control, but she was not interested in establishing a French

hegemony; this explains the more reserved British attitude towards France's allies in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, situated safely across the Atlantic and the English Channel respectively, the United States and Great Britain could afford to look upon European affairs in a detached and, therefore, fairly objective manner. Circumstances were different in the case of France and Italy. France had never forgotten that, not so long ago, she had been the foremost Power on the continent of Europe. Defeated by Germany in 1870-1871, nearly defeated again in the late summer of 1914, bled white and her birthrate declining, she dreaded the incomparably stronger eastern neighbour and tried to offset her own lack of strength and self-confidence by creating a network of allies in Germany's rear: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia. Her aim at the Peace Conference was to strengthen these states by endowing them with as much territory, population, and resources as they could possibly digest. Italy, mindful of her long domination by the Habsburgs, whose armies had so often consisted to a considerable extent of Croats and Slovenes, strove to attain a status of equality with France. Freed at last from the permanent Austrian threat in the north and northeast, she tried to penetrate as deeply as possible in these directions. Seeing France successfully establishing her own predominance in Europe by means of a network of alliances, she tried to do likewise. This objective explains her policy of cultivating the friendship of Hungary, her attempts to be of service to Poland in the Teschen dispute, her support of Austria against France's ally Yugoslavia, and--although this is outside the scope of this thesis--her friendly attitude towards Serbia's old enemy Bulgaria. This Italian policy, continued under Mussolini, eventually led to very close relations with Austria and Hungary, and finally to an alliance with recovered Germany.

We have observed the importance of nationalism with respect to the downfall of Austria-Hungary; when the Peace Conference of Paris assembled, the destruction of the Habsburg Empire was already an accomplished fact. The desire, for better or worse, to create an independent state consisting of all members of the same nationality has proved to be irresistible in modern Europe. Wilson's Fourteen Points, with their implied demand for national self-determination, supported and strengthened this desire within the confines of the Dual Monarchy. However, the desire for national sovereignty frequently developed along lines not foreseen by Wilson: basing itself on historic traditions with their past glories and grievances, and on economic and strategic necessities, nationalism often overstepped ethnic boundaries. Czechoslovakia and Italy at the Peace Conference are two prominent examples of this extreme nationalism. Wilson acted, on the whole, on the side of fairness and justice, although in the case of the prohibition of the Anschluss, his lack of consideration for the Sudeten Germans and, especially, his blunder over South Tyrol, his record is open to severe criticism. It ought to be stressed in this connection, however, that Wilson's influence, by providing a democratic mantle, made nationalism, if not less aggressive, at least a little more tractable, because in a democratic society the voices of moderation and sanity can never be completely stifled. Thus Czechoslovakia could never treat her minorities in the way Habsburg Hungary had done. Considering the inextricable patchwork of nationalities in certain parts of Europe, complete national self-determination could never be carried out, but the peacemakers of 1919 tried to apply the more humane approach of "making the frontiers fit peoples"[23] rather than the more effective but brutal

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[23]Rene Albrecht-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe Since the Congress of Vienna (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), p.365.

method of making peoples fit the frontiers, which became the practice only a few years later.

In some instances, the Peace Conference considered the holding of a plebiscite to determine the fate of a contested region. However, several considerations made the delegates reluctant to resort to this measure: in some cases, for instance in the Austrian Littoral, Dalmatia, and Marburg, the sentiments of the population were known to run counter to the interests of a Great Power or one of its allies. In other instances, as in the case of Teschen, conditions might change rapidly and lead to a change in local feeling. Therefore the Conference resorted only in a few cases to plebiscites. In this connection it is interesting to note that, even in an age of nationalism, economic interests and historical tradition played a considerable role: the Slovenes of Carinthia are an example. Another attempt to settle the fate of small disputed territories was the creation of Free States or Free Cities. However, such units remained a source of friction between their neighbours and seem to have been regarded even at their creation only as a temporary solution of an embarrassing problem. The fate of the Free State of Fiume proved its artificiality.

The avoidance of negotiations with, and the general attitude towards the new Republic of Austria must be regarded as a serious error of the Paris Peace Conference. By refusing to grant Austria any rights at all at the Conference, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia obtained the great advantage of being able to influence the actions of the Allies by the very nature of direct contact; thus Austria's opponents were able to coordinate--not necessarily always intentionally--their own territorial claims at her expense: Italy could not obtain Dalmatia because of Yugoslavia's opposition, but she received the Sexten Valley and Tarvis from Austria; Yugoslavia was unable to get the Littoral and Fiume because

of Italy's opposition, but she took Marburg from Austria. Difficulties arose, however, when the contest over some disputed territory was waged by two allies of fairly equal standing, as was the case with Teschen; here Poland's "compensation" was envisaged to be Prussian Upper Silesia. In the economic field, impoverished Austria was burdened with the payment of reparations and the loss of all investments in Allied countries. The condition of new Austria is most poignantly described in a well-known university text book:

> The German remnant of a once extensive empire was reduced to a demoralized capital city and a truncated inadequate hinterland. The Treaty of St. Germain wrote the inexorable finis . . . to an economically wholesome existence, and its ratification crushed the spirits of those Austrians who, in the revolutionary excitement of November 1918, had persuaded themselves that some kind of national reconstruction and recovery was still possible.[24]

New Austria led a miserable economic and, therefore, political existence for the next twenty years, and, for obvious reasons, never paid any reparations. It took the horrors of Hitler's regime and the Second World War, followed by completely changed political and economic circumstances, to give her population belief and strength in an independent future. Yugoslavia, too, went through more than twenty years of bitter internal strife before a tolerable relationship between the Serbs and the other nationalities of the country was established. Czechoslovakia, owing to her natural resources and highly developed industries, was a fairly prosperous country, but with her population of Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, Magyars, Ukrainians, and Poles she did not rest on solid foundations and the crisis of 1938 led to her collapse. The end of the Second World War

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[24] Frank P. Chambers, Christina Phelps Harris, and Charles C. Bayley, This Age of Conflict. A Contemporary World History, 1914 to the Present (rev. ed.; New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950), p.189.

saw her restoration and the achievement of stability by means of a more understanding attitude of the Czechs towards the Slovaks and through measures which the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 would have never tolerated: the expulsion of nearly 3,000,000 Sudeten Germans as well as a considerable number of Magyars. On the other hand, the events of 1938-1939 have proved that Czechoslovakia without the historic frontiers of Bohemia and Moravia is unable to lead an independent existence.

With regard to the fate of the territories dealt with by this thesis, Teschen has remained divided on the lines laid down in 1920 in spite of a temporary change between 1938-1945; the events of 1938 proved that Poland had neither forgiven nor forgotten. As has been stated already, the territory inhabited by the Sudeten Germans has remained part of Czechoslovakia but the Sudeten Germans have been expelled. The settlement of Italy's frontiers with Yugoslavia, which caused so much trouble, has been completely undone: Zara, Fiume, all the Adriatic islands, western Carniola, and Istria belong to Yugoslavia today. South Tyrol, whose inhabitants were subjected to bitter persecution between the wars, is still under Italian rule and the problem continues to poison the political atmosphere of Central Europe.

Another aspect of the territorial settlements of 1919 is the influence of the League of Nations. It appears that Wilson and, even to a greater degree, Colonel House, were on several occasions persuaded to deviate from their principles in order to secure general acceptance of the League in the hope that its authority would, in time, remedy any unjust decision by the Peace Conference. We have noted that during the negotiations at Paris on many occasions the League was suggested as the guardian over contested territories; however, the faith in its efficacy was greatest with the United States delegation, and hardly existent with

the Italians and smaller Powers. Finally, the succession states of the Habsburg Empire as well as several other small states were obliged to sign treaties in which they promised, under the trusteeship of the League of Nations, to safeguard the rights of all their citizens belonging to racial, linguistic, or religious minorities. Unfortunately, as the lack of authority of the League became more and more apparent, these Minority Treaties were less and less enforced.

So far most of the conclusions of this thesis appear to be strongly critical of the provisions of peacemaking in Central Europe. This is, however, not entirely the case. It has been pointed out already that the peacemakers had to work within the limits set by their very imperfect age. They were also liable to commit human errors, especially as they were under the twin pressures of public opinion and overwork. They certainly did not approach their tremendous task without preparation; in the United States, Britain, and, to a lesser degree, France experts on geographical economic, historical, and political problems had for a period of more than a year painstakingly collected all information which might be of use at the Peace Conference. Furthermore, although the dice were heavily loaded against the defeated, extreme demands by the victorious states, at any rate as far as Austria is concerned, were rejected, for instance, Czechoslovakia's demand for a corridor with Yugoslavia or Yugoslavia's demands in Carinthia.[25] Italy's successful demand for the Brenner frontier was the exception. Wilson, Lansing, Lloyd George, and Balfour as a rule adjusted their actions to the verdict of their experts who tried to be as scientific and objective as possible. Clemenceau, Pichon, Orlando, and Sonnino are far more open to the reproach that they frequently either

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[25]See Map IVa.

influenced their territorial experts or ignored their findings. With regard to the League of Nations it ought to be said that, even if it proved to be a failure, its aims remained an ideal for the more advanced and clear-sighted section of mankind; the founding of the United Nations less than a generation after the Peace Conference of Paris proves that Wilson's vision corresponded to the needs of humanity and that the labours of the League had not been in vain. What finally emerged from the Conference was a new map of Central Europe, indicating the arrival of a new age.

> Whatever mistakes there may have been . . . it may be justly affirmed that on no similar occasion in the past has so earnest and systematic an effort been made to settle territorial questions on the basis, not of the interests or the convenience of the Great Powers, but of the rights and aspirations of the peoples directly concerned; that the Peace Conference at Paris has liberated and unified more nations than any previous European congress, or all the congresses of the last century taken together; and that the principle of nationality has never before won so sweeping and signal a victory.[26]

There still remains the important fact to be considered that the destruction of the great economic unit of Austria-Hungary brought economic hardship to its now independent component parts. Against this it should be remembered not only that the Peace Conference tried, as some of the economic provisions of the Treaty of St. Germain prove, to promote economic cooperation among the former partners--an attempt which failed owing to the prevalence of economic nationalism among the new states--but also that the succession states, except Poland, as compared with the semi-feudal Habsburg Monarchy, represented a more modern society.

> Rumania . . . compelled even her nobles to distribute land to the peasants on a generous scale. In Czechoslovakia land was freely assigned to the peasant by the new government. The Serbs applied their old policy [of peasant land ownership] freely and readily to

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[26] Haskins and Lord, Some Problems of the Peace Conference, p.288.

the whole of Yugoslavia, and distributed land to peasants in fair shares, taking care that it should be inalienable.[27]

In conclusion, we have to ask what lessons are to be learned from the history of the years 1918-1919 in Europe, and from the events which followed. History would be an interesting but not a useful subject if her lessons could not be applied for the benefit of man. Concerning Central Europe, we learn two things: first, that the forces of nationalism in our time are seen to be in the long run irresistible and destined to sweep away any obstacle in their path; second, that the splitting up of Central Europe into small units has proved to be both politically and economically harmful. Thus the only possibility of achieving political stability and economic prosperity in that part of the world lies in the combination of national sovereignty and economic cooperation, leading perhaps, in the distant future, to the development of a common sentiment transcending the present narrow confines of nationality. The European Common Market is possibly a sign that, in a different part of Europe, history's lessons are being learned and applied.

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[27]A. J. Grant and Harold W. V. Temperley, Europe in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (1789-1950) (6th rev. ed. by Lillian M. Penson; London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1952), p.442.

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## APPENDIX A

## NATIONALITY STATISTICS OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

1. Total Population of Nationalities in Austria According to Language

| Nationality | 1910 |
|---|---|
| Germans | 9,950,000 |
| Czechs | 6,436,000 |
| Poles | 4,968,000 |
| Ruthenians | 3,519,000 |
| Slovenes | 1,253,000 |
| Serbo-Croats | 783,000 |
| Italians | 768,000 |
| Rumanians | 275,000 |

2. Nationalities in Hungary According to Language, Including Transylvania, Fiume, and Croatia-Slavonia (Totals)

| Nationality | 1910 |
|---|---|
| Magyars | 9,945,000 |
| Germans | 2,037,000 |
| Slovaks | 1,968,000 |
| Rumanians | 2,949,000 |
| Ruthenians | 473,000 |
| Croats | 1,833,000 |
| Serbs | 1,106,000 |

3. Nationalities in Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1910 (approximate figures)*

| Nationality | Population |
|---|---|
| Croats | 400,000 (21 percent) |
| Serbs | 850,000 (42 percent) |
| Mohammedans | 650,000 (34 percent) |

*The great majority of Bosnian Mohammedans were of Serbo-Croat ethnic stock. Because they differ in custom and in religion from both the Serbs and the Croats, it is impossible to allot them in correct proportions between Serbs and Croats.

4. Nationality Totals in the Empire in 1910, including Bosnia-Hercegovina (approximate figures)

| Nationality | Population | Nationality | Population |
|---|---|---|---|
| Germans | 12,000,000 | Mohammedan Serbo-Croats in Bosnia | 650,000 |
| Magyars | 10,100,000 | Poles | 5,000,000 |
| Czechs | 6,550,000 | Ruthenians | 4,000,000 |
| Slovaks | 1,950,000 | Rumanians | 3,200,000 |
| Croats | 2,625,000 | Slovenes | 1,300,000 |
| Serbs | 1,925,000 | Italians | 1,000,000 |

5. Nationality Totals in Approximate Percentages

| Nationality | Percentage of Population | Nationality | Percentage of Population |
|---|---|---|---|
| Germans | 23.9 | Mohammedan Serbo-Croats in Bosnia | 1.2 |
| Magyars | 20.2 | Poles | 10.0 |
| Czechs | 12.6 | Ruthenians | 7.9 |
| Slovaks | 3.8 | Rumanians | 6.4 |
| Croats | 5.3 | Slovenes | 2.6 |
| Serbs | 3.8 | Italians | 2.0 |

## APPENDIX B

## STATISTICS DEALING WITH RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS

1. Religious Affiliations in Austria in 1910 (in percentages)

| | |
|---|---|
| Catholics, including members of Greek Catholic and Uniat churches | 91.0 |
| Members of Greek Oriental (Orthodox) churches | 2.3 |
| Protestants | 1.9 |
| Jews | 4.7 |

2. Religious Affiliations in Hungary in 1910, including Croatia-Slavonia

| Religious Affiliation | Percentage of Population | |
|---|---|---|
| Roman Catholics | 52.1 | Total Catholics, 61.8 |
| Greek Catholics | 9.7 | |
| Calvinists | 12.6 | Total Protestants, 19.0 |
| Lutherans | 6.4 | |
| Unitarians | 0.3 | |
| Jews | 4.5 | |

3. Religious Affiliations in Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1910 (approximate percentages)

| Religious Affiliation | Percentage of Population |
|---|---|
| Greek Orientals (Orthodox) | 43.3 |
| Mohammedans | 32.2 |
| Roman Catholics | 23.0 |
| Jews | 0.6 |

4. Religious Affiliations in the Empire in 1910 (approximate percentages)

| Religious Affiliation | Percentage of Population |
|---|---|
| Catholics (Roman, Greek, and Uniat churches) | 77.2 |
| Protestants | 8.9 |
| Greek Orientals (Orthodox) | 8.7 |
| Jews | 3.9 |
| Mohammedans | 1.1 |

APPENDIX C

THE SHARE OF THE VARIOUS NATIONALITIES IN THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION IN VIENNA

(Hugelmann, Das Nationalitätenrecht des alten Österreich, p.280)

| | Germans | Poles | Czechs | South Slavs | Italians | Magyars | Rumanians | Ukrainians |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ministry of Foreign Affairs | 396 | 49 | 55 | 52 | 37 | 229 | 14 | - |
| Ministry of War | 419 | 18 | 91 | 29 | 5 | 42 | 8 | 2 |
| Court of Administration | 53 | 7 | 10 | 3 | 1 | 1 | - | - |
| Presidium of Council of Ministers | 31 | 10 | 4 | 3 | - | - | - | - |
| Ministry of the Interior | 187 | 19 | 31 | 10 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| Ministry of Education | 109 | 13 | 17 | 5 | 3 | 1 | - | 4 |
| Ministry of Justice and Supreme Court | 77 | 48 | 31 | 19 | 7 | - | 2 | 13 |
| Ministry of Finance | 224 | 28 | 24 | 10 | 7 | - | 1 | 1 |
| Ministry of Trade and Commerce | 1915 | 15 | 128 | 10 | 5 | - | - | - |
| Ministry of Public Works | 613 | 35 | 99 | 12 | 1 | - | 1 | 2 |
| Ministry of Railways | 406 | 37 | 67 | 2 | 2 | - | 1 | - |
| Ministry of Agriculture | 117 | 13 | 16 | 2 | - | - | - | - |
| Ministry of Defence | 225 | 16 | 80 | 1 | - | - | - | - |
| Total | 4772 | 308 | 653 | 158 | 73 | 276 | 28 | 25 |

## APPENDIX D

### PRESIDENT WILSON'S FOURTEEN POINTS, FOUR PRINCIPLES, FOUR ENDS, AND FIVE PARTICULARS

(Chambers, Harris, and Bayley, This Age of Conflict, Appendix B, pp.xxxvii-xxxviii

and

Herbert Hoover, The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson, pp.23-27)

1. Fourteen Points, January 8, 1918.

(1) Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

(2) Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

(3) The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

(4) Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

(5) A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined.

(6) The evacuation of all Russian territory and such settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

(7) Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

(8) All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made in the interest of all.

(9) A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

(10) The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

(11) Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

(12) The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

(13) An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

(14) A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

2. Four Principles, February 11, 1918.

(1) There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages.

(2) Peoples are not to be handed about from one sovereignty to another by an international conference or an understanding between rivals and antagonists.

(3) National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. "Self-determination" is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril.

(4) We cannot have general peace for the asking, or by the mere arrangements of a peace conference. It cannot be pieced together out of individual understandings between powerful states. All the parties to this war must join in the settlement of every issue anywhere involved in it.

3. Four Ends, July 4, 1918.

(1) The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world; or, if it cannot be presently destroyed, at the least its reduction to virtual impotence.

(2) The settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.

(3) The consent of all nations to be governed in their conduct towards each other by the same principles of honor and of respect for the common law of civilized society that govern the individual citizens of all modern states in their relations with one another; to the end that all promises and covenants may be sacredly observed; no private plots or conspiracies hatched, no selfish injuries wrought with impunity, and a mutual trust established upon the handsome foundation of a mutual respect for right.

(4) The establishment of an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit and by which every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned shall be sanctified.

4. Five Particulars, September 27, 1918.

(1) The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favorites and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned.

(2) No special or separate interest of any single nation or any group of nations can be made the basis of any part of the settlement which is not consistent with the common interest of all.

(3) There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations.

(4) And more specifically, there can be no special, selfish economic combinations within the League and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion except as the power of economic penalty by exclusion from the markets of the world may be vested in the League of Nations as a means of discipline and control.

(5) All international agreements and treaties ofevery kind must be made known in their entirety to the rest of the world.

## APPENDIX E

### ALLIED STATEMENT OF WAR AIMS, JANUARY 10, 1917
### NOTE TO PRESIDENT WILSON

(Tardieu, The Truth About the Treaty, p.81)

1. Restoration of Belgium, Serbia and Montenegro and of the damages they have sustained.

2. Evacuation of the invaded territory of France, Russia and Roumania with full reparations.

3. Reorganization of Europe, guaranteed by a stable regime, based upon the respect of nationality and the right of all peoples, great and small, to pursue their economic development in full security and upon territorial and international conventions guaranteeing land and sea frontiers against unwarranted aggression.

4. Restitution of provinces or territories previously taken from the Allies by force or against the will of the inhabitants.

5. Liberation of Italians, Slavs, Roumanians and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination.

6. Liberation of the population subjected to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; rejection out of Europe of the Ottoman Empire as foreign to western civilization.

7. The intentions of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia towards Poland are clearly indicated in the proclamation which he has just addressed to his Armies.

8. The Allies have never aimed at the extermination of the German peoples or at their disappearance as a political entity.

## APPENDIX F

## THE TREATY OF LONDON AND DECLARATIONS

(Albrecht-Carrié, Italy at the Paris Peace Conference, pp.334-39)

### I. AGREEMENT BETWEEN FRANCE, RUSSIA, GREAT BRITAIN AND ITALY, SIGNED AT LONDON, APRIL 26, 1915

By Order of his Government the Marquis Imperiali, Ambassador of His Majesty the King of Italy, has the honour to communicate to the Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Grey, His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and to their Excellencies M. Paul Cambon, Ambassador of the French Republic, and to Count de Benckendorff, Ambassador of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the following memorandum:

Memorandum

Article 1. A military convention shall be immediately concluded between the General Staffs of France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia. This convention shall settle the minimum number of military forces to be employed by Russia against Austria-Hungary in order to prevent that Power from concentrating all its strength against Italy, in the event of Russia deciding to direct her principal effort against Germany.

This military convention shall settle question of armistices, which necessarily comes within the scope of the Commanders-in-chief of the Armies.

Article 2. On her part, Italy undertakes to use her entire resources for the purpose of waging war jointly with France, Great Britain and Russia against all their enemies.

Article 3. The French and British fleets shall render active and permanent assistance to Italy until such time as the Austro-Hungarian fleet shall have been destroyed or until peace shall have been concluded.

A naval convention shall be immediately concluded to this effect between France, Great Britain and Italy.

Article 4. Under the Treaty of Peace, Italy shall obtain the Trentino, Cisalpine Tyrol with its geographical and natural frontier (the Brenner frontier), as well as Trieste, the counties of Gorizia and Gradisca, all Istria as far as the Quarnero and including Volosca and the Istrian islands of Cherso and Lussin, as well as the small islands of Plavnik,

Unie, Canidole, Palazzuoli, San Pietro di Nembi, Asinello, Gruica, and the neighbouring islets.

Note. The frontier required to ensure execution of Article 4 hereof shall be traced as follows:

From the Piz Umbrail as far as north of the Stelvio, it shall follow the crest of the Rhetian Alps up to the sources of the Adige and the Eisach, then following the Reschen and Brenner mountains and the Oetz and Ziller heights. The frontier shall then bend towards the south, cross Mt. Toblach and join the present frontier of the Carnic Alps. It shall follow this frontier line as far as Mt. Tarvis and from Mt. Tarvis the watershed of the Julian Alps by the Predil Pass, Mt. Mangart, the Tricorno (Terglu) and the watersheds of the Podberdo, Podlaniscam and Idria passes. From this point the frontier shall follow a south-easterly direction towards the Schneeberg, leaving the entire basin of the Save and its tributaries outside Italian territory. From the Schneeberg the frontier shall come down to the coast in such a way as to include Castua, Mattuglia and Volosca within Italian territory.

Article 5. Italy shall also be given the province of Dalmatia within its present administrative boundaries, including to the north Lisarica and Tribania; to the south as far as a line starting from Cape Planka on the coast and following eastwards the crests of the heights forming the watershed, in such a way as to leave within Italian territory all the valleys and streams flowing towards Sebenico--such as the Cicola, Kerka, Butisnica and their tributaries. She shall also obtain all the islands situate to the north and west of Dalmatia, from Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Scherda, Maon, Pago and Patadura to the north, up to Meleda to the south including Sant' Andrea, Busi, Lissa, Lesina, Tercola, Curzola, Cazza and Lagosta, as well as the neighbouring rocks and islets and Pelagosa, with the exception of Greater and Lesser Zirona, Bua, Solta and Brazza.

To be neutralised:

(1) The entire coast from Cape Planka on the north to the southern base of the peninsula of Sabbioncello in the south, so as to include the whole of that peninsula; (2) the portion of the coast which begins in the north at a point situated 10 kilometres south of the headland of Ragusa Vecchia extending southward as far as the River Voiussa, in such a way as to include the gulf and ports of Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno, St. Jean de Medua and Durazzo, without prejudice to the rights of Montenegro consequent on the declarations exchanged between the Powers in April and May 1909. As these rights only apply to the present Montenegrin territory, they cannot be extended to any territory or ports which may be assigned to Montenegro. Consequently neutralisation shall not apply to any part of the coast now belonging to Montenegro. There shall be maintained all restrictions concerning the port of Antivari which were accepted by Montenegro in 1909; (3) finally, all the islands not given to Italy.

Note. The following Adriatic territory shall be assigned by the four Allied Powers to Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro:

In the Upper Adriatic, the whole coast from the bay of Volosca on the borders of Istria as far as the northern frontier of Dalmatia, including the coast which is at present Hungarian, and all the coast of Croatia,

with the port of Fiume and the small ports of Novi and Carlopago, as well as the islands of Veglia, Pervichio, Gregorio, Goli and Arbe. And, in the Lower Adriatic (in the region interesting Serbia and Montenegro) the whole coast from Cape Planka as far as the River Drin, with the important harbours of Spalato, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno and St. Jean de Medua and the islands of Greater and Lesser Zirona, Bua, Solta, Brazza, Jaclian and Calamotta. The port of Durazzo to be assigned to the independent Moslem State of Albania.

Article 6. Italy shall receive full sovereignty over Valona, the island of Saseno and surrounding territory of sufficient extent to assure defence of these points (from the Voiussa to the north and east, approximately to the northern boundary of the district of Chimara on the south).

Article 7. Should Italy obtain the Trentino and Istria in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, together with Dalmatia and the Adriatic islands within the limits specified in Article 5, and the Bay of Valona (Article 6), and if the central portion of Albania is reserved for the establishment of a small autonomous neutralised State, Italy shall not oppose the division of Northern and Southern Albania between Montenegro, Serbia and Greece, should France, Great Britain and Russia so desire. The coast from the southern boundary of the Italian territory of Valona (see Article 6) up to Cape Stylos shall be neutralised.

Italy shall be charged with the representation of the State of Albania in its relations with foreign Powers.

Italy agrees, moreover, to leave sufficient territory in any event to the east of Albania to ensure the existence of a frontier line between Greece and Serbia to the west of Lake Ochrida.

Article 8. Italy shall receive entire sovereignty over the Dodecanese Islands which she is at present occupying.

Article 9. Generally speaking, France, Great Britain and Russia recognise that Italy is interested in the maintenance of the balance of power in the Mediterranean and that, in the event of the total or partial partition of Turkey in Asia, she ought to obtain a just share of the Mediterranean region adjacent to the province of Adalia, where Italy has already acquired rights and interests which formed the subject of an Italo-British convention. The zone which shall eventually be allotted to Italy shall be delimited, at the proper time, due account being taken of the existing interests of France and Great Britain.

The interests of Italy shall also be taken into consideration in the event of the territorial integrity of the Turkish Empire being maintained and of alterations being made in the zones of interest of the Powers.

If France, Great Britain and Russia occupy any territories in Turkey in Asia during the course of the war, the Mediterranean region bordering on the Province of Adalia within the limits indicated above shall be reserved to Italy, who shall be entitled to occupy it.

Article 10. All rights and privileges in Libya at present belonging to the Sultan by virtue of the Treaty of Lausanne are transferred to Italy.

Article 11. Italy shall receive a share of any eventual war indemnity corresponding to her efforts and her sacrifices.

Article 12. Italy declares that she associates herself in the declaration made by France, Great Britain and Russia to the effect that Arabia and the Moslem Holy Places in Arabia shall be left under the authority of an independent Moslem Power.

Article 13. In the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in Africa at the expense of Germany, those two Powers agree in principle that Italy may claim some equitable compensation, particularly as regards the settlement in her favour of the questions relative to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland and Libya and the neighbouring colonies belonging to France and Great Britain.

Article 14. Great Britain undertakes to facilitate the immediate conclusion under equitable conditions, of a loan of at least £50,000,000 to be issued on the London market.

Article 15. France, Great Britain and Russia shall support such opposition as Italy may make to any proposal in the direction of introducing a representative of the Holy See in any peace negotiations or negotiations for the settlement of questions raised by the present war.

Article 16. The present arrangement shall be held secret. The adherence of Italy to the Declaration of the 5th September 1914, shall alone be made public, immediately upon declaration of war by or against Italy.

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After having taken act of the foregoing memorandum, the representatives of France, Great Britain and Russia, duly authorised to that effect, have concluded the following agreement with the representative of Italy, also duly authorised by his Government:

France, Great Britain and Russia give their full assent to the memorandum presented by the Italian Government.

With reference to Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the memorandum, which provide for military and naval co-operation between the four Powers, Italy declares that she will take the field at the earliest possible date and within a period not exceeding one month from the signature of these presents.

In faith whereof the undersigned have signed the present agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at London, in quadruplicate, the 26th day of April, 1915.

(L.S.) E. Grey.
(L.S.) Imperiali.
(L.S.) Benckendorff.
(L.S.) Paul Cambon.

II. DECLARATION BY WHICH FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN, ITALY AND RUSSIA UNDERTAKE NOT TO CONCLUDE A SEPARATE PEACE DURING THE COURSE OF THE PRESENT EUROPEAN WAR

The Italian Government having decided to participate in the present war with the French, British and Russian Governments and to accede to the Declaration made at London, the 5th September, 1914, by the three above-named Governments,

The undersigned, being duly authorised by their respective Governments, make the following declaration:

The French, British, Italian and Russian Governments mutually undertake not to conclude a separate peace during the course of the present war.

The four Governments agree that, whenever there may be occasion to discuss the terms of peace, none of the Allied Powers shall lay down any conditions of peace without previous agreement with each of the other Allies.

In faith whereof the undersigned have signed the present Declaration and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at London, in quadruplicate, the 26th day of April, 1915.

(L.S.) E. Grey.
(L.S.) Imperiali.
(L.S.) Benckendorff.
(L.S.) Paul Cambon

III. DECLARATION

The Declaration of the 26th of April, 1915, whereby France, Great Britain, Italy and Russia undertake not to conclude a separate peace during the present European war, shall remain secret.

After the declaration of war by or against Italy, the four Powers shall sign a new declaration in identical terms, which shall thereupon be made public.

In faith whereof the undersigned have executed the present Declaration and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at London, in quadruplicate, the 26th day of April, 1915.

(L.S.) E. Grey.
(L.S.) Imperiali.
(L.S.) Benckendorff.
(L.S.) Paul Cambon.

## APPENDIX G

### REPRESENTATION AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE

(Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919, pp.264-65)

I. The Conference, summoned with a view to lay down the conditions of peace, in the first place by peace preliminaries and later by a definitive Treaty of Peace, shall include the representatives of the Allied or Associated belligerent Powers.

The belligerent Powers with general interests (the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan) shall attend all sessions and commissions.

The belligerent Powers with special interests (Belgium, Brazil, the British Dominions and India, China, Cuba, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, the Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, Purtugal, Roumania, Serbia, Siam, and the Czechoslovak Republic) shall attend sessions at which questions concerning them are discussed.

Powers having broken off diplomatic relations with the enemy Powers (Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay) shall attend sessions at which questions interesting them will be discussed.

Neutral Powers and States in process of formation shall, on being summoned by the Powers with general interests, be heard, either orally or in writing, at sessions devoted especially to the examination of questions in which they are directly concerned, and only in so far as these questions are concerned.

II. The Powers shall be represented by Plenipotentiary Delegates to the number of--

Five for the United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan;
Three for Belgium, Brazil, Serbia;
Two for China, Greece, the Hedjaz, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Siam, and the Czechoslovak Republic;
One for Cuba, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, and Panama;
One for Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay.

The British Dominions and India shall be represented as follows--

Two Delegates each for Canada, Australia, South Africa, and

India (including the native States);
One Delegate for New Zealand.

Each Delegation shall be entitled to set up a panel but the number of Plenipotentiaries shall not exceed the figures given above.

The representatives of the Dominions (including Newfoundland) and India can, moreover, be included in the representation of the British Empire by means of the panel system.

Montenegro shall be represented by one Delegate, but the manner of his appointment shall not be decided until the present political situation of that country becomes clear.

The conditions governing the representation of Russia shall be settled by the Conference when Russian affairs come up for discussion.

III. Each Delegation of Plenipotentiaries may be accompanied by duly accredited Technical Delegates and by two shorthand writers.

The Technical Delegates may attend sessions in order to supply information when called upon. They may be asked to speak in order to give necessary explanations.

IV. The order of precedence shall follow the alphabetical order of the Powers in French.

*Great Britain was represented under the title of "British Empire."

APPENDIX H

NEW AUSTRIA'S INTERPRETATION OF HER RELATIONSHIP TO OLD AUSTRIA

(Almond and Lutz, The Treaty of St. Germain, pp.242-48)

DELEGATION OF THE
GERMANIC-AUSTRIAN REPUBLIC
No.355

ST. GERMAIN-EN-LAYE, 16 JUNE, 1919

TO: His Excellency, M. Georges Clemenceau, President of the Peace Conference

MR. PRESIDENT:

In compliance with the explanations of Your Excellency, at the time of the opening of negotiations with Germanic-Austria, the undersigned Delegation hastens to present to you, by notes and memorandums, dated June 15 and 16, within the time limit required, its remarks with regard to the parts of a treaty which were given to it.

It is necessary, however, before entering into deliberations, to clear up a question of prime importance, the entangled state of which would prevent the negotiators, arbitrators as well as parties, to understand each other in their pursuit of the truth and would therefore place in doubt the elementary conditions of any equitable judgment.

The question alluded to is brought forth, implicitly, by the wording of a great number of passages in the Preamble as well as in various articles, wording which causes uncertainty as to the international subject with whom the treaty is to be concluded.

The undersigned delegation can but represent the Republic, founded November 12, 1918, on those of the territories of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy which are inhabited by the Austrian people of German nationality. The Delegation is not qualified to represent any other State.

Now, the draft which has just been submitted to us mentions an "Austria" with which the Powers were dragged into war (Preamble #2) when, before the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the idea of a war against the former "Austria" would have been inconceivable, considering, that by virtue of the fundamental laws in force, only the Dual Monarchy of "Austria-Hungary" was invested with the juridical power to perform

acts of international life. After the collapse there was no longer any Austria-Hungary nor Austria, the German Austrian republic was not founded until after the cessation of hostilities. It could not, in fact, ever have been in a state of war with any nation whatever. Moreover, it is stated in the text (Preamble, Section 3) that the former monarchy was replaced , in Austria, by a republican government. This is inaccurate, for in Cisleithania six different governments have been created to administer respectively the state founded on the land inhabited by the members of the nationality. One of these new states is called by virtue of its original laws, in force up to the present, "the Republic of German Austria."

The Treaty imposes, according to the text of the résumé published by the Supreme Council, on "Austria" the duty of ceding a great number of territories. This duty, whether fulfilled or about to be fulfilled, can be incumbent only on a State whose frontiers comprise or have comprised the territories in question. We are not in this position, and we never have been. Our young republic welcomed with warm sympathy the creation of independent and democratic states on these territories; it accepts spontaneously all regulations conceding to each of these states its natural territory, the same as it claims for itself the territory inhabited by the German Austrian people. Being able, therefore, to assent without reserve to the draft of the Treaty as far as these territorial questions are concerned, German Austria claims only the liberty of her national territory, whose delimitation forms the subject of the above-mentioned memoranda.

The Treaty further says, under different provisions, that German Austria should maintain certain international engagements made by the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Obviously, there can be no question of the maintenance of such obligations, seeing that the latter were never incurred by the state founded on November 12, 1918. It would be more in accord with the real situation to make German Austria consent to any convention that you wish to apply to her case, without considering whether the former monarchy had or had not been a contracting party to the agreement in question.

Finally, it cannot be supposed that it is the intention of the Allies and Associates, as would seem to be implied by the text (among others) of Article 32, paragraph e, Part X, Section IV, to make German Austria responsible for the indemnification of damages caused outside of its frontiers by the authorities or populations of other parts of former Austria. In the same way the last sentence of Article 13, paragraph 1, Part X, Section IV; Article 35, Section V, as well as other analogous provisions, can be explained only by the error of considering Austria as a belligerent which, during the war, occupied foreign territories or took other belligerent measures. The war was, however, waged only by the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, by means of the Imperial and Royal army. Rights acquired by third states or third persons in consequence of measures of occupation or any other military action can there, if it comes to that point, be put only to the charge of all the resulting states. The German Austrian Government in no wise refuses, as it stated when negotiations were opened, to assume its respective part of all the obligations incurred by the fallen power. It is, however, only acquired rights, and obligations contracted or incurred, that can pass from the

author to his successor; while no act whatever committed by the author, which would have entailed an obligation during the life of the latter, can affect the rights of his successor, until this consequence has legally entered into force.

In striking contradiction to the order of ideas adopted by the peace conditions, all the states created from Austria-Hungary accepted unanimously and without reserve the principle that all that is left of the fortune of the fallen monarchy shall form a common inheritance. A special procedure has been created to liquidate this commonwealth. The assets have already been partially divided, and the rest will be similarly divided. No opinion has ever been advanced or any point of view admitted, by which German Austria should be the sole heir. We cannot therefore in any wise accept an argument by which German Austria alone should inherit the obligations and responsibilities of the former Austria.

What are, in fact, the reasons alleged as a basis for the identification of the young German Austrian Republic, but not the other resulting states, with the former monarchy? By what chain of argument could one arrive at a different solution for German Austria on the one hand and the other new states on the other, in regard to the inheritance of the former Cisleithania?

Can it be the name? The name of the German Austrian Republic was expressly chosen to markdthe difference between the former polyglot state, composed of nine nationalities, and the new republic, including only one of them. In any case the name cannot be taken as prejudicial to the thing.

Obviously, it cannot be the territory or the population either, for in the number of inhabitants and in area German Austria is the least important of all the resulting states.

In the same way the situation of the capital on the territory of German Austria can not be invoked as a pretext for a different treatment. The wealth and importance of Vienna have been the result of the economic strength of the great empire. They vanish with it. It is principally this disproportionate city in a small country without resources that causes the greatest difficulties.

The German Austrian Delegation does not wish, moreover, to take seriously the argument of certain publicists, according to which German Austria should be punished for the courage shown during the war by the Austrian soldiers of the German race. Without ignoring the courageous devotion shown during the war, it would at the same time be unjust to attribute the merit of it solely to the inhabitants of the present German Austria. Not only the Germans of the countries of the Alps, of the Sudetes, of Bohemia and of other parts of the former monarchy, but the Latin races, the Magyars, the Slavs and especially the Poles, Croats and Slovenes lent their spontaneous aid to that sad and proud duty which was imposed on them by a grave fault of the governments, but the devoted accomplishment of which surrounds the heroic defeat of our former country with a halo of glory.

It is the same case with the argument drawn from the fact that many representatives of the present republic had worked as publicists or statesmen for the welfare of the former monarchy. On this subject more ample information will be furnished to the Conference. For the moment, the German Austrian Delegation confines itself to stating in this connection that never, during the existence of the Dual Monarchy, was the direction of Foreign Affairs entrusted to a statesman who was a native of the countries now belonging to German Austria. When the war was declared, the portfolio in question was in the hands of Count Berchtold, a Hungarian subject, assisted by Count Forgach, a Hungarian also, and by Baron Musulin, a Croat. Moreover, during the recent decades Austria-Hungary was represented almost exclusively by Hungarian or Bohemian diplomats; thus in 1914 almost all the ambassadorial posts were occupied by Hungarians, notably those at Paris, at St. Petersburg, at Berlin, at Rome, at Constantinople and at Tokio.

Since 1907, the Germans in the Austrian Chamber of Deputies have been in a minority incapable of controlling votes without joining some other national party. Consequently, the Austrian governments have always been composed in part of Czechs, Poles, and sometimes of Slovenes.

To plead the cause of a suffering nation and to give it justice, it is of the greatest importance to learn on what arguments it has been thought possible to designate precisely the smallest, the poorest, the most pacific and the most democratic of the states created from the former monarchy as its successor, by rendering it responsible not only for all the obligations incurred, but also for the consequences of faults committed and measures taken by the former governments with the co-operation of Hungarian, Polish, Czech and Slovene statesmen.

The Delegation therefore takes the liberty of addressing to the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference the formal request to either establish and determine clearly the above arguments, or suppress in the text of the Treaty all provisions founded on the identification of German Austria with the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy, releasing the young republic from the disastrous consequences resulting from this train of argument.

It is with full confidence that German Austria appeals to the justice of the Peace Conference.

RENNER

DELEGATION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF GERMAN-AUSTRIA
NO.617

ST. GERMAIN-EN-LAYE
JULY 2ND, 1919

His Excellency, M. Clemenceau

SIR,

With reference to their Note of the 16th June, No. 355, the undersigned Delegation beg leave to revert to different assertions made on the subject of the international situation of German-Austria. It must be clearly established by basing ourselves on the real facts, that there is no reason in virtue of which German-Austria can be described either as a belligerent or as a successor to the collapsed Monarchy any more than any other of the States issuing from the former Monarchy can be so described.

Amongst the motive forces which influence the acts of the Monarchy, that particular part which at the present time forms German-Austria was far from having a predominant importance; to endeavour to pretend that the inhabitants of the German regions--contrary to the wishes of the other peoples--determined the decisions of the Commonwealth would be to falsify history. The various aspirations of the peoples united within Austria-Hungary tended as a whole to the existence of that State whose union was in the first instance presided over and represented by the Dynasty. The non-German peoples had in fact drawn from this political combination the civilizing force which now forms the basis of their future.

The declaration and the continuation of the war--acts based on the sovereign power of the Monarch--were clearly imposed by the arbitrary will of the governing men, and in particular of the military chiefs of the General Staff. Within the modest limits, however, in which the assent and collaboration of the people and its representatives had any influence, it was by no means the German people of Austria alone which gave its assistance for that purpose. It is, on the contrary, evident, from historic facts, that the war was, in so far as the former Austria-Hungary is concerned, a war of Hungarians against Serbians, of Poles against their hereditary oppressors, especially against Russia, the would-be participator in the partition of Poland, a war of the Ukrainians against Czarism, of Croats and Slovenes on the one side against the Italians, their natural rivals in the Adriatic, on the other, for the predominance of the Catholic Jugo-Slavs over the orthodox peoples in the Balkans.

These two facts in regard to the state of affairs before the war on the one hand, and during the war on the other, are irrefutably proved in the annexed statement. The Conference will be so good as to conclude therefrom that German-Austria is as a "belligerent" and as a "successor" in precisely the same position as her neighbours, who have likewise issued from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

I have the honour, etc.

(Signed) RENNER

## APPENDIX I

### STATEMENT OF THE AUSTRIAN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CONCERNING THE TREATY OF ST. GERMAIN

(Almond and Lutz, The Treaty of St. Germain, pp.76-79)

(Saturday, September 6, 1919)

The National Assembly of the Republic of German Austria receives the report of the State Chancellor on the manner in which the negotiations at St. Germain took place as well as the results of these negotiations.

The National Assembly solemnly protests before the entire world against the provisions of the Peace Treaty which,--under the pretext of protecting the independence of German Austria--deprives the German Austrian nation of its right of self-determination, and refuses it the right to realize its ardent desire for union with the mother-country Germany, a desire constituting a vital, economic, intellectual and political necessity. The National Assembly expresses the hope that, as soon as peace shall have dissipated the spirit of animosity and national rancor provoked by the war, the Powers will not continue, thanks to the intervention of the League of Nations, to refuse to the German people its right to unity and its national liberty, a right accorded to all other nations.

It is with the utmost profound bitterness that the National Assembly protests against the decree of the Allied and Associated Powers, a decree unfortunately irrevocable, by virtue of which three million and a half Germans of the Country of the Sudetes are violently separated from the Germans of the Alps, with whom they have formed for centuries a political and economic unity. By this decree they are deprived of their national liberty and subjected to the foreign domination of a nation which in this very Peace Treaty recognizes itself as their enemy.

Deprived of all power to avert this disaster and to spare Europe the troubles that will inevitably result from this offense against the most sacred rights of a nation, the National Assembly of German Austria, before the bar of history, charges with the responsiblity for this decision the conscience of the Powers who put it into execution in spite of our most solemn warning.

The National Assembly has behind it the assent of all the citizens of this country and makes itself the mouthpiece of the cry coming from their hearts and laying before the entire civilized world its complaints and protests against the decree by which the Germans of the Southern Tyrol are torn from their sole and only country, the Tyrol, separating them moreover from the Germans of the country of the Alps and thereby from

all their people. Recalling its proposition for the military neutralization of this country, the National Assembly rejects the alleged reason for this annexation, according to which the necessity for strategic protection is imperative; it is, moreover, the very absence of all means of defense as well as the impotence to which our mutilated country is reduced that show how unfounded is the pretext advanced.

The National Assembly expects the League of Nations to repair as soon as possible the incomprehensible injustice committed against the Germans of the Country of the Sudetes, the Germans of Southern Tyrol and important parts of Carinthia, Styria and Lower Austria. The most hearty wishes of the National Assembly of German Austria go out to the brothers separated from us on the north as well as on the south, with their future clouded with incessant conflict. Bound by the natural community of blood and language which persist above changes in constitutional form, we shall remain united with our brothers by that prfound sympathy which is the result of the secular union of our destinies, identical hitherto.

It is with satisfaction that the National Assembly notes the fact that the Allied and Associated Powers have wished to take account of the ethnic and economic situation in German West Hungary, by recognizing the right of these territories to join the Germans of the Alpine countries. It extends a warm and hearty welcome to the compatriots of German West Hungary, and it charges the Government to take immediately all necessary measures to assure to the Germans of West Hungary the exercise of their right to self-determination, to create a regular representation by elections based on the system of universal suffrage, as well as proportional representation, to invest the people in question with all the rights of autonomous administration and make possible its participation in the public powers in all matters of common interest.

The National Assembly notes the assurance contained in the reply made by the Allied and Associated Powers in the Financial and Economic Clauses, an assurance according to which wish sic to take into account our extremely unfortunate situation and to insure our existence within the limits of the strictly necessary. While entirely disposed to emerge from the past and to progress towards a new future among nations, the National Assembly considers a great part of the economic and financial [sic] as impossible to execute; it fears that our nation is simply not able to support them.

Now, in spite of all this, we have no choice; the country and the people have, in short, need of the peace which will reopen the world to them from the moral and material point of view, and which alone can restore to the masses of our people the means of working at home as well as abroad; we need the peace which will at last bring back the prisoners of war to their homes; we need the peace which will bring about the international recognition of our State, making it possible to improve its national constitution in tranquillity and to reestablish its economic life.

We have no choice for the further reason that our country depends on the Great Powers for its food, its coal and its raw materials, as well as for the reestablishment of its credit and the value of its money.

The National Assembly must unfortunately take this constraint into account, although it considers the Peace of St. Germain as unjust nationally, fatal politically and inexecutable economically. From the political and national point of view, it must throw the responsibility on the Powers; as to the economic point of view, it can only wait until it knows the plans of the Powers as to the execution of the economic and financial clauses. The National Assembly expects that the promises made by the Powers in their reply will be accomplished; it considers the League of Nations as the jurisdiction called upon to do justice to our Republic and to assure it in future; and it instructs the Chancellor to sign the Peace Treaty.

MAP I

DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONALITIES IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
(FROM KANN, THE MULTINATIONAL EMPIRE, I, PP.40-41)



MAP II
ADMINISTRATIVE BOUNDARIES OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
(FROM KANN, THE MULTINATIONAL EMPIRE, I, PP.20-21)



MAP IIIa

THE TREATY OF LONDON
(FROM ALBRECHT-CARRIE, ITALY AT THE
PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE, P.27)


Key: Frontier 1914 ————

Treaty of London line ·····

MAP IIIb

SOUTH TYROL
(FROM ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ, ITALY AT THE
PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE, P.92)


Key: Frontier 1914 ————
Treaty of London line - - - - -
Linguistic frontier .....
Railway

MAP IIIc

FIUME

(FROM ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ, ITALY AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE, p.305
and
TOYNBEE, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1924, p.409)




Key: Corpus Separatum
Frontier 1920
Frontier 1924

MAP IIId

ITALY'S CLAIMS AND THE WILSON LINE
(FROM ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ, ITALY AT THE
PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE, PP.93
AND 187)




Key: Frontier 1914 —·—·—·
Treaty of London line ------
Italy's demands February 1919 ·····
Wilson line ———
Territory of the Free State of Fiume under the original Tardieu Plan

MAP IVa
YUGOSLAVIA'S TERRITORIAL DEMANDS FROM AUSTRIA
(FROM TEMPERLEY (ED.), A HISTORY OF THE PEACE
CONFERENCE OF PARIS IV, PP.282-83)



MAP IVb

THE ASSLING TRIANGLE AND THE RAILWAY LINKS OF TRIESTE AND FIUME WITH THE NORTH
(FROM HANS SLANAR, ATLAS FÜR HAUPTSCHULEN, MITTELSCHULEN UND VERWANDTE LEHRANSTALTEN)




Key: Frontier 1914 ———

Assling Triangle

MAP IVc

THE KLAGENFURT PLEBISCITE AREA

(FROM TEMPERLEY (ED.), A HISTORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF PARIS, IV, PP.370-71)




Key: Austro Italian frontier 1914 —·····—·····

Austrian frontier 1919 —×—×—×

Carinthian frontier ·····

Plebiscite zones - - - - - - - - -

MAP Va

GERMAN MAJORITIES IN THE HISTORIC PROVINCES

(FROM WISKEMANN, CZECHS AND GERMANS, PP.118-19
DERIVED FROM A CZECHOSLOVAK SOURCE 1936)



MAP Vb

GERMAN MAJORITIES IN BOHEMIA: CZECHOSLOVAK MAP SUBMITTED TO THE PEACE CONFERENCE

(FROM SIFTON COLLECTION, DOCUMENTS OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 1919, II, P.58)



MAP Vc
THE DUCHY OF TESCHEN
(FROM TEMPERLEY (ED.), A HISTORY OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE OF PARIS, IV, PP.348-49)




Key:
Coalfield
Line of November 5, 1918 x x x x x x
Line of February 3, 1919 — — — — — —
Line suggested on August 22, 1919 — · · · — · · ·
Final line July 28, 1920 — x — x — x —

MAP VI

NEW AUSTRIA

(BASED ON ALMOND AND LUTZ, THE TREATY OF ST. GERMAIN, ÜBERSICHTSKARTE DER TERRITORIALEN FRIEDENSBEDINGUNGEN FÜR DEUTSCH-ÖSTERREICH)


Key: New Austria's territorial claims ·····
Allied draft of June 2 — — — — —
Final frontier 1921 ————

MAP VII
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE TERRITORY OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
(FROM PUTZGER, HISTORISCHER SCHUL-ATLAS)